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Helen Louise Flavell Abstract 
 
The current cultural climate, theoretical developments, the changing state of the tertiary 
institution, and the increasing presence of voices from the margin have contributed to the 
critical re-evaluation of academic writing as a way of knowing and representing the 
world. At the same time, hybrid forms of writing, those that exist in the interstices of 
established generic codes, are experiencing increased critical attention. Yet, despite the 
fact that genre has become an inadequate notion to describe boundary-crossing writing, 
little appears to have shifted in the way these forms are understood. Dominant 
methodologies tend to render what is between less visible or valid, and they define this 
space only in terms of its relation to set borders. Located at the boundaries of what is 
familiar and unfamiliar, “writing-between” is a contentious space where elements are 
combined without clear rules to aid identification. In this thesis the term “ficto-criticism” 
is used broadly to describe generically transgressive writing that blurs the defining lines 
between creative and critical texts. The thesis explores the political and theoretical 
implications of writing-between through a discussion of Australian and Canadian work in 
English (or English translation), which display the characteristics of the ficto-critical 
form. This thesis argues for a critical understanding of ficto-criticism that conceptualises 
it as a highly political strategy of literary intervention, rather than as a mere trend toward 
cross-genre writing. Indeed, rather than understanding it as surface play, the thesis argues 
that ficto-critical practice is deeply troubled by the oppressive role of academic writing 
and that, significantly, its emergence was highly influenced by postcolonial and feminist 
theory. Thus, ficto-critical practice interrogates the violence of representation and 
explores what is left out and or misrepresented through that process. The thesis applies 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept-tools to articulate a methodology by virtue of which 
desire and ficto-criticism are understood as productive forms that are liberated from an 
equation of lack. The tension between ficto-criticism as an open practice and the tradition 
of scholarly writing, which requires a clear fixed proposition and outcomes, mirrors the 
project of ficto-criticism, which seeks to unlearn one’s authority and privilege as the 
beginning of a process towards developing an ethical relationship with the other. 
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General introduction  
Fix-criticism 
 
When I run the spell check over my thesis I am repeatedly asked whether I want to change 
the “ficto” of ficto-criticism to “fix.” Initially it was merely an annoyance, like many of the 
other pre-programmed rule-bound commands of the computer that are arbitrarily applied, 
and which are not appropriate in every situation. However, the notion of “fix-criticism” 
and the computer’s insistence on it became useful since it highlighted a common theme 
throughout this research project: the tensions between the transgressive character of ficto-
criticism and the conventional nature of established knowledge. Ficto-criticism was a word 
that had been made up to represent a generically hybrid writing practice, which was 
unrecognised by the computer’s dictionary due to its recent and localised history. In the 
light of this, “fix-criticism” became a reminder of my project, and a way to think through 
the questions raised by ficto-criticism as an identified and identifiable practice. 
 
As my thesis attests, hybrid forms of writing—those that exist in the interstices of 
established generic codes of taxonomy—are experiencing increased critical attention, and 
this is not limited to literary studies. If we believe what is being said and written about 
hybridity, it indeed seems that there has been a dramatic growth in such forms, and more 
generally a popular engagement with the concept of heterogeneity. For example, much has 
been written on boundary and border crossing, hybridity and the emergence of new 
(trans)disciplines, and over the past few years transgression or rule breaking has been a 
common conference theme. Even as early as 1983 Clifford Geertz was declaring that a 
trend toward genre blurring was already well established. In “Blurred Genres: The 
Refiguration of Social Thought,” he announced: “there has been an enormous amount of 
genre mixing in intellectual life in recent years, and it is, such blurring of kinds, continuing 
apace” (19). According to Geertz, the scope of this transdisciplinary and generic blurring is 
substantial:  
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This genre blurring is more than just a matter of Harry Houdini or Richard Nixon 
turning up as characters in novels or of midwestern murder sprees described as 
though a gothic romancer had imagined them. It is philosophical inquiries looking 
like literary criticism (think of Stanley Cavell or Thoreau, Sartre on Flaubert), 
scientific discussions looking like belles lettres morceaux (Lewis Thomas, Loren 
Eiseley), baroque fantasies presented as deadpan empirical observations (Borges, 
Barthelme), histories that consist of equations and tables or law court testimony 
(Fogel and Engerman, Le Roi Ladurie), documentaries that read like true 
confessions (Mailer), parables posing as ethnographies (Castenada [sic]), 
theoretical treatises set out as travelogues (Lévi Strauss), ideological arguments 
cast as historiographical inquiries (Edward Said), epistemological studies 
constructed like political tracts (Paul Feyerabend), methodological polemics got up 
as personal memoirs (James Watson). Nabokov’s Pale Fire, that impossible object 
made of poetry and fiction, footnotes and images from the clinic, seems very much 
of the time; one waits only for quantum theory in verse or biography in algebra. 
(19-20) 
Geertz goes on to state that this “distinctive phenomenon” demonstrates that “[s]omething 
is happening to the way we think about the way we think” (20). However, twenty years 
after his paper, conceptualisations of genre and disciplines as coherent discreet categories 
remain dominant to our way of knowing. The paradigm of knowledge he seems to imagine 
arriving in 1983—a paradigm comfortable with narratives of discontinuity and 
transgressed boundaries—appears to remain elusive. In literature we still rely on old 
categories to define and describe texts that lie generically “between.” In other words, 
despite announcements by many postmodern theorists that genre is anachronistic and 
inappropriate to describe the new forms of writing that cross boundaries, little appears to 
have shifted in terms of how we really think and demonstrate our understanding. 
According to Ralph Cohen, for example, the belief that genre is an anachronistic concept 
in the postmodern literary world relies on the assumption that “a genre theory of the novel 
is committed to backgrounding literary artifice, to demanding coherence, unity and linear  
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continuity” (11). Put another way, despite the fact that there are theories of genre that are 
compatible with discontinuity and multiple discourses, the dominant theory of genre as 
taxonomic remains most familiar to us, justifying the statements made by many 
postmodern literary critics (Cohen). The phrases we use in relation to postmodern texts, 
such as generic hybridity, generically challenging and generically transformative, all still 
rely on the word genre and its fixed taxonomy for definition and existence. Similarly, the 
notion of transdiscipline still relies on discipline for meaning. This is what it means to 
exist at the interstices, in the space between what is familiar and unfamiliar: dominant 
methodologies of conceptualisation tend toward rendering what is between less visible or 
valid, and defining this space only in terms of its relation to set borders. Ficto-criticism as 
“writing-between” is, therefore, a contentious space where a mixture of elements are 
combined without clear rules of organisation, hierarchy, or set characteristics to aid 
identification. In this context, the ironies inherent in the computer’s rule-bound insistence 
on “fix-criticism” are reiterated. It does not and cannot recognise the hybridity suggested 
by this new term ficto-criticism. 
 
In an effort to remain consistent with the hybridity engendered in ficto-criticism (both the 
concept and the term), I am using ficto-criticism in this thesis very broadly to describe 
generically transgressive writing, which blurs the defining lines between fiction/creative 
writing and critical/theoretical texts. My thesis explores this writing-between and the 
social, political, critical, and theoretical implications of the increasing body of texts that 
defy standard generic conventions. This is achieved through a focused study of Australian 
and Canadian work in English (or English translation) that display the characteristics of the 
emerging genre of ficto-criticism. Significantly, the thesis explores not just the texts that 
identify as “ficto-criticism” but also those that take a ficto-critical approach. The 
implications of the apparent growing popularity of this generic space between fiction and 
non-fiction are also explored through tracing the genesis of the term. The decision to carry 
out a comparative study of Australian and Canadian ficto-critical writing developed out of 
the realisation that the term—taken up in Australia to describe creative-critical texts— 
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came from Canada. I was interested in finding out why two postcolonial nations, with 
much in common, both appeared to have writers that identified with this term, and 
presumably the practice. As this study will show, whilst there are many differences, there 
is a strong link between Australia, Canada and “ficto-criticism.” The term, in fact, 
originated in Canada. The events surrounding the term’s deployment and arrival in 
Australia illustrate the revolutionary power of transgressive forms and what controls are 
brought to bear on them. Ficto-criticism (the word) thus represents the experimental 
generic space between fiction and non-fictional forms. It also functions as a link between 
Australia, Canada and the creative-critical writing practices of the authors found in these 
countries.  
 
However, despite the apparent similarities and linkages between Australia and Canada in 
relation to ficto-criticism, in Australia the discourse on creative-critical texts is unique. 
This is due to the fact that Australia is the only English speaking country in which one 
term (ficto-criticism) has risen to dominance—over many—to describe this hybrid form. 
More specifically, in Australia, the dominance of ficto-criticism tends to be within literary, 
cultural studies and the arts. Notably, although the term developed in Canada through the 
work of a little-known art critic, it is only employed by a handful of writers, the most 
prominent being Aritha van Herk.
1 In Canada, often no term is used to describe the 
blurring of criticism and fiction and it is simply enacted, or, alternatively, another term is 
employed to describe ficto-critical writing. An excellent example is Québecoise feminist 
fiction-theory (une fiction théorique), the term coined by Nicole Brossard to describe her 
text L’Amer (1977).
2 A self-reflexive, anti-generic form of writing, fiction-theory 
questions authority and binary codes, destabilises generic hierarchies and through this 
process challenges the fictions that bind women’s lives (Godard, “Theorizing Fiction 
Theory”).  Not surprisingly, in Australia there is also a tradition of women writing 
creative-critical texts, although here, particularly early on, there was frequently no term or 
label applied. As will be revealed in Chapter Five, where I trace the use of the term ficto-
criticism in Australia, most early practitioners, mainly women, resisted the temptation to  
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fix the form by applying a name to their approach. Significantly, the rise of term’s 
popularity in Australia, I argue, undermines the transgressive intent of the (non)genre and 
exposes some of the myths around this kind of writing. 
 
What this thesis is concerned with, therefore, is how ficto-criticism emerged in Australia 
as a hip, fashionable and sexy new genre, and the differences between Australian and 
Canadian examples of ficto-criticism. In the process of examining the above this thesis 
reveals the problematics of being “between” as well as the reaction of the academy toward 
fluid knowledges.  Interestingly, the between-ness of ficto-criticism may be understood in 
another way in the sense that it has begun to be accepted as a legitimate form or 
established genre in some contexts, yet at the same time it remains in the broader literary 
world a marginal and marginalised practice. For that reason, this thesis is particularly 
timely as ficto-criticism becomes less a general trend toward cross-genre writing and more 
a specific and identified form of literary intervention. In Australia, for example, the term is 
recognised in literary and academic circles, yet it will not be found in the latest of literary 
dictionaries (nor the Oxford English Dictionary or The Oxford Dictionary of New Words).  
You can in Australia also study ficto-criticism at university.  At the University of 
Tasmania, for example, a unit on ficto-criticism is part of the honours program in English. 
In Canada, in some university literature departments—such as the University of Calgary—
you may experiment with normative academic modes and a (controlled) ficto-critical 
approach.
3  However, the practice and term remains marginalised as a legitimate mode of 
academic writing.  Even though texts that display the characteristics of ficto-criticism may 
be studied, there is little support for students and academics wishing to write in this way 
and still be taken seriously. Ficto-critical studies of specific topics may be tolerated in 
creative writing schools, but they are often seen as the soft option by the serious 
intellectual disciplines and lacking intellectual rigour. Frequently, in the process of 
researching ficto-criticism, I have come across anecdotal evidence that illustrates people’s 
frustration with, and dismissal of, generically mutant texts like ficto-criticism.
4 I have 
often heard statements like this arise: “This isn’t an essay/thesis/report, this is creative  
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writing/fiction!”  Alternatively, creative writers will often attack ficto-criticism for what 
they perceive as the heavy-handed inclusion of theoretical or intellectual concerns in 
fiction. 
 
What began to emerge as I researched writing-between, therefore, were three parallel lines 
of investigation that complicated the research project.  Firstly, the very interesting and 
elusive trail of the term ficto-criticism, its use, meaning and genesis which—certainly in 
Australia—appears to suggest the visible birth of a new kind of writing.  Secondly, the 
examination of alternative terms used to describe writing that displays the characteristics 
of ficto-criticism, and, thirdly, the discovery and exploration of those texts that display 
ficto-critical tendencies but go unmarked or unlabelled. The necessity of this approach due 
to the ambiguity of the form has made for a challenging research project, as has theorising 
the writing-between within the tradition of a doctoral thesis. Since my thesis is not written 
ficto-critically the inconsistency suggested in writing about such a practice whilst 
remaining within normative academic writing convention is highlighted. Most theses in 
Australia that address ficto-criticism do so ficto-critically, usually only examining the form 
critically in the introduction or an early chapter as a justification for the chosen writing 
style. That is, the focus is on practising ficto-criticism rather than analysing it; the whole 
thesis is not devoted to its historical, material and theoretical analysis.
5 My dissertation is 
the first in Australia to do so in specific relation to both the term and the concept. The 
methodology adopted by other studies of ficto-criticism is probably more consistent with 
ficto-critical discourse since the use of fictional techniques tends to keep the meaning of a 
text much more open. In other words, my thesis is in danger of being dismissed by 
advocates of ficto-criticism for—potentially—failing to realise the same transgression.
6 
Nevertheless, there is a need for the kind of critical intervention into ficto-critical practice 
found here due to the dominance of certain discourses around the form. These statements, 
often about the radical and revolutionary nature of ficto-criticism, tend to be naïve and 
inadequately theorised. They also tend to lock into a binary structure thereby failing to 
recognise the critique of binary systems implicit in ficto-criticism as writing-between. In  
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their terms, ficto-criticism is billed as either good (radical other and revolutionary) or bad 
(narcissistic and lacking intellectual rigour). Yet the story of ficto-criticism is quite 
different and much more consistent with its between character. Similarly, the complexity 
of ficto-criticism would be difficult to explore in a ficto-critical mode within the confines 
of a PhD thesis. The scope of my project—both Australian and Canadian ficto-critical 
writing—and the term’s genesis from Canada to Australia, would also be difficult to 
address adequately in a creative mode whilst at the same time maintaining the necessary 
word count. Writing on ficto-criticism straight, as it were, may also prove more likely to 
encourage the interest of some critics of ficto-critical practice, allowing them to engage 
with it on their own (generic) terms. Therefore, despite my initial concerns, the 
contradiction inherent in analysing an open form from within a scholarly tradition that 
tends toward closure has not detracted from the main storylines of my thesis. Rather, 
tracing these tensions and contradictions has made more apparent the processes of 
negotiation between practices such as ficto-criticism and dominant ways of knowing. In 
other words, the tension between ficto-criticism as an open practice and the tradition of 
scholarly writing, which wants a clear fixed proposition and outcomes, mirrors the project 
of ficto-criticism.  
 
Importantly, this thesis will prove a number of hypotheses that, whilst not unconnected, 
have contradictory elements. This contradictory characteristic is immutable, since it cannot 
be separated from what ficto-criticism is. Thus, the focus of this dissertation is not to 
discover a new form of writing, but to think through the historical context from which 
there has developed a need to question the tradition of normative academic writing. In 
other words, in this study ficto-criticism is read as a critique of the generic neutrality of 
normative (or current dominant) modes of academic and critical writing. It questions the 
reality of the knowledges produced by such discourses. The focus here is not, however, the 
history of critical writing and criticism. My project is to investigate the value of ficto-
criticism as a transgressive practice that works to explore the nexus between language, 
power and the economy of knowledge.  
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Thus, despite tracing the emergence of the term and ficto-critical texts, this dissertation 
does not, however, attempt to suggest that border crossing texts are new—that ficto-
criticism is new—but, rather, explores the historical conditions that have contributed to 
allowing these texts an increasing degree of recognition and reception.  Why are more 
writers—particularly those within the academy—interested in experimenting with 
transgressive forms such as creative criticism? Put another way, what conditions have 
resulted in this seeming identification with between-ness and its characteristics, resulting 
in a plethora of texts that are not only generically between, but also often explore the 
condition of life between?  Texts have always displayed contradictory moments that defy 
codification. Certainly, generic mutation is not something inherent only to the post-
industrial period in which we find ourselves.  To be sure, technological metaphors lend 
themselves to describing hybridity, yet hybridity is not in itself a new thing specific to this 
period in time, especially literary generic hybridity. Well-known texts are now being 
revisited and reassessed in terms of their tendencies to be contradictory and challenge 
prescribed generic conventions. This shift in interest toward genre blurring is significant 
for what it tells us about the political and theoretical mood in which we find ourselves, and 
the epistemological questions facing the human sciences. 
 
   ♦   ♦         ♦ 
 
I begin this thesis in Chapter One with a discussion of a generically hybrid book by a high 
profile Australian creative writer, Helen Garner’s The First Stone (1995).  The decision to 
begin with The First Stone, which may or may not be considered a ficto-critical text, is a 
deliberate strategy designed to maintain the openness inherent in ficto-criticism as a 
transgressive (non)genre.  As we shall discover, many of the debates surrounding Garner’s 
book resonate with the debates that circle ficto-criticism. This discussion provides a 
context in which to begin a dialogue on ficto-criticism as writing-between. 
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Chapter Two critically introduces the theories of Deleuze and Guattari to open a 
theoretical space in which ficto-criticism can remain conceptualised in a way that is 
consistent with its between-ness. The application of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept-tools 
is a logical move in a thesis on writing-between since the critique of binary structures and 
interpretive codes are a major focus of their work. Their concept-tools of de-and re-
territorialisation, for example, help extrapolate the tensions inherent in being both between 
and outside classification (of being a (non)genre).
7 The Deleuzian reading of desire as 
productive, liberates experimental hybrid forms like ficto-criticism from an equation of 
lack, allowing them to be conceptualised broadly—as constituting a vast mix of between 
forms. In this theoretical context, the focus does not need to remain on what ficto-critical 
texts are or are not, but rather what they have the potential to achieve through their 
experimentation.
8 Here I demonstrate that the multiple and transformative philosophy of 
Deleuze and Guattari not only resembles ficto-critical practice, it can be productively 
applied to analyse the politics of ficto-critical texts. This chapter thus lays the theoretical 
groundwork to enable the analysis of writing-between that follows; an approach that I 
argue is consistent with the ethos of ficto-critical practice. By engaging with aspects of 
what is often now referred to as “Deleuzian thought,” I establish the key stylistic features 
of ficto-criticism. Through this process I reiterate why their concept-tools are so useful and 
relevant to conceptualise not only ficto-criticism itself, but also the literature, debates and 
themes surrounding it. The revolutionary potential of ficto-criticism is therefore developed 
through an engagement with Deleuze and Guattari.  The main texts of theirs, which I draw 
on, are Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (1986), Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (1983) and A Thousand Plateaus (1987).  This chapter also includes close 
readings of some Australian and Canadian examples of ficto-criticism to extrapolate my 
use of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept-tools, including Guattari’s autopoetic subjectivity 
developed in Chaosmosis (1995).  
 
Chapter Three, following on from the theoretical tenor established in Two, functions 
transitionally by establishing the way in which—internationally—ficto-critical texts in  
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English have overwhelmingly been labelled postmodern. Through a survey of the 
literature, primarily from England and the United States, it shows how a particular kind of 
popular “postmodernism” has become the framework for ficto-critical texts, how this 
process relies on a binary structure, and how it crushes any other possible influences on 
this phenomenon. In other words, before going on in future chapters to investigate and 
demonstrate the more complex or between influences on, and of, ficto-criticism, I first 
show how it has been heavily and easily aligned with a particular kind of nihilistic 
postmodernism. This literature survey includes a discussion of a range of terms used in 
place of ficto-criticism, outside Australian and Canadian examples.  Most importantly, 
however, this chapter establishes the basis on which to imagine many other much more 
politically interesting influences on the emergence of ficto-criticism, such as 
postcolonialism and feminism. Rather than mere textual or surface play—free from any 
ethical or political motivation—I argue that ficto-critical texts are deeply troubled by the 
colonising role of critical or academic writing. Ficto-critical practice is concerned with 
interrogating the violence of representation, to legitimately explore what is inevitably left 
out and or misrepresented through that process. 
 
In the Fourth Chapter I give a history of Australian ficto-criticism, including the history of 
the term (its application and non-application).  This history works to undo the overcoding 
(in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense) of ficto-criticism within postmodern discourse.  I achieve 
this through giving evidence of alternative influences on the development of ficto-critical 
practices in Australia, and through critically exploring the Deleuzian concept-tool of 
becoming-woman. By revealing texts that have been left out of the published discourse on 
ficto-criticism, I illustrate the dangers inherent in this practice ending up as a recognisable 
form of writing with key advocates and set codes. Not surprisingly, the texts that more 
closely reproduce the process of becoming-woman have been left out of the official ficto-
critical story, since they radically contradict dominant conventions. Becoming-woman, 
central to Deleuzian thought, is materialist, vitalist, and celebrates difference as a 
productive force. Becoming-woman is a constant process of transformation, with plateaus  
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of intensity. Although related to the position of the feminine in society rather than an 
essential or biological notion of women, with an almost poetic sensibility we discover that 
many of the ficto-critical works left out are by female writers; their foray into the ficto-
critical inspired by their location on the margin and the exclusion of their experience from 
academic writing. Most importantly, this chapter argues that if ficto-criticism is to 
maintain its revolutionary potential it must imitate the deterritorialising movement of 
becoming. In this chapter, several Australian examples undergo a close reading, including 
Terri-ann White’s Finding Theodore and Brina (2001) and Kim Scott’s Benang: From the 
Heart (1999). Textual analysis is incorporated throughout the thesis, which reflects, again, 
not only a Deleuzian pragmatic approach to the use of theory, but also the generically 
mixed-up character of ficto-criticism.  That is, in keeping with the theoretical approach and 
writing-between, the theory and practical readings are incorporated into a working praxis. I 
have not wholly separated the theory neatly into its own chapter.  Instead, the theory 
informs the thesis on all levels, including the decision to engage with a multiplicity of 
examples. Through the exploration of an alternative Australian ficto-critical tradition, 
therefore, the Fourth Chapter illustrates that the ficto-critical turn has not merely been 
influenced by (an aesthetic) postmodernism, but by a range of highly political discourses 
that bring into sharp relief the construction of stereotypes around race, class, gender and 
sexuality.  These discourses have also acted on ficto-criticism, bringing to the foreground 
the power differential between subjects and objects of study and criticism, and revealing 
the colonising powers of discourse. Ficto-critical texts at their best self-reflexively explore 
the effect of the critic’s race, class, gender, sexuality and personal history on their material.  
 
Chapter Five looks at Canadian ficto-critical work in English (or English translation), 
again confirming that the primary focus of ficto-criticism is on the processes of 
colonisation in writing (and the links between certain neutral genres and the oppression of 
difference). This chapter continues the history of the term, giving evidence to prove that it 
originated in Canada, and was then exported to Australia.  The story of how this occurred 
and how the term was taken up in Australia—and not in the same way in Canada— 
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confirms the thesis storylines by offering an alternative reading of ficto-criticism and its 
influences from dominant (published) sources. In this chapter I continue the argument that 
ficto-criticism is informed by a minoritarian politics, which has inspired ficto-critics to 
write through convention as a political act. 
 
The final chapter (Six) draws together the thesis arguments or storylines by further 
illustrating how readings informed by binary structures, or any definitive methodology, are 
dangerous when dealing with writing-between.  Despite the rhetoric that aligns ficto-
criticism with popularised notions of postmodernism, as radical, open and revolutionary, 
ficto-critical texts must be carefully examined on a case-by-case basis.  Chapter Six 
examines the micro-politics of individual ficto-critical texts, exploring their success in 
countering the colonising forces of discourse. The texts examined include Smaro 
Kamboureli’s Scandalous Bodies (2000), Robert Kroetsch’s essay titled ‘The Moment of 
the Discovery of America Continues,” and Dany Laferriére’s Why Must a Black Writer 
Write About Sex? (1994). The final chapter questions the implications of some ficto-
critical texts. In particular, it problematises ficto-critical discourse, questioning its 
suggested revolutionary power through an investigation of the kind of authorial self 
imagined in a number of examples, reaffirming the need for constant self-reflexive 
attention to one’s micro-politics and the impossibility of imposing prescriptive rules of 
interpretation or analysis on writing-between. Whilst it may be tempting to launch into 
broad generalities about ficto-criticism, a detailed engagement with some examples 
(representative of its multiplicity) reveals what historical change has already established. 
That is, inflexible truths imposed from above repress difference and a multitude of other 
knowledges. This ficto-critical study thus functions as a model for an expansive range of 
border-crossing knowledges, exploring the impact of transgressive writing on normative 
intellectual work as these hybrid forms seemingly become more prevalent.  
 
Since my conceptualisation of ficto-criticism as a writing practice between genres is very 
open, I have chosen to read and analyse ficto-criticism across a wide range of texts. This is  
13 
not to elide difference, but to establish that ficto-critical practice—which self-consciously 
critiques the colonising power of writing as representation—is now more prolific. As this 
thesis demonstrates, more critics and writers are not only writing ficto-critically but also 
reading ficto-critically. The current cultural climate, theoretical developments, the 
changing state of the tertiary institution, and increasing voices from the margin have all 
contributed to the re-evaluation and self-conscious questioning of critical writing as a way 
of knowing and representing the world. My conceptualisation of ficto-criticism is thus 
consistent with my reading of ficto-critical forms. I am simultaneously working to keep the 
definition and meaning of ficto-criticism open, whilst at the same time remaining critically 
attentive to the discourse of ficto-criticism and its own immersion in processes of 
domination and colonisation. Much like the arbitrary insistence on “fix-criticism” by the 
computer’s spell check program, the historical materiality of my thesis thus reveals its 
inevitable contingency and the partiality of its analysis.  
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1 By little-known I mean that the writer who helped develop the term is not well-known within the official 
discourse of Australian ficto-criticism, and the literary circles of both Australia and Canada. The writer is 
Jeanne Randolph and her influence on the development of the term is outlined in the fifth chapter, 
Becoming-Minoritarian: Canadian Ficto-criticism. 
2 Published in English as These Our Mothers (1983). 
3 This is largely due to the influence of Aritha van Herk at the University of Calgary. See Chapter Five on 
Canadian ficto-criticism for more. 
4 To give an indication that ficto-criticism continues to be judged unfavourably, postgraduate students often 
approach me seeking references to justify and explain their decision to write ficto-critically, or incorporate a 
ficto-critical section in their dissertation.  
5 See, for example, Simon Robb’s 2001 PhD thesis titled “Fictocritical Sentences.” He examines ficto-
criticism within the introduction as a justification for the rest of his thesis, written ficto-critically. Whilst he 
does engage with the concept critically, the entire thesis is not devoted to exploring the practice. 
6 Significantly, one of the things ficto-criticism works toward is collapsing the distinction between primary 
and secondary texts, another binary division on which academic discourse relies. 
7 I deliberately do not spend a lot of time detailing Deleuze and Guattari’s theories in this thesis. Rather, and 
in-keeping with their theoretical approach, I use their concepts as pragmatic tools. The reasons behind this 
decision is more fully explained in Chapter Two, which outlines my reading of the Deleuzian theories that I 
employ to theorise writing-between. 
8 For an early application of Deleuzian theory to the postcolonial literatures of Canada and Australia see 
Kateryna Olijnyk Arthur’s “Between Literatures: Canada and Australia” (1988: 3-12) Arthur argues that 
Deleuzian thought releases the literature of Canada and Australia from always lacking the tradition of the 
centre.  It allows the experimental literatures of each country to be liberated from both nationalistic and 
internationalistic goals. The multiple and often contradictory nature of each country’s identity no longer need 
be seen negatively. Instead of being viewed as a source of insecurity, it can be seen as a source of creative 
power.    15
chapter one 
Casting The First Stone: 
Ficto-criticism as writing-between 
 
Introduction 
In an effort to hold central the uncertainty and contingency of writing-between I have 
deliberately chosen to begin my thesis with a brief discussion of a book that may or may not 
be considered ficto-criticism on first inspection. The book is The First Stone written by the 
high profile Australian creative writer Helen Garner and published in 1995. Whilst The First 
Stone is generically ambiguous (between fiction and non-fiction) it is not obviously ficto-
critical. It is a text that has neither been linked to the concept of creative-critical writing, nor 
the term ficto-criticism. The decision to begin with this book signals my intention to broaden 
the field of ficto-criticism, not limiting the discussion to those texts obviously and easily 
identifiable as such.  It is also characteristic of my intention to keep both the thesis and the 
definition of ficto-criticism open to negotiation in an effort to interrogate categorisation and its 
political implications. In other words, I begin with an example that explores why ficto-
criticism should be cast as writing-between. Garner’s contentious book, written in response to 
a very high profile incident of sexual harassment at one of Australia’s oldest universities, was 
attacked by some academic feminists for blatantly mixing fiction with fact, whilst at the same 
time being positioned as a serious critical analysis of sex and power. The First Stone is written 
from a subjective and personal perspective, and employs fictional and narrative techniques. At 
the same time it makes use of authentic factual texts such as interviews, newspaper articles 
and letters. The generically ambiguous style of The First Stone presented as non-fiction—and 
the media’s sensationalism of reactions to the text—makes Garner’s book a heightened 
example to explore many of the themes central to ficto-criticism. In particular, it provides 
fruitful ground on which to think through what constitutes ficto-criticism, the reactions from 
the academy to the destabilisation of truth through mixing fact and fiction, and the   16
effectiveness of binary systems in relation to writing-between. The following discussion on 
Garner’s book furnishes us with a context in which to begin a dialogue on ficto-criticism, 
arguing for my reading of it as writing-between. As I demonstrate, much of the commentary 
made in response to Helen Garner’s book runs parallel with the commentary made in relation 
to ficto-criticism.  
    
♦   ♦         ♦ 
 
Journalists are never meant to allow themselves to be part of the story, but then one of 
the things [Helen] Garner and I talked about was how much a story—fiction or non-
fiction—must always be about the teller. (Simons 27) 
 
In recent years well-known Australian novelist Helen Garner has stated publicly on a number 
of occasions that she has increasingly been drawn away from fiction writing towards non-
fiction (“You’ve Come A Long Way Baby”). In Australia few people would have been able to 
miss the furore over the Ormond College sexual harassment case at the University of 
Melbourne, and the ensuing debates that developed in the media around freedom of speech, 
(Australian) feminism, sexual harassment and political correctness. Garner, a feminist of the 
older generation, found herself in trouble with the new wave of feminists when she began 
research for her non-fiction book on the events.  Having written a letter of sympathy to the 
accused male academic (whom she did not know), she then set about researching and writing 
her book.  Surprisingly, after writing her letter of sympathy, a letter that quickly became 
common knowledge at the university, Garner was offended that the women involved refused 
to be interviewed by her and made much of what she perceived as their deliberate obscuration 
of the truth.  Central to this story is the criticism Garner attracted for using fictional devices in 
her book of non-fiction, most notably the division of Dr Jenna Mead, the senior woman 
academic at the University of Melbourne who supported the young women complainants, into   17
six or seven different characters.  The (implied) argument developed in The First Stone, of the 
feminist conspiracy against the College Master was therefore aided by her fictional 
characterisation of Mead.  Subsequently Garner argued that her splitting of Mead into a 
number of people was undertaken to defend herself against defamation litigation.  The First 
Stone, then, was seen to blur fact and fiction, yet represent itself as a well researched non-
fictional account.  All aided, it has been argued by Mead, through Garner’s reputation as an 
author of repute and her contacts in the media. 
 
In one of the oldest and most prestigious colleges at one of the most established Australian 
universities, the ruination of the career of the Ormond College Master at the hands of a 
feminist conspiracy fuelled a backlash against bureaucratic feminazis and political correctness.  
The words from the back cover of The First Stone, in a style suggestive of the journalistic 
reportage of a not-to-be-overlooked highly newsworthy incident, set the scene for these 
events:  
In the autumn of 1992, two young women students at Melbourne University went to 
the police claiming that they had been indecently assaulted at a party.  The man they 
accused was the head of their co-ed residential college.  The shock of these charges 
split the community and painfully focused the debate about sex and power. (The First 
Stone back cover) 
This back cover “blurb” in its (menacing) opening sentence (“In the autumn of 1992 . . .”) 
implies that there is a mystery.  A mystery that Garner, eminent novelist and Walkley-Award 
winning journalist, will resolve for readers.
1  The language is also very much in keeping with 
the divisive methods of the popular media, for example, “shock” and “split the community.”  
Similarly, the phrases and debates that developed in relation to this incident through media 
usage and repetition, as Mead has pointed out, press buttons: “These buttons are labelled 
‘feminist conspiracy,’ ‘a man’s career,’ and ‘wounded victim’” (Mead, “The First Stone” 9).  
   18
The ensuing developments after the initial allegations of sexual harassment were, therefore, 
carried out very publicly in the media.  On first examination they seem to be very distant from 
a discussion on Australian and Canadian ficto-criticism and the growing (questionable) 
popularity of alternative and creatively critical forms of writing.  However, there are a number 
of related themes and debates that link these two phenomena.  For example, both raise similar 
questions around the distinctions between: reality/fiction; right/wrong; objectivity/subjectivity; 
criticism/fiction; old/new.  Most importantly, both give rise to very similar reactionary and 
polarised debates around the ethics of self-location, authority, voice, and truth.  Both are also 
generically between, defying the conventions of a number of genres, and, as a result, both 
frustrate the reader’s generic expectations.  Surprisingly, however, and despite these 
similarities, different patterns of allegiance emerge in the debates around ficto-criticism and 
Garner’s highly personal reportage.  For example, one might expect a hybrid form like 
Garner’s, which breaks with journalistic convention by employing a very personal and private 
voice, to fall on the left side of the binary pairs listed above.  This is not the case with The 
First Stone.  Despite identifying her work with New Journalism—a marginal and potentially 
radical form of journalistic writing in its subjective style—Garner has been heavily critiqued 
for being on the ideological right in her support of the Ormond College Master as a victim of 
feminism gone too far.  New Journalism with its highly subjective, creative and candid style of 
commentary, in contrast to the refutably objective presentation of “just the facts” by traditional 
journalism, is generally considered marginal by the serious established press.  In the words of 
Tom Wolfe in The New Journalism: “They [journalists and the literati] needed to believe, in 
short, that the new form [New Journalism] was illegitimate . . .a ‘bastard form’” (39). 
Significantly, the varying and diverse forms of creative-critical writing that I will address in 
this thesis as ficto-criticism have also been represented in the published literature as radical, 
marginal, and challenging to conservative (literary) traditions.  Thus, what these emerging and 
conflicting patterns of allegiance signal (between two hybrid forms—Garner’s text and ficto-
criticism)—are the dangers inherent in binary systems of thought (particularly in relation to   19
writing-between).  Not all hybrid generically challenging texts are automatically or simply left 
of centre, that is, marginal and radical.  To put it another way, a change to the aesthetics and 
stylistics of a literary genre that potentially poses a threat to established generic conventions, 
might—on the surface—suggest a radical or alternative ideological position.  However, these 
aesthetic and formal changes to a text do not guarantee a commitment to an alternative 
political agenda.  A binary system of thought therefore has the potential—as I will 
demonstrate with The First Stone and this thesis—to reduce highly complex arguments and 
events to simple oppositions, which are wholly inappropriate when dealing with writing-
between. In the instance of Garner’s generic oxymoron—her non-fiction novel—this process 
was aided by the adversarial style of the popular media. As such, the distortions caused by a 
binary system are magnified. However, before going on to engage with the reactions to The 
First Stone and their relation to ficto-criticism, I will first briefly introduce Garner’s “ficto-
critical” style, a style well illustrated by her own introduction, the first chapter. 
 
Reaffirming its sense of mystery, seriousness and factual nature, The First Stone begins with 
the following sentences: “Around lunchtime on Thursday 9 April 1992, a man called Dr Colin 
Shepherd went to the police station in the inner Melbourne suburb of Carlton. In the CIB 
office there, he had this conversation with two CIB detectives” (1). What follows is what 
appears to be a transcription of the police interview. Although the names are changed in The 
First Stone to avoid defamation charges and there is no reference to the source of this 
interview, this text retains a certain legitimacy. For example, Colin Shepherd—the man being 
interviewed—is mistakenly called Dr Colin, instead of Dr Shepherd: “Dr Colin (sic), do you 
agree that the time is now approximately twelve-o-six?” (1). The inclusion of “(sic)” 
reinforces the legitimacy of the source by indicating that it has been faithfully reproduced, 
including any errors. This is how Garner’s text begins. However, most of The First Stone is 
written in a subjective first person voice, which describes scenes as if part of an 
autobiographical account of actual events, her voice being interspersed with reproductions of   20
authentic texts, such as letters, newspaper articles and interview notes. The text, written from a 
subjective and personal perspective, which employs fictional and narrative techniques, none-
the-less carries a substantial authority through the discourse of authentic voice. Throughout 
The First Stone Garner struggles with the questions surrounding sex and power, and, whilst 
not presented as an essay, her non-fictional novel argues a certain perspective, very 
persuasively. This is achieved, in part, through the revelation of her own doubts, which 
function almost as if part of a concession argument. In other words, Garner deals with the 
possible objections to her perspective by acknowledging and addressing them. Ultimately, 
however, she argues beyond these doubts and concerns to a position from which she views the 
reaction of the women students as self-righteous, reactive, inflexible and unforgiving.  
 
In one chapter, for example, Garner discusses varying experiences of sexual assault recounted 
by women of her generation, whom she had met at a dinner party. One story, in particular, by 
a woman who was raped by a doctor at age eighteen, touches Garner. The woman does not, at 
the time, report the assault, nor does she tell anyone. In fact, she even pays for the consultation 
directly after the rape. This story leads Garner to not only think through what dynamics restrict 
women from speaking out in circumstances like these, but what also prompts them to act in 
such immediate and grotesque gestures of compliance after being violated. Later in the same 
chapter Garner recounts a similar, although less serious, incident she experienced in which she 
paid a masseur who had “come onto her” during the massage. She too wonders why she 
behaves so properly. In this chapter Garner is clearly struggling with the question asked of one 
of the Ormond college students during the trial. Why didn’t she just slap the Master after he 
groped her? Why does she react so passively and then report him later? The morning after the 
dinner party, Garner feels an immediate identification with the young women who brought the 
charges against Dr Shepherd: 
I woke up . . . sad and anxious, aware of the immense weight of men on women, the 
ubiquity of their attentions, the exhaustion of our resistance. In such a mood it seemed   21
to me an illusion that women could learn to deal with this pressure briskly, forcefully, 
with humour and grace. I thought about the complainants, Elizabeth and Nicole, and I 
felt deeply sorry for them.  (171) 
Interestingly, rather than undermining her final position, passages such as this function—as 
does her chapter—to shore up her argument by evoking an alliance, through direct reference to 
similar experiences. If Garner has had the same kind of experience and she still feels Nicole 
and Elizabeth have over reacted—here referred to by their first names, confirming a sense of 
intimacy—then her argument is reinforced. Garner is, after all, speaking from the authority of 
experience, and it is her gendered profile as a feminist of an older generation that generates 
such interest in her book. There is disagreement in the feminist ranks. The meanings of 
Garner’s ficto-criticism are, then, very complex, the text slipping between an overtly 
fictionalised account of a series of actual events, and a serious critical investigation into the 
much larger questions of sex, gender, power, feminism and patriarchy. 
 
The Ormond sexual harassment incident, and the ensuing events, is thus clearly an intricate 
story, one that signals the complexities involved when researching something generically 
between such as ficto-criticism.  For example, the hybridity of ficto-criticism—and its 
ambiguous non(generic) status—meant that it was difficult to immediately locate and identify 
examples with certainty. In other words, at the start of my project the delineating markers of 
ficto-criticism had not been determined, and, so, were amorphous.  I had to answer the 
question of what exactly constituted a ficto-critical text before I could proceed. The research 
therefore began with the examination of a wide range of texts, which like Garner’s 
demonstrated similar investments in the boundaries between factuality/creativity, 
objectivity/subjectivity, confession (also often found in ficto-critical texts) and criticism. I had 
to carry out this extensive reading, as anything generically between fiction and 
criticism/theory was potentially a kind of ficto-criticism. This was a time-consuming yet 
worthwhile exercise as it helped isolate research problems associated with what is often seen   22
as a generically challenged form, and at the same time illustrated the issues that emerge when 
boundaries are crossed.  The events that occurred with The First Stone, for example, whilst 
certainly caught up with other influencing discourses such as a patriarchal reaction to 
feminism and Australian anti-intellectualism, are interesting and relevant to ficto-criticism 
because they demonstrate the anger and defensiveness that erupt when people’s world views 
are challenged.  The narratives that emerged in relation to the debate over The First Stone also 
illustrate some of the issues and difficulties associated with researching ficto-criticism.  There 
are, therefore, a number of useful connections between ficto-critical writing and The First 
Stone that I will now explore as a means to demonstrate some of the central themes of the 
emerging discourse of ficto-criticism. 
 
The academic setting and connections to the story of The First Stone, for example, are highly 
relevant to ficto-criticism.  As this thesis will reveal, much ficto-critical writing in both 
Australia and Canada is associated with the academy either directly by being produced by 
academics, or indirectly as a response to normative academic writing and criticism.  Similarly, 
the alleged sexual harassment of the two students that prompted Garner to write The First 
Stone took place at a university college party.  Into this prestigious setting at Ormond College 
enters Garner whose book seems directed as a challenge to academic and institutionalised 
knowledge, something which Garner seems to perceive herself as being excluded from.  On 
several occasions in The First Stone Garner implies her dislike of theory when placed above, 
and to the exclusion of, life experience.  In fact, this is central to her critique of the women 
who take their allegations to the police.  Repeatedly she asks why they went to these lengths, 
and implies they have gone too far with their abstract theories.
2 Garner’s frustration with 
theory and her belief in experience can be seen in her discussion of the character “Janet F-,” 
the director of Melbourne University’s counselling service who was involved in the attempted 
conciliation between the Master and the complainants. Garner clearly identifies with this 
woman, whom she sees as speaking from life experience: “She struck me as someone who had   23
been around, perhaps suffered in her private life, who knew something of the world and spoke 
from that knowledge rather than from theory or dogma” (Garner 42). Taken in the context of 
her book this quote seems to suggest that Garner believed the (privileged) academic feminists 
at Melbourne University had moved beyond life or lived reality into dogmatic theories on sex 
and power.  Instead of overlooking a man’s moment of weakness, his human-ness, Garner 
perceives the women as taking this opportunity to ruin his career.  Significantly, the 
underlying assumptions of Garner’s position highlight similar concerns expressed by some 
ficto-critical writers: namely a critique of the exclusion of the body and what is human (that is, 
moments of weakness, failure and doubt) from the objective and pseudo-scientific language of 
academic discourse.  This is a discourse that places the mind and intellectual pursuits above 
the body, memory and experience.  In subsequent chapters I will demonstrate that, like Garner, 
many ficto-critics also feel excluded from, and perhaps objectified by, the discourses of 
academic knowledge.  It is worth remembering that Garner’s foray, as a novelist into this 
academic scene, is a challenge to academic generic rules about objects and subjects of 
knowledge.  Garner would more likely be found in an academic setting as the object of 
academic research and attention.  In The First Stone, however, she turns the table on her 
potential critics by directing her own investigation into—and critique of—the academy.  
Similarly, some Canadian and Australian ficto-critics are creative writers and poets who turn 
the table on their critics.
3  By enacting their own self-reflexive commentary on their own texts 
and through mixing criticism and fiction, ficto-critics do away with the critic and demonstrate 
their agency: they are no longer merely the object of criticism. 
 
In other moments Garner gives clues as to why else she may dislike academics and the 
academy. For example, she admits her feelings of inferiority in the face of their authorised 
knowledge.  Speaking of the panic she felt prior to an interview with a Melbourne University 
Law lecturer, Garner admits: “I recognised this panic.  It was the same old fear of professors 
and people with Ph.Ds, a leftover from my own undistinguished and almost totally silent   24
university career, thirty years ago” (145). Interestingly, a similar fear of intellectualism or 
dislike of over-theorisation such as Garner’s emerges on occasion around ficto-critical texts.  
Whilst some ficto-critics seem to be mobilised by a desire to demystify academic language 
and reach a wider audience, many ficto-critical texts are highly theoretically informed and 
require a reader well versed in contemporary theories.  The image of the popular academic 
who writes in a personal language more accessible to the average reader, or the highly 
theoretically self-referential text, however, both seem to have in their sights the omnipotent 
academic voice from on high which presents itself as objective and masterful, and which 
excludes—in the process—life and experience.  Garner’s The First Stone can also be read as a 
critique of academic mastery and established knowledge, a masterful knowledge from which 
she appears to feel excluded. Of course, whether Garner’s critique of the events and the 
academic feminists’ actions are well-founded remains questionable.  Yet, what all this 
demonstrates is the complexity around virtually any phenomenon, and the importance of not 
approaching such events and issues without attention to the contradictions, exclusions and 
complexities (that is, what ficto-criticism attempts to address).  Ironically, despite Garner’s 
hybrid form that in many ways challenges authorised discourses (in particular those from the 
academy), her text does not trace its own immersion in equally authorised discourses, such as 
her connections with the media and her reliance on the discourse of free speech to validate her 
approach.  Although Garner reflects on her possible motivations for her perspective, she fails 
to really interrogate them in any meaningful way. 
 
Another interesting connection between ficto-criticism and The First Stone is that both are 
often critiqued for failing to meet the expectations of clever or competent writing and research.  
This critique comes from a traditional academic or intellectual position and must be 
recognised as having a reliance on truth and real facts. For example, Janet Malcolm. Matthew 
Ricketson, in his article titled “Helen Garner’s The First Stone: Hitchhiking on the Credibility 
of Other Writers,” critiques Garner for trading on the reputation of the well-researched work   25
of renowned New Journalists like John McPhee, Ian Jack, Tracy Kidder and others.  Ricketson 
argues that what is important is “the quality of the reporting and research work.  Without that, 
all the fine prose in the world has little meaning” (85). In effect, Ricketson implies that whilst 
Garner’s prose might be up to scratch, her research, reporting and intellectual work in The 
First Stone falls below the standard of the New Journalists whose work she identifies with.  He 
implies that she fails to get to the truth. Ricketson says: “Garner’s keen antennae picked up the 
resonances of the Ormond case, but she lacks [Janet] Malcolm’s intellectual rigour” (99). 
Similarly, ficto-criticism finds itself being critiqued in the academy for its lack of intellectual 
rigour and for failing to demonstrate a clear understanding and analysis of its subject.  Mead 
has also critiqued Garner for her failure to understand the issues that encompass sexual 
harassment and for failing to do adequate research.  Also, like many examples of ficto-
criticism, Garner’s text makes the story of the research virtually as important, if not more so, 
than the actual analysis. As a result, Garner was criticised for focusing her story on the process 
of research and writing, and for writing in a manner that was subjective and personal. In 
particular, she was attacked for making too central to her narrative the story of the young 
women’s refusal to speak to her. According to Ricketson, Garner—struggling to gather raw 
material—“made the story of not getting the story into a running refrain in The First Stone” 
(96-7). He states: 
That many readers found this story engaging may testify to Garner’s skill as a writer, 
but more importantly, to her fame as a novelist.  If the average journalist tried this on, 
most readers would say, ‘spare me your angst; tell me what happened at Ormond.’ 
Garner’s is a dubious strategy because she has shifted the heart of the inquiry away 
from Ormond College and located it inside herself.  (97)  
Again, these critiques may well be founded when applied to The First Stone. However, what is 
interesting is that—as hybrid forms—both ficto-criticism and Garner’s text are critiqued for 
similar failings. Ficto-criticism is also often critiqued for being too subjective: for locating the 
story in relation to individual and personal experience and memory.   These failings, such as a   26
subjective approach, are only failings if measured against a standard they were not wishing to 
emulate. Both First Stone, ficto-criticism and other border-crossing texts become dubious 
strategies because they break the rules of convention. Yet, neither The First Stone nor ficto-
criticism are attempting to be objective in the sense of academic writing, nor are they saying 
that their perspective is completely fictionalised. In Garner’s text, for example, the truth of the 
events is mediated by her use of an intrusive embodied voice. As The First Stone 
demonstrates, whether or not this author is taken as objective by a general readership on the 
basis of her reputation—overlooking the literary/theoretical (subjective) implications of her 
use of personal voice—is quite another question. To put it another way, a reader versed in 
literary theory may read the inclusion of the personal voice into a book of non-fiction like 
Garner’s as a signal for a degree of self-reflection and an acknowledgment of the author’s role 
in framing the events (the partiality of their perspective). But what does it signal to a non-
academic audience? Also, what kind of subjectivity is being constructed in hybrid texts? 
Should it be taken that all texts that break generic conventions—mixing fiction and non-
fiction—dislodge authority and truth? Garner also includes other voices—the voices of the 
people involved in the incident—that she interviews. But does this mean the text is 
automatically polyvocal and open? The negative reaction to The First Stone by some 
Australian academics suggests that it does not. More importantly, however, it signals the 
importance of taking into account the historical and material context of individual texts when 
reading ficto-criticism. One cannot separate ficto-critical texts from the conditions of their 
production because no two are ever the same. 
 
The events surrounding Garner’s The First Stone are thus highly useful to consider in relation 
to ficto-criticism, as they signal the complexity of the problems and issues raised when truth is 
seen to be toyed with.  That is, when someone (Garner) breaks down the distinction between 
the fictive and the real and then (in this case) represents it as fact.  What is at risk are differing 
accounts of reality, and this is exactly what ficto-criticism is concerned with: the   27
accommodation or acknowledgment of differing truths and perspectives. As I will show, ficto-
criticism is informed by a growing realisation that knowledge is partial and contested, and that 
the dominant academic generic form is inadequate to incorporate the tensions arising from the 
anxiety of speaking for and about the other. Perhaps it is the challenge to established 
viewpoints that makes the reaction to both ficto-criticism and The First Stone so divisive.
4  
Whilst I do not necessarily support Garner’s perspective on the events at Ormond College, nor 
her representation of her account as non-fiction, her book, like ficto-criticism, by mixing fact 
and fiction, posed a very real threat to some discourses.  Discourses, which at that particular 
historical point in time were in some ways becoming entrenched in certain contexts: 
institutionalised feminism and political correctness.  What made The First Stone so dangerous, 
and the reaction to it so strong, was its destabilisation of truth via its generic hybridity. This 
destabilisation of (recently) established ways of knowing worked to disrupt the truth behind 
the events (distorted by both her book and the media).  As the book bodyjamming (1997) 
edited by Jenna Mead—and published in response to The First Stone—confirms, what was 
occurring was a contestation over truth and representation. Mead’s title to the introduction of 
bodyjamming says it all: “Tell It Like It Is.”   Like ficto-criticism, therefore, Garner’s book 
challenged established genres and their conventions: in other words, she didn’t play by the 
rules, and was accused of misleading her readers.   
 
Garner’s failure to play by the (generic) rules is, significantly, a major source of material for 
her critics and for the critics of ficto-criticism. In the instance of The First Stone, however, 
there is a very different outcome.  It is important to remember that there is a significant 
difference between the two examples: that is, Garner’s account was represented as factual and 
therefore truthful.  Ficto-criticism—on the other hand—questions the construction of facts and 
their proof through contaminating the generic purity of academic (non-fictional) modes of 
writing.  Garner’s text, through destabilising categories, like ficto-criticism, presents a threat 
to authorised discourses. This was her intention to question some of the discourses that she 
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held close, which in her eyes were becoming institutionalised and rigid. In the case of The 
First Stone, the discourses she was questioning—political correctness and feminism—were 
arguably at their height. Garner appeared to be reacting against what she perceived was the 
dogmatic application of liberatory discourses. The ease with which her hybrid form was taken 
up by dominant right wing discourses to back their world view, however, attests not only to 
Garner’s failure to calculate the full implications of her chosen critical hybrid style, but also 
the power of discourse to shape our reality. In particular, the media’s take on her book 
radically changed the perception of the events, and this was something Garner did not 
anticipate.  Significantly, by drawing attention to generic conventions through breaking their 
rules, ficto-criticism in its commitment to self-reflexivity attends to exposing the effects of 
discourse.  The First Stone whilst displaying a degree of self-reflection fails to achieve this 
self-reflexivity: a self-reflexivity that I will demonstrate in this thesis is an important aspect of 
ficto-critical texts if they are to be successful in countering the colonising powers of discourse. 
 
Garner’s text thus presents another key issue related to ficto-criticism. That is, the question of 
definition. How do you define ficto-criticism? On first inspection The First Stone displays 
some key features, but is it ficto-criticism? How do you determine where ficto-criticism begins 
and ends without contradicting yourself when the basis for traditional generic taxonomy is a 
target of ficto-criticism, as a space between such categories? We get a sense through Garner’s 
comments about the academy that she writes a personalised account of events as a way to 
counter the official version of knowledges, such as feminism, emanating from the academy. 
What she appears to have begun the book with (at least), was a desire to open the discussion 
on sex and power, a discussion she felt had become closed. To be theoretically consistent with 
ficto-criticism’s presentation of alternative between knowledges and its generic hybridity, it is 
thus necessary to keep the definition open. However, as the critiques of ficto-criticism and 
Garner’s text (discussed thus far) illustrate, there are risks both intellectual and political in 
doing so. Misunderstandings are very probable, since the rules of reading are not clear. Whilst   29
The First Stone was picked up and promoted by the media, the risks of being overlooked and 
dismissed are also very real for writing-between. Garner’s text too easily served the discourses 
that powerfully oppose political correctness and feminism. As a result, it was taken up to 
reaffirm these perspectives. Ironically, these points of view are just as inflexible or closed as 
Garner understood (institutionalised) feminism to have become. So whilst The First Stone took 
to the centre stage, this is not the usual state of affairs for most ficto-critical forms, which are 
most definitely at the margin of official discourses. If we turn to look at another generically 
hybrid form that both The First Stone and ficto-criticism have been aligned with—New 
Journalism—more of the risks inherent in the between become apparent.
 5  
 
In his article on Garner’s book, for example, Rickertson says: “This kind of writing was 
labelled New Journalism in the sixties, but there were so many arguments about it—this isn’t 
new! this isn’t journalism!—that the term fell into disuse” (82). Given that it is the generic 
hybridity of New Journalism that very probably caused the demise of the term, the same 
scenario could be anticipated for ficto-criticism. Certainly, what Rickertson says of New 
Journalism has also been said of ficto-criticism. In effect, the indeterminacy of hybrid forms 
makes them vulnerable to being ignored or subsumed by dominant discourses. This explains 
the disputes over terminology around Garner’s text, New Journalism and ficto-criticism. For 
example, before making the statement quoted above, Ricketson discusses the nomenclature of 
the style of writing Garner employs in The First Stone: 
Garner used the term reportage in her author’s note, and it is one of several that grope 
toward a definition of this kind of writing.  None is completely satisfactory.  Literary 
journalism and literary non-fiction sound pompous; creative non-fiction sounds like a 
contradiction in terms; faction has been discredited; narrative journalism seems a bit 
narrow; the literature of fact is ponderous . . .. (82) 
Generically challenging forms like ficto-criticism and New Journalism—forms of writing 
situated between—are difficult to name and pin down precisely because they exist between 
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established categories.  Ficto-criticism also comes with an array of possible terms, for example 
(to name a few): paracriticism, fiction-theory, critifiction, post-criticism and performative 
writing.  The recent debate in Australia (discussed in Chapter Four) over whether one should 
use ficto-criticism or creative non-fiction to describe this kind of writing, suggests that ficto-
criticism (the term) may well be falling into disuse.
6 The plethora of terms used to describe the 
blurring of criticism and fiction makes the project of researching ficto-criticism challenging. 
This will be addressed in the thesis since it says much about writing-between. 
 
There is one final significant point that The First Stone raises in relation to ficto-criticism, in 
particular, regarding terminology and definition.  That is, in an effort to “grope toward a 
definition of this kind of writing,” there is often a conflation, or slippage, of terms used to 
describe the boundary crossing ficto-criticism enacts (Ricketson 82).  In numerous discussions 
on varying ficto-critical texts, terms with different meanings are collapsed together.  The 
slippage between words like criticism/theory/fact/non-fiction, in the literature that addresses 
ficto-criticism, at first seemed merely another complication to exploring ficto-criticism and its 
implications, until I realised this occurred through the application of, yet again, a binary 
structure. This system of bifurcation repeats the following pattern: 
 masculine   feminine 
 centre    margin 
 fact    speculation 
 objective     subjective 
logical    emotional 
theoretical   lacking  intellectual  rigour 
criticism   creative  writing 
serious    light 
structured   unstructured 
mind    body   31
The words fact/fiction/non-fiction/theory and criticism, serious journalism/reportage, or 
fiction/creative writing/speculation, only come to mean the same (that is, become 
interchangeable) when placed in opposition to the other.  This conflation of terms, especially 
words like theory and criticism that do not have the same meaning, can perhaps be explained 
as an attempt to contain an unruly, difficult, between or emerging genre.  It also points to the 
challenges involved in researching writing-between, where terminology and definitions are in 
constant contestation.  
 
Significantly, texts that attempt to grapple with the elision of the boundary between reality and 
fiction are symptomatic of the times we live in, as, it appears, is the tendency toward reading 
for indeterminate and differing realities. Many of these developments have been attributed to 
postmodernism and postmodernity, and the collapse of the grand narratives. Across a range of 
media we can see a shift in perception, critical judgement is continually being undermined as 
new technological developments and the discovery of new knowledges distort the perception 
of reality. How, for example, do you interpret and judge a photograph when images are so 
easily manipulated by computers, when seeing is no longer believing?  Similarly, the 
increasing trend towards docu-drama in film and television, made possible by small, light 
video cameras, poses questions about art and artifice.
7 As fiction, history, auto/biography and 
reality experience reciprocal contamination, new possibilities and new relationships between 
the subject and object of interpretation must be envisioned.  This is the point at which ficto-
criticism emerges—as one of the possible ways critical practice attempts to deal with these 
changes and developments, and the resultant shifts in perspective.  In other words, when so 
many alternative perspectives are available, one is forced to become self-conscious about 
one’s own position and viewpoint.   
 
Will events like The First Stone, including the media reaction, become more prolific as 
boundaries are elided under the cultural logic of what has been labelled postmodernism, and as   32
fiction and its generic conventions become exhausted? Or will we learn to live with an 
increasing ambiguity around truth and reality? Perhaps the exhaustion of fictional conventions 
(to the point of cliché) explains why Garner finds reportage so enthralling and herself drawn 
more and more to writing non-fiction. Does it also explain, in part, why there seem to be more 
television programs and films being made that are so much about the telling—the creative 
process—rather than the tale? Fact is stranger than fiction. Whatever Garner’s reasons for her 
interest in non-fiction, these new forms of writing seem to be, like The First Stone, signalling 
an important shift. A shift, which if continued to be viewed from a binary platform, may result 
in many of the more interesting social and political implications and influences of writing-
between being overlooked. For example, is this phenomenon merely the result of 
postmodernism, and a reaction against modernism?  Postmodernism is certainly lauded most 
often in the literature on border crossing texts as the defining influence.  Yet, as I will 
demonstrate, whilst postmodernism has been instrumental in helping establish a climate more 
receptive to generically between texts, it is not the only influence on the varying writing forms 
that are developing and which challenge objectivity and the detached authoritative expert 
voice from above.  To read these texts simply in terms of a reaction to modernism (as 
postmodern) results in overlooking a number of more interesting discourses and their 
influence on these texts.  
 
conclusion 
The First Stone, therefore, makes apparent the issues and debates that circulate in relation to 
ficto-criticism since both betray the assumptions of fact and fiction. The book’s divisive 
profile made possible through media sensationalism is productive in this context since it 
reveals the way in which binaries function to detract from the more slippery meanings and 
power relations emanating from writing-between. Subtler and less reactionary readings of 
Garner’s book—not reliant on an either/or model—may reveal the ambiguities in her position 
and, most importantly, that her self-reflective speaking position does little to really counter or   33
expose her own position of power and ability to construct reality. The next chapter further 
develops the notion of ficto-criticism cast as writing-between by conceiving a conceptual 
framework, using the theories of Deleuze and Guattari that allows for being between. 
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1 A Walkley is one of Australia’s highest awards for journalism. 
2 In fact, the women only take their complaint to the police when the University fails to address their allegations 
properly. 
3 See Louky Bersianik’s “Aristotle’s Lantern: an essay on criticism,” published in A Mazing Space (1986: 39-48). 
Here Bersianik—a poet—writes back to traditional critics that she argues close and limit the text by enforcing 
one inflexible reading or interpretation. Such critics approach the text with certain expectations and ideas. Her 
reading is feminist and she identifies this kind of closed criticism as masculine (although performed by both men 
and women). The essay is interesting as she links the power structures that enable the critic (which can be 
reconfigured to spell citric) a supposed objective position to “demolish” certain writings that do not fit 
established models. Bersianik’s essay is written in response to a review of a collection of her work, which is 
dismissed as feminine and frivolous. Significantly, Bersianik’s essay is not written within the genre of criticism. 
It is quite playful and ends creatively with an extension of the metaphor of the spider’s web. 
4 In his introduction to the journal Event’s ninth Creative Non-Fiction Contest, George Galt discusses the 
boundary between fact and fiction. Galt describes the “deep unease” generated when one crosses to the other: “In 
our highly rational, legalistic, byte-bound culture, we understand fiction to inhabit a different realm. Some of us 
need to be given a clear signal when we are entering it” (1996/7: 7-11). This is exactly what Garner is critiqued 
for not doing. 
5 The discourse of Australian ficto-criticism has several connections with New Journalism. For example, at the 
University of Tasmania, Joan Dideon’s writing (that has been identified as New Journalism) is on the reading list 
for the unit on ficto-criticism. Similarly, Australian ficto-critic Stephen Muecke teaches ficto-criticism at the 
University of Technology, Sydney. Dideon’s book After Henry has been listed on his suggested reading list. The 
unpublished introduction to Muecke’s anthology of ficto-criticism similarly makes reference to New Journalism 
and the work of Dideon. 
6 Amanda Nettlebeck in the introduction to The Space Between: Australian Women Writing Fictocriticism has 
said that the term has a short term function (1998: 13).  
7 The extraordinary popularity of reality T.V., of series like Big Brother, featuring real people not actors also 
testifies to how changes in technology are influencing our perspective (both literally and intellectually). 
Entertainment is changing.  Previously it was more closely tied to obviously fictionalised narratives.  Now whole 
cable channels and internet sites are devoted to docu-dramas.  There seem to be even more and more programs 
about placing people in confined spaces and observing their every action and interaction.  This is reality T.V. but 
it is also unambiguously being manipulated or fictionalised (something which there is no attempt to hide). The 
very successful movie The Truman Show, starring Jim Carey, where a man’s whole life becomes a long running 
television program, encapsulates much of this blurring of reality and fiction, and illustrates the experience of 
living in an interstitial space (the struggle over truth).   35
chapter two 
How can we enter? 
Ficto-criticism as a minor literature 
 
For reading a text is never a scholarly exercise in search of what is signified, still 
less a highly textual exercise in search of a signifier.  Rather it is a productive use 
of the literary machine, a montage of desiring machines, a schizoid exercise that 
extracts from the text its revolutionary force. (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 
106)  
 
Introduction 
In Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, Deleuze and Guattari ask the question: “How can 
we enter into Kafka’s work? This is a rhizome, a burrow. The castle has multiple entrances 
whose rules of usage and whose locations aren’t very well known” (3). In this chapter, 
through Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of “minor literature,” I answer the question of how 
we can enter into ficto-criticism. From this entry point I then explore in detail several of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts found in Anti-Oedipus, Chaosmosis and A Thousand 
Plateaus to develop a theoretical context in which to engage with ficto-criticism as 
writing-between. As a burrow with multiple entrances, ficto-criticism invites a Deleuzian 
mapping.
1 This chapter is, therefore, methodological. Here I argue that the theories of 
Deleuze and Guattari not only resemble ficto-critical writing, but can also be applied 
productively to its analysis. By looking directly at specific examples of Canadian and 
Australian ficto-critical writing I play out the details of my engagement with the theories 
of Deleuze and Guattari as a means to realise the political implications of ficto-criticism. 
In the process, I develop a materialist assemblage of ficto-critical characteristics, outlining 
the three main forms of ficto-critical expression: collage/montage, autobiography, and 
metafictive. I argue that each expression encourages a more fluid processual subjectivity, 
different from what I see as the individuated, masterful or Oedipalised subject of 
normative critical writing.    36
 
The individuated subject is, according to Deleuze and Guattari, a product of the blind 
enforcement of the Oedipal complex, which represses the subject, knowledge, thought, and 
desire through its role as the overarching interpretative system. In this system desire can 
only ever equal lack since any connections outside established rules and conventions imply 
a shortcoming or dysfunction. In Deleuze and Guattari’s theories desire is reclaimed as a 
productive, connective, creative and positive process that enables the subject to be 
imagined as vital, constantly changing through its engagement with the other. Envisioned 
in a Deleuzian system, ficto-criticism and the subject it generates can be seen positively. 
Here ficto-criticism need not be apologetic and defensive for its creative transgression, nor 
must it explain its failure to adhere to the rigorous objectivity of conventional academic 
writing. It becomes an alternate critical paradigm where new connections between the self 
and other are actively sought. Instead of interpreting and repressing difference—through 
an inflexible code regardless of the context—ficto-critical writing engages with what it 
sets out to explore in an experimental ethical creative process. The self of ficto-critical 
writing does not wish mastery over its subject, and self-reflexively acknowledges the 
impact of that subject (the other) on the self. In other words, ficto-critical writing 
fundamentally recognises—at the level of generic style—the contingent and partial nature 
of all critical writing and by extension, knowledge.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari’s theories thus emerge as relevant tools to explore ficto-criticism 
since they open a space in which writing-between can be considered in a manner that 
allows for its creativity, multiplicity and complexity. It need not be automatically 
dismissed for failing to play by the rules, nor need it be interpreted singularly. 
Significantly, however, my use of Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual system—including 
the notion of minor literature—is materialist and determined by my understanding of their 
work and its relevance to ficto-criticism. This approach is, in fact, consistent with their 
oeuvre since Deleuze and Guattari’s theories encourage and allow for such appropriation. 
For example, as Brian Massumi has stated “Delueze’s own image for a concept is not a   37
brick but a ‘tool box’” (xv). Similarly, in Dialogues with Clare Parnet, Deleuze says of 
concepts; ‘There’s no question of difficulty or understanding: concepts are exactly like 
sounds, colours or images, they are intensities which suit you or not, which are acceptable 
or aren’t acceptable” (10). Therefore, rather than referring to their theories as ideas or 
merely concepts, I have chosen to use “concept-tools” as an alternative. As this term 
suggests I do not spend a great deal of time interpreting their theories, instead I use their 
concept-tools in a productive and pragmatic way by employing them to map the varying 
characteristics of ficto-criticism, and the challenges such a practice raises to more 
traditional ways of knowing. In this thesis I am concerned with the practical application of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s theories within the context of the historical emergence of ficto-
criticism rather than exploring and explaining the philosophical and intellectual traditions 
that inform their work.  
 
However, despite the flexibility of approach allowed for by Deleuzian thought, it is still 
necessary to provide some explanation as to my reading and application of their theories.  
I begin this chapter, therefore, by examining a passage from the introduction to Kafka by 
Réda Bensmaïa in order to introduce my reading of Deleuze and Guattari. From there I 
discuss the three main reasons why Deleuzian thought is so relevant to ficto-criticism 
through introducing some of their key concept-tools. These include the notion of 
minoritarian and majoritarian, de- and reterrritorialisation, and the subject developed by 
Guattari in Chaosmosis. An initial discussion on these concept-tools is necessary as 
background to argue that ficto-criticism is a minor literature that operates to critique of 
normative academic writing. Similarly, to establish the status of ficto-criticism as a minor 
literature I then work through the three characteristics outlined in Kafka, relating them to 
writing-between. Finally, I argue for the three characteristics or expressions of writing-
between—collage/montage, autobiographical and metafictive—by examining Australian 
and Canadian texts. These include Erin Mouré’s Pillage Laud, a short piece by Anne 
Brewster, Fred Wah’s Diamond Grill, Gail Jones’ “Skulls, Fontanelles and the Spaces 
Between,” and finishing with Yasmin Ladha’s The Lion’s Granddaughter.   38
 
Modelling Deleuze and Guattari? 
Bensmaïa, in the translated version of her foreword, clarifies the potential of minor 
literature for reading other literatures at the margin of literary tradition: 
By proposing the concept of “minor literature”. . . Deleuze and Guattari give the 
modern reader a means by which to enter into Kafka’s work without being 
weighted down by the old categories of genres, types, modes, and style (in the 
“linguistic” sense of the term, as Barthes would say). These categories would imply 
that the reader’s task is at bottom to interpret Kafka’s writing, whether the 
interpretation take the form of parabolism, negative theology, allegory, symbolism, 
“correspondences,” and so on. The concept of minor literature permits a reversal: 
instead of Kafka’s work being related to some preexistent category or literary 
genre, it will henceforth serve as a rallying point or model for certain texts and “bi-
lingual” writing practices that, until now, had to pass through a long purgatory 
before even being read, much less recognized. (xiv)  
In mapping Kafka’s work as minor literature Deleuze and Guattari have thus developed a 
concept-tool that encourages an approach to literature not based on the search for what is 
signified. Instead of focusing on interpretation, minor literature enables one to engage 
creatively and experimentally with texts. Ficto-criticism, which mixes the generic markers 
of fiction and non-fiction, is a creative experimental style of critical writing that has—as a 
result of its hybridity—little or no rules. Put another way, ficto-critical writing imitates the 
philosophical approach of minor literature. The term ficto-criticism is, in fact, 
indeterminate, and the practice encourages indeterminacy. In the words of Deleuze and 
Guattari: “Only the principle of multiple entrances prevents the introduction of the enemy, 
the Signifier and those attempts to interpret a work that is actually only open to 
experimentation” (Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka 3). Similarly, as suggested by the small 
amount of published material that directly addresses such practices, ficto-criticism is a 
form that has not been researched much at all. It is, as a consequence, not well known like 
other minor literatures. Part of the failure of ficto-criticism to attract serious critical   39
academic attention is very probably its diverse and slippery multiple character. The 
concept of a minor literature, as Bensmäiä states in the quotation above, thus recuperates 
writing practices that were previously banished to the margins and left unexamined due to 
their unruly, difficult style. Deleuze and Guattari’s question of how to enter into Kafka’s 
work—that opens his oeuvre to the possibility of a minor literature—thus resonates loudly 
with such a practice as ficto-criticism. A closer examination of the full quotation from 
Bensmäiä gives me an opportunity to introduce my approach to the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari, an approach that will build and develop in this thesis along the same continuum.  
 
Generally speaking the words of Bensmäiä quoted above serve well as an introduction to 
the concept-tool of a minor literature and its relevance as a dynamic theoretical entry point 
for the generically hybrid ficto-criticism, a (non)form generally dismissed by the literary 
disciplines. However, her use of “model” to describe Kafka’s work and minor literature is 
contradictory. It is contradictory both in the context of her passage and that of Deleuzian 
theory.  Whilst the use of “model” might be explained as a symptom of translation, the 
word is antithetical to Deleuzian theory because it conveys the traditional notion of genre. 
This is a subtle yet important detail, and its identification here demonstrates how I am 
choosing to read Deleuze and Guattari’s work to engage with ficto-criticism. “Model” 
commonly means an exemplar, and implies something fixed, which is then imitated. As 
Bensmäiä herself argues, minor literature desires escape from such models or categories. 
The notion of model in this passage thus becomes a contradiction in terms and highlights 
the challenges Deleuzian theory presents to dominant ways of knowing.
2  Instead of fixing 
and reducing concepts and knowledge into manageable pieces, Deleuzian theory prefers 
the experimental productive flow of ideas without hierarchy. This is suggested by the 
concept-tool of the rhizome,
3 which is set in play to reveal the arboreal structure of 
bifurcation that they argue underpins dominant Western thought. The rhizome represents a 
multiplicity of heterogeneous connections; the rhizome is always both/and and never 
either/or. Subsequently, I prefer the expression “rallying point,” given in Bensmäiä’s 
passage as an alternative to “model,” as this phrasing implies much more motility and is   40
thus more consistent with Deleuzian thought. This is because “rallying point” is less 
prescriptive and does not propose to determine where one will end up; from a rallying 
point there is the potential for movement in any direction. The contradiction implied by the 
use of the term model in the translated passage of Bensmäiä is thus enabling in the context 
of this chapter, as it foregrounds my intention to think through ficto-criticism as a 
politically motivated writing practice that shuns the traditional modelisation of genre.
4  
 
Deleuze and Guattari critique the tradition of hermeneutics in Western philosophy, which 
attempts to revise and totalise the material, actual, social and subjective through an 
interpretative key. Ficto-criticism—a performative practice—thus runs parallel with 
Deleuzian thought and the characteristics of minor literatures: 
But a minor, or revolutionary, literature begins by expressing itself and doesn’t 
conceptualize until afterward (“I do not see the word at all, I invent it”). Expression 
must break forms, encourage ruptures and new sproutings. When a form is broken, 
one must reconstruct the content that will necessarily be part of a rupture in the 
order of things. (Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka 28) 
The “sprouting” of the term from an experimental and unnamed practice, combined with 
the form’s contravention of the rules of criticism, signals why ficto-criticism can be 
envisioned as a minor literature. Ficto-criticism ruptures the order of things with its 
multiple creative experimentation between fiction and non-fiction, encouraging a 
rhizomatic theorisation. It is for these practical and conceptual reasons that I have chosen 
to use the concept-tools of Deleuze and Guattari, as a way to imagine the space-between 
that is ficto-criticism. Through my application of Deleuzian theory I encourage a 
productive use of the literary machine, extracting from the ficto-critical text its 
revolutionary force. This means in Deleuzian terms, not just the unravelling of meaning 
and the unified subject but, the positive dynamic production and connection of new 
meanings and subjectivities. Having established the general theoretical approach of my 
ficto-critical exegesis, I now introduce in more detail the concept-tools of Deleuze and 
Guattari that I engage with in this chapter, and I discuss their relevance. Given the   41
complexity of Deleuzian thought—and its desire to imagine a way to think differently—
there is a need to introduce some of the key themes and ideas present in their work. After 
doing so, I then delve more substantially into the Deleuzian notion of minor literature to 
begin to visualize the theoretical terrain that, I argue, best realises ficto-criticism as a 
practice of writing-between. 
 
Firstly, ficto-criticism, particularly within the context of the academy, is minoritarian. That 
is, it reproduces a deterritorialising movement since it eschews dominant forms and 
celebrates connections between elements. Deterritorialisation is a key term of Deleuze and 
Guattari that refers to the escape or release of desire from stable, blocking states such as 
the Oedipal complex. As a result, ficto-criticism is minoritarian since it sits in relation to 
majoritarian or normative critical writing, which functions as the standard. Similarly, ficto-
criticism enacts a minoritarian movement by refusing the majoritarian voice or position of 
the dominant critic. The mixing of genres that seeks to critique the codes and conventions 
of criticism is a risky business for many as it is the process of risking one’s own authority 
and legitimacy in the writing of criticism. In ficto-criticism there is no will to power by 
conquering a text through its objectification and sublimation as the object of study. Ficto-
criticism is the process of doing something with rather than to the text: rather than an act of 
mastery it desires to break the boundaries between subject and object enacted by 
traditional (interpretative) criticism. The play with genres works to question literary 
hierarchies and the inclusion of the personal and creative threaten the notion of objective 
truth proven by the orderly and controlling essay. Ficto-criticism includes the excesses 
ghosting the margins of the dominant academic essay and in its extreme form can be 
nonsensical or, in Deleuzian terms, a form of schizoanalysis.
5 Similarly, creative writing 
that includes non-fictional concerns illuminates the arbitrary nature of the distinctions that 
inform generic hierarchies. 
 
In contrast, academic texts reduce their subject of analysis to fixed meanings and readings. 
This is achieved by the reductive and dialectic style of scholarly writing as it discards any   42
elements that distract from the, more often than not, linear argument. If the detractors are 
not discarded, then they are swiftly dealt with, proven to be aberrant, incorrect, or just 
irrelevant. The student learning the academic essay style is required to order and control 
their material to enact closure in a convincing fashion that proves their mastery over their 
topic and material. If the student is being asked to strictly follow the traditional academic 
essay form, they are also required to evacuate the text of any traces of personal interest. 
Anything personal—according to the conventions of academic writing—should be 
confined to the preface or acknowledgments. The serious academic is expected to do the 
same. Despite the developments and shifts in intellectual beliefs, which acknowledge the 
partiality of knowledge, there remains an institutional reliance on old systems of belief that 
wish to fix knowledge through the notion of objectivity. Ficto-criticism’s defiance of the 
conventions of traditional critical writing, such as objectivity, marks it as minoritarian. 
 
Secondly, Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of the constant and connected relationship 
between de- and re-territorialisation inherent in the world of capitalism is extremely useful 
in conceptualising the tenuous and tense space of ficto-criticism. Whilst it unravels genre 
through sitting between existing generic borders, ficto-criticism still relies on such generic 
borders to come into non-being (as it were). If, as already suggested, deterritorialisation 
refers to a process where flows of interconnectedness replace monolithic ideologies, 
reterritorialisation then refers to the flows of desire being blocked, that is it refers to their 
capture by territories or codes such as the school, family, nation, or, in this case, genre and 
literary tradition. Illustrating this constant pull between the two states, Deleuze and 
Guattari say that “[t]he movement of deterritorialisation can never be grasped in itself, one 
can only grasp its indices in relation to the territorial representations” (Anti-Oedipus 316). 
De- and re-territorialisation thus help explain the way in which ficto-criticism utilises the 
territoriality of genre to deterritorialise literature. At the same time, this formula explains 
the way in which ficto-criticism is in constant danger of being reterritorialised through that 
identification, and the institutional academic traditions that pressure the text to make sense 
and demonstrate its mastery. Unlike the traditional critic, the ficto-critic or “schizoanalyst   43
is not an interpreter, even less a theatre director; [s]he is a mechanic, a micromechanic. 
There are no excavations to be undertaken, no archaeology . . .” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
Anti-Oedipus 338). Although here I’m speaking mainly of ficto-criticism within academic 
institutions, similar concerns about the sense and nonsense of the text abound in dominant 
theories of writing.  Elements such as clarity, understanding, syntax, and grammar are the 
yardsticks with which to measure the success and worth of a piece of writing. Ficto-
criticism must always on some level remain a writing-between, always between escape and 
capture: “[s]chizophrenia or desiring production is the boundary between the molar 
organisation and the molecular multiplicity of desire . . .” (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-
Oedipus 102). Within ficto-criticism there is always, therefore, an internal limit on which 
it can be caught, the challenge is to take ficto-criticism into the desert, the space where 
Deleuze and Guattari imagine the realisation of many “lines of flight” or deterritorialised 
flows of desire. The ever-present potential threat of reterritorialisation explains the need 
for individual and contextual readings of each example of ficto-criticism, for even within a 
deterritorialised text, moments of micro-fascism can (and do) indeed exist.
6 Deleuze and 
Guattari signal this themselves, warning that the dangers are always ever present and that 
escape is never guaranteed (A Thousand Plateaus 250). 
 
The third major reason for using Deleuze and Guattari in this discussion on ficto-criticism 
is their theorisation of subjectivity (that Guattari extrapolates in Chaosmosis). This notion 
of subjectivity is useful in conceptualising the practice of ficto-criticism. According to 
Guattari the self is in a constant process of subjectification. The self is produced and 
becomes a co-creator of itself and that which it interacts with because it is always in a state 
of becoming. He describes this subjectivity as autopoetic and machinic, arguing that this 
notion of subjectivity has the potential to encourage a new ethico-political paradigm, that 
is imagined, in their terms, at a molecular level. Molecular is posited in relation to molar 
institutionalised structures, such as the family, church, school and the state. In this relation, 
molecular thus comes to suggest localised, multiple and micro-level meanings, writings, 
incidents and objects which are then inscribed with an order and significance by dominant   44
structures of organization.
7 This molecular and creative subjectivity, composed of a 
multitude of modalities of alterity grasped only at its point of emergence, Guattari hopes 
cannot help but encourage a new way of being in the world that is: 
non-xenophobic, non-racist, non-phallocratic—intensive and processual . . . a new 
love of the unknown . . . In the end, a politics and ethics of singularity, breaking the 
consensus, the infantile ‘reassurance’ distilled by dominant subjectivity. (117)  
Maintaining the trope of the machine, as a productive system of interruptions, the 
subjectivity Guattari proposes is neither based on mastery nor on a closing off between the 
self and other. Instead of an individuated subjectivity linked to origins and location, he 
desires an understanding of the subject by evaluating displacement and constant change. In 
Guattari’s words: “Autopoetic machines undertake an incessant process of the replacement 
of their components as they must continually compensate for the external perturbations to 
which they are exposed” (39). Through reading a book, using the internet, familial and 
institutional relations, and media events, the subject is constantly being produced. As 
outlined in Anti-Oedipus this subjectivity is also in danger of being individualised as 
capitalist axioms work to recode the heterogeneity of this processual creative production.  
 
How is this autopoetic subjectivity useful to ficto-criticism? It is useful as it mirrors the 
way in which ficto-criticism breaks down the distinction between the self and the other 
constructed by traditional criticism, which relies on an arbitrary distinction between 
object/subject, criticism/literature and non-fiction/fiction. As Guattari reminds us: “One 
gets to know them [the other] not through representation but through active 
contamination” (14). Ficto-criticism demonstrates the subject-in-process through a critique 
of the division between the self and the other. By mixing fictional techniques with non-
fictional styles or forms, ficto-criticism dares to become the other of academic discourse: it 
takes the voice of the native informant of ethnographic texts. In this autopoetic (aesthetic-
creative) moment, ficto-criticism has the potential to break free and become something 
other than what is predetermined by the molar: “The time has come for hypertexts in every 
genre, and even for a new cognitive and sensory writing that Pierre Levy describes as   45
‘dynamic ideography’” (Guattari 96-7). As a molecular desiring practice this kind of 
writing thus requires a different approach from traditional reading models. The application 
of Deleuzian theory thus not only helps explain the need for a different approach to 
reading ficto-criticism, it enables a reading that is more sympathetic to the multiplicity of a 
practice of writing-between.  Having established the broad grounds for applying the work 
of Deleuze and Guattari, I now turn to more wholly explore the notion of a minor literature 
and its relevance to ficto-criticism. 
 
Ficto-criticism as (a) minor literature 
As one of the many possible points of entry into the virtually unmapped ficto-critical 
burrow, I now fully embrace Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of a minor literature and their 
desire for a deterritorialised encounter with Kafka’s texts, as an opening into ficto-
criticism. Both in the context of the academy and outside the academy, in the literary 
world of publishing and readership, ficto-criticism is a minor literature.  To establish 
clearly its minoritarian status, I begin by employing the tropes of the bent head (portrait-
photo) and the straightened head (musical sound) that Deleuze and Guattari use (among 
others) to conceptualise Kafka’s work.  According to them, these elements are consistent 
throughout Kafka’s texts. For example, in The Castle there is the portrait of a porter with 
his head bent, his chin sunk into his chest. Whilst in The Metamorphosis and Amerika 
sound is present as desire, expressed through the vibration of pure sonorous material. The 
musical sounds they identify in Kafka are not organised into composition; they are 
unstructured sounds, “a sonority that ruptures” (Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka 6).
 Deleuze 
and Guattari begin by linking these two “relatively independent forms” to illustrate the 
presence of alternative productive connections in his texts, beyond Oedipal triangulation. 
The equation or concepts they develop here, of the bent and straightened head, are very 
useful in understanding ficto-criticism, as they demonstrate the complexity around the 
process and tension between its de- and re-territorialisation. However, it is important to 
consider that in Kafka this equation is not fixed and is not intended to function as a formal 
opposition. The element that plays the role of heterogeneity is not always the same, as it is   46
affected by its material location within Kafka’s oeuvre. The significance of this is that, 
through his constant experimentation, Kafka’s work challenges the tradition of 
hermeneutics, imagining a line of escape from the exaggerated Oedipus. 
 
This “lifting” of Deleuze and Guattari’s tropes developed specifically in relation to Kafka 
(the bent and desiring straightened head) may appear to be an arbitrary gesture.  However, 
as argued earlier, Deleuze and Guattari’s theories actually encourage and allow for such 
appropriation since they understand concepts to be like tools, which are either useful or not 
useful in a given context. In this instance, I find in Deleuze and Guattari’s “tool box,” the 
concepts of the bent and straightened head interesting and playful images with which to 
explore ficto-criticism. I experience my own lifting, as I take from Deleuze and Guattari’s 
tool box of concepts and move towards these image-concepts, a literal (light fingered) 
lifting and a lifting and straightening of my head in a gesture of desire towards new 
connections and new possibilities.  In the words of Deleuze and Guattari, therefore, I find 
these images or tropes acceptable colours and sounds to “pick up”
 8 and proceed with at 
this point.   
 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, the bent head of the portrait photo in their equation is a 
form of content: “a blocked, oppressed or oppressing, neutralised desire, with a minimum 
of connection, childhood memory, territoriality or reterritorialisation.”  In contrast, the 
straightened head (suggested by musical sound in Kafka) is a form of expression, as 
“music always seems caught up in an indivisible becoming-child or becoming-animal, a 
sonorous block that opposes the visual memory.” The straightened head of expression, is 
“a desire that straightens up or moves forward, and opens us to new connections, 
childhood block or animal block, deterritorialisation” (Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka 5). In 
this equation, I have taken the bent head of content to express the reterritorialisation or 
territoriality of ficto-criticism.  By this I mean the placement of ficto-criticism both inside 
and outside the academy, its geographic and discursive location as a product in the literary 
machine.  The straightened head, however, the image of expression, is here suggestive of   47
ficto-criticism as a line of flight, a creative deterritorialisation or flow of desire. Ficto-
criticism embodies desire—it is a creative gesturing towards new connections, new 
forms—a potentiality and an act of deterritorialisation achieved theoretically and 
stylistically through its challenge to the taxonomic hierarchy of genre. As already stated, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s reclamation of desire from lack challenges its association with 
acquisition (the lack of a real object)—to make it a productive force. They argue that from 
Plato through to contemporary (psychoanalytic) theories, desire has been (dis)credited as 
lack:
9 “everywhere we encounter the analytic process that consists in extrapolating a 
transcendent and common something . . .for the sole purpose of introducing lack into 
desire” (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 72). In this way, ficto-criticism is better 
understood as a productive and revolutionary force. Instead of interpreting it as 
(non)generic and lacking an assumed unity, it is now a source of creative power and, as 
such, a form of minor literature. 
 
For ficto-criticism, therefore, both the bent and the straightened head are tropes of minor 
literatures.  The bent head for ficto-criticism within the academy is suggestive of the 
moments of deterritorialisation enacted through the performance of ficto-criticism, as it 
challenges the codes and conventions of scholarly writing but which the institution blocks. 
The bent head might be the literal bent or blocked head (intellect) of the student or 
academic attempting to write ficto-criticism, who is either given poor marks, prevented 
from writing in this way at all, or, in the case of the academic, refused tenure or promotion. 
In “Ficto-criticism: Pedagogy and Practice,” Anne Brewster signals this dynamic when she 
discusses the institutional pressures that endorse “the more conventional forms of 
scholarship and knowledge while deprivileging other genres of writing such as fiction” 
(89). To fiction we might also add ficto-criticism, a form of writing Brewster says a 
number of her students are drawn towards, but which is marginal within the academy: 
my students often express frustration with the discursive limits of the essay which 
has long enjoyed the status of the prime genre of written assessment in literary and 
cultural studies courses.  They find the conventions of the so-called impersonal,   48
disinterested voice of academic scholarship and the narrative closure of the 
[academic] essay limiting.  They often question the hierarchisation and 
compartmentalisation of genres in the academy which generally disallow forms of 
written assessment other than the essay such as the importation of discursive 
strategies of fiction or poetry (or other genres) into the essay. (“Ficto-criticism 
Pedagogy and Practice” 90)    
According to Brewster, therefore, one might imagine that the marginal status of alternative 
(non)genres like ficto-criticism could induce the frustrated student or academic attempting 
to write ficto-critically to bend their heads in a gesture of “blocked, oppressed or 
oppressing neutralised desire” (Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka 5). For example, in “Against 
Subjectivity,” Michael Bérubé talks of the way in which humanities scholars have been 
taken to task for failing to keep their interests out of their work. Quoting John Searle 
discussing grant applications to the American National Endowment for the Humanities 
(NEH), Bérubé signals the detrimental effect that such an approach may have on one’s 
career. According to Bérubé, Searle states: 
[F]unding agencies such as the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) 
receive an increasing number of applications in which it is obvious that the scholar 
wants to write a book about his or her politically motivated subjective reactions to, 
feelings about, and general “take on” the Renaissance, the plight of women in the 
Middle Ages, minority novelists of the Pacific North-west, transvestites in the 
eighteenth century. (qtd. in Bérubé 1064) 
As Searle’s comments (and their tone) clearly intimate, writing ficto-critically by 
incorporating autobiographical subjective concerns—concerns not cloaked by a feigned 
objectivity—has the potential to block or repress your grant application.
10 
 
From the perspective of creative writing ficto-criticism is also minoritarian and might 
cause a similar “bending of the head;” both for the creative writer who wishes to write 
ficto-critically and for the creative writer who rejects the advances of non-fiction into 
fiction. Ficto-criticism—positioned between fiction and non-fiction—will often illicit   49
negative responses from either side of the generic border. From a traditional academic 
perspective ficto-criticism is judged as not intellectually rigorous, lacking discipline, 
narcissistic and the soft option in contrast to more conservative modes of academic writing 
and research. Similarly, from the perspective of creative writing the self-reflexivity 
inherent in ficto-criticism informed by contemporary theory is often viewed as an 
inappropriate incursion of non-fictional and academic or intellectual concerns into a 
“purely” creative mode of writing.
11 Creative writers who challenge existing genres by 
mixing fiction with traditional non-fictional concerns and approaches are thus often 
criticised for betraying the conventions of fiction/creative writing. Contemporary theories 
of literature and epistemology have for some time acknowledged the arbitrary nature of 
such distinctions. Yet, despite the partial nature of such constructions having been 
generally acknowledged and accepted intellectually, it seems that—stylistically—one is 
expected to remain loyal to forms of writing that are underwritten by theories of 
knowledge that have been “overturned.” For those who strongly invest in established 
generic borders to define their work and place, ficto-criticism is understandably viewed 
negatively and has produced strong, often emotive, responses. Simon Robb discusses the 
reception of ficto-criticism in “Academic Divination is Not a Mysticism.” According to 
him, “There are limits to this writing [ficto-criticism] and they can be found in the logic of 
the discourse in which one is located.” From the perspective of academic discourse, for 
example, it thus becomes: “a kind of contamination or pollution of rational academic 
writing: ‘matter out of place.’” (98). I would argue that, from the traditional discourse of 
creative writing, ficto-criticism would similarly be seen as a kind of pollution.  Ficto-
criticism is consequently seen as a weed, which “exists only to fill waste spaces left by 
cultivated areas. It grows between, among other things” (Deleuze and Guattari, A 
Thousand Plateaus 31). Ficto-critical practices are viewed as marginal to established 
discursive practices; from either side of the generic fence, ficto-criticism is a 
“contaminated” form.  
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The bent head could also come to invoke the territoriality of ficto-criticism, as it becomes 
“blocked and oppressed” in the sense that it begins to be codified: in other words, the 
location of ficto-criticism within the university and its appearance in certain published 
forms.
 12 These connections—with established centres of power in the literary machine—
show the forces of reterritorialisation at work. Ficto-criticism in Canada and Australia has 
many connections with universities, even sometimes with the more conservative, older 
universities. The revolutionary project of ficto-criticism would not immediately be thought 
of as being associated with the institutionalised power of the academy, nor would one 
expect it to be published (by well established publishing houses), and yet it is. How does a 
form of writing-between that critiques normative academic writing and challenges the 
generic boundaries of fiction and non-fiction find itself with such legitimate associations? 
One can, for example, (as already mentioned) study ficto-criticism at the University of 
Tasmania as part of an honours degree, and publishing houses like Routledge and Duke 
University Press have released anthologies of ficto-critical writing.
13 These are instances 
of ficto-criticism being reappropriated into centres of legitimate knowledge production. 
Here the academy and publishers incorporate some milder forms of ficto-criticism into 
their canon, reducing its revolutionary potential as it becomes a known style theorised, 
analysed and interpreted by introductory chapters that explain its meaning and the origin of 
the form. Significantly, it is often the more conservative and accessible forms of ficto-
criticism that have attracted critical attention, such as autobiographical literary criticism. 
However, despite its affiliations with institutions such as the academy and publishing—in 
both Canada and Australia—ficto-criticism remains largely marginal. It might be seen as a 
new sexy postmodern form, but few universities teach it and recognise it as a legitimate 
mode of assessment, and more often than not ficto-criticism tends to be published by 
small, independent publishers (where they remain).
14 The association of ficto-criticism 
with institutions of the literary machine signals the many contradictions of ficto-criticism: 
positioned quite literally between, in the sense of being marginal, yet at the same time 
located in such powerful institutions. 
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To further establish the relevance of minor literatures as a methodological framework for 
ficto-criticism, I will now discuss the three characteristics of minor literature that Deleuze 
and Guattari outline:  
1.  “A minor literature doesn’t come from a minor language; it is rather that which a 
minority constructs within a major language. But the first characteristic of minor 
literature in any case is that in it language is affected with a high coefficient of 
deterritorialization.”  
2.  “The second characteristic of minor literatures is that everything in them is political 
. . .The individual concern . . . becomes all the more necessary, indispensable, 
magnified, because a whole other story is vibrating within it.”  
3.  “The third characteristic of minor literature is that in it everything takes on a 
collective value . . . literature finds itself positively charged with the role and 
function of the collective, and even revolutionary, enunciation.” 
(Kafka 16-7) 
Ficto-criticism meets these criteria. Firstly, by breaking the conventions of normative 
generic forms, ficto-criticism is a practice with a high coefficient of deterritorialisation. 
For example, it deterritorialises scholarly writing by incorporating the less serious and 
objective (from the standpoint of critical discourse) characteristics of poetics, 
autobiography, description and narrative. All of these characteristics are considered by the 
discourse of scholarship to be suggestive of fiction (in the sense of not being objective and 
factual) and, as a result, have no place in serious academic writing. Take, for example, 
autobiography. Whilst autobiography is categorised as non-fiction—and believed to be 
based on fact—when incorporated into academic writing it is seen to weaken the research. 
General readers might believe a work of autobiography to be wholly true, but academic 
audiences are likely to be suspicious of the narrative being told as a personal story and thus 
tainted by the subjective and the fictional. Autobiography, despite being categorised as 
non-fiction, is therefore viewed as having a much higher level of fictional content than 
objective scholarly writing. From a traditional academic perspective the inclusion of 
autobiographical detail suggests a subjective response that cannot be true. The blurring of   52
the lines between such genres, therefore, functions to deterritorialise the major languages 
that determine what is fact and what is fiction.   
 
Ficto-criticism similarly deterritorialises fiction, as it becomes self-referential through 
taking on a critical or theoretical role normally associated with non-fictional genres. In 
examining its own mode of production, and by extension the generic rules of fiction (thus 
actively undermining them), metafictive ficto-critical forms defy not only the formal role 
of fiction as entertainment but also the role of criticism as a separate and specialised 
discipline. By constructing a minority language from within existing major languages—
fiction and non-fiction—the ficto-critic imagines an alternative or revolutionary minor 
literature. Here, the student, academic, or creative writer becomes “like a foreigner in 
one’s own language. Constructing a line of flight” (Deleuze and Parnet 4). As Deleuze and 
Parnet write: “We must become bilingual in a single language, we must create a minor use 
of our own language” (4). This “bilingualisation” is what the ficto-critic moves towards 
with their hybridised form. 
  
Through this deterritorialisation ficto-criticism thus achieves the second characteristic of 
minor literatures. That is, the connection of the individual to the political domain. When 
one is operating in the “cramped space” of a minor literature the norms of the major 
literature that determine its minoritarian status immediately fall into sharp relief (“because 
a whole other story is vibrating within it” (17)). Ficto-criticism is a political act as it 
presents alternatives to dominant generic modes. Through its minoritarian placement in 
relation to normative modes of writing it cannot fail, therefore, to make apparent the 
modalities of certain writing styles and their connections to wider structures of knowledge, 
which determine hierarchies of value. Consequently, within a minor literature the focus 
shifts from a majoritarian perspective to a minoritarian perspective, in which connections 
between dominant structures loom large:  
What in great literature goes on down below, constituting a not indispensable cellar 
of the structure, here takes place in the full light of day, what is there a matter of   53
passing interest for a few, here absorbs everyone no less than as a matter of life and 
death. (Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka 17) 
The situation becomes grave, “a matter of life and death,” because the dominant structural 
conditions—that the minor literature flies in the face of—threaten to extinguish it.   
 
The third and final characteristic of minor literatures that Deleuze and Guattari establish is 
that of the collective assemblage of enunciation. Ficto-criticism invokes collective value in 
that it is simultaneously imbued with multiplicity while undermining mastery. One voice 
does not speak above in a minor literature. For example, how can you have “talent”—how 
can you be a master—in a literature in constant (experimental) flux? As a deterritorialising 
practice ficto-criticism is always in the process of breakdown. Significantly, according to 
Deleuze and Guattari, literature is always a deterritorialising practice that is then captured 
and reterritorialised: “For literature is like schizophrenia: a process and not a goal . . .” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 133). The trick is to not allow oneself to be coded 
into a hard segment by maintaining: “a violence against syntax, a concerted destruction of 
the signifier, non-sense erected as a flow, polyvocity that returns to haunt all relations” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 133).  In ficto-critical writing, as expressed in 
Deleuzian terms, collective assemblages of enunciation function directly within the 
multiplicity of machinic assemblages and take on a rhizomatic formulation that only ever 
begins in the middle: 
The middle is by no means an average; on the contrary, it is where things pick up 
speed. Between things does not designate a localizable relation going from one 
thing to the other and back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal 
movement that sweeps one and the other away, a stream without beginning or end 
that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle. (Deleuze and Guattari, 
A Thousand Plateaus 25) 
This is how ficto-criticism operates, as a contaminated form between and within fiction 
and non-fiction. When mapped by Deleuzian methodology ficto-criticism is a collective   54
enunciation in so much as it maintains those machinic assemblages, which are always 
“between” in their multiplicity. 
 
Three expressions of ficto-criticism 
In the same way that Deleuze and Guattari identify three characteristics of minor 
literatures, three characteristics or stylistic tendencies are apparent in ficto-critical 
discourse. The three expressions of ficto-criticism are collage/montage or pick-up, 
autobiographical, and metafictive. Whilst I wish to observe these stylistics, I am in no way 
suggesting that they are mutually exclusive categories, either conceptually or in practice. 
For example, many ficto-critical texts demonstrate all three expressions with varying 
intensities. In keeping with the perpendicular direction of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept 
of the between, these stylistic trends do “not designate a localizable relation going from 
one thing to the other and back again,” but a conjunction of “and, and, and” (A Thousand 
Plateaus 25). Similarly, in the process of examining these stylistic characteristics, I bring 
into play some other interconnected concepts of Deleuze and Guattari that help imagine 
ficto-criticism both as a space-between, and as writing-between. What, however, needs to 
be kept in mind is that there are levels or degrees of intensity in the use of these stylistics, 
as there are in the processes of capture and escape for ficto-criticism from generic 
taxonomy.
15 I now outline these stylistic tendencies and give an explanation of their 
character. 
 
The first ficto-critical stylistic is constituted by a tendency to use the devices of collage 
and montage in ficto-critical texts. The generic conventions of established forms such as 
non-fiction, the academic essay, poetry, prose, and realism are split open by bringing 
together text from many sources and genres in unexpected ways. The Fontana Dictionary 
of Modern Thought defines collage as an: “Internationally current French term for the 
sticking together of disparate elements to make a picture. The modern use of this 
technique, now an artistic and educational commonplace . . .” Montage, in general terms, 
has a similar definition: “. . .for almost any type of compilation made up of disparate   55
elements, particularly where there is a mechanical quality about the work.” In this thesis, I 
am using these terms very loosely to mean the splicing together of disparate elements. 
These elements are deemed disparate from the perspective of major (official) languages, 
such as, grammar or genre. Whilst I have chosen to identify this stylistic expression in 
ficto-critical practice as collage/montage—since I am using these terms generally to 
suggest a practice of compiling disparate elements—I wish to point out that within 
Deleuzian theory the notion of “pick-up” is more appropriate. Collage and montage are 
terms easily recognisable, which is why I have employed them here to suggest a range of 
“cut-up” effects. However, as Deleuze points out in his dialogue with Claire Parnet, “cut-
up” in fact introduces the notion of lack back into the equation. Instead he proposes pick-
up, a stammering, in which “there is no cutting, folding or turning down, but 
multiplications according to the growing dimensions” (18). If ficto-critical texts are to be 
taken into the Deleuzian desert—to imagine a line of flight—they must become as if a 
stammering.  
 
The second characteristic could be termed autobiographical criticism or what has been 
identified as the personal turn in criticism. This is where the academic or non-fictional 
writer allows very openly the subjective nature of their discourse to flourish by 
incorporating autobiographical detail. As discussed earlier, despite being categorised as 
non-fiction autobiography is still deemed, through its subjective focus, to be less truthful 
or factual than discourses, which emphasise an objective stance.  The tendency towards 
autobiography in scholarly and other non-fictional writing is the dominant form ficto-
criticism takes in America, and is often aligned with the personal essay and creative non-
fiction. This is the most conservative expression of ficto-criticism, particularly when made 
very superficially and without any other self-referential gestures or textual 
experimentation.
16 In many ways, autobiographical criticism in its simplest form reflects 
an increasing unease around speaking for and about the other. 
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The third and final characteristic is what I have called metafictive ficto-criticism. The 
metafictive ficto-critical text is ostensively fictional—on first inspection—but undermines 
the generic taxonomy of fiction by enacting a self-referential commentary on its own mode 
of production. Texts such as these incorporate a critical commentary about the process of 
writing and meaning production. This characteristic is demonstrated by creative texts that 
integrate metafictive moments, which then break with mimesis by undermining the generic 
contract agreed to under the authority of realism. This stylistic characteristic of the 
between-text reflects the tendency in critical discourse (particularly literary criticism) 
increasingly to read contemporary creative texts as acts of theoretical commentary. 
 
The three expressions of ficto-criticism, thus, all generically “mix it up” in varying ways, 
and whilst not mutually exclusive they demonstrate quite distinct traits common to ficto-
critical texts. It is crucial to remember, however, that in a Deleuzian landscape these 
expressions can be present as only subtle traces, as explosive intensities that transgress the 
rules of knowing, or as something between. Through a close examination of several 
Australian and Canadian ficto-critical texts I illustrate these tendencies. These texts have 
been selected as they reflect each expression, yet in a manner that demonstrates the 
productive connections between the three stylistic expressions. 
 
In discussing the tendency towards collage techniques in ficto-critical texts I begin by 
examining Canadian poet Erin Mouré’s Pillage Laud. From here I move to discuss a short 
ficto-critical piece by Australian academic/ficto-critic Anne Brewster, finishing with 
Canadian Fred Wah’s Diamond Grill. I then look at several more texts, this time those that 
demonstrate the autobiographical and metafictive tendency in ficto-criticism. Here, things 
become less easily distinguishable as each text demonstrates more than one stylistic 
element, making cross-references back to Mouré, Brewster and Wah’s works. 
 
Pillage Laud, published in 1999, is poetry written using computer software. Mouré’s work 
demonstrates one of the characteristics of minor literature identified by Deleuze and   57
Guattari by maintaining a language style with a high coefficient of deterritorialisation. She 
states: “People who are making sense are just making me laugh, is all” (Furious 92). 
Mouré enacts a highly productive use of the literary machine by employing MacProse as a 
tool for her poetry. In the introductory pages she states: 
Pillage Laud selects from pages of computer-generated sentences to produce 
lesbian sex poems, by pulling through certain found vocabularies, relying on 
context: boy plug vagina library fate tool doctrine bath discipline belt beds pioneer 
book ambition finger fist flow.  (no page number given) 
Her poetry, in the tradition of language poetry, defamiliarises words by plundering 
language and destabilising referentiality. Collaging words together in a flow that breaks 
with grammar and syntax her work celebrates lesbian desire, producing, as it were, a minor 
language from within a major literary tradition. Identifying as a lesbian, Mouré has written 
about the effect this sense of being marginal has had on her work. To her: “Language 
never seems transparent” (“Acknowledging the Red Spades” 28). As the title of her 
collection suggests, this is a book in praise of plundering language. The following passage, 
from a poem titled “High Prairie,” illustrates Mouré’s irrefutable challenge to language 
through its break with syntax: 
  Who had the adults of opportunity listened. Have they pleased 
  Performances? Relax won’t display us. 
 
  This chapter is the idiom of curiosity, the note: 
  So competent a heroism. 
  Criticism was so veterinary a master. 
  The ventricle of marble, did an aloof fiction prepare? 
 
  We repeat laws, but you must circle me. 
  Our idiom—grace—came to flow; every hole had scattered 
  Every vote, we were parades. 
  So thick a restriction is speaking.   58
 
  To pause expands, who couldn’t the urge establish? 
  My shock is exercise. 
   A dictionary especially rules. 
 
  The skirt between another life and the writer charms you; 
  When am I entering? 
  The risk tugs between a sentence and my pioneer. 
 
 Vertiginous.  (16) 
This excerpt from Pillage Laud does indeed unravel and challenge the conventions of 
grammar and syntax, but is it ficto-criticism? The self-referential quality produced through 
actively undermining the tradition of poetry and language works as a critique of traditional 
modes of writing and speaking (and more specifically of (not) writing and speaking lesbian 
desire). I selected this passage as it demonstrates a moment when Mouré’s work also 
enacts a higher level of commentary on traditional critical roles (at more than just a formal 
level by breaking with conventional and conventionally valued modes of writing). In my 
reading of ficto-criticism as a between or minor literature, which is indicative of a 
productive desire for new connections between fiction and non-fiction, her work thus 
becomes a ficto-critical act in so much as it is creative yet critical. If Mouré’s meta-critical 
project (critiquing critical tradition) is in doubt, one need only look to one of the rare 
moments she speaks directly about her writing. In “The Acts,” an epilogue to her book 
Furious, Mouré discusses the issues she explores in her writing, and the problem of 
judging work that defies the tradition of language and genre (sense). Here, she also 
enunciates a methodology that is suggestive of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of collective 
assemblage and desire for a lines of flight:  
There’s no way you can logically or symptomatically break down & explain the 
connection between these parts. But, yet, when you take two parallel things & 
place them in the same reading, you enunciate a kind of alteration: your perception   59
of one part is affected by your perception of the others, whether you like it or not. 
&, I believe anyhow, that there are connections between seemingly parallel things 
that haven’t been enunciated yet because of flaws or “closed sets” (flaws is a value 
judgement) in our ways of speech. So, then, do we give up? Or do we try to break 
open the connections in another way? 
And Mouré goes on to explain that: 
What I am trying to do in my work these days is two things: 1) break down the 
logical connections/structure of “meaning” (referentiality), and 2) break down the 
noun/verb opposition wherein the present so-called ‘power’ of the language 
resides, both of these while still using the surface of ordinary speaking as a reflex 
for emotional power . . . (Mouré, Furious 93) 
Mouré’s challenge to referentiality and by extension knowledge is what determines her 
ficto-critical stance, which is achieved in part through the way she collages words and 
images together in non-standard ways. Moreover, there are several lines from “High 
Prairie” that confirm her play with language is much more than just an aesthetic adventure. 
For example, the line: “Criticism was so veterinary a master.” In this line or equation, the 
poet/poem becomes a dog in relation to their master and of lesser value than the highly 
trained master, the critic. As the veterinary, the critic might literally operate on or treat the 
poem. This line is also suggestive, I argue, of vivisection, that is, the way traditional 
criticism pulls apart and dissects the text in their quest for unified meaning.
17 Mouré’s use 
of “was” in this line denotes past tense (“Criticism was so veterinary a master”). Does this 
suggest that she has escaped traditional criticism by collapsing poetry and criticism 
together in her own text? 
 
Significantly, the use of the word master in relation to the critic brings into play notions of 
mastery, implying a range of hierarchies, starting with the relationship between the highly 
trained master/critic and subservient dog/poet, to the whole question of the great masters 
of literature (determined by whom?). In this way, Mouré can be seen to be invoking a 
commentary on critical judgement, her work simultaneously becoming a political   60
statement (“The second characteristic of minor literatures is that everything in them is 
political . . .” (17)). Mouré has, in fact, stated that she sees no distinction between politics 
and language (“Acknowledging the Red Spades” 27). Other lines from this passage that 
similarly suggest a higher order of commentary about the role of criticism, the search of a 
signifier, and more generally about systems of knowledge, are: “So thick a restriction is 
speaking,” “A dictionary especially rules,” and “We repeat laws, but you must circle me.” 
Ironically, my identification and interpretation of Mouré’s work as ficto-critical functions 
to demonstrate how easily texts—even those that challenge convention and order—can be 
captured and coded. Speaking of the deterritorialised nature of desire under capitalism, 
Deleuze and Guattari discuss how artificial reterritorialisations work to capture desire: 
Everything in the system is insane: this is because the capitalist machine thrives on 
decoded and deterritorialized flows; it decodes and deterritorializes them still more 
but while causing them to pass into an axiomatic apparatus that combines them, 
and at the points of combination produces pseudo and artificial reterritorializations. 
(Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 374) 
In this sense, ficto-criticism (the category) is itself a pseudo or artificial reterritorialisation 
in the same way that the genres of fiction and non-fiction are artificial categories. 
 
Mouré’s work is thus not necessarily lacking sense, meaning, or poetic style; instead, it is 
quite literally a productive use of desiring machines that I have, through the conventions of 
academic writing, recoded. However, by using a computer program to generate the 
material for her poems, and through breaking with syntax and thus traditional literary 
sense through collage-like techniques, one can imagine some readers—still searching for 
unity—asking where does her skill lie? Yet her work is an assemblage: “Assemblages are 
composed, and decomposed, and recomposed without a molar unity informing them” 
(Genesko 12). The application of the notion of talent is not relevant to minor literatures. 
 
In contrast to Mouré, Anne Brewster is a writer who is located within the academy. She 
employs what she describes as “collage-like arrangements” in her ficto-critical writing,   61
and has an interest in language poetry (an emerging category, like ficto-criticism, that 
could easily be applied to Pillage Laud) (Brewster, “Ficto-criticism: Pedagogy and 
Practice” 92).
18 Brewster is one of a handful of academics in Australia, along with Heather 
Kerr, that advocate ficto-critical writing.
19 Brewster is also a creative writer: her ficto-
critical piece published in The Space Between: Australian Women Writing Fictocriticism, 
demonstrates the use of collage and montage techniques in ficto-criticism.
20 In “Sucking 
on Remembrance: Encounters with the Vampire and Other Histories of the Body,” 
Brewster places creative passages alongside quotes from contemporary critical writers. For 
instance, at the end of her text you find a collection of endnotes referencing writers such as 
Walter Benjamin, Judith Butler, Sidonie Smith, Hélène Cixous and Iain Chambers. This 
style leaves the reader wondering whether this is creative writing or academic criticism. 
While on the one hand it is short in length like an academic essay and not arranged 
typographically on the page like a poem, as is Mouré’s text, on the other it is very creative 
and resembles prose-poetry.  
 
Unlike Mouré’s writing, which defies syntax, Brewster’s text more overtly defies generic 
convention. Mouré deterritorialises words through defamiliarising their referentiality, 
achieved by collaging them together in ways that break syntactical expectation. Brewster, 
on the other hand, deterritorialises through defamiliarlising genre, similarly employing 
collage-like techniques to achieve this. The context in which Brewster writes and works—
within an Australian university—makes her discourse more easily identifiable as ficto-
criticism. This is due to her primary role as an academic and, of course, her identification 
with the term. If she were like Mouré—only a creative writer—it would be much easier to 
see her work as experimental writing.
21 The context of the academy, however, makes it 
much more apparent that Brewster is offering an alternative to normative academic writing 
and that her hybridised style challenges the object and subject of traditional literary 
criticism.
22 This is aided, of course, by her presentation of papers at academic conferences 
on the subject of ficto-criticism. Her ficto-criticism is thus a practice that opens the space 
of traditional academic discourse to experimentation. As Brewster has stated:    62
In defamiliarising genre, ficto-criticism interrogates the way in which academic 
knowledges are constructed. It can be seen as a space clearing strategy which 
enables the dialogisation, the hybridisation and the relativisation of knowledges. 
(“Ficto-criticism: Pedagogy and Practice” 90) 
Her ficto-critical practice is therefore imbued with a critique of normative academic modes 
of writing: “I’m fascinated by the epistemic violence of the will to know, to name and to 
possess, particularly in the fields of colonisation and gender and also the contestatory and 
agonistic nature of knowledge production . . .” (“Ficto-criticism: Pedagogy and Practice” 
92). In its will to know, name and possess traditional academic convention would render 
Mouré’s work outside the realms of ficto-criticism since it fits the form of poetry. From 
the established academic perspective ficto-criticism would also seem much to an elastic 
category. However, by viewing Pillage Laud as ficto-criticism the divide between the 
traditional object of literary study (poem) and the subject (critic) is crossed, as she 
becomes the critic herself. Both Mouré and Brewster, for example, also make reference to 
contemporary writers and theorists, much in the same way as an academic text would. In 
fact, in the introductory pages of Pillage Laud Mouré quotes Derrida, Deleuze and 
Beckett.  
 
Another contemporary text that can be seen as an instance of ficto-criticism—which also 
employs collage-like techniques—is Fred Wah’s Diamond Grill. In the 
acknowledgements, Wah describes his text as “biotext.”
23 The material of this book 
explores his experience growing up in the Canada of the fifties with a hyphenated identity; 
his father was a Canadian-born Chinese-Scots-Irishman raised in China, whilst his mother 
was a Swedish-born Canadian. The chapters of this non-traditional autobiographic novel 
resemble paragraphs, and usually occupy only one page.
24 Each of these chapters begins 
with the first part of the first sentence as the title. The title of the book comes from his 
father’s Chinese-Canadian restaurant:  
  MIXED GRILL IS AN ENTRÉE 
  AT  THE  DIAMOND     63
and, as in most Chinese-Canadian restaurants in western Canada, is your typical 
improvised imitation of Empire cuisine. No kippers or kidney for the Chinese café 
cooks, though. They know the authentic mixed grill is alright. It is part of the 
colonial cook’s training, learning to serve the superior race in Hong Kong and 
Victoria properly, mostly as chefs in private elite clubs and homes. But, as the 
original lamb chop, split lamb kidney, and pork sausage edges its way onto every 
small town café menu, its ruddy countenance has mutated into something quick and 
dirty, not grilled at all, but fried. (Wah 2) 
While the collage technique in Diamond Grill is less apparent than in Brewster’s work, it 
is nevertheless still present. As the creative autobiographical passages are interspersed 
with cuttings from non-fictional sources, other sections incorporate disjunctive flows of 
language. In “Chinese Head Tax Paid Out Land Grants to,” for example, Wah splices 
together in a stream-of-consciousness several different texts as a commentary on the 
racism inherent in the head tax applied to Chinese immigrants to Canada. The section 
specifically dealing with the Chinese Immigration Act takes text from the original “Head 
Tax Certificate,” and fills the gaps left for an individual’s details with racialised 
stereotypes and vilification: 
This certifies that under the provisions of the Chinese Immigration Act Charley 
Chim Chong Say Wong Liu Chung a native of The Peach Garden in the Kingdom 
of Laundry of the age ancient years and whose title official rank profession or 
occupation is that of a rented muscle who arrived or landed at Gold Mountain on 
the auspicious day of the Yellow Pages 190_ 1858, 1885, 1903, 1923, 1947 Vide 
statement and declaration form No. one son has (never will be) paid the fee or duty 
imposed upon Chinese Immigrants on their arrival in Canada NOT, no Chinky way 
being exempt from such payment under the terms of the said Act . . . (Diamond 
Grill 130) 
Wah enacts a critique of racism and colonialism through reappropriating official language 
for his own (minor) use and interspersing it with clichés of Chinese culture from a white 
Canadian perspective. It is the incorporation of non-fictional texts into his biotext that   64
gives it a ficto-critical edge, as it works to disturb the reader’s generic and grammatical 
expectations. Wah also makes several references throughout the text to history, fiction and 
truth. This is carried out by direct reference or through the way he continuously plays with 
and draws on the tension between fact and fiction.
25 In some passages, for example, the 
same sequence of events is recalled, but with a different outcome or recollection of what 
happened. Wah’s choice in employing such techniques in his text is a reminder of Mouré’s 
statement about her minoritarian experience, and of how this informed her suspicion of 
language and meaning (“language never seems transparent”). Wah’s hyphenated identity 
has perhaps also made him sensitive to the arbitrary nature of language and, by extension, 
history, fiction and truth. His reliance on the localised minor narratives of family stories is 
the only way he can imagine a place for himself in Canada where his identity is not 
figured. As Wah has stated on Diamond Grill: “Certainly some people of mixed race enjoy 
a considerable identification with the book because, I imagine, the betweenness is not a 
position that often escapes being hijacked by the angst of purity on either side of it” 
(Faking It 99). The official or major languages, which rely on binaries and clear 
boundaries, do not recognise him and his hyphenated identity and if they do it is only to 
coopt him. Wah dislikes the way in which those who do not live the reality of ambiguous 
and marginalised narratives and identities appropriate the sign of the hyphen under the 
auspice of the immigrant. Within this context there is no room for the specificities of his 
experience and his family histories: 
  ANOTHER CHIP ON MY SHOULDER 
  IS  THE  APPROPRIATION 
of the immigrant identity. I see it all over the place. Even one of the country’s best-
known writers has said We are all immigrants to this place even if we were born 
here. Can’t these people from central leave anything to itself? Why deny the 
immigrant his or her real world? Why be in such a rush to dilute? Those of us who 
have already been genetically diluted need our own space to figure it out. I don’t 
want to be inducted into someone else’s story, or project. Particularly one that 
would reduce or usurp my family’s residue of ghost values to another status quo.   65
Sorry, but I’m just not interested in this collective enterprise erected from the 
sacrosanct great railway imagination dedicated to harvesting a dominant white 
cultural landscape. There’s a whole forest of us out here who don’t like clear-cut, 
suspect the mechanical purity of righteous, clear, shinning, Homelite Americas, 
chainsaws whining, just across the valley.  
No way I’ll let these chips fall where they may. (Wah, Diamond Grill 125) 
Wah’s uses of collage-like techniques in his book are suggestive of letting the “chips fall 
where they may.”  Those chips represent his own (unapologetically) personal interests, 
which are seen as shortcomings (chips on his shoulder) by those from the centre who do 
not understand why he does not wish to align himself with the great white Canadian 
immigrant identity. Wah is neither pretending to, nor interested in, writing a grand 
narrative with feigned objectivity. Instead, Wah presents a broken minor language, rather 
than reproducing a linear narrative such as those that exclude both his family stories and 
identity. The reference in the passage to the “sacrosanct great railway imagination” is 
significant since it refers to the official linear narrative of the settlement of Canada, based 
on the national mythology of the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR).
26 In 
fact, the collage-style of his text undermines such narratives both at the level of content 
and form. Everything in his text, therefore, becomes political:  
ink pious pages partial pronouns translated letters shore-to-shore Pacific jetsam 
pretending love forgotten history braided gender half-breed loneliness naïve voices 
degraded miscourse racist myths talking gods fact and fiction remembered faces 
different brothers sisters misery tucked margins whisper zero crisscross noisy 
mothers. . .bilingual I’s their unheard sighs, their yet still-floating lives. (Wah, 
Diamond Grill 7)  
Wah’s use of footnotes give his text a polyvocal sensibility, as they include references to 
contemporary theory and non-fiction. They add to the collage-like style at both the level of 
syntax and genre. The suggestive polyvocality is reinforced by his constant play on truth, 
fiction and history. “Who is speaking and for whom,” seem to be common questions   66
throughout this book. More generally, though, Wah’s text also interrogates the violence of 
representation. 
 
Significantly, Wah’s book demonstrates not just the collage/montage tendency in ficto-
critical texts, but also the way autobiographical references are called upon to situate the 
minor stories of ficto-criticism, as these refuse the position of a grand narrative. Not 
coincidentally, concerns about truth, knowledge production, language, naming and 
(critical) judgement resurface in all of the texts discussed above. As consistent themes 
throughout ficto-critical discourse these concerns foreground the latter’s autobiographical 
character as yet another stylistic feature of ficto-criticism. What is important, in any case, 
is to determine how autobiography is used to signal the partiality of knowledge and 
question definitive interpretive acts. However, before looking at the autobiographical 
tendency in ficto-critical texts in detail, I will first reiterate the critical intention of ficto-
criticism, as it presents itself as an alternative to the colonising process of normative 
critical writing. Indeed, ficto-criticism and normative critical writing have very different 
projects. In acknowledging this, an examination of the differing subjectivities intimated by 
these writing practices should also elucidate their very different approaches. While one is 
constituted by/as productive writing between, it thus becomes minor literature; the other is 
rule bound and derivative of a major literature.  
 
Wah’s critique of unifying major linear narratives signals dissatisfaction with those 
traditional modes of writing that are complicit with colonisation. In this context, 
colonisation is taken to mean the literal colonisation of lands and people, and also the 
colonisation of language and literature. As already discussed, in Deleuzian theory—
writing is considered a deterritorialising practice—which is then recoded or 
reterritorialised by unified categories such as genre, type, style, etcetera. In contrast to 
hybrid ficto-critical practice traditional academic writing that examines, interprets and 
limits a text functions to capture and code the deterritorialised flows of desire. Discussing 
his use of the words “biotext” and “biofiction” to describe Diamond Grill, Wah states:   67
I’m using the term “biotext” as a hedge against the kind of writing I do in Diamond 
Grill being hijacked by readymade generic expectations, the cachet exuded, at least 
for me, by those other two terms, autobiography and life writing. As I neared 
finishing with the text, however, I felt I needed to call the hedge a hedge and so I 
tinted it as “biofiction.” For this book, that feels like a happier term, 
compositionally, since it indicates the possible brush with certain narrative tropes. 
How to depoeticize the anecdote by claiming its artificiality, and thereby gaining 
some levitation for the “biotext,” feels comfortably aligned with a poetic of 
drunken tai chi (negative capability and so forth) and my interest in keeping the 
hyphen hyphenated; Diamond Grill settles nothing (I hope). (Faking It 97) 
With his ficto-critical text Wah, it seems, is attempting to avoid doing exactly what 
academic writing is designed to do, that is, to close the text and narrow its revolutionary 
potential. One of the ways in which Wah opens his text is through the introduction of the 
notion of fiction. By identifying his book as “biofiction,” Diamond Grill becomes a mix of 
autobiography and fiction, broadening the ambiguity already created through its collage-
like play. Wah’s use of the words “biotext” and “biofiction” are attempts to escape 
“readymade generic expectations,” to keep a space open for his text to become something 
other—something hyphenated—and more relevant to his own between experience and 
identity.  
 
In contrast to Wah’s approach in Diamond Grill, which hopes to settle nothing, academic 
writing is designed to demonstrate the author’s mastery and intellectual ability through 
producing a rigorous and persuasive argument, which banishes any contradictory elements 
to the edge of its linear narrative. Nor does the academic essay—the superior genre of non-
fiction—allow for personal detail. Any personal and embodied references are to be 
confined to the preface and acknowledgements. In his ficto-critical text Conspiring with 
Forms: Life in Academic Texts, Terry Caesar explores the conventions of academic writing 
as he discusses his wholly mediocre career as an academic, implying that it may well have 
been better had he followed the conventions of academic writing more closely. Quoting   68
James Bennett, Ceasar observes that little has changed in academic discourse, despite 
substantial shifts in recent theories:  
James Bennett has a consideration on how little the technique of the analytical 
essay has changed despite how much recent theory has celebrated the ‘fissure’ of 
boundaries between literature and literary criticism: ‘the argumentative, analytic 
order seems to cling firmly to nonfiction prose.’ (viii) 
Almost ten years after Geertz’s 1983 essay “Blurring Genres,” in which he identified a 
significant shift in intellectual life and academic writing styles toward what could be 
described as ficto-criticism, Guattari argues that in the university objectivity continues to 
be paramount. In 1992 he said: “A systematic rejection of subjectivity in the name of 
mythical scientific objectivity continues to reign in the university” (117).
27 In 2003 I 
would argue that little has changed, and that ficto-critical gestures still represent a 
challenge to this “mythical scientific objectivity.” Despite some early proclamations and 
excitement around genre blurring—such as Geertz’s—as a new kind of academic 
disciplinary practice, ficto-criticism remains as a minor literature. Ficto-critical texts in 
both Australia and Canada thus maintain their position on the margin of the academy as 
they incorporate elements of the writer’s subjectivity by including personal detail, 
memory, moments of uncertainty, reflection and corporeal reality. The revolutionary 
power of ficto-criticism is informed by its minoritarian position, its role in challenging 
normative academic writing. In the final chapter I explore what might happen if ficto-
critical styles were to be taken up in a more mainstream fashion in the academy. 
 
In “Reflections on Academic Discourse,” Peter Elbow discusses the nature of academic 
writing. He says: “Indeed, there is what I would call a certain rubber-gloved quality to the 
voice and register typical of most academic discourses—not just author-evacuated but also 
showing a kind of reluctance to touch one’s meanings with one’s naked fingers” (145). 
Similarly, Susan Koppelman says of the academic essay:  
Essays are like prepackaged diet foods—no schmaltz, no seasoning, no garnish, no 
taste. Essays are like what I imagine sex with a sex therapist to be—no love,   69
nothing personal, no joking asides, no memories, no plans for the future, no 
relationship between participants. (76) 
Both of these quotes are suggestive of the artificial distance that normative academic 
writing sets up between itself and its object of analysis. Elbow argues that by teaching this 
academic style in universities academics are tacitly teaching a version of reality, including 
the student’s place and mode of operation within such a world. That is, it is producing a 
particular kind of subject. According to Elbow, academic writing implicitly carries with it 
the following meanings: 
1.  “A version of reality.” A view of the world as manageable, including an ability to 
control language.  
2.  “Academic discourse teaches a set of social authority relations: how to talk to each 
other in a way that excludes ordinary people.” 
3.  Behind academic discourse (textual conventions) there is a note of anxiety and 
insecurity. 
4.  Academic writing contains an element of display. That is, showing off as a means 
to impress.  (146-8) 
Academic writing is thus the opposite of minor literature: “A rhizome, a burrow, yes—but 
not an ivory tower” (Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka 41). As such, normative academic 
writing implies a unified individuated subjectivity based on what Deleuze and Guattari 
would call an Oedipalised subject. Ficto-criticism, on the other hand, with its focus on the 
situated partial nature of knowledge, suggests quite a different notion of the subject.   
 
In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari make a connection between the role of Oedipus in 
psychoanalysis as an interpretive myth par excellence and the way in which capitalism 
functions. The enforcement of Oedipus through psychiatry and its subsequent 
triangulisation (Mommy, Daddy, Me) ensures that desire equals lack: 
When we relate desire to Oedipus, we are condemned to ignore the productive 
nature of desire: we condemn desire to vague dreams or imaginations that are 
merely conscious expression of it; we relate it to independent existences—the   70
father, the mother, the begetters—that do not yet comprise their elements as 
internal elements of desire. (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 107)  
In opposition to psychoanalysis Deleuze and Guattari suggest schizoanalysis. They argue 
that psychoanalysis neuroticises the subject, who in this Oedipal system is always doomed 
to be lacking something. The attraction of the “schizo” character for Deleuze and Guattari 
is that it resists Oedipalisation. It is a productive force that refuses to be tied to some latent 
content or past: “Freud doesn’t like schizophrenics. He doesn’t like their resistance to 
being oedipalized . . .” (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 23). They argue that 
capitalism produces “an awesome schizophrenic accumulation of energy or charge, against 
which it brings all its vast powers of repression to bear” (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-
Oedipus 34). Oedipus is the means to crush and repress these productive desiring-
machines. In the process of enforcing the Oedipal dogma, the psychoanalyst becomes a 
fascist as they recreate themselves as God or father and interpreter of the patient’s 
neurosis. As it becomes the despotic signifier Oedipus kills the “endless connections, 
nonexclusive disjunctions, nonspecific conjunctions, partial objects and flows” (Deleuze 
and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 54). The patient’s productive unconscious therefore becomes 
an unconscious that can only express itself as myth, tragedy and dream. 
 
The connections between the theories developed by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus 
and Kafka, are suggested by the way they imagine an an-Oedipal space for literary works: 
“As Kafka says, the problem isn’t that of liberty but of escape. The question of the father 
isn’t how to become free in relation to him (an Oedipal question) but how to find a path 
there where he didn’t find any” (Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka 10). The implications of 
Deleuzian theory are thus substantial for not only literature but also for literary criticism 
(and criticism more generally) as desire is released from lack. In the words of Deleuze and 
Guattari: “The three errors concerning desire are called lack, law, and signifier” (Deleuze 
and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 111). What is the role of criticism and non-fictional writing if it 
is not to interpret and judge texts, events, and ideas in relation to categories, rules and 
signification? In this context, ficto-criticism presents itself as a creative alternative to   71
normative critical writing, the “path where he [the father/Oedipus] didn’t find any” (Kafka 
10). The alternative creative path that ficto-criticism takes is quite literally the production 
of something from the imagination, as it does not follow a predetermined route it becomes 
a line of flight rather than an escape (from major literatures). I am employing creative here 
to mean both an acknowledgment of the creative nature of all acts of criticism and non-
fiction, and also the creative production of both the self and the text through this process.  
 
The subject suggested by normative academic writing, described by Elbow, is therefore 
very much the Oedipalised subject described by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus. A 
neurotic subject who reproduces fascist authority structures by: controlling language, 
writing in a way that excludes ordinary people, and displaying insecurity by working hard 
to impress, referring to higher powers of knowledge and authority through citation. In 
other words, the Oedipalised subject of academic writing that lacks, in turn, Oedipalises 
the text or object of analysis much in the same way that the psychiatrist Oedipalises their 
patient. Instead of viewing the text as a productive force of the literary machine—
something to “plug into”—the text is reduced to triangulation, interpreted through so many 
old categories: 
It is as if the so-called signifying chain, made up of elements that are themselves 
nonsignifying—of polyvocal writing and detachable fragments—were the object of 
a special treatment, a crushing operation that extracted a detached object from the 
chain, a despotic signifier from whose law the entire chain seems consequently to 
be suspended, each link triangulated. (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 73) 
I am suggesting, therefore, that ficto-criticism has the potential to imagine a different kind 
of subject from that implied by the tone and distant stance of normative academic critical 
writing. Instead of an Oedipalised subject, ficto-critical writing encourages a 
deterritorialised subject that crosses the boundary between itself and object of criticism. In 
Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm Guattari discusses his preferred 
conceptualisation of the subject. He desires to replace the common understanding of the 
subject with “subjectification,” a notion of the subject that is understood as autopoetic and   72
seen to actively engage with the other through creative and productive connections. His 
concept of subjectification is relevant to ficto-critical writing since it helps conceive of a 
subject that is not distanced, closed off and controlling of the other. The subject of 
Chaosmosis both desires contact with the other and acknowledges the impact of its 
surroundings and experiences on itself. 
 
In Chaosmosis Guattari develops more fully the notion of the subjectification evident in 
the books that he jointly wrote with Deleuze: Anti-Oedipus, Kafka and A Thousand 
Plateaus. According to Guattari, contemporary upheavals resulting from capitalism and 
technological developments have meant that the notion of the subject and its meaning is 
not only becoming a more pressing question, but that we also require a new way to 
understand the “subjective cocktail” that is emerging. Subjectivity or subjectification has 
in these times of global media and consumerism become the driving force, not ideology. In 
other words, the notion of the subject as a pre-existing entity—set in opposition to 
society—is no longer adequate to explain our experience. Nor is it useful, according to 
Guattari, in effectively negotiating the complex forces that come to bear on us in this 
milieu.  Guattari critiques dualities, asking how can we understand the complex and 
dramatic changes to the subject effected by events like Tiananmen Square that are globally 
diffused by the mass media. He suggests that these vast processes of subjectification 
require more sophisticated understandings of the subject as they surpass “simple 
ideological demands:”  
The immense movement unleashed by the Chinese students at Tiananmen Square 
obviously had as its goal the slogans of political democratisation. But it is equally 
certain that the contagious affective charges it bore far surpassed simple ideological 
demands. A whole lifestyle, collective ethic and conception of social relations 
(derived from Western images) were set into motion. (2) 
In Chaosmosis, therefore, the subject is conceived of as a process and not a product: 
subjectification instead of a subject.
28 Subjectification, in his terms, is constantly in a 
process of becoming—it is in a nascent state—influenced and produced by individuals,   73
groups, events and institutions. Guattari says: “Subjectivity is in fact plural and 
polyphonic—to use Mikhaïl Bakhtin’s expression. It recognises no dominant or 
determinant instance guiding all other forms according to a univocal causality” (5). 
Guattari argues that this conception of the subject more easily explains mass movements of 
subjectification, warning that they do not necessarily develop in the direction of 
emancipation. Such large movements of subjectification can, in fact, be fascist or 
nationalistic like fundamentalism: “The machinic production of subjectivity can work for 
the better or for the worse” (Guattari 79). Again, Guattari, as he does in his jointly 
authored books with Deleuze, argues for a pragmatic approach to such questions refusing 
to rely on absolutes.  
 
If the subject is replaced by the notion of subjectification—a processual and productive 
force—then the self cannot be closed off from the world outside: it becomes its other in 
becoming itself. It is always other than itself, and the other is thus always part of the self. 
According to Guattari, we require this new model because old models (for example, 
Freudian) are based on dividing the self from its environment, aiding the blockage of 
desire by compartmentalising and individualising. This process closes off any notion of 
collective subjectification and encourages othering as it reduces the subject to a pre-given 
entity with latent content. In the autopoetic subjectification proposed in Chaosmosis, 
however, “I is an other, a multiplicity of others, embodied at the intersection of partial 
components of enunciation, breaching on all sides individuated identity and the organised 
body” (83). In this subjectification, the self is produced through pre-personal singularities. 
A singularity is an event-centred rupture that can be both human and non-human and 
which is either both linguistic and or bodily. Subjectification is viewed as creative and 
aesthetic; it is autopoetic thus helping to “contribute to an authentic relation with the 
other” (Guattari 7). This is achieved because the self is always becoming part of the other: 
“Not only is I an other, but it is a multitude of modalities of alterity. Here we are no longer 
floating in the signifier, the subject and the big Other in general” (Guattari 96). In this   74
process of subjectification the self is constantly produced through these pre-personal 
singularities. 
 
In contrast to the Oedipalised subject of traditional academic writing that divides the body-
self from the text for analysis with the distance of objectivity, the ficto-critic acknowledges 
the process of subjectification, in the autopoetic sense explained by Guattari, through their 
creative engagement with their text or object of investigation. The creativity to be found in 
all acts of writing is acknowledged as genres are blurred and fiction becomes part of non-
fiction. The continual creative production of the self is also implicated in this self-
referential practice that does not aspire to an artificial objectivity: 
Analysis is no longer the transferential interpretation of symptoms as a function of 
a preexisting, latent content, but the invention of a new catalytic nuclei capable of 
bifurcating existence. A singularity, a rupture of sense, a cut, a fragmentation, the 
detachment of a semiotic content—in a dadaist or surrealist manner—can originate 
mutant nuclei of subjectification. (Guattari 19) 
Through what Guattari would call autopoetic machinic self-production, subjectification in 
ficto-critical discourse is more able to maintain diverse relations of alterity, something 
which traditional academic writing and criticism seems unable to do with its reliance on 
rules, categories, expert knowledge, mastery and objectivity. According to Guattari: “It is 
from a failure to see that machinic segments are autopoetic and ontogenetic that one 
endlessly makes universalist reductions to the Signifier and to scientific rationality” (30). 
The following piece of ficto-criticism examined is particularly telling since it reveals 
critique embedded in ficto-criticism of academic, rational writing and its role in 
colonisation and the construct of knowledge. 
 
One example of Australian ficto-criticism that demonstrates the different subjectivities 
implied by the two forms of writing is “Skulls, Fontanelles and the Spaces Between,” by 
Gail Jones.
29 This essay by Jones is particularly pertinent as it is not only ficto-critical, but 
also enacts quite directly a critique of colonisation, linking together the discourses   75
underlying both the colonising process of scientific writing and other colonising practices. 
Importantly, Jones’ creative-academic text employs subjective and autobiographical detail, 
establishing a softer and more relational dialogue between the texts she discusses and her 
critical voice, which is not magisterial, authoritarian and distant. In contrast to this ficto-
critical work, normative academic discourse, using the rationalist project of objectivity, 
forces the subject of analysis and interpretation to become the object of study. As Jones 
reveals, the subject of rationalist discourse becomes a reified, objectified thing that can 
then be commodified, traded and manipulated. Through the generic conventions of 
academic or rationalist writing the subject becomes separated from the author thus 
requiring less consideration and respect.  
 
In contrast Jones’ essay is personal, subjective and, at points, emotive as she discusses the 
various ways skulls have been imagined in colonial discourse. She examines a range of 
colonial texts, looking at the discursive construction of the skull (usually belonging to a 
native). The skull becomes a trope in Jones’ ficto-criticism for the objectification of 
something that is irrevocably linked to a living body, culture, life, relationships, memories, 
places: 
In the mid to late nineteenth-century the ‘authorities’ of scientific racism used 
mercury, sand, white mustard seed, pearl barley, shot, water and even rubber bags 
to gauge and to hierarchise degrees of humanity in a system which arbitrarily 
ranked the ‘Caucasian’ at one hundred percent. I imagine these men, mock Hamlets 
with their Yoricks, bent in a pose of concentrated and diligent contemplation, 
filling carefully, oh so carefully, those hollows where minds had once rested. More 
Hollywoodishly, they recall generic scientists-in-white-coats, weighing in dim and 
B-graded light clammy fragments of humans on archaic scales. Melodrama 
contests theory almost irresistibly: the consideration of skulls summons any 
number of cinematic hallucinations, images-done-to-death, parodic phantasms. 
(Yet our theorising suppresses the resources of melodrama. Why, I wonder? 
It is after all a mode which recognises and theatricalises aspects of horror,   76
and its currencies are uncanny return—which may be read as misrecognised 
resistance—and the monstrous and cruel appetites of white mythologies. It 
has a quality of exaggeration that, pertaining above all to the symbolic, well 
equips it as a heuristic device to discuss the projection mechanism of the 
imperial.) (“Skulls, Fontanelles and the Space Between” 174)
30 
The empty skull becomes the evacuated vessel, an object of analysis, scientific 
investigation, speculation, and kitsch curiosity. For example, in one of Jones’ tales, the 
skull of a native is translated into a souvenir, a cigarette box. In contrast the fontanelle 
represents a potential and productive space between, connected to life: 
the body is just another tasty piece of meat and the skull just another disarticulated 
sphere of bone. This inverts the exquisiteness of the fontanelle, where inter-space is 
paradoxically the figure of plenitude and presence. Here the head is a field of 
negative values, the nightmare of unBeing, one might say, that is the final solution 
of imperialist alterity. (178) 
As Jones signals implicitly and explicitly: imperialist alterity equals unBeing; the same 
unBeing that the colonising practice of traditional academic discourse constructs for 
alterity. Jones connects the skull as a sign—evacuated of its human potential—to a real 
person. The subtitle of “Skulls, Fontanelles” is “In memoriam: Fanny Balbuk.” By 
remembering Fanny Balbuk, a Bibbulmum
31 woman who was the object of a study by 
Western Australian ethnographer Daisy Bates, Jones reconnects the skull to a person and 
humanness. She allows a space for Fanny Balbuk to speak. Bates’ ethnographic study, 
however, does not. According to Jones, when Fanny Balbuk died in 1907, Bates requested 
possession of her skull. Bates is denied, but in her ethnographic discourse Balbuk’s skull is 
still reduced to a valuable object, one to be possessed and snatched: 
Property is therefore linked to the displacement of subjectivity and to the 
enforcement of sanctions by which this displacement is ensured; and one might add 
that body-snatching is in a sense a rational extension of this already sinister 
reification. Fanny Balbuk’s skull is ‘invaluable’ because, in its deathliness, it   77
certifies the expulsion of the colonised subject, certifies, that is to say, the 
amortisation of the Imperial. (173) 
Linking rationalist discourses with colonial reification and objectification of the colonised, 
Jones implicitly—through her ficto-critical style—critiques normative academic writing: 
“To put it more simply, there is a need to supplement rationalist and mimeticist 
explication, to veer and seek out the new surfaces of difficult subjects. To veer, perhaps 
wildly, into realms of melodrama, rhapsody, the intolerable elegiac” (179). Ficto-criticism 
makes room for melodrama and for the stories from the margin to resurface. 
 
In the context of the dualism between fiction and non-fiction, ficto-criticism can thus be 
imagined as the fontanelle: as a productive space between full of potentialities, which can 
be linked to an embodied political, historical and social materiality. At the level of genre, 
therefore, Jones’ ficto-criticism is the other of academic criticism. It is not rationalist and 
objective; it is everything Fanny Balbuk is to Bates. As the native is to scientific 
discourses, so ficto-criticism is to traditional academic writing. “Skulls, Fontanelles and 
the Spaces Between” is not masterful and rational; it is emotional, non-linear, personal, 
embodied and invites melodrama. In this way Jones breaks down the artificial distance 
between the subject and object sustained in normative criticism, as her text takes on the 
position of the native informant. Jones makes strong reference to Bates’ (and other 
ethnographic studies’) construction of the native as irrational, childish, and wilful. In 
opposing the conventions of traditional objective writing, Jones productively opens herself 
to becoming the other in a way consistent with autopoesis: 
(We tend to discount not only melodrama but the broad resources of the rhapsodic. 
In high-theorising we aim for tonal equanimity, for a tone hieratic, magisterial, and 
remotely impersonal. So academic prose is marked, for the most part, by a 
repressive absence of the lyrical. By wide-awake realisms. By studious 
passionlessness. By loss of affirmation.) (175) 
The use of autobiographical elements in ficto-criticism that include the body and personal 
details pertaining to memory, imagination, insecurities, relationships, the experience (and   78
melodrama) of living, thus realises a subjectivity that is quite different from the controlling 
academic critical subject with their voice from on high. According to Guattari, the 
autopoetic subjectification that allows diverse relations of alterity can be found precisely in 
the creative passionate ficto-critical discourse that Jones calls for: “Aspects of this kind of 
polysemic, animistic, transindividual subjectivity can . . . be found in the worlds of 
infancy, madness, amorous passion and artistic creation” (101). The embodied 
autobiographical critic is also historically, politically and socially placed in a personal 
relationship with their (fellow) subject of attention. In Guattari’s Chaosmosis, the point of 
subject-object fusion is the point of subjectification. Significantly, Brian Attebery says of 
critique that doubles as fiction that “‘the study of’ becomes indistinguishable from ‘the 
thing studied’” (185). In this way, ficto-criticism enacts the fusion of subject and object 
and demonstrates the ethico-aesthetic paradigm Guattari calls for, in which:  
generalised ecology—or ecosophy—will work as a science of ecosystems, as a bid 
for political regeneration, and as ethical, aesthetic and analytic engagement. It will 
tend to create new systems of valoristation, a new taste for life, a new gentleness 
between the sexes, generations, ethnic groups, races . .  ..  (92) 
Supporters of ficto-criticism have lauded its capacity—contained in its radical, perverse 
nature—to redefine relations of power, and Jones’ text goes some way towards an ethico-
aesthetic engagement with her subject. To say that all texts that display ficto-critical 
characteristics do so is, however, a risky announcement. It is the kind of announcement 
that resonates with bold declarations emanating from normative academic work. In 
Deleuze and Guattari’s terms reterritorialisation is always ever present, and I would 
warn—as they do—of the danger implicit in making such unified statements. The question 
of whether ficto-criticism achieves what it sets out to do is something that will be explored 
in later chapters, as it is a complex question. For now, I will return to the stylistic 
tendencies of ficto-critical discourse, and look at the final characteristic: metafictive ficto-
criticism. 
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Metafictive ficto-criticism is made up of largely creative works that self-referentially 
foreground their potential as critical acts, and as a commentary on the processes of writing. 
Opening ficto-criticism to include fictional texts that enact critical self-reflexivity plugs 
into the deterritorialising potential of ficto-criticism as it broadens the what constitutes 
ficto-criticism, making it even less stable a category and thus able to be contained. 
Nevertheless, many ficto-critical texts employ metafictive devices. Jones’ text for 
example—although published in an academic journal—is creative and critically self-
referential: challenging the normative rules of genre. It demonstrates a metadiscursive 
consciousness through exploring its own mode of production, examining the discourses it 
emerges from. Significantly, the critical self-reflexivity or metadiscursive tendency in 
ficto-criticism can be enacted in a number of ways, and at different levels of subtlety. 
Often there are references to the arbitrary taxonomy of generic forms either implicitly or 
explicitly, and like Jones’ “Skulls, Fontanelles,” these texts break down the distinction 
between the subject and object of criticism. Enacting an an-Oedipal subjectivity ficto-
criticism is subtly self-referential as it suggests a critique of the generic standards that call 
it into existence. By enacting a self-referential examination of their own processes of 
production, (largely creative) ficto-critical texts do away with the need for the critic and 
critical interpretation.  They pre-empt the critical act and, as a result, are representative of 
the writer’s revenge on critical judgment. In literary studies the creative text is the 
objectified other, the emotional, melodramatic native who requires interpretation. In ficto-
criticism the other speaks back. Diamond Grill, for example, anticipates how the text will 
be co-opted into standard generic forms. Wah works hard to keep the text open and true to 
his hyphenated identity by describing it as biofiction and maintaining a disjunctive 
position in relation to generic rules and expectation. His text, by contemplating the 
processes of writing demonstrates the metafictive tendency in ficto-criticism. It also shows 
how autobiography is called into play, as are collage-like techniques. Metafictive ficto-
criticism thus unravels academic writing—but also creative writing forms—as it “mixes it 
up.” 
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This metafictive tendency in ficto-criticism incorporates a vast selection of texts in 
Australia and Canada that can be novel length, in the form of poetry (as Mouré’s is) or 
essay length. I have, however, chosen one example by a Canadian creative writer that 
appears in a collection of short writings: Yasmin Ladha’s “Beena” from The Lion’s 
Granddaughter to illustrate one formulation it may take. It must also be noted that all of 
the texts I have addressed demonstrate at some level all three of the stylistic tendencies: 
collage/montage, autobiography, and metafiction. Later chapters will more fully display 
the multiple expressions ficto-criticism can take. 
 
The Lion’s Granddaughter appears to be fiction but like the texts already discussed it 
incorporates the role of non-fiction by self-referentially anticipating the critic’s judgment. 
Creative and playful, this text is as much a work of fiction as it is a meditation on critical 
judgment, generic expectation, the canon and colonisation. Ladha addresses the reader 
directly in a conversational style. In “Beena” the reader is “Readerji.” Early in the piece 
she asks that the reader “banish the critic from their eye.” Throughout “Beena” Ladha 
makes numerous references to role of the critic as coloniser: 
Readerji, I ask you, will the critic’s privilege, his Brahmin privilege, will it never 
cease? You are content to drink the incantations from his soma drink? He works on 
formulas while I, my precious reader, create . . . And the 
critic/Brahmin/camel/colonizer is out, out of text! Readerji, Beena soma-wine, 
your and mine, salut! . . . Only the critic’s nostrils put me off.           (“Beena” 1-2) 
This direct addressing of the reader has several effects. It sets a frame for reading and 
establishes a rapport, or relationship between the reader and narrator/author. At one stage 
she asks: “You correcting me?” This statement directed at the reader brings into focus the 
politics of judgment enacted in the process of reading. As the reader you might not be 
judging her, but this direct statement encourages you to challenge your assumptions about 
the text (its generic formulation and its value). As Ladha states: “He [the critic] works on 
formulas while I, my precious reader, create . . .” This line is reminiscent of Deleuzian 
theory: the critic limits and reduces the text to an Oedipal drama. In contrast, Ladha—the   81
ficto-critic—creates something in an act of aesthetic autopoesis: “There is no hidden 
hyphenated meaning in Be-eena, though I am sure the critic will suck the book dry and 
author-interpret Beena. Yes, yes, I have my reasons for choosing the name. Have patience” 
(8). Ladha wishes to avoid being author-interpreted, or, in other words, being reduced to a 
limited individuated subject through which her texts could then be interpreted (very likely 
in relation to ethnic stereotypes). As she states: “There is never only a story. That’s why a 
story’s collar bones are chubby (always) because she carries layers and layers of stories” 
(3). Reminiscent of the ficto-critical space between that her writing takes, Ladha 
constantly challenges the system of reification upon which colonising practices rely. 
According to bell hooks: “By calling on the reader to enter realms of the unknown with no 
will to colonize or possess, critical fictions offer alternatives to an imperialist paradigm 
which constructs the text as territory to be conquered, taken over, irrevocably altered” 
(“Narratives of Struggle” 58). Ladha opens her text to all kinds of rule-breaking, then 
prods and questions the reader, asking them to think about their assumptions: 
Readerji, don’t shout. All these stories knotted together are also giving me a 
headache. What? No Readerji, no one can be at our door. Listen, Beena is yours-
mine. This is our zenana. Textbook stories of this equals that are a critic’s formula. 
Yaar-Readerji, life isn’t organised linearly because it is constantly piling. When I 
go to heat the milk or clean the fridge, other small things happen along the way: I 
pick up my mother’s sock from the couch (which really needs to be cleaned), close 
the bathroom door, slam down the receiver when I realize it is a salesman, and 
finally, finally, I come to the milk. God, I hope the saucepan is clean. Similarly, a 
story is never linear. A story’s collarbones are full of meat—by her very nature, she 
is massing constantly. (17) 
Ladha’s text thus brings into play the embodied extratextual moments present in all acts of 
writing. In metafiction the process of writing is brought into the text. As a result, so too is 
the reality of the text creator—the author—breaking mimesis. Metafictive ficto-criticism 
such as Ladha’s also breaks the omnipotent register of critical writing (its own mimesis): 
as the author in all their bodily subjective reality becomes evident. One well-known   82
American piece of autobiographical ficto-criticism caused a considerable stir when 
published, as the academic author dared to include the need to visit the toilet whilst in the 
process of writing.
32 It is difficult to remain the expert, your voice from on high, when 
discussing such personal subjectified bodily matters. The re-positioning of the critic at an 
embodied minor level, tantamount to the object of interpretation, means that ficto-critical 
gestures have the potential to reduce the coloniser’s privilege: 
Critical fictions effectively intervene and challenge dominant reading practices 
when they compel the uncritical reader to put aside set notions of what literature 
should be or do and enthusiastically grasp new and different approaches . . . This 
may indeed require them to relinquish privilege and their acceptance of dominant 
ways of knowing as preparation for hearing different voices. (hooks, “Narratives of 
Struggle” 57) 
Ladha’s “Beena” is just one example of metafictive ficto-criticism. It is also a fairly 
obvious one, in that it contains such overt references to the critic’s traditional role. Other 
metafictional texts constitute ficto-criticism, yet their ficto-critical character is subtler, 
since they more closely resemble novels and their metadiscursive commentary is on a 
lesser scale. As Wenche Ommundsen has written, metafiction exists at the intersection 
between theory and fiction (viii). Metafiction and historical metafictions thus also 
constitute ficto-critical acts: 
In the case of metafiction the paradox of self-referentiality eventually turns  not 
only on literary self-representation, but also on metafictional writing outside 
fictional texts. Literary criticism, which like its object of study functions through 
the medium of language, thus becomes implicated in its critique. What 
conventions, linguistic and narrative, govern the discourses of literary 
commentary? Can criticism ever hope to escape fictionality, to stand outside the 
literary processes it takes for its object of analysis? One of the important lessons of 
metafiction may well be that all writing about literature . . . is forced, reflexively, to 
examine its own practices, to question the stories it tells about literature and the 
critical categories it constructs to accommodate them. (Ommundsen 13)   83
The final stylistic characteristic of ficto-critical texts, metafiction, is therefore a broad 
category. In applying Deleuzian methodology to ficto-criticism it is possible to envision 
that ficto-critical texts do not intend to resolve the problem of academic writing as a mode 
of colonisation, but to dissolve it by undermining the structures on which it relies to 
imagine a line of escape.   
  
Conclusion 
The revolutionary potential of ficto-criticism thus comes from its between character and its 
work toward deterritorialising monolithic ideologies and the binaries on which they 
depend. The concept-tool of a minor literature has allowed us an entry point into the ficto-
critical burrow, by providing an approach to literature not reliant on the old categories, 
models, types and genres. Without such an approach, ficto-criticism as a (non)form is 
virtually invisible, or else meaningless. With a more traditional system it can also only be 
perceived as lacking, or be redefined as a new genre with set characteristics and rules of 
reading therefore becoming what it is attempting to escape from. This, of course, would be 
a limited and prescriptive model. While the three expressions of ficto-criticism that I have 
outlined in this chapter—collage/montage, autobiographical and metafictive—present a 
potential problematic relation to ficto-criticism as a minor literature, they are not distinct 
categories and do not attempt to disguise or limit the excesses of ficto-critical 
experimentation. On the contrary, I argue that they illustrate an attempt to develop a 
critical practice that has an ethical relationship to the other—a way to accommodate 
difference—imagining a new role for the critic. Unlike normative critical writing the 
subject of ficto-criticism refuses the magisterial voice that establishes a clear boundary 
between itself as expert judge and the subject of interpretation. Instead, the author function 
in ficto-criticism is performative, vitalist, breaking down the binary distinction between 
self/other, criticism/fiction, truth/fallacy and subject/object. It challenges the categories 
and models dominant academic writing and research wishes to prove through its 
authoritatively objective approach. The theoretical context of this dissertation—employing 
a Deleuzian methodology—is thus convincing since it reproduces and productively   84
interconnects with a practice that conceptually is always in defiance of binary structures. 
The danger of seeing ficto-criticism as a rhizome, however, is that ficto-criticism becomes 
too broad and unwieldy; it becomes for many critics nonsensical. Yet it is essential to keep 
ficto-criticism open to the other in order for it to reach its revolutionary force—and, most 
importantly, to expose some of the more interesting and political aspects of this practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
1 Other writers have identified the relevance of Deleuzian theory to conceptualising ficto-criticism. 
Australian Sabrina Achilles, in her paper titled “Ficto-criticism: Casting the Self” published in the 
postgraduate journal W/EDGE  employs Deleuzian theory to help explain ficto-criticism (1995: 54-9). 
2 Deleuzian theory is, in many ways, difficult to apply in the context of traditional critical writing since it 
works against closure. The words usually employed in critical academic writing in relation to theoretical 
models become problematic. For example, as already suggested, “model” is inappropriate in a Deleuzian 
context. Similarly, “concept” (in its standard use in critical writing) also implies a fixity that is inconsistent 
with Deleuzian theory. This is why I prefer “concept-tool”  as an alternative.    85
                                                                                                                           
3 Their concept-tool of the rhizome is discussed in detail in their introduction to A Thousand Plateaus (1987: 
3-23). 
4 Although I do not directly refer to Derrida’s “Law of Genre,” the concept of genre he outlines in this paper 
resonates with ficto-criticism. For Derrida, “every text participates in one or several genres, there is no 
genreless text; there is always genre and genres, yet such participation never amounts to belonging . . .” 
(1980: 212). Ficto-criticism, slipping in-between totalising taxonomic theories of genre, actually acts-out 
Derrida’s law of genre as a law of impurity or a principle of contamination (1980: 204). 
5 The term schizoanalysis comes from Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
(1987).  A complex term, it is suggestive of their critique of the overarching power of the Oedipal complex 
as an interpretative system. They link the Oedipalisation of the subject with other interpretative codes that 
block productive flows of desire in the same way that Oedipus does (read as the manifestation of lack by 
Freud’s psychoanalysis). Schizoanalysis is thus presented by Deleuze and Guattari as an alternative to 
psychoanalysis.  
6 Fascism is taken here to mean the will to power present in all of us.  According to Deleuze and Guattari, we 
have a responsibility to address our own fascism, even on a micro-political level. My reference to micro-
fascism here is a reference to the violence carried out on the other through any process of representation that 
closes down difference—the flows of desire released through the movement of deterritorialisation.    
7 In the work of Deleuze and Guattari there are a number of linked terms such as molar and molecular, which 
seem to reinforce a binary structure. However, these paired terms do not function in the same way as a binary 
since they do not remain static as each term maintains a certain multiplicity through its interchangeable 
quality. See below, later in the chapter, for a more substantial discussion of this moveable Deleuzian 
assemblage in relation to their reading of Kafka’s texts. 
8 See Deleuze and Parnet in Dialogues where they say: “This is better than the ‘cut-up.’ It is rather a ‘pick-
me-up’ or ‘pick-up’—in the dictionary = collecting up, chance restarting of the motor, getting on to the 
wavelength; and then the sexual connotation of the word” (1987: 10). 
9 See Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (1983: 25). 
10 As Bérubé goes on to discuss, John Searle’s essay in which he criticises others for being subjective is itself 
his own “‘take on’ the applications he has reviewed for the National Humanities Council.” In other words, 
his politics and subjective response inform his own position (1064). 
11 In “Theory: Beauty or Monster? Resistance to Theory in the Feminine,” Smaro Kamboureli examines the 
response contemporary theory has received from some Canadian women writers of fiction. Constructed as 
elitist, masculine and monolithic, Kamboureli argues that contemporary theory is portrayed as the “beast” by 
these women writers—who then see themselves as  “beauties”—the mute objects of theoretical enquiry. 
Whilst Kamboureli is discussing women writers, her paper illustrates the kind of reaction theory can and 
does receive from some creative writers. Kamboureli argues that this reaction is based on a binary system (a 
system in which we have been trained to view the world). Regardless of the gender of the creative writer, in 
this binary fiction becomes feminised and thus requires protection from the aggressive masculinised 
advances of theory. For those relying on these binaries and generic distinctions, theory and non-fictional 
concerns will always be problematic when combined with fiction. As Kamboureli points out, however, 
theory can provide useful insights for writing acts.  
12 As already signalled earlier, this thesis is also part of that process of codification as ficto-criticism 
becomes a topic worthy of postgraduate research. 
13 The best-known examples are: Confessions of the Critics (1996 Routledge) and The Intimate Critique: 
Autobiographical Literary Criticism (1993 Duke UP). 
14 Although not a Canadian or Australian publication, Steven Shaviro’s book Doom Patrols: A Theoretical 
Fiction on Postmodernism is published by High Risk Books. This text is discussed in the following chapter 
and is ficto-critical. In Canada the small press NeWest is often the publisher of ficto-criticism, whilst in 
Australia the similarly regional small publisher the Fremantle Arts Centre Press is responsible for releasing 
what has since been described as key Australian ficto-critical texts, such as No Substitute, No Road and 
Reading the Country. This is discussed in detail in Chapter Four on Australian ficto-criticism. 
15 Significantly, Deleuze and Guattari employ the word intensity to signal—rather than separate and close off 
categories—an interconnected multiplicity that varies only in terms of degree or vibration (on a molecular 
level). 
16 Queer Latin American scholar Sylvia Molloy, in “Mock Heroics and Personal Markings,” observes that 
she employs the personal in strategic terms for political ends. She makes the important point that the kind of 
subject evoked is designed to challenge the unified and masterful objective critic of normative academic 
writing:    86
                                                                                                                           
In other words, by the personal here, I mean not a presentation or construction of a coherent 
persona or he systematic recourse to exemplary or nostalgic anecdote as the sustaining design of a 
critical text but the necessary, intrusive, and discontinuous uses of a first-person narrative as a way 
of steering reading, redirecting reflection, defamiliarizing a too familiar scene of so-called 
impersonal critical reading. (1996: 1073) 
17 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, vivisection can also mean more generally: “Excessively 
minute examination or criticism.” 
18 For a more recent piece of ficto-criticism by Brewster that employs a collage/montage technique see 
“Strangeness, Magic, Writing” in Cultural Studies Review 9.2 (2003): 157-63. 
19 Heather Kerr, in “Perverse Writing: Maternity and Monarchy: Fictocriticism and Exorbitant, Plural 
Bodies,” also identifies textual collage as a dominant tendency in ficto-critical writing (1997).. 
20 In “Processing Fictocriticism,” a review of The Space Between , Rosslyn Prosser observes that Anna 
Gibbs’ piece in the collection employs the technique of cut-up (1999: 1). 
21 Mouré’s text, which is less obviously an act of criticism, requires one to have a less traditionally academic 
approach if one is going to be open to read it as ficto-criticism and not merely poetry. That is, be adventurous 
and accept ficto-criticism as a multiple space-between. 
22 Quoting Roland Barthes Amanda Nettelbeck describes ficto-criticism as both undermining the masterful 
critic and employing montage techniques (1998: 5).  
23 George Bowering describes his ficto-critical text Errata (1988), designed to explore the margins of the 
book, as biofiction. He states: “Autobiography replaces the writer. Biotext is an extension of him” (1988: 
34).  According to Bowering, Michael Ondaatje created the biotext with “Rock Bottom” published in 
Running in the Family. 
24 In an interview with Fred Wah, Ashok Mathur describes Diamond Grill as being “comprised of over one 
hundred prose segments, ranging in length from perhaps half a page to, at most, about three pages. Each 
prose segment functions in what I’d call a distinct and independent yet enmeshed, interdependent fashion” 
(2000: 98). 
25 In Diamond Grill, for example, there is an overt reference to the relative nature of history and truth: “Betty 
Goodman ordered stewed oysters for lunch and you got me to wait on her while you went to the can and 
puked, all those puzzled moments in the new world when your brown brow squinched up while you 
translated vectors or politesse or measurement . . . all these moments nothing but your river of truth, fiction, 
and history, nothing but the long nights . . . “ (1997: 156). 
26 See Daniel Francis’ National Dreams: Myth, Memory, and Canadian History. Francis discusses the 
mythology of the CPR in Canadian national imagination as an icon of Canadian identity. The CPR is 
representative of the peaceful settler myth of Canada, that masks an often violent process of colonisation. 
Wah’s reference to the railway imagination is significant in that the railway was “built chiefly on the backs 
of Chinese coolie labour” (1997: 15); another instance where the stories that Wah writes about are silenced.  
See also Sky Lee’s Disappearing Moon Café. This text, which mixes fiction and historical fact, also 
illuminates stories from the margin of Canada’s dominant narratives. Lee, like Wah, makes reference to the 
Chinese coolie labour on the CPR, “forgotten as chinamen generally are” (1991: 6).  
27Chaosmosis, first published as Chaosmose by Éditions Galilée in 1992. 
28 According to Ian Buchanan autopoesis—self-invention—has long been central to the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari. He makes the point that their notion of the subject is focussed on the moment, that is, self-invention 
for itself rather than what will become or has already become (1997:86). 
29 Heather Kerr in “Fictocritical Empathy and the Work of Mourning” (2003: 180-200), addresses this text 
by Jones. Kerr explores whether “cross-cultural fictocritical writing” functions effectively as a counter 
discourseby drawing together ethics and aesthetics.  
30 The layout on the page (with the extra indentation) reflects the original publication. 
31 Fanny Balbuk is described by ethnographer Daisy Bates in her book The Passing of the Aborigines: A Life 
Spent Among the Natives of Australia (1938) as “the last Perth woman.” Bates is now imfamous for her 
belief that it was necessary for Europeans to “smooth the dying pillow” of Indigenous Australians, who were 
doomed to extinction. 
32 See Jane Tompkins’ “Me and My Shadow” (1993: 23-40). 88 
 
chapter three 
Danger! Postmodernism1   
 
Introduction 
Reading ficto-criticism through the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari—as shown in 
Chapter Two—is not only productive in understanding the main stylistics of the 
(non)form, but also in reading the themes and debates that surround it. In Chapter Three I 
explore the key discourse circulated in relation to international ficto-critical forms in 
English—postmodernism. Here I argue that postmodernism and, in particular, a popular 
reading of the term based on a binary system has limited and reduced the discussion on 
ficto-criticism. Specifically, the application of the postmodern label to ficto-criticism has 
meant that the more interesting and political motivations for writing-between have been 
overlooked. These will be explored in the subsequent chapters on Australian and Canadian 
ficto-criticism. The purpose of this chapter is, however, to demonstrate that in Deleuzian 
terms postmodernism has become an order-word (in relation to ficto-criticism), despite 
postmodern theorists’ attempts to keep the concept open and mutable. According to 
Deleuze and Guattari: “the order-word is a death sentence; it always implies a death 
sentence, even if it has been considerably softened, becoming symbolic, initiatory, 
temporary, etc.” ( A Thousand Plateaus 107). In their philosophy a death is implied 
through the application of an order-word since an order-word (through becoming codified) 
blocks the flows of nomadic (desiring) thought keeping us always in the same system of 
limitation or lack. As postmodernism becomes reduced through the process of being 
established as an order-word—and caught into a binary relation with modernism—so too 
does ficto-criticism find itself represented in narrow terms. The application of 
postmodernism to ficto-criticism—as I argue in this chapter—has thus resulted in 
particular limiting reading patterns of ficto-criticism; readings that are then coloured by 
whether you view postmodernism positively or negatively. Bob Hodge’s article 
“Monstrous Knowledge: Doing PhDs in the New Humanities,” for example, illustrates this 
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system of reading at work. Hodge discusses the reception of postmodern theses when 
judged by specific criteria, which do not apply to these texts: 
some theses currently being written or examined run the risk of being judged by 
completely inappropriate criteria: as failing to be good ‘Old Humanities’ theses, 
when they should be looked at to see if they are good ‘New Humanities’ works.  
(35) 
Hodge goes on to show the conventions on which a PhD thesis is judged. Here is a 
selection from his table, clearly showing how a postmodern thesis may be viewed from a 
modernist perspective: 
Modernism        Postmodernism (+)   Postmodernism (-) 
  piece of research        piece of writing    no content 
  research v writing      research as writing    too subjective 
 disciplinary        transdisciplinary   undisciplined 
 self-effacing        self-reflexive    self-indulgent 
  summarizes the argument    strings quotes    unoriginal, pastiche 
  descriptive        creative/critical    not really a thesis (39) 
The last line aptly illustrates the way in which ficto-criticism tends to be read when judged 
by modernist criteria and within a binary system. Thus ficto-criticism becomes a radical 
threat to traditional forms of literature, whether that be criticism, theory or fiction. From 
the opposing perspective (postmodernism), however, ficto-criticism tends to be celebrated 
as new and radical. These debates function to over-write other influences on ficto-criticism 
and the subtleties of individual texts and their politics. By surveying the international 
literature and texts in English that either display or discuss the characteristics of ficto-
criticism, this chapter makes clear that postmodernism, as well as poststructuralist theories 
(so often simply equated with postmodernism), reduce—in fact crush—the various other 
aspects of ficto-critical practice. Thus, the many elements of ficto-criticism that run 
contrary to popular understandings of postmodernism as radical and nihilistic are 
subsumed. Once the danger of postmodernism as an order-word is addressed, a gap 
emerges from which to discover that the display of postmodern aesthetics in ficto-critical 90 
 
texts runs secondary to a concern about the violence of representation and its role in 
colonising the other. In this chapter I explore a range of texts in English primarily from 
Britain and the United States to illustrate the process of overcoding at work and to 
establish the broader context for Australian and Canadian examples. However, to lead into 
this and to clearly establish the ease with which postmodernism is aligned with ficto-
critical texts I first engage in a reading of J.M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals and the 
reflective commentary essays included in the 1997 publication. This reading works as 
micro-model for the discussion that follows. Despite this book displaying strong ethical 
concerns—including an implied duty to interrogate the ideological function of generic 
forms in the debates around animal rights—Coetzee’s creative-critical text is repeatedly 
linked with a binary notion of postmodernism, which implies a mere fascination with the 
surface. 
 
The Lives of Animals 
In a recent book titled The Lives of Animals, J.M. Coetzee publishes his Tanner Lecture, 
given at Princeton University.  Although Coetzee’s lecture is philosophical in nature—in 
keeping with the Tanner tradition—it breaks with the typical generic form of the lecture 
(Gutman 3). Coetzee’s lecture is in fact not a lecture at all, but fiction.  Like Garner’s The 
First Stone, The Lives of Animals appears to be another example of a trend towards 
fictionalising academic discourse and the realms of non-fiction: an example of ficto-
criticism.  This fictionalisation of academic writing and discourse manifests itself in a 
number of ways, yet Coetzee’s narrative adopts a specific literary device, a device strongly 
associated with postmodernism.  In a metafictional move Coetzee’s lecture is the story of a 
fictional author arriving at an American university, having been invited to speak.  The 
story he narrates in the lecture is, therefore, of an author of fiction being invited to give a 
lecture, as he has been invited to Princeton to give the Tanner Lecture.   
 
Coetzee’s author-character Elizabeth Costello—an aging Australian woman writer—
choses to speak on a topic close to her heart: animal rights. In her fictional lecture, 91 
 
Costello gives an impassioned plea for animals. She argues that the emphasis on reason in 
Western culture functions to diminish the value of animals, judged as bereft of reason. As 
Amy Gutmann points out in the introduction to The Lives of Animals, Coetzee’s decision 
to fictionalise is strategic and deliberate, containing “a critique of a more philosophical 
approach to the topic of animal rights” (3).  His narrative mise en abyme structure draws 
attention to the conventions of the lecture and by extension the conventions of the 
academy, which rely on logic and reason.  Gutmann reads Coetzee’s use of fiction as an 
attempt to move away from traditional intellectualised debates around animal rights—a 
critique of the rational approach that denies emotion and embodiment—toward a more 
empathetic or emotional identification with the suffering of animals:  “The fictional form 
in Coetzee’s hands. . .appears to have an ethical purpose: extending our sympathies to 
animals” (4). Interestingly, Costello’s son works as an assistant professor of physics at the 
university at which she has been invited to speak.  His discomfort with his mother 
speaking at the university where he is employed within the discipline of science becomes 
intensified as—predicably—his colleagues reject her argument that reason is overrated. 
Given the metafictional form with which Coetzee has chosen to present his lecture, might 
we assume, like Gutmann, that Costello’s defence of animals and critique of the 
hierarchies that sustain rationality is also his position?  Why else has he chosen to write in 
such a way and challenge normative academic forms of expression by employing fiction?  
My suggestion is that his generic choice strategically reflects his argument.   
 
Coetzee’s text is interesting not only for its formal inversion of academic hierarchies 
(those inherent in generic codes), but also for what goes on at the micro-political level.  
For example, why does his author-character take the form of an aging Australian woman 
writer, and what is the connection between this choice of character profile and his 
suggestively ficto-critical form?  Is it somehow easier, as a white middle-class male 
academic, to write such challenges to academic discursive conventions under the guise of 
an aging eccentric antipodean woman? Alternatively, is Coetzee highlighting, and through 
that process possibly reaffirming, the structural dualities on which such hierarchical 92 
 
divisions are made?  The division between emotion/rationality and the privileging of 
rationality that disallows the “voices” of animals, mirrors not only the division of theory 
and fiction, but also other dualities imbued with similarly structured values.
2  For example: 
 Mind   body 
 Theory   fiction 
Centre   margin 
 Man   woman 
 Europe   antipodes   
 Rationality  emotion 
 Carnivore  vegetarian 
Costello is, after all, with her strict vegan-vegetarianism, her single status, her 
geographical marginality, and aging frailty, the antithesis of the academics she encounters 
on this trip.  As her son laments: 
He wishes his mother had not come.  It is nice to see her again; it is nice that she 
should see her grandchildren; it is nice for her to get recognition; but the price he is 
paying and the price he stands to pay if the visit goes badly seem to him excessive.  
Why can she not be an ordinary old woman living an ordinary old woman’s life?  If 
she wants to open her heart to animals, why can’t she stay at home and open it to 
her cats? (Coetzee 38) 
Elizabeth Costello is clearly not playing by the rules or conventions society has determined 
for her age and gender.  Most importantly, however, she surprises her hosts by delivering a 
lecture on animal rights, not literature or literary criticism as expected.  Her less than 
academically rigorous lecture that argues for emotion in favour of rationality (in the 
context of the university) therefore threatens to embarrass her son.  Coetzee, too, fails to 
play by the rules of the academic lecture format when he delivers his metafictional 
narrative.  However, unlike Costello, he avoids the risk of possible embarrassment to both 
his audience and himself with his highly self-conscious metafictional structure.  As a 
result, he makes it clear that his text—its form and content—has been cleverly and 
carefully calculated to produce a specific effect.  Therefore, what Coetzee does by 93 
 
employing the metafictional frame story is to draw attention to the question of critical 
distance and its collapse.  By emphasising the process of production by writing about 
someone lecturing about a topic that is like his form—out of place—he addresses the 
audience’s assumptions on perspective and carries out a form of self-conscious meta-
criticism.  He is, in effect, enacting a ficto-critique, challenging established hierarchies of 
authority and genres, and introducing a certain degree of ambiguity.  The Lives of Animals, 
as an example of ficto-criticism that questions truth and reality, becomes an even more 
powerfully pointed critique of authority when we consider that it is performed within a 
very prestigious institute of learning: a place where knowledge is established and 
disseminated. Coetzee’s Tanner Lecture at Princeton University, by deconstructing and 
thus challenging hierarchies through literary devices like metafiction, displays a number of 
postmodern characteristics.  Not surprisingly, this book as one of many examples of ficto-
criticism elucidates the process in which creative-critical acts are so often aligned with, 
and interpreted through, popularised or dominant notions of postmodernism. 
 
As Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals suggests with its use of the metafictional frame story, 
the aesthetic characteristics of ficto-critical texts lend themselves to postmodern 
association.  For example, included in The Lives of Animals are four essays written in 
response to Coetzee’s lecture.  Several of these essays directly frame Coetzee’s lecture-
narrative in relation to postmodernism, whilst the rest grapple with his deliberate 
disruption of critical distance (a central concern of postmodernism) and its implications for 
their own texts.  Wendy Doniger, for example, begins her essay with the following line: “It 
seems somehow reductionistic to respond to these deeply moving readings as if they had 
been dry academic readings” (93). Immediately, the style of Coetzee’s form seems to have 
had the desired effect as Doniger questions the appropriateness of dealing with his work in 
a detached, dry academic voice.  Doniger appears compelled to state her position (and self) 
in relation to her narrative.  Similarly, Barbara Smuts writes in a personal voice on her 
commitment to animal rights, the result of her experience with animals.  Whilst critiquing 94 
 
the lack of reference to real-life relations with animals in Coetzee’s text, Smuts draws 
attention to academic conventions that distance them (academics) from their subjects: 
Why doesn’t Elizabeth Costello mention her relations with her cats as an important 
source of her knowledge about, and attitudes toward, other animals?  Maybe she 
feels constrained by the still-strong academic taboo against references to personal 
experience. . . (Smuts 108)   
In yet another of these framing essays, Marjorie Garber implicitly emphasises the links 
between Coetzee’s narrative and postmodernism by discussing the text as an instance of 
metafiction: 
The genre of these lectures, then, is metafiction, and together they constitute a 
version of the academic novel, though crucially this one is suffused with pathos 
rather than comedy.  The effect is to insulate the warring “ideas” (about animal 
rights, about consciousness, about death, about the family, about academia) against 
claims of authorship and authority. (79)   
The challenge to authorship and authority Garber identifies in The Lives of Animals is a 
key tenet of postmodern discourse, and is issued by Coetzee through his metafictional 
form.  According to the dominant literature, in metafiction the author is viewed by their 
self-conscious inclusion and intrusion into the text as having lost their omnipotent 
(authorial) authority.  Coetzee includes his authorial role by mirroring his experience of 
lecturing with his character’s almost identical set of circumstances.  Writing about writing, 
the author thus reveals his process and focuses the reader’s attention on their role in 
constructing this text-world.  As his method of constructing an illusionary world is 
shattered through the self-referential nature of the text, so too is the authority on which that 
world is created. Coetzee’s literary self-consciousness, then, is what makes his text be 
perceived as postmodern. 
 
The final essay included in The Lives of Animals similarly contributes to, and affirms, the 
predominance of postmodernism as the frame for Coetzee’s text.  This essay by Peter 
Singer is itself metafiction. Singer’s essay is about an academic’s process of writing and 95 
 
thinking through his response to Coetzee’s narrative.  Again, the question of the author’s 
situation in relation to his object of study arises.  In this creative piece the academic 
character (or Singer himself?) states his difficulties with Coetzee’s approach. Addressing 
his daughter the character says: “Call me old-fashioned, then, but I prefer to keep truth and 
fiction clearly separate.  All I want to know is: how am I supposed to reply to this?” 
(Singer 86).   Ironically, however, despite his character’s statement, Singer has chosen to 
respond by mixing truth/fact and fiction, much in the same way as Coetzee does.  As the 
daughter-character Naomi observes in Singer’s narrative, the blurring of fact and fiction 
makes Coetzee’s text postmodern. In fact, Naomi makes it clear that her Dad must know 
this since it is common knowledge and obvious: 
“You mean that he’s going to stand up there and give a lecture about 
someone giving a lecture? Très post-moderne.” 
“What’s postmodern about it?” 
“Oh, Dad, where have you been for the past decade? You know, Baudrillard, and 
all that stuff about simulation, breaking down the distinction between reality and 
representation, and so on? And look at all the opportunities for playing with self-
reference!” (Singer 85) 
Like Singer’s essay, The Lives of Animals therefore becomes as much about literature, 
writing, representation and the construction of meaning as it is about animals and their 
rights.  The aesthetic stylistics and underlying philosophical critique of established truth 
values in The Lives of Animals—as the accompanying commentary essays suggest—
clearly lend themselves to postmodernism. Through this association ficto-criticism 
becomes caught into the broader debates surrounding postmodernism, in which 
postmodernism becomes the radical other of modernism.  
 
A closer reading of the accompanying essays in The Lives of Animals illustrates this 
process at work. All four of the essays included in the book that mark his text as 
postmodern imply some level of discomfort around his perceived nihilistic and anarchistic 
challenge to authority and established truth. Despite this discomfort often only being 96 
 
registered as anxiety around how to approach his text, it suggests a mode of dialectic 
thinking.  That is, as Coeztee throws authority and critical distance into question, his 
commentators seem compelled to interrogate their own positions; they ask: “can I speak, 
can I judge?” as they immediately begin to flounder as he undermines these basic 
academic assumptions. This reflects a binary: a system of thought that can only imagine an 
either/or. In other words, if Coetzee questions rationality, truth and authority—throwing 
into dispute our means of knowing the world—can we know true reality? Through their 
palpable anxiety around how to respond to his text, his commentators cannot help but 
invoke a certain nihilism, which they inadvertently imply is present in his text (and linked 
to what they see as his postmodern style).  
 
Yet The Lives of Animals is arguing for a truth. Coetzee’s narrative asks—on ethical 
grounds—that we urgently attend to the very real suffering of animals at our hands. 
Coetzee is, therefore, making both a judgement and an argument. He has a position even if 
that position takes a fictional form. His text is not nihilistic, and this runs contrary to the 
inferred reading of postmodernism brought to, and applied to, his text. Significantly, 
however, even if Coetzee’s commentators may evoke more sophisticated and nuanced 
readings of postmodernism in their essays on his narrative, their application of the term 
cannot help bring into play the dominant binary conception of postmodernism. The Lives 
of Animals reveals then, in part, how easily postmodernism can be (and is) used to frame 
the phenomenon of ficto-criticism. More importantly, it clearly shows that in this dynamic 
a particular vision of postmodernism is evoked, and this will either excite or disturb the 
reader depending on their ideological and political viewpoint. As a small scale and 
localised example, Coetzee’s book functions as a micro-model or introduction to the 
argument in this chapter.  Firstly, how, within the tradition and conventions of academic 
writing and research, ficto-criticism can almost not avoid being limited and constrained by 
postmodernism, and, secondly, how more often than not the form or flavour 
postmodernism takes in these discourses is very much about it being post modern.
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Readers are by now very familiar with the complexity of the debates around 
postmodernism’s meaning and definition. However, this does not seem to prevent many 
commentators, both academic and other, reducing postmodernism to a simple manageable 
concept, often as a means to prove their point. As Thomas Docherty argues in his preface 
to Postmodernism: A Reader, “the term ‘postmodernism’ has become one of the most 
insistently used terms in the cultural debates of recent years, it is a term which has often 
been used with a great deal of imprecision” (xiii). Mirroring the anxiety about 
postmodernism invoked in the commentary essays found in The Lives Of Animals, 
Docherty begins his list of common miss-perceptions of postmodernism by highlighting 
the very often-repeated idea that it is nihilistic or anarchic: 
For some, postmodern equates with ‘nihilistic’ or ‘anarchic’; for others, it refers to 
a culture dominated by the banality of televisual representations and Las Vegas-
style neon-signs whose presence everywhere reminds us of the McDonaldisation of 
an otherwise vegetarian world; yet others think of that explosion of poststructuralist 
theory which arose in the 1960s and 1970s as a postmodern manner of thinking. 
The prevalence of such populist, rather superficial and essentially misleading 
characterisations of the postmodern is troubling for anyone who would take the 
issues of contemporary culture seriously.  (Doherty xiii)   
The essays accompanying The Lives of Animals thus reveal how the postmodernism 
Doherty warns of is very much in circulation, and easily brought into play in the context of 
ficto-criticism since such texts mirror many postmodern stylistic tendencies. Significantly, 
distracting from ficto-criticism’s more complex workings, this postmodern over-coding or 
masking is predicated on an understanding of postmodernism as a radical epistemological 
break from modernism demonstrated by the crisis in representation. The superficial or 
dominant postmodernism I am alluding to is therefore one that is seen in simple terms as 
what follows modernism, as a period, style, and view of the world defined in opposition to 
what is traditional and modern. Popularised postmodernism—viewed in the tradition of 
Western thought as a challenge to the philosophical and aesthetic traditions that precedes 
it—is seen as marking the end of grand narratives, the collapse of critical distance, and the 98 
 
resulting problem with nomenclature.  As a consequence, postmodernism is characterised 
by such markers as the everyday or local, fragmentation, fluid subjectivity, non-linearity, 
polyvocality, generic hybridity, intertextuality, and pastiche sometimes bordering on 
plagiarism.
4  
 
In relation to literature, postmodernism is understood as a self-conscious literary practice, 
which uses and abuses conventions. In literary postmodernism it is the conventions of 
realism that are played with. In ficto-criticism—with criticism as the axis—one could 
suggest that the self-consciousness and play is around objectivity and its relation to what is 
real.
5 It is not difficult to appreciate, therefore, how many examples of ficto-criticism—
which display the stylistic characteristics and concerns of postmodernism—find 
themselves deemed a product of postmodernism. What the discourse around ficto-critique 
has failed to fully explore, however, are those characteristics of ficto-critical texts that run 
contrary to populist notions of postmodernism, and, in some cases, even the more nuanced 
understandings of the term. For example, as Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals demonstrated 
despite the ethical imperative of his text (including a perceived truth and judgement) it has 
still been associated with an uncompromising revolutionary postmodernism in which every 
form of representation is invalid.  His text may employ postmodern literary devices, but it 
is not nihilistic or refuting all reality. What this contradiction illustrates is how the 
application of a dialectic view of postmodernism as a radical break distracts from other 
workings and tendencies in ficto-criticism.
6 To reiterate, what is of interest here is how 
postmodernism—and in particular a binarised notion of postmodernism—functions to 
detract from the more dynamic and political aspects of what much ficto-critical writing is 
attempting to address: the violence of representation in academic writing. The overarching 
use of postmodernism as the means to explain ficto-criticism also works to over-code and 
simplify the multiplicities of an expansive range of writing-between. In this context, where 
the order-word function of postmodernism is revealed, questions emerge such as: is ficto-
criticism automatically the radical threat that many perceive it to be? Does it really signal 
the end of criticism or merely the exhaustion of traditional critical writing models?
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ficto-criticism’s main influence necessarily postmodernism? What are the other possible 
influences? Ironically, the postmodern over-coding of ficto-criticism is carried forward by 
the conventions of academic writing that encourages singular propositions and mastery. 
Ficto-criticism, however, attempts to explore what is pushed to the edge by academic 
discourse and in the process enacts a critique of academic discursive conventions. 
Consistent with this ficto-critical flavour, which is concerned with contradictions, silences 
and excesses of academic writing, instead of postmodernism as the defining code I am 
more interested in the conflicting, inconsistent characteristics of the liminal space that 
ficto-critical texts occupy. By being attentive to these contradictions, it becomes apparent 
that the display of postmodern aesthetic style runs secondary in ficto-critical texts to a 
concern about representation and colonisation in writing practices. This first chapter 
therefore introduces a range of primary ficto-critical texts and secondary readings of ficto-
criticism, to demonstrate the use of postmodernism and poststructuralist theories (often 
simply equated with postmodernism) to code ficto-criticism.  This literature survey also 
fleshes out some of the contradictions in placing such a varying range of labile texts under 
the rubric of postmodernism.  
 
The term labile, introduced above, and used throughout the thesis, has been employed 
deliberately and strategically at this point to signify the unstable and slippery nature of 
ficto-critical texts. The Oxford English Dictionary gives the definition of labile as: “1. 
Prone to fall into error or sin;” “2. Apt to slip away, slippery,” and; “3. Prone to undergo 
displacement in position or change in nature.” All three definitions—including the obvious 
feminising intonations—I believe are apt descriptors for ficto-criticism. In other words, its 
use reflects one of the main storylines of the thesis; that is, the dangers of conceptualising 
ficto-criticism simply and in line with normative academic criticism that demands ordered 
and linear arguments ending with one climactic finish. For ficto-criticism’s revolutionary 
potential to be fully realised, ficto-criticism must be analysed in such a way as to draw out 
the many contradictions and slippages inherent in the condition of being between.  
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International “ficto-criticism” 
The examples I now address from the United States and Britain will thus help substantiate 
the need to conceptualise ficto-critique as labile and disparate. These examples are those 
that fall outside the Canadian and Australian context, and are suggestive of a much more 
expansive trend towards fictionalising academic writing and other realms of non-fiction 
(and/or the incursion of theoretical and critical concerns into fiction). Through a survey of 
the literature, it is clear that a trend toward reading fictional texts as instances of 
theoretical critique is also developing. That is, there is a tendency from a critical 
perspective toward not only writing ficto-critically but reading ficto-critically. 
Significantly, this survey is not a comprehensive study of all texts that reflect and engage 
with such hybridity, but a general survey to allow an understanding of the international 
context (in English) from which Canadian and Australian ficto-criticism has developed. 
This survey will also explicate the variations in the methods of ficto-critique, whilst at the 
same time providing a backdrop to highlight the differences between Canadian and 
Australian ficto-criticism in a broader context. 
 
Ficto-critical techniques appear to be taking hold of the imagination of many researchers, 
writers and academics. Since the 1980s and across a range of disciplines, one can witness a 
shift to ficto-critical concerns. For example, in the book Writes of Passage: Reading 
Travel Writing (1999), James Duncan and Derek Gregory point out how travel writing is 
not only increasingly becoming a focus of academic attention, but also that there has been 
a distinctive shift in travel books towards personal and subjective accounts. About the 
bulging number of new travel texts, they say: “bookstores whose travel shelves were once 
confined to atlases, guidebooks and maps—to normally ‘factual’ and ‘objective’ 
accounts—now include sections devoted to personal, avowedly imaginative accounts of 
travel” (1). Until recently, according to Duncan and Gregory, travel writing “not conducted 
under the sign of ‘Science’ was virtually ignored by [academic] studies” (2). Recognising 
the ways “travel writing and its cultural practices have been located within larger 
formations in which the inscriptions of power and privilege are made clearly visible,” 
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Writes of Passage examines the shift to a more personal voice as an act of criticism against 
the “imperial stylistics” of traditional travel writing (2). Anthropology, like travel writing, 
with its direct and immediate immersion into another place and culture, has resulted in a 
similar interrogation of the politics of location, authority and varying power differentials—
this time, in relation to the anthropologist or ethnographer.  What is of concern—and under 
attack—is the relation of the subject to its object and the detached “objective” academic or 
scientific voice.
8  As Judith Okely and Helen Calloway argue in the preface to 
Anthropology and Autobiography: “the ‘race,’ nationality, gender, age, and personal 
history of the fieldworker affect the process, interaction and emergent material” (Okely 
and Calloway xi). According to Okely, “the practice of intense fieldwork [in anthropology] 
is unique among all other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences” (Okely 8). This 
might, in part, explain why anthropology has in many ways lead and influenced the 
changes that are represented by the ficto-critical turn.
9  Historically, under pressure to be 
scientific, anthropologists compartmentalised fieldwork experience.
10  Now, instead of 
publishing fictionalised or personal autobiographical accounts of fieldwork separately, and 
often under pseudonyms, more anthropologists are including not only autobiographical 
detail but are also producing ethnographic fictions.  Many of these anthropological ficto-
critical texts deliberately play on the division between fact and fiction. A very good 
example of an anthropological ficto-critique is Enigma Variations (1995) by Richard and 
Sally Price.  To set the scene of this “novel:” 
In a steamy colonial city, an eccentric Frenchman offers for sale an extraordinary 
collection of primitive art.  The two anthropologists called in to appraise the pieces 
for the national museum quickly find themselves in a world where the boundaries 
of authenticity and deception blur in the tropical heat.  Enigma Variations—in the 
tradition of The Recognitions and The Crying of Lot 49—is an entertainment as 
readable for its intellectual power as for its irresistible drama.  (backcover)             
The Prices are anthropologists and this is a fiction, yet here the two characters are 
remarkably like the authors of this text.  Is this autobiography (the characters are Richard 
and Sally), is this a novel (it is clearly narrative), is it an anthropological monograph, or is 102
 
it fact?  The whole text is bounded by references to authenticity and “fakerie.”  As the 
reviews quoted on the back cover confirm, this text is a “genre-busting meditation on the 
nature of genre-busting”: “Enigma Variations is a hybrid work that keeps tempting you to 
read it as fact although it is officially labelled fiction. . .” (Blume and Sokolov 
respectively).  Similarly, George Lamming (again from the back cover) signals the generic 
hybridity of Enigma Variations, its mixing of fact and fiction: “A rare combination of 
scholarly passion and an exuberant narrative skill.”  The question of the authenticity of the 
works of art unfolds in the novel as a metaphor for exploring the division between fact and 
fiction in academic writing, and perhaps all writing.  When one is in the business of 
producing representations “Richard” and “Sally” argue for the need to be mindful of the 
power differentials between the subject and object of writing: 
Refilling our glasses again, we began tossing around the proposition that writers 
confront a similar tangle of moral issues, that they must constantly conjure with the 
inequalities of power and knowledge between themselves and their subjects, 
whether they’re creating a newspaper article, an anthropological monograph, or a 
work of fiction.  (Price 137)     
The work of ethnologist Michael Taussig also functions with attention to similar concerns, 
although it does so in quite a different manner from Enigma Variations.
11  The Magic of 
the State (1997), for example, seems to refute all attempts at ethnographic realism.  
Taussig creates his own “magic state” in an imaginary South-American republic.  The 
“artefactuality” of Taussig’s narrative has been described by one reviewer, Paul Magee, as 
an “overly academic fiction—or overly fictive academia” (197). The Magic of the State, 
undercutting the whole precept of interpretation and judgement through its artificial state 
and dream-like narrative style, influences Magee. He does not respond to Taussig’s text 
with a traditional review, as to do so would be to miss (interpret) a central message of the 
text.  The irony of this situation is not wasted on Magee: “How does one judge The Magic 
of the State without simply laughing at the absurd irony of even attempting to do so? The 
whole point for Taussig is to maintain, in his text’s wild inscrutability, the anomie upon 
whose violent repression, through representation, the Law is founded” (198). Magee goes 103
 
on to describe The Magic of the State as narrative interspersed with shards of theory, a text 
that only ever arrives at varying degrees of epistemological anxiety. As can be seen, both 
Taussig and the Prices’ texts foreground a serious concern about the role and effect of 
representation, as well as the power differential between the author and subject. 
 
The developments in anthropology and ethnography represented by the Prices’ and 
Taussig’s texts have been addressed, and not without controversy. Taussig, for example, 
has been described as a “polarizing figure” in the field of anthropology by the New York 
Times journalist Emily Eakin in her article titled “Anthropology’s Alternative Radical.” 
Eakin says of Taussig: 
He is the innovator and most extreme practitioner of what he calls fictocriticism 
and what might fairly be described as gonzo anthropology. Blending fact and 
fiction, ethnographic observation, archival history, literary theory and memoir, his 
books read more like beatnik novels than sober analyses of other cultures.
   (no 
page number) 
According to Eakin, The Magic of the State has been described both as a “terrible book” 
and a “remarkable achievement,” suggestive of the polarised debates around moderism and 
postmodernism. Not surprisingly, the challenges to disciplinary and generic boundaries 
wrought by Taussig and the Prices’ work are identified as postmodern.
12  
 
Many of the secondary texts that register these shifts seem imbued with a sense of 
discovery—the discovery of something radically different from that which preceded it.  In 
the Introduction to Anthropology and Literature, for example, Edward Bruner says:  “this 
volume is a product of its time, of the late 1980s/early 1990s ‘experimental moment’ in 
anthropology and the postmodern turn” (1). The idea that this “experimental moment” in 
ethnographic fiction is something new—as implied here by the reference to 
postmodernism defined by a period in history—appears to lock into the dialectic model of 
modernism versus postmodernism. In this system the reader tends to become focussed in a 
reactionary way on how codes and expectations are transgressed—what is truth etcetera—104
 
and not on the miniature politics of actual texts produced within a specific historical 
context. Thus limited readings are applied wholesale to groups of texts resulting in many 
other possible readings being crushed. For example, describing the reception of several 
hybrid ethnographic fictions, Bruner says: 
But according to the somewhat dogmatic conventional wisdom, isn’t the difference 
that ethnography is FACT, whereas a short story is FICTION; that one tells the 
TRUTH whereas the other is FANTASY; that ethnographers are SCIENTISTS 
whereas writers are ARTISTS?  I reject these binaries as too simplistic, but the 
story does change in the telling.  (18)  
Ethnographic fiction, therefore, appears to be charged with the same transgressions as 
Helen Garner’s The First Stone, for confusing reality and truth with a fictional subjective 
representation.  Despite their very different agendas and topics, both these genre-busting 
forms elicit the same reactive responses for breaking the rules of belief, the way we learn 
to know the world. Traditional thought, stemming from a binary platform, struggles with 
the writing-between, asking, what is this, how do you read and judge it, and grumbling that 
it is not playing by the rules.  In the provocatively titled Subcultures Reader (suggesting a 
marginal space) Stephen Tyler’s 1986 essay on “Postmodern Ethnography” is reprinted.  
Here Tyler’s title clearly identifies ethnographic fiction such as the Price’s and Taussig’s 
as postmodern.  Tyler therefore further demonstrates the link between texts that challenge 
Cartesian logic and those that challenge the postmodern turn. Thus both Taussig and the 
Prices texts illustrate the interpretative context and the reactions to works that defy the 
generic expectation for proper, factual and objective academic research and writing. 
 
Travel writing, ethnography, and anthropology, are not, however, the only disciplines that 
are experiencing generic contamination of their dominant discursive style.  Examples arise 
across a range of disciplines, such as: cultural and  literary studies,
13 film studies,
14 
performance studies,
15 law, history, philosophy,
16 visual arts,
17 and even beyond the 
humanities into some areas of the sciences.  A View from the Divide: Creative Nonfiction 
on Health and Science (1999), for example, suggests that even the most purely scientific 105
 
and objective disciplines are not immune to the ficto-critical turn. Published by Pittsburg 
University Press, this book is described as being able—by dint of its generic style—to 
reach and enlighten both a general and specialised readership.
18 Lee Gutkin, the editor of 
this collection, is the founder of Creative Nonfiction, a journal established in 1994.
19  
Gutkin is also considered to be one of the leaders of creative non-fiction in America and 
has played some part in its broadening popularity.  In America creative non-fiction is one 
of the dominant terms given to texts that “sully” non-fiction with what are normally 
deemed the stylistic devices of creative writing, such as characterisation, narrative, and 
dialogue.
20  These works of creative non-fiction often include autobiographical detail and 
might also be described in secondary texts as examples of the personal essay.  The 
reference to the essay form confirms that this essayistic creative non-fiction is not entirely 
new as early versions of the essay intersect stylistically with this emerging creative non-
fiction.  What is different, however, is the increasing popularity of this kind of writing and 
its move into contemporary academic discourse.  A recent publication that addresses such 
concerns is the appropriately titled Personal Effects: The Social Character of Scholarly 
Writing published in 2001. Calling for the human to be put back into the humanities: 
This volume collects essays that, taken together, try to show how fundamental it is 
in humanistic scholarship to take account, in a variety of ways and as part of the 
subject matter, of the personal and collective experience of teachers and 
researchers. (Bleich and Holdstein 1) 
This shift toward more subjective and localised accounts in academic writing appears to 
reflect an increasing frustration with existing academic writing models. In fact, I believe 
such developments highlight the exhaustion of normative academic writing forms. 
Similarly, they signal the failure to address current cultural, theoretical and political 
conditions where localised stories are increasingly challenging dominant systems of 
knowledge. Furthermore, personal criticism might also reflect the recent fashionable 
intellectual focus on the body, by presenting knowledge as embodied and situated. 
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Autobiographical criticism 
In America, the focus in the secondary literature on writing-between is very much on 
autobiography. Yet whilst I will show that the essay is the preferred framing genre, 
numerous terms are employed to describe these shifting forms.  These texts, which can be 
loosely described as ficto-critical, for sitting between the taxonomic generic markers of 
fiction and non-fiction, are also variously described as autocritique, the new belletrism, 
experimental critical writing,
21 narrative criticism, and literary non-fiction.
22 Often in the 
secondary texts that address personalised criticism, little is done to delineate or track the 
differences between these terms and their usage.  Similarly, there is slippage around 
differing kinds of non-fiction, which become interchangeable, such as, criticism, theory 
and academic writing. The plethora of possible names for these varying ficto-critical works 
indicates another central problematic of postmodernism and its connection to ficto-
critique: nomenclature.  This further adds to the postmodern flavour of ficto-critical works.   
 
In the United States, literary and cultural criticism certainly appears to be undergoing an  
“autobiographical turn,” a phenomenon that Elspeth Probyn identifies in Sexing the Self: 
Gendered Positions in Cultural Studies (1993).  Although Probyn’s focus is on cultural 
studies, the shift to personal criticism in the academy is not limited to this disciplinary 
field.  This shift in American criticism has been marked by the publication of several 
secondary texts
23 for example: Critical Fictions (1991), The Intimate Critique: 
Autobiographical Literary Criticism (1993), An Alchemy of Genres (1994), The Art of the 
Personal Essay (1994), and Confessions of the Critics (1996), as well as the recent 
Personal Effects (2001) quoted from earlier. The appearance of so many anthologies 
would suggest that a shift has occurred in academic writing. Nancy K. Miller in “Getting 
Personal: Autobiography as Cultural Criticism” muses on the possible reasons for the 
“efflorescence of personal criticism in the United States in the eighties” (Miller 20).
24  As 
possible explanations Miller lists late capitalism’s disruption of subjectivity, 
postcolonialism, and a reaction against High Theory (which she argues required the 
theoretical evacuation of the social subjects producing it). She also states: 
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Indeed, one of the reasons for the current proliferation of autobiographical criticism 
may well be the effect of a crisis over. . .representivity: an anxiety over speaking as 
and speaking for, doubling the postmodern crisis of representation that has been so 
repetitively diagnosed.  Though the reign of the Master Narratives, we are told, has 
passed, micro-narratives abound, and with them a massive reconsideration of the 
conditions grounding authorization itself. At the same time, moreover, through a 
paradox of reversible effects we are now becoming familiar with, the 
poststructuralist lesson and the postmodern moment have powerfully imprinted on 
contemporary productions of identity writing.  (Miller 20)       
Whilst postmodernism emerges again as a likely influence, as Miller points out in the same 
paper, feminists have for sometime been exploring autobiographical criticism. This foray 
into personal criticism was and is a way to explore who is speaking and for who, and to 
question for whom the genteel and generalised “we” implied and constructed by traditional 
academic discourse represents (and by extension excludes and represses).  What is 
pressing now, is to think through the reasons why ficto-critical styles are being taken up 
much more broadly, and at the same time being so heavily coded as postmodern. As 
Probyn observes: 
The very male voice that is now being rendered ‘personal’ served, in part, to 
exclude feminist work from critical discourse.  While this is not to guard the 
personal jealously within the terrain of feminist thought, it is to remember 
important feminist articulations of the autobiographical voice.  In the midst of all 
the critical acceptance and appropriation of self-reflexivity, the recognition of 
previous articulations requires that we question why this particular discursive 
formation, at this specific time, has gained favour. (Relocating Cultural Studies 
106) 
Probyn makes the point that earlier feminist articulations of autobiographical criticism 
were largely ignored. What conditions now bring it to such popularity, and what does this 
tell us about the theoretical and political milieu we live in?  
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In the United States the emphasis in secondary texts that address this self-conscious turn 
toward autobiography in criticism tends to be on the essay as the preferred mode or style, 
rather than feminism as a possible influence.  For example, Diane Freedman in 
“Autobiographical Literary Criticism as the New Belletrism,” as her title suggests, clearly 
identifies the essay as the form of personalised criticism.  Her conceptualisation of 
autobiographical criticism as the new belletrism identifies American ficto-critical moves as 
a return to an earlier form of the essay (before its appropriation as an academic genre and 
reincarnation as logical formal writing).  According to Phillip Lopate in his introduction to 
The Art of the Personal Essay (1994), the term essay once suggested an irregular 
undigested piece of writing that focused on the everyday, meandered, put the “I” at centre 
stage, and was informal in its use of language.
25  Lopate believes that the current historical 
conditions in the United States are ripe for the return of the (personal) essay:  
Another opportunity [for the essay] comes from the growing awareness that the 
United States is a pluralistic, multicultural society, that this is our future as a 
society, and that we need to listen carefully to the intellectual voices of minorities 
and immigrants. . ..  The personal essay turns out to be one of the most useful 
instruments with which outsiders can reach dominant culture quickly and forcefully 
and testify to the precise ambiguities of their situation as individuals and group 
members.  (1) 
He also confirms Freedman’s argument that the essay is undergoing a cautious revival 
(“Autobiographical Literary Criticism”).  Lopate argues that this return to the essay is 
influenced in part by high modernism or postmodernism: 
[T]he personal essay’s suitability for experimental method and self-reflexive 
process, its tolerance for the fragmentary and irresolution, make it uniquely 
appropriate to the present era, whether we want to label it late modernist or 
postmodernist.  My own sense is that we are going through a cautious revival of the 
genre. (1) 
According to Freedman, who cites Lopate’s collection in her paper as an example of the 
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literary essay of personal meditation in bookstores, book reviews, and the academy—
including in cross-disciplinary scholarship and the writing asked of students as well as 
what they read” (3). Freedman clearly believes that the personal turn is not limited merely 
to literary criticism, but is part of a much wider phenomenon.  She identifies several 
belletristic scholars outside literature, including: Anthony Appiah (philosophy/Africana 
studies), Ruth Behar (anthropology), Norma Field (Asian studies), Eunice Lipton (art 
history), Sarah Ruddich (philosophy), Carolyn Steedman (psychoanalysis/sociology) and 
Patricia Williams (law) (Freedman 4). Nancy Miller also compiles a list of 
autobiographical critics.  She includes on her “who’s-who” of personal criticism the 
following writers: Gloria Anzaldúa, Gayatri Spivak, Jane Gallop, Alice Walker, Alice 
Kaplan, Carolyn Heilbrum, Frank Lentricchia, Rachel Blau DuPlessis, bell hooks, Audrey 
Lorde, Cherrie Moraga, and (like Freedman) Patricia Williams (importantly, Miller does 
not include all of their work).
26  Freedman’s list, like Miller’s, is “far from complete.” 
However, their lists give some indication of the scope and diversity of ficto-critical texts 
that appear to be challenging the boundaries of academic and non-fiction writing in 
varying disciplines (and in varying ways).
27  
 
Since both Miller and Freedman identify Patricia Williams,
28 I now look at some of her 
work to understand the kind of writing being discussed within the confines of 
autobiographical criticism. According to Miller, Williams is well-known for her “montage 
of personal and legal anecdote” (2). Williams’ writing is an interesting and significant 
example of the potential of autobiographical criticism, scholarship that is at once 
intelligent, analytically insightful, well researched and personal.  Her work—very 
reminiscent of early notions of the essay—is neither wholly objectivist nor subjective.  
Williams, a law Professor at Columbia University, writes out of her own experience and 
analyses contemporary instances of prejudice.  Her most recent book The Rooster’s Egg: 
On the Persistence of Prejudice (1995) employs a consciousness of the dynamics of race, 
gender, sexuality and class, examining the new forms, or transmutation, of prejudice.  
Williams inserts into her analytical narrative—that is not structured and clinically ordered 110
 
as is traditional academic writing—her own experience as a single parent and African-
American woman.
29 In “Scholarly Memoir: An Un-‘Professional’ Practice” Margaret 
Willard-Traub identifies Williams as one of several writers who have: 
demonstrated in their scholarly work, much of which draws on examples from 
personal experience, how academic and professional languages function to place 
women, people of colour, and the poor in subordinate positions both outside and 
within the academy, albeit in different ways and with different consequences.  (31)  
In one of her essays, “Radio Hoods,” Williams looks at the increasing popularity of racist 
right wing DJs like the infamous Howard Stern of New York.  Unravelling the complex 
discourses that protect and legitimate such propagators of racism and hate in America, 
Williams’ argument takes power and meaning not just from her sophisticated analysis but 
also from her use of personal experience.  For example, in the middle of her analysis, she 
inserts this: 
Not long ago I had the misfortune to hail a taxi cab in which the driver was 
listening to Howard Stern undress some woman.  After some blocks, I had to get 
out.  I was, frankly, afraid to ask the driver to turn it off—not because I was afraid 
of “censoring” him, but because the driver was stripping me too as he leered into 
the rear view mirror.  “Something the matter?” he demanded, still leering, as I 
asked him to pull over and let me out at the next corner, well short of my 
destination.  (The Rooster’s Egg 52-3)   
In the section of text that follows directly—bracketed off by ellipsis—Williams makes a 
point of telling you what she says she won’t tell: she explains the effect (the psychic 
violence) of Howard Stern’s voice “a tinny screeching backdrop” inside the taxi (and 
outside) on her person: 
(I’ll spare you the full story of what happened from there—trying to get another 
cab, having lots of trouble as cabs sped by me while stopping for all the white 
businessmen who so much as scratch their heads near the curb; a nice young white 
man seeing my plight, giving me his cab, having to thank him, he hero, me saved-
but-humiliated, cab driver peeved and surly.  I fight my way to my destination, 111
 
arriving in a bad mood, militant black woman, cranky feminazi, gotta watch out for 
my type, no pleasing that kind).  
(The Rooster’s Egg 53) 
The effect of telling—yet stating that she isn’t going to tell—highlights the exclusionary 
conventions of academic discourse and analysis that push such experiences to the margin.  
By saying politely, considerately, “I’ll spare you the full story,” but telling in a fairly 
detailed fashion exactly what happened, Williams addresses the (white/male) reader’s 
anxiety and resulting desire to avoid the messy (emotional/bodily) details.  Williams, 
however, is not silenced by the conventions of polite academic discourse (let’s not take it 
personally): she tells you what happened next.  Hers is, therefore, a situated knowledge, 
grounded in personal experience and invested with her concerns.
 30 The language and 
writing does not reflect the author-evacuated prose of traditional academic scholarship, 
and her voice and personality resonate loudly throughout the essays in this collection.  
Significantly, Williams in The Rooster’s Egg does not defer her authority to particular 
theorists or other authors.  Her method of citation is very low key: this is not a text 
peppered with footnotes.  There are, in fact, none.  The bibliography is a simple Notes at 
the end of the book, keyed by page number and refers mainly to primary texts she 
examines, not secondary texts employed to back her argument.  Her authority comes from 
herself and her experience.
31 Whilst Williams’ work surfaces in several secondary texts in 
relation to autobiographical criticism and indeed ficto-criticism, her style of writing is just 
one example of a myriad of approaches to personal/autobiographical/Belletristic criticism 
that fall under the umbrella of alternative ficto-critical forms. These critically creative 
mutations challenge traditional academic thesis-driven writing by refusing (to feign) 
objectivity and mastery.   
 
As one can imagine, the inclusion of fictional moves like autobiography open the 
discourses of academic voice and writing to a plethora of labile experimentation(s) lost 
somewhere between fiction and non-fiction.  However, one thing that the varying 
formations of personalised criticism do have in common, other than the use of personal 112
 
experience and voice, is the often-found charge of narcissism or navel-gazing. What is 
interesting about this charge of narcissism is that it is imbued with the same rhetoric of 
dismissal that ficto-critical texts receive when labelled as symptoms of radical and 
experimental postmodernism. They are cast as destroying all that is good and true about 
normative academic writing and research. The accusations of narcissism echo fears in the 
West of the increasing “Me” generation viewed as the result of postmodernity.  As Edward 
Bruner signals in Anthropology and Literature on the risk of narcissism: “The danger is in 
putting the personal self so deeply back into the text that it completely dominates, so that 
the work becomes narcissistic and egotistical” (6). Also, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese critiques 
personal criticism as a “naked display of one’s personal failings. . .more often than not 
fall[ing] into a complacent exhibitionism” (74). Significantly, Rachel Brownstein discusses 
in Confessions of the Critics—in this climate of  “excessive, obsessive concern everywhere 
with persons and personalities”— how the cult of the personality has resulted in academics 
being featured in glossy magazines like The New Yorker.  No wonder, she argues, that 
“professors are tempted to talk about themselves rather than about literary texts” (32-3). 
Again, this shift in criticism and non-fiction to the personal has been identified as 
postmodern. According to Peter Brooks: “A recent trend toward the personalization of 
criticism, indeed toward the cult of the critic’s personality, seems to me regrettable, a kind 
of academic version of the postmodern replacement of personhood by celebrity—as if one 
did not really exist until celebrated in People magazine” (20). Similarly, Lopate (on the 
personal essay) suggests that a public “weaned on Oprah, [is] uniquely sympathetic to the 
sound of authentic witnessing and hard-won experience” (1). Times are, as Lopate has 
argued, ripe for the personal essay and this certainly seems true of American academic 
writing.  As Miller indicates in her paper on autobiographical criticism: “In England it was 
suggested to me that being ‘personal’ was in fact being American!” (“Autobiography as 
Cultural Criticism” 3). Freedman goes even further.  According to her, in true American 
style, “the new belletrism is somehow deeply American (though practiced elsewhere, of 
course . . .)” (“Autobiographical Literary Criticism” 5). 
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If American scholarship in the eighties experienced a personal turn in critical or academic 
writing, so too did British criticism.  In Britain, however, this appeared to be mainly 
confined to one particular field, that of cultural studies.  Probyn identifies the work of 
several British writers such as Carolyn Steedman, Valerie Walkerdine, Angela McRobbie 
and Rosalind Coward, as demonstrating the effective use of the personal in criticism and 
theory.  According to Probyn, these feminist critics are “not, of course, operating in a 
vacuum; the mode of theorizing from the ground has a solid history stretching from 
Raymond Williams, E.P. Thompson, and Stuart Hall to more recent ethnographic studies 
by Christine Griffith to Dick Hebdige’s recent work . . .” (“True Voices 118). Theorising 
and writing “from the ground up,” as Probyn describes it, is not a surprising move from 
cultural studies theorists.  Like feminists, many of the academics in cultural studies write 
from the experience of having been marginalised, in this case, by their class (if not also 
their race, gender and sexuality).  The cultural studies project of questioning the 
hierarchies that divide high and low culture—disqualifying certain topics from serious 
study—has perhaps helped precipitate an interest in autobiographical criticism, as a way to 
validate not only their experience but also their work.  The lives of the British working 
class—their popular cultural icons and rituals—were, prior to the establishment of cultural 
studies, not seen as topics worthy of serious critical attention in their own right.  With the 
rise of cultural studies the topics of academic attention have broadened to include the 
minor stories of popular culture.  For example, Angela McRobbie and Valerie 
Walkerdine’s essays in Gender and Generation (1984) (writers whom Probyn identifies) 
tackle such topics as popular dance trends and the proliferation and dispersion of popular 
myths of romantic heterosexist love.   
 
Whilst both McRobbie and Walkerdine write from their own clearly stated interests and 
experience, there are moments of uncertainty about the reception of their work.  This 
seems to suggest that both writing the personal into criticism and defying academic generic 
conventions was potentially a risky business in the 1980s (and perhaps remains so).  For 
example, McRobbie declares almost apologetically “I should add that my mode of 114
 
presentation here is unashamedly unconventional.  What I offer here resembles more a 
series of snapshot profiles than a thorough academic thesis” (130). Similarly, Rosalind 
Coward in Female Desire (1984), another of Probyn’s examples, states: 
I don’t approach these things [food, clothes, novels, soap operas, houses etcetera] 
as a distant critic but as someone examining myself, examining my own life under 
a microscope . . .. This book has not been written as a result of painstaking 
academic research on each of the topics, although it is informed by previous 
theoretical studies of these issues. (14)       
What Coward describes here echoes Lopate’s description of the personal essay.  However, 
despite McRobbie’s assertion that her presentation is “unashamedly unconventional,” both 
her and Coward appear to be explaining or justifying their approach in the face of 
anticipated criticism.  Each foregrounds the fact that they do not intend, or desire, to meet 
with conventional standards of academic rigour.
32 Although these examples were 
published fairly early in the 1980s—and are early examples of the wider personal turn in 
criticism—their anxiety and attempts to justify their approach suggests that what they were 
doing was indeed risky.  Particularly risky in terms of their careers as academics: in terms 
of being taken seriously as scholars. The anxiety demonstrated by their self-consciousness 
around transgressing the boundaries and conventions of non-fictional genres with personal 
experience, narrative and vernacular language, may help explain why the personal voice 
was not taken up by all cultural studies theorists. The little or minor stories of pop culture 
might now be legitimate topics for study with the demise of the metanarratives. However, 
the insertion of oneself into one’s work on the level of professional academic presentation 
appeared to be much less appealing, particularly if one desired tenure.
33  It is also worth 
noting that this insertion of oneself into personal criticism presents as much more than a 
light-hearted anecdote at the beginning, but informs the topic, mode of study, and writing.  
As Peter Elbow suggests: 
Notice the difference between the discourse of people who are established  in the 
profession and those who are not—particularly those without tenure.  Certain 115
 
liberties, risks, tones, and stances are taken by established insiders that are not 
usually taken by the unannealed.  Discourse is power. (139)   
Elbow makes a good point, echoed by Marianna Torgnovick. She states of her turn to 
experimental critical writing: “I knew I wanted to write something significantly different 
in tone and style from my first two books. I had recently been tenured and then promoted 
to full professor, and I felt that I was no longer writing for committees—I was writing for 
myself” (25). Similarly, Bruner, discussing the challenges facing early potential fictioneers 
observes: “A young anthropologist aiming to get on with a career and to achieve status in 
the discipline would be highly motivated to accept prevailing conventions” (5). This is 
why early experimentations—of fictional accounts of fieldwork—were published under 
pseudonyms.  The degree of ficto-critical experimentation, whilst dependent on the 
individual academic and their job security is, of course, predicated on a whole range of 
other rapidly changing factors, for example the disciplinary stream and the department’s 
degree of interdisciplinarity. The acceptance of ficto-critical experimentation would also 
be mediated by the history of the institution in which the ficto-critics might find 
themselves. Access to publishing, such as refereed journals, journals that would consider 
writing that challenged academic conventions would similarly influence the degree of 
experimentation.  Ficto-criticism as between genres, however, involves not just the 
incursion of fictional conventions into academic and non-fictional writing, but also the 
reverse: the incursion of non-fictional markers—such as theory—into fiction. 
 
Fiction as criticism 
As the disruption of non-fictional genres with fiction finds itself labelled postmodern, so 
too does fiction interrupted by non-fictional modes (such as academic writing).  The best 
example to demonstrate this process of codification is metafiction.  Typically, metafiction 
has been deemed postmodern,
34 through its self-conscious awareness and focus on systems 
of meaning making in language.  That is, the incorporation of contemporary theories of 
language results in metafictional texts staging their own metacommentary.  By directly 
challenging and drawing attention to the conventions of realist fiction, metafiction disrupts 
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the genre and throws into question its pre-eminence as the fictional mode.  The parallels 
between ficto-criticism and metafiction are therefore substantial (as suggested by earlier 
discussions of Coetzee’s book The Lives of Animals): both are between genres, challenging 
the conventions of dominant genres.  Ficto-criticism for example—by mixing fiction and 
non-fiction—questions the authority and pre-eminence of academic writing as the 
critically intelligent mode, as metafiction questions realism.  The conventions of realism, 
like those of academic writing, have become, for a range of reasons, virtual cliches.  No 
longer able to deal effectively with the current prevailing historical conditions—the 
breakdown between reality and fiction—traditional realist texts have become increasingly 
intertexual, and increasingly contain moments of metacommentary.
35 As Michael Boyd 
argues in The Reflexive Novel: Fiction as Critique (1983) metafiction is “a species of 
criticism in fictional form” (23). If metafiction is a form of literary criticism, then a variety 
of self-conscious fictional texts must be considered as potential ficto-critiques.  However, 
it is often the context in which they appear that determines how easy it is to make that 
identification.  It also depends on how much space or flexibility you wish to give to 
conceptualising ficto-criticism as a space between.  For example Coetzee’s The Lives of 
Animals—a metafiction and ficto-critique—could, if one did not know its history (that is, 
its academic frame), be viewed as merely a collection of short stories that seem to be 
commenting on academic discourse.  Coetzee’s text emphasises the academic connections 
and thus the meaning of his text as a commentary on, or critique of, academic convention 
and reason.  However, other fictional examples that predominantly seem weighted toward 
fiction rather than criticism, theory or non-fiction are less easily viewed as potential 
examples of ficto-criticism.  In looking at them as between genres, where does one draw 
the line—what degree of fictionalisation or non-fictionalisation in their opposing defining 
genre—makes them ficto-critical?  Interestingly and somewhat ironically, it is precisely 
the conventions of literary criticism that help override these ambiguities by encouraging 
singular readings, preferring to be in a position of mastery over the fictional text.  If a work 
of fiction begins to enact its own metacommentary or be viewed as a critique in its own 
right, is criticism in its present form still relevant?  The implications of this genre busting 117
 
on pedagogy are substantial, as has been hinted by several writers on ficto-critical texts.
36 
This is an important point, yet one that has failed to be explored in any detail. What effect 
will ficto-criticism have in the current economic rationalist environment of tertiary 
education, given the way it undermines the division between the virtual and the real?
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If one begins to accept ficto-critique as writing-between—as I argue in this thesis—
broadening out the possibilities of the space and spaces between, then a whole range of 
labile texts surface. For example, if metafiction can be considered a critical act in creative 
form as Boyd suggests, then historiographic metafiction must also be considered under the 
umbrella of potential ficto-criticism. Yet, Alison Bartlett, an Australian ficto-critic, pushes 
the boundaries of criticism even further.  In a paper titled “Other Stories: The 
Representation of History in Recent Fiction by Australian Women Writers,” she argues 
that the historical fictions she examines represent an intersection between theory and 
fiction.  Rewriting history, often from the local and everday, historiographic fictions 
disrupt the grand narrative of history by presenting an alternative vision of events.  Are 
these texts also to be considered creative acts of criticism that are theoretically informed?  
Bartlett argues that they are, in fact, ficto-critical.  She links these historic fictions with 
ficto-criticism by suggesting they reflect varying theoretical approaches.  However, 
whether they are ficto-critical in the sense that they arrive at self-reflexivity—examining 
their own process—she does not indicate.  Self-reflexivity is an important theme of ficto-
criticism and can be played out in varying subtle ways.  Bartlett’s paper therefore 
highlights the complications in determining what constitutes writing-between, confirming 
that there is without doubt contestation over this space and its meanings.  The texts she 
selects “are all concerned with retrieving historical female subjects through the medium of 
fiction and,” in the process, they explore the “overlapping discourse of historiography and 
historical fiction.” As Bartlett points out “[t]hrough the medium of fiction, they are able to 
negotiate and experiment with the problems of representing history” (“Other Stories” 165). 
In this way, she identifies these texts as theoretical fictions, reflecting their own historical 
origins through their particular theoretical approaches. What is significant about Bartlett’s 118
 
paper is that she identifies texts categorised primarily as fiction, as instances of theoretical 
critique.    
 
Significantly, this approach is not Bartlett’s alone.  For example, in the realm of 
ecocriticism recent academic work has identified contemporary literature informed by a 
deep ecological approach, to be examples of theoretical critique.  Patrick Murphy, in his 
paper titled “The Women are Speaking,” discusses a range of texts that he argues 
constitutes theoretical commentary and that raise certain issues around theories of ecology 
and political activism.  According to Murphy, the ecofeminist literary non-fiction, fiction 
and poetry he examines enact a theoretical critique by linking the oppression of women 
with the exploitation of nature, and by developing theories of political action.  His 
inclusion of poetry as examples of ecofeminist theoretical critique further expands the 
space between to include other literary genres beyond the fictional. There are, 
significantly, a number of ficto-critical texts that appear primarily as prose on the page yet 
are interspersed—or broken—with poetic form.  Whilst not ecocriticism, several of Rachel 
Blau DuPlessis’ pieces in her book The Pink Guitar (1990) carry out such experimental 
crossing of non-fictional borders.  Susan Griffin is however a well-known ecofeminist 
critic and she, in her collection Made From this Earth (1982), includes poetry into some of 
her pieces.  It is not surprising to discover that Griffin’s experimental essays have as their 
target the barriers between the pairs mind/body, nature/culture, and male/female.  In 
ecocritique as much as in feminism a major target of criticism is the abstraction or 
disembodiment of theoretical and political arguments that render issues like ecological 
devastation devoid of physical reality and, as a result, less pressing.  Deep ecology—that 
informs ecocriticism—also enacts a similar politicisation of the personal, by requiring us 
all to examine on a tangible personal level how our everyday practices (theoretical, 
philosophical and literal) impact on the environment.
38 
 
Imagining the space between fiction and non-fiction as expansive enough to include 
fictional/poetic works like the ecocritical examples Murphy describes, and Barlett’s 119
 
historic fictions, has the potential to generate methodological problems for my dissertation. 
This approach—somewhat ironically—becomes problematic in the face of thesis 
conventions that require students to contain their topic and manage it within prescribed 
generic requirements.  While reading writing-between as inclusive of these creative texts 
opens up ficto-critique, it could also result in charges of conceptualising it too broadly, so 
that almost everything becomes (potentially) ficto-criticism.  This criticism might be 
partially justified. However, as discussed in Chapter Two, it seems justified only if one 
remains within the existing paradigm of academic discursive conventions, and it is this 
traditional critical paradigm that ficto-criticism is concerned with exploring.  This Catch 
22 situation aside, there are some other very logical, intellectual and methodological 
reasons for approaching ficto-criticism as a between practice.   To understand the shift to 
ficto-critique and to explore its overcoding as postmodern, there needs to be some 
attention to, and consciousness of, the ways in which (primarily) fictional creative texts are 
now being read as examples of theoretical critique.  Examining and considering these 
instances helps contextualise and understand the shift to ficto-critique across a range of 
disciplines.   
 
Contextualising the emergence of these changes to critical reading practices enables one to 
recognise them as not isolated incidents, but as reflective of wider social and cultural shifts 
that challenge and examine knowledge and the process of its production.  Including these 
texts in an initial literary survey also helps demonstrate and understand how postmodern 
overcoding eradicates and suffocates so many differences and contradictions that arise in 
these varying ficto-critical texts.  As Murphy and Barlett’s papers signal, there seems to be 
something peculiar to this milieu that is emerging, and resulting in, an increasing trend 
towards reading such texts as critique. The texts Murphy examines are, after all, labelled 
ecocriticism.  Similar ecological concerns were—without doubt—expressed in earlier 
fictional texts. What is it, then, about this period in literary criticism (and beyond) that is 
resulting in the foregrounding of both fictional devices in non-fiction and non-fictional 120
 
critical aspects in fictional texts?  This is a question that will be explored in the subsequent 
chapters that address Australian and Canadian ficto-criticism. 
 
In another paper, another term arises in relation to critical fiction. In this instance, novels 
are again being read as criticism. Norma Bouchard in her paper titled “‘Critifictional’ 
Epistemes in Contemporary Literature: The Case of Foucault’s Pendulum,” discusses 
“critifiction,” which she argues is a sub-genre of the academic novel. In this paper 
Bouchard develops a lengthy argument for the inclusion of Umberto Eco’s novel 
Foucault’s Pendulum into this critifictional genre, a genre that she argues incorporates 
“novels written by British authors David Lodge and Malcolm Bradbury” (474). In fact, 
Bouchard, quoting Siegfried Mews, defines critifiction as a new form of the academic 
novel, “penned by critics and professors of literature who consciously endeavour to 
combine critical theory and fictional practice by engaging in the production of both sorts 
of texts” (Bouchard 498). Despite the critifictional label implying hybridity, this definition 
maintains a separation between academic and creative genres. For example, the words “the 
production of both sorts of texts” imply that the combination of critical theory and fiction 
cannot be combined successfully within a single text. The combining of fiction and theory 
is carried out through an author who writes both, not through the recognition that a text can 
be both fictional and theoretical. Therefore, regardless of the implied similarities between 
ficto-criticism and critifiction—suggested by its hybrid label—the generic divide implied 
by Mews’ definition is inconsistent with ficto-critical practice. In other words, Bouchard 
uses critifiction to name this style of writing, but the definition does not imply genre 
blurring as the label would suggest.
39 However, despite this anomaly in her paper, she is 
attempting to identify a form of writing that mixes fictional and non-fictional genres. For 
example, the academic novel implies the combining of academic interests and concerns 
with the novel form. Similarly, the term critifiction implies a kind of fictional writing that 
has, as its primary focus, the critique of something. According to Bouchard, in the case of 
Eco’s text, the focus of the critique enacted through the combination of critical theory and 
fiction, is deconstruction. Bouchard states: 121
 
Using a textual and intertextual approach, this essay establishes a metonymic 
relation between Eco’s recent theoretical stance against deconstruction and his 
latest novel. Eco’s major critical essays from the mid-eighties will provide the 
background to support a critifictional reading of Foucault’s Pendulum.  (497)  
Interestingly, deconstruction—a highly complex analytic procedure that disrupts the 
seeming continuity of the idealist tradition from Plato to Hegel—is often reduced to a form 
of poststructualist theory, and then placed under the umbrella of postmodernism. 
Bouchard’s paper thus links academic novels, critifiction and postmodernism. To 
demonstrate further the easy conflation of poststructuralism, critifiction, and 
postmodernism, one need only look at the original text from which Bouchard borrowed the 
term. Federman’s monograph on critifiction is titled Critifiction: Postmodern Essays. As a 
result—and through these kinds of slippery associations—we find that another example of 
creative criticism is associated with postmodernism. Again, this occurs through the 
reduction of complex terms. 
 
Bouchard’s paper on critifiction, therefore, is interesting for a number of reasons as it 
suggests several things worth emphasising about the supposed relationship between ficto-
criticism and postmodernism. For example, although it associates another potential ficto-
critical form with a theory aligned with poststructuralism and thus postmodernism, the 
academic novels used as examples in this paper are, in fact, antagonistic to deconstruction 
(seen as an excess of theory). Put another way, the critifiction she describes critiques 
deconstruction and, as a result, does not seem celebratory of the radical nihilistic 
postmodernism deconstruction tends to be aligned with. In fact, according to Bouchard, 
these critifictional novels are parodying the so–called nihilism of deconstruction.
40 There 
is, therefore, a contradiction. If Bouchard’s argument that these novels work to critique 
deconstruction is correct, here is another example of a creatively-critical (ficto-critical) 
form that cannot automatically be assumed to support postmodernism, even though it may 
display postmodern literary aesthetic traits. This scenario demonstrates that a more 122
 
complex approach must be applied to ficto-critical texts, one that can dialogically explore 
the grey areas between polarised binary structures. 
 
Although Bouchard quotes Mews for her definition of critifiction, the term actually comes 
from Raymond Federman. This is an important detail since Federman’s definition of 
critifiction contains a significant emphasis on self-reflexivity. For Federman, critifictional 
discourse is one that is critical, fictitious and self-conscious. The importance of reflexivity 
to his notion of critifiction is demonstrated rather than stated categorically. This he 
achieves via both an explicit and implicit critique of traditional critical modes, which he 
clearly reads as lacking self-reflexivity. In his essay “Critifiction: Imagination as 
Playgerism,” Federman carries out an attack on normative criticism through his style of 
ficto-critical writing. His critique appears to be based on an understanding of traditional 
critical writing as limiting and reductive to the object of his attention. However, despite the 
use of Federman’s self-conscious term critifiction, the novels Bouchard discusses as 
examples of critifiction seem more about parodying or lampooning academic life and 
intellectual fashions (such as deconstruction) than self-conciously examining their own 
mode of production and authority. Significantly, the whole reasoning behind critifiction is 
to develop a self-concious critical writing practice as a counter to normative critical 
writing, seen as powerfully lacking self-consciousness. Bouchard acknowledges the 
emphasis on lampooning in the academic novels she examines. For example, she cites 
David Lodge who speaks of satirising and carnivalising in his academic novels the same 
contemporary theories he employs in his academic work (499). Malcolm Bradbury’s Cuts 
(1987), whilst not analysed by Bouchard, illustrates the lampooning of academic life and 
intellectual pursuits that goes on in academic novels.
41 For example, the main character of 
Cuts is Henry Babbacombe. He is overtly satirised and stereotyped, as is the theory of 
deconstruction (here interpreted banally as meaning everything is fictitious). Throughout 
the novel there are numerous references to reality not existing at all, and there seems very 
little evidence of self-reflexivity. In fact, the only trace of self-reflexivity is the emphasis 
on the provisionality of knowledge, via the consistent talk about the unreality of reality. 123
 
For example, in the words of Babbacombe: “It was certainly a very mixed and funny sort 
of world, the modern world of today, and probably quite engrossing if you could find a 
way of writing about it without getting too involved in reality, which of course did not 
exist anyway” (Bradbury 79). As this quotation suggests, the main theme of this academic 
critifictional novel is to lampoon academics, their isolated and overly academic lives, and 
their fashionable theories that tend to become dogma. Therefore, any self-reflexivity 
achieved through the play on fictionalising one’s argument is undermined by the 
overarching attack on deconstruction (carried out in a very didactic manner). Similarly, the 
novel does not examine its own immersion in some powerful discourses as a means to 
represent and reconfirm a particular world view. There is also a difference between 
enacting a critique—as well as acknowledging the partiality of one’s perspective—through 
employing fictional devices, and merely playing on the notion that reality may be a fiction. 
The extreme satirising in such academic novels as Cuts, therefore, reflects and perpetuates 
popularised readings of postmoderism, and as a result can be read as a defensive move to 
counter what is perceived as the threat of postmodernism to our reality (and our 
understanding of how we make that reality mean something to us). What all this signals is 
the importance of reiterating the complexity of creatively critical genres, and the dangers 
of trying to capture and contain ficto-criticism under the heading of postmodernism.  As 
many of the academic novels Bouchard describes as critifiction demonstrate, whilst they 
challenge a key poststructuralist theory—deconstruction—they still can employ aesthetic 
styles normally aligned with postmodernism. Some ficto-critical texts may challenge high 
theory, while others are heavily informed by contemporary theories. 
 
Questions thus need to be raised regarding the increasing identification of these potential 
critical-theoretical fictions, and, as already signalled, why they are so easily and 
predominantly coded as postmodern.  Much earlier texts—outside dominant 
conceptualisations of postmodernism as specific to a historical period—have played with 
and challenged generic boundaries and offered alternative forms of critique.  Is the 
difference now that many of the emerging texts are more overtly conscious of language as 124
 
a system of meaning making? Or is it that as critics we are more attuned to reading in this 
way, reading texts as agents that create realities and influence their audience?  This post 
semiotics self-consciousness around language and meaning might also explain the trend in 
academic writing, in a more candid self-conscious fashion, to explore both the critic and 
the writer’s relationship to their object of study.  What seems consistent, however, in all of 
these examples of texts that lie between fiction and non-fiction, as well as the secondary 
texts that examine them, is a concern with generic conventions and the referentiality of 
language, which foregrounds their power to shape our reality. 
 
Not surprisingly, where other novel-length (and primarily fictional) texts have been 
identified as a form of criticism—that is, as between fiction and criticism—the majority of 
secondary critical texts continue to mark them as postmodern.  These fictional texts find 
themselves generically between for incorporating contemporary theories and enacting self-
reflexivity through foregrounding the referentiality of language.  Bartlett, Murphy and 
Bouchard are not the only writers to argue that such texts are criticism dressed up in 
fiction.  Freedman also reads novel-length texts as criticism. It does indeed seem, 
therefore, that more academics are inclined to read largely fictional texts as alternative 
forms of criticism.  For example, in her paper “Autobiographical Literary Criticism,” 
Freedman reads texts like Maxine Hong Kingston’s The Woman Warrior and China Men 
as representing “a paradigm shift in academic writing” (4). Similarly, Michael Hostein in 
his thought provokingly titled paper “Creative Writing as Comparative Criticism: Maxine 
Hong Kingston and the Vision of the Bicultural Writer,” draws a similar conclusion in 
relation to Kingston’s novels.  What does this say about the state of criticism and academic 
writing when creative texts such as Hong Kingston’s are considered acts of criticism, and 
seen as a challenge to its traditional paradigm? One possible answer is that criticism—in 
its current dominant form—appears to be reaching a point of exhaustion: it no longer 
reflects the social and political reality of both the experiences of its readers or the texts that 
it wishes to explore. 
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Two other creative writers whose work is also imbued with out creative-critical acts, are 
Kathy Acker and Jeanette Winterson.  Both writers cross generic boundaries and 
conventions, incorporate a high degree of intertextuality, and play on words, story 
structures and meanings to create alternative realities.  Both also confront many cultural 
and social conventions in a wider sense.  Like Costello, Coetzee’s character in The Lives of 
Animals, Winterson and Acker generate discomfort by transgressing societal rules. As in 
The Lives of Animals, these writers’ generic transgressions mirror their disruption of other 
conventions of polite ordered society.  Acker does this with her colourful language and 
hyper-real pornographic scenes, and Winterson with her ambiguous sexuality and lesbian 
eroticism.  Given the self-referentiality of their texts, their choice of material, and their 
challenge to generic conventions, several of their texts can be interpreted as acts of 
criticism.  Their texts ask whose reality is being represented by mainstream literature; who 
makes the rules, both societal and generic; and most importantly who has the right to judge 
or interpret?
42  
 
Not surprisingly—given the characteristics of their writing—both Winterson and Acker’s 
work has, like ficto-criticism, been predominantly framed by postmodernism.  A brief 
search through MLA’s electronic database for texts on Winterson reveals numerous 
secondary works that discuss her texts in relation to postmodernism.  For example, Christy 
Burns describes Winterson as a “British postmodern author” in her paper “Fantastic 
Language: Jeanette Winterson’s Recovery of the Postmodern Word.” Burns states: “Like 
many British postmodern authors, Winterson is dissatisfied with mere realism, and she. . 
.would graft new possibilities onto the received social order” (291-2). Emphasising 
Winterson’s metafictive interruptions (“I’m telling you stories.  Trust me.”), Burns 
foregrounds the postmodern characteristics of Winterson’s Romantic prose.  Noel King, 
however, goes even further in framing Acker’s work.  According to King, Acker’s writing 
constitutes both a post-critical and postmodern act.  In “Kathy Acker on the Loose,” he 
says her experimental fictions seem close to postmodern practices in the other arts (“Kathy 
Acker on the Loose” 335). Floating in an orbit of “pomo echoes,” King says, Acker’s 126
 
“‘ficto-critical’ mixing of genres makes [her] a writer whose work pushes the boundaries 
of what we recognise as literary” (“Kathy Acker on the Loose” 334). 
 
If predominantly creative novel-length texts such as Acker’s and Winterson’s—and indeed 
Hong Kingston’s—are to be considered within the ficto-critical space between, then ficto-
critique does not seem to be limited to a certain length of text.  At least it does not in this 
open conceptualisation of this hybrid form that, by its very transgeneric nature, demands a 
certain open-ended-ness and flexible approach.  This is, after all, the (generic) space 
between.  Quite logically, therefore, writing-between includes and mixes many literary 
forms: script, prose, poetry, non-fiction, theory and autobiography.  As demonstrated by 
the literature thus far, ficto-criticism is indeed a slippery and contradictory category.  Yet, 
for this very reason—its conceptualisation—length is an issue for ficto-criticism.  If one 
places the emphasis on criticism (ficto-criticism as an act of criticism that plays with other 
genres) then the length of the text becomes a defining characteristic.  Notably, the majority 
of secondary texts and anthologies examined so far focus on texts of a certain essayistic 
length.  This implies that ficto-critical acts are generally seen in opposition to the academic 
article, and this is a common view of ficto-critical texts.  However, this conceptualisation 
enacts another binary that distracts from ficto-criticism’s between nature.  For example, in 
Estranging the Familiar: Toward a Revitalised Critical Thinking, Douglas Atkins 
establishes the essay (in its original Montaigne formula) as very different—indeed as an 
alternative to—the critical academic article. Whilst suggesting that ficto-criticism disrupts 
traditional critical conventions, this conceptualisation still maintains the traditional divide 
(at least in literary criticism) between the interpretative text (of a certain essayistic length) 
and the text to be interpreted (novel-length, poetry/script, etcetera).  In broader terms, if 
seen as mainly critical and therefore constituting a certain essay length, ficto-criticism 
loses much of its revolutionary power as the boundaries between object and subject of 
analysis are left in place. When considered as only being defined as a certain length or 
kind of text, the generic border crossing that ficto-criticism is focused on achieving is thus 
left relatively unrecognised.  Of course, other factors figure in deciding what length piece 127
 
of writing works for criticism.  For example, the conventions of academic journals and 
conferences affect the length of critical writing.  These conventions of space and time 
close off texts into neat manageable endings, producing a finished piece in its own right, 
not a work in process to be continued, or an unruly long text.  Significantly, this reflects 
the conventions of normative academic writing: a form judged on its ability to contain its 
subject/material and lead it to a logical conclusion via a persuasive linear argument. 
 
Therefore, whilst questioning academic convention is without doubt a major focus of ficto-
critique, thinking it through with one’s eyes focused on the critical aspects results in 
closing down writing-between much in the same way that (over) coding it as postmodern 
does.  As writing-between, ficto-critical acts of creative-criticism spiral outward to include 
a myriad of texts of varying lengths and in differing forms.  As this chapter demonstrates, 
confining ficto-critique to a narrow range of texts is not only impossible in the face of the 
examples arising, but illogical philosophically speaking in imagining what a space 
between may encompass.  In subsequent chapters the open approach to ficto-criticism 
established in this chapter is refined as the thesis begins to explore more fully the 
implications of this labile space. Yet, as indicated earlier, to enable an imagining of the 
space between and its wider social and cultural influences, it is necessary to first examine 
both the varying forms and contexts in which these texts emerge and the ways in which 
they are named and discussed. 
 
Given the shift in criticism and academic non-fiction to creative experimentation, and the 
increasing tendency in criticism to interpret fictional texts as instances of criticism, it is no 
surprise that many of the writers engaging in this ficto-critical discourse are creative 
writers. These are creative writers in their own right, or academics who write creatively for 
an audience outside the university. As a result, one of the terms that is used as a label for 
ficto-critics is poet-critic. In America this is a term that turns up repeatedly in relation to 
creative-criticism. In An Alchemy of Genres: Cross-Genre Writing by American Feminist 
Poet-Critics Freedman describes a new critical mode that runs parallel with other ficto-128
 
critical practices. She speaks of a criticism that blurs boundaries: crossing the 
personal/private with the public; body with mind; subjective with objective; a process of 
becoming both/and not either/or. The primary writers Freedman engages with in this book 
and identifies as poet-critics are: Adrienne Rich, Marge Piercy, Susan Griffin, Alice 
Walker, Gloria Anzaldúa, Cherie Moraga, Maxine Hong Kingston and Louise Bernikow. 
Whilst Freedman is concerned with feminist articulations of poet-criticism, the term poet-
critic is not limited to women writers. Freedman describes it as a feminine form of writing 
open to both men and women, one grounded in a situated/bodily knowledge that breaks 
hierarchies, is personal, and open-ended: 
Writers in this mode use language not to gain power but to create intimacy, 
intimacy often achieved through self-reflexive statements on the why and how of 
their practice. Such metadiscursive comments commonly announce the substitution 
of unconventional or multiple genres for the traditional essay, argue for personal 
over fixed terms. (An Alchemy of Genres 3-4)  
Therefore, like the ecocriticism and other forms of ficto-critique already discussed, 
criticism written by poet-critics offers a challenge to authority, fixed centres and meanings. 
Since this is also a common theme of poststructuralist and postmodernist discourses, the 
trend in secondary texts to align ficto-critical practices with the decentering project of the 
posts is a logical move. To demonstrate the ease with which this is done one need only 
look at the term post-criticism. Post-criticism illustrates just how easy it is to draw an 
alliance between creative-critical experimental writing, postmodernism and 
poststructuralism. This term comes from a paper on ficto-criticism by Gregory Ulmer in 
the very well-known book on postmodernism: The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern 
Culture (1983). In “The Object of Post-criticism,” Ulmer explores the contemporary trend 
in critical writing to problematise the representation of the object of study. Given that this 
was an early text to address creatively-critical texts and that it appears in a popular book, 
this article by Ulmer is pivotal in the discourse of ficto-criticism.  Through what seems to 
be a Lyotardian prism, postmodernism is read as a continuation of the avant-garde 
practices of high modernism. Ulmer examines the work of Derrida, Barthes and Benjamin 129
 
in the area of post-criticism, and their use of high modernist techniques such as collage and 
montage; Derrida’s Glas (1974) is drawn out as one of Ulmer’s main examples of post-
criticism. Ulmer’s use of the prefix post to identify this trend in contemporary criticism—
by writers associated with poststructuralism—appears therefore as not only a logical move 
but also ultimately the right move. Despite his implied application of a Lyotardian model 
of postmodernism, his use of the term post-criticism to describe these playful, creatively 
critical texts tends to lend itself to less sophisticated readings of postmodernism as very 
different from modernism, indeed, beyond modernism.  
 
The centrality of Ulmer’s paper as one of the key texts on experimental creative-criticism 
simultaneously explains the predominance of the posts in secondary texts that examine 
ficto-critical discourse, and illustrates the easy and superficial compatibility of these 
varying forms with dominant or popular understandings of postmodernism and 
poststructuralism. The trend toward creative-critical texts, however, does not necessarily 
indicate the dissolution of criticism any more than post-modernism represents the end or 
passing of all aspects of modernism. In other words, the prefix of post enacts a binary. A 
binary that is not only problematic for representing a form that is between, but also 
problematic since it works as a force that distracts from the power of ficto-criticism. As 
this chapter has demonstrated, a disparate selection of hybrid texts fit in the space of ficto-
criticism, and many have contradictory elements. They do not fit together homogeneously 
with each other, nor do they necessarily meet all the formal characteristics identified as 
postmodern. Yet binarised readings of poststructuralism and postmodernism—as refuting 
all truth, value and reality—are often applied directly to ficto-critical practices, or 
implicitly through easy critical association with popular notions of postmodernism. Put 
another way, despite the range and scope of these ficto-critical texts, one thing they do 
seem to have in common is their external identification as manifestations of 
postmodernism.  
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Even Freedman, in her overtly feminist study An Alchemy of Genres, is compelled to 
acknowledge the connections between women poet-critics and poststructuralism. 
Freedman highlights some of the commonalities between the two projects. Quoting Terry 
Eagleton she observes,  “there is no clear division for poststructuralism between ‘criticism’ 
and ‘creation’: both are subsumed into writing as such” (qutd. in Freedman 91). Her 
inclusion of this reference implies the influence of poststructuralist discourse on feminist 
poet-critics, thus subtly eliding their differences. This is an effect of academic convention. 
Ficto-critical texts that explore the powers of discourse, blur categories and acknowledge 
the social construction of the subject appear to lock in unison with postmodern discourse. 
Subsequently, and given the dominance of postmodernism as a model to explain the 
conditions of life in the twentieth-century, ficto-criticism has become—overwhelmingly—
a postmodern phenomenon.   
 
What makes it so necessary to acknowledge the influences of postmodernism—even 
within feminist focused texts like Freedman’s—are the prevailing conventions of 
scholarship. It is necessary to show that one is aware of and conversant with contemporary 
intellectual theories and movements; to leave out postmodernism in a discussion on ficto-
critical texts would surely be to leave oneself open to criticism. One should know the field 
of thought relevant to one’s own research interests. But what is the cost of the adherence to 
such conventions—at the cost of alternative paths of discovery and knowledge? As 
demonstrated, postmodernism clearly emerges as a very relevant frame to explain and 
contextualise experimental critical moves. Yet this process of codification—ficto-criticism 
stamped postmodern—ironically places postmodern decentring in a central position, 
leaving little room for other influences to surface in any meaningful way. 
 
Even French writers like Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, who clearly 
incorporate poetics into their highly theoretical texts, find their women centred work 
subsumed under the framework of poststructuralism, thus becoming another example of 
the link between ficto-critical practices and postmodernism. These writers have certainly 131
 
been influential on other women writers interested in writing against masculine literary 
traditions, yet they too are easily reclaimed and categorised under postmodernism—in a 
broad sense—through their theoretical focus on language (via semiotics) and the style of 
their writing. Their capture under the large banners of poststructualism and postmodernism 
tends to override the political feminist impetus of their work. Cixous’ writing, for example, 
has been described as critical fiction or fictional criticism by Verena Andermatt Conley, 
and it displays all the characteristics of postmodernism: 
Postmodernism . . . is committed to modes of thinking and representation which 
emphasize fragmentations, discontinuities and incommensurable aspects of a given 
object, from intellectual systems to architecture . . . Postmodernist analysis is often 
marked by forms of writing that are more literary, certainly more self-reflexive, 
than is common in critical writing—the critic as self-conscious creator of new 
meanings upon the ground of the object of study, showing that object no special 
respect. It prefers montage to perspective, intertextuality to referentiality, “bits-as-
bits” to unified totalities. ( Key Concepts in Communication and Cultural Studies 
234) 
Compare, for example, Cixous’ Rootprints, published in English in 1997, with the 
postmodernism described above. Rootprints is fragmentary, self-referential (through its 
autobiographical approach), intertextual, and unresolved. It also visually reflects this 
approach as passages of text are reproduced in different fonts, and in some cases separated 
off in boxes. The challenge enacted by writers such as Cixous, Irigaray and Kristeva to 
what is popularly identified as the tradition of modernism demonstrates the easy 
application of the discourse of postmodernism to their work. 
 
Another term that arises to label experimental criticism as postmodern is the American 
expression theoretical fiction. It, too, finds itself in bed with postmodernism. Steven 
Shaviro—a literary, cultural and film theorist—uses it to identify his particular irreverent 
approach to writing criticism or commentary on contemporary culture. Doom Patrols: A 
Theoretical Fiction about Postmodernism (1997) is an exemplary text as it again illustrates 132
 
the easy alliance between postmodernism and critical acts that defy traditional paradigms 
of knowledge and the authority it garners. Doom Patrols is an “in your face,” “no holes 
barred” critical narrative. Very much a fast moving critical pulp fiction, Shaviro 
deliberately and provocatively invokes popular cultural icons as a model for his critical 
text. His title, for example, comes from the popular American comic DOOM PATROL. 
This invocation of his critical text as a comic book simultaneously pokes fun at the 
seriousness of normative critical texts, and his own culturally and historically placed text 
that attempts to describe our current milieu. According to Shaviro: “Doom Patrols is not a 
work of historical scholarship or objective description or ideology critique or in-depth 
interpretation. I have scrupulously followed Oscar Wilde’s two fine maxims, that the critic 
should avoid ‘careless habits of accuracy,’ and that e [sic] should ‘strive to see the object 
as itself it really is not’” (preface, no page number given). Speaking of the comic DOOM 
PATROL (yet invoking his own textual production through the shared title) he also says: 
“these comic books aren’t made to last. They are cheap commodities, printed in limited 
quantities on low grade paper, designed for rapid turnover and almost instantaneous 
obsolescence” (3). By beginning his text with a discussion on DOOM PATROLS (the 
comic) and its transient significance as one of many popular cultural possibilities, Shaviro 
sets up (for those not initiated into the ficto-critical world) the context in which to read his 
text. He is not offering the definitive or authoritative (grand) narrative on postmodernism 
(or anything else for that matter). As he states in the Preface: “This book is a theoretical 
fiction, because I treat discursive ideas and arguments in a way analogous to how a 
novelist treats characters and events” (no page number given). Consistent with this 
approach, Shaviro titles each of his chapters with the name of a celebrity. For example, 
there are chapters titled: “Bill Gates,” “Andy Warhol,” “Dean Martin,” “Cindy Sherman” 
and “Walt Disney.” Shaviro’s shifting, multiply-positioned-person narrative therefore 
mirrors the postmodern fascination with personalities. However, as he also suggests, these 
are not real identities but singularities; they are fictional constructs even though they 
ostensibly refer to actual individuals. In this way, Shaviro’s theoretical-fiction—although 
labelled by him as autobiography—differs from the autobiographical criticism described 133
 
earlier. It differs as he, much more overtly, problematises in a self-concious fashion the 
self/ves constructed through his narrative and evokes an identity much less reliant on 
notions of a stable or fixed self/identity. One way he does this is through the use of varying 
gender neutral pronouns like “e,” “em” and “eir.” In other words, Shaviro draws attention 
to the kind of self/ves productively growing from his theoretical fiction: self/ves that is/are 
then actively developed in contradictory and confusing ways, undercutting the reader’s 
expectations of not only fixed identity rooted in a tangible reality, but also literature. For 
example, his Preface ends with: “Needless to say, this book is autobiographical. Every 
word.” This final introductory statement—foregrounded by “needless”—works to throw 
into sharp relief the conventional generic expectations of readers of autobiography (that it 
is true/based on truth), and also the exact opposite (that it is not true/maybe a lie or 
fiction). With this same statement Shaviro also invokes the conventions of realism. He 
achieves this by directly addressing the reader in the style of early realist novelists.  (“Dear 
reader, this is how it all happened.”) By undermining the truth value of such statements, he 
highlights the increasingly cliched nature of conventional generic practice, questioning 
truth itself and the rules we know the world by. He achieves this destabilising effect for the 
reader by simultaneously undermining and reaffirming the trust and intimacy between the 
narrator and reader, suggesting that perhaps the generic contract will not be honoured. 
(This text is not autobiography, not non-fiction, not fiction and not a comic book.) His 
theoretical fiction is therefore a shifting text, based on neither a fixed identity as the story 
keeps changing, or a knowable reality. Shaviro’s book does not reproduce the stable, 
argumentative, convincing voice of normative critical discourse, assured and reaffirming a 
hypothesis. Nor is it a typical fictionalised narrative. Doom Patrols therefore achieves a 
sophisticated and subtle level of self-reflexivity, a self-consciousness that requires a reader 
versed in the nuances of literary theory and tradition to be fully realised. The alignment of 
his text with postmodernism through its subtitle (A Theoretical Fiction about 
Postmodernism), and the implied statement in this subtitle that the style of writing is 
consistent with his subject, makes clear that theoretical fictions or creative-critical texts 
develop out of an engagement with the ethos of postmodernism.  134
 
 
One final example, which concretes the overwhelming presence of postmodernism in the 
international discourse of ficto-critical texts, is the work of Ihab Hassan. Significantly, his 
concept of the paraliterary irrefutably illustrates the connection between postmodernism 
and the discourse of ficto-critical practice. In his writing, creative-criticism—here labelled 
paracriticism—is tied to the development of postmodernism. In Paracriticism: Seven 
Speculations of the Times (1979) Hassan’s paracritical essays concern themselves with the 
role of criticism in a postmodern context. He asks: “When will criticism confront the 
implications of its own queries, and what then will it become?” (xv). In his preface to the 
collection he states his desire to “break out of criticism,” and that he does not know into 
what genre his paracriticism—his alternative critical form—fits (xi). In other words, 
Hassan’s paracriticism is between genres, as suggested by the prefix para. According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary para has: 
the sense ‘by the side of, beside,’ whence ‘alongside of, by, past, beyond,’ etc. In 
composition it had the same senses, with such cognate adverbial ones as ‘to one 
side, aside, amiss, faulty, irregular, disordered, improper, wrong;’ also expressing 
subsidiary relation, alteration, perversion, simulation, etc. 
Hassan’s paracriticism is imagined, thus, as a hybrid, suggestive of a number of other 
postmodern (non)genres including Shaviro’s irreverent theoretical fiction and Ulmer’s 
notion of post-criticism. Hassan’s paracriticism, like ficto-criticism, mixes personal and 
creative genres with criticism. A number of his paracritical speculations also play with text 
on the page, like poetry, defying more conservative critical models. Speaking of chapter 
two of his book The Postmodern Turn, he says: “This paracritical style of the chapter 
deforms the page, hoping less to mime its subject than to suggest alternative critical 
discourses” (xiii). Significantly, Hassan parallels the development of postmodernism and 
paracriticism (as an alternative critical form); here postmodernism is a place where 
“literature and criticism constantly blend” (The Postmodern Turn xiii).  
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Conclusion 
As this chapter has demonstrated ficto-criticism—imagined as writing -between—
constitutes a disparate and labile collection of texts. Although imagined and 
conceptualised as a symptom of postmodernism there are many elements of ficto-critical 
texts that run contrary to its popular understanding. These instances, as in the example of 
Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals, tend to be overcome by the anxieties and debates around 
postmodernism. These texts do display postmodern aesthetic markers, yet there are often 
opposing characteristics that speak of other influences. As I have shown, some ficto-
critical texts react against high theory (read poststructuralism), while others like Shaviro’s 
Doom Patrols actively acknowledge the influence of poststructuralist theories. Similarly, 
the return in academic texts to more personalised, autobiographical and situated critical 
writing—again effectively a form of ficto-criticism—often seems reliant on a unified 
individual, not the fragmented, fluid and unfixed self equated with postmodernism. 
Despite this, autobiographical criticism is often aligned with a postmodern fascination with 
personalities. Interestingly, the same people will critique these varying texts, as they are 
positioned between fiction and non-fiction, for contradictory reasons suggesting some 
inconsistency in how they are read and perceived. For example, as Cathy Davidson has 
observed in “Critical Fictions,” the use of personal detail in criticism may find itself 
disliked by the same people who reproach academics for being too jargon-orientated and 
out of touch with reality (1071). What they are objecting to is the challenge to convention 
implied by the inclusion of the personal. Since postmodernism and ficto-critical texts both 
question authority, value, representation and meaning they tend to be conflated. The 
application of postmodernism has, therefore, resulted in a diverse range of experimental 
ficto-critical forms being effectively lumped under one determinate label—or order-
word—crushing other potential readings of this ficto-critical turn. Subsequently, given the 
debates and anxieties around postmodernism, ficto-criticism is often read as either all 
radical and challenging or dismissed as not rigorous, intellectual and disciplined. However, 
as I will show in the chapters that follow, ficto-criticism is actually somewhere between 
these two poles, and has much more to do with postcolonial discourse than 
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postmodernism. In subsequent chapters the open approach to ficto-criticism established in 
this chapter is refined as the thesis begins to explore theoretically the implications of this 
labile space. As Freedman has noted: 
Perhaps the more marginalized one feels, the more one wants to blur the division 
between public and private life and language and to resist both dualism and 
separatism by crossing from language to language, genre to genre, discipline to 
discipline, writer to reader. (An Alchemy of Genres 71) 
The postmodern/poststructuralist label, however, has reinforced a hierarchy of order and 
value—reflected in binary pairs like masculine/feminine and west/east—in relation to a 
style of writing that attempts to critique such systems of domination. Indeed, the binary of 
modernism versus postmodernism limits the revolutionary impetus of a form that must 
remain open to experimentation as a space between if it is to be able to imagine a different 
relation to the other. 
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1 This title is borrowed, in part, from a work by artist Richard Tipping. His 1992 screen print shows a 
typically stylised sign warning of danger. The entire sign reads: DANGER: Postmodernism Doesn’t Give A 
Flying Duck. I would add to this, in the context of the argument of this chapter, “and neither does ficto-
criticism.” However, as will become clear, divisive statements such as this, of course, mask much more 
complex meanings and relations. 
2 As Hélène Cixous points out in her creative-critical paper “Sorties”:  “Always the same metaphor: we 
follow it, it transports us, in all of its forms, wherever a discourse is organised. The same thread, or double 
tress leads us, whether we are reading or speaking, through literature, philosophy, criticism, centuries of 
representation, of reflection” (1975: 90).  
3 The kinds of debates and reactions that ficto-criticism generates—as demonstrated with The First Stone and 
The Lives of Animals—are parallel with the rhetoric surrounding the debates of the “culture wars” (witnessed 
in recent years in theoretical and critical discourse). 
4 I have taken these commonly understood and general markers of postmodernism from The Fontana 
Dictionary of Modern Thought. 
5 This notion of literary self-consciousness as the marker of postmodern literature comes from Linda 
Hutcheon. Significantly, in The Canadian Postmodern she suggests that the need to situate oneself as a critic 
is also a postmodern phenomenon (1988: viii). 
6 Significantly, however, it might be the conditions of postmodernism that makes these texts more visible as 
one becomes sensitised to, and begins to recognise, the border crossing signs of this dynamic (non) category 
of ficto-critique. 
7 See my paper “Ficto-criticism: THE END of criticism as we write it?” Here I argue that the emergence of 
ficto-criticism, rather than suggesting the end of criticism, is about problematising the critical act, and 
challenging traditional criticism’s power to present the truth (1998). 
8 For a more complete discussion on the breakdown of ethnographic authority in the twentieth-century see 
James Clifford’s “On Ethnographic Authority” in The Predicament of Culture (1988) published by Harvard 
UP.  
9 The influence of modern ethnography on self-referential criticism has been acknowledged; see Elspeth 
Probyn’s “True Voice and Real People: The ‘problem’ of the autobiographical in cultural studies” 
(1993:105), and Peter Brooks in “Aesthetics and Ideology: What Happened to Poetics?” (1994: 520). 
10 For an interesting example of an anthropological anthology that shows the breakdown of scientific 
objectivity in the discipline see Sex, Sexuality, and the Anthropologist (1999).  In this collection 
anthropologists describe the experience of having to acknowledge that their hosts see them as gendered and 
sexual beings, instead of objective observers.  
11 Taussig who was born in Australia, immigrated to America in 1969, and identifies with the term ficto-
criticism. This is one of the few examples of ficto-criticism being used outside Canada and Australia. 
Taussig’s friendship with the Australian ficto-critical advocate Stephen Muecke might explain his use of the 
term.  
12 For example, Richard and Sally Price’s book, Enigma Variations, is likened on the back cover to two well-
known books that have been identified as postmodern: The Recognitions and The Crying of Lot 49. 
13 See Ross Chambers’ book Loiterature (1999), for example. His book examines what he describes as the 
Western literary tradition of “loiterature” (digressive, wayward texts that celebrate failure). Chambers argues 
for a literary criticism that is consistent with this literary tradition and which is against closure and control. 
He uses the metaphor of canine philosophy (what humans can learn from dogs) to argue for a form of literary 
criticism which embraces digression.  
14 In “The Pressure of the Unconscious Upon the Image,” Susan Dermody argues for a model of 
documentary that is neither factual or fictional. In keeping with her argument she writes in a manner that is 
sketchy and open, and critiques scholarly writing for maintaining an absent self. In effect, her article is ficto-
critical. (1995: 292-310). For a discussion on self-reflexivity in documentary film, which deals with the 
issues of “ficto-criticism,” see Jeanne Allen’s “Self-Reflexivity in Documentary” (1991: 103-10). Also see 
“Performing Documentary” by Bill Nichols (1994: 92-106). Nichols explores examples of documentary that 
defies generic borders much in the same way as performative writing or ficto-criticism. 
15 See Della Pollock’s “Performative Writing” in The Ends of Performance (1998). The kind of performative 
writing she argues for is ficto-critical. 
16 See Lee Hoinacki’s Stumbling Toward Justice: Stories of Place (1999). In a series of highly personalised 
narratives, Hoinacki, in a philosophical treatise, critiques the notion of progress. Former Dominican priest, 
political scientist and subsistence farmer, Hoinacki says of his text: “I must discover and improvise my own 
story as I go along.” 
17 See Chapter Four and Five for more examples of ficto-criticism in the field of visual arts. 
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18 Pittsburg University Press catalogue, 1999. 
19 Prizes now exist for creative non-fiction in the United States (and elsewhere). For example, the Associated 
Writing Program’s Award for Creative Nonfiction; see Michael Martone’s Flatness and Other Landscapes 
(1999).  Martone’s award winning creative non-fiction explores the myth of America’s Midwestern 
landscape as culturally flat.  Through a rich multidimensional exploration of culture and history, Martone 
reveals the depth and layers to a landscape that has been rendered merely “level.” Creative non-fiction has 
also been called, in the United States, the fourth genre.  See, for example, The Fourth Genre: Contemporary 
Writers of/on Creative Nonfiction (1998) edited by Michael Steinberg, Robert L. Loot, and Robert Root Jnr. 
20 The use of terms like creative non-fiction to describe writing-between texts (between fiction and non-
fiction/fact) helps explain why New Journalism often enters discussions of ficto-critical texts.  See Diane 
Freedman in “Autobiographical Literary Criticism,” where she lists New Journalism along with creative non-
fiction as influencing the increasing fascination with the personal essay (1996).    
21 See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s “Teaching ‘Experimental Critical Writing,’” in which she describes 
teaching graduate and undergraduate students different modes of critical writing: 
As the ambitions of literary criticism become more expansive and searching under the influence of 
deconstruction, Marxism, psychoanalysis, popular culture, and liberatory theoretical movements 
around race, colonialism, and sexuality, there is increased room for experimentation and 
reflectiveness the modalities of critical writing, as well . . . The ultimate goal of the class is to 
prepare students to produce professionally publishable writing that change the current profile of 
what is publishable in our profession. (1998: 104) 
22 Freedman, Confessions of the Critics (1996: 3-4). 
23 Ficto-critical texts—because they collapse both subject and object—have a tendency to dissolve 
distinctions like secondary and primary texts.  Ficto-critical texts collected in these anthologies often provide 
a metacommentary on their process of ficto-critique as well as addressing their subject of discussion.  
24 Miller describes personal criticism as criticism that “entails an explicitly autobiographical act” (1991: 1). 
25 See Phillip Lopate’s introduction for a complete definition and outline of the informal personal essay.  He 
identifies a range of characteristics of the personal essay, seen as a sub-genre of the essay (1994: xxiii-liv). 
26 For a complete list and the works Miller associates as examples of autobiographical criticism see her 
article “Autobiography as Literary Criticism” (1991: 2-3). 
27 Another example is Christine Brooke-Rose’s 1991 book Stories, Theories and Things, published by 
Cambridge UP. 
28 Patricia Williams also surfaces as influential for several Canadian ficto-critics.  
29 Her earlier book, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (1992), is also written in the same personal style. 
30 Donna Haraway’s book Simians, Cyborgs, and Women discusses the notion of situated knowledge. The 
cyborg writing she describes could well be taken as a form of ficto-criticism for its hybridity, partiality and 
embodied view. For example, when she describes cyborg writing she could well be speaking, in this instance, 
of the hybrid work by Williams: 
Contests for the meanings of writing are a major form of contemporary political struggle. Releasing 
the play of writing is deadly serious. The poetry and stories of US women of colour are repeatedly 
about writing, about access to the power to signify; but this time that power must be neither phallic 
nor innocent. Cyborg writing must not be about the Fall, the imagination of a once-upon-a-time 
wholeness before language, before writing, before Man. Cyborg writing is about the power to 
survive, not on the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as other. . .  The 
tools are often stories, retold stories, versions that reverse and displace the hierarchical dualisms of 
naturalized identities. In retelling origin stories, cyborg authors subvert the central myths of origin 
in Western culture. (1991: 175) 
31 The politics of the bibliography is one thing that cannot be overlooked when examining ficto-criticism, as 
it is a useful tool for thinking through ficto-critique and its role in the academy and traditional pedagogy. 
32 In “Experimental Critical Writing” Marianna Torgovnick speaks of the impossibility—as today’s 
scholar—to be able to read everything that has ever been written about a subject. According to her: “we cling 
to the fiction of completeness and coverage that the academic style preserves. This style protects us, we 
fondly believe, from being careless or subjective or unfair” (1990: 27). 
33 In “Getting Personal” Miller discusses the pressure to conform to an objective model of academic 
criticism:  “Academic women wanting jobs and tenure (and most of us did) conformed to the ‘critical 
plausibility’ of their scene and cohort which required an objective style” (1991: 15).  Similarly, H. Aram 
Veeser in Confessions of the Critics quotes Susan Jarratt who signals that writing personally is easier when 
one is already a well-established author.  Jarratt is specifically talking about male writers who “out” 
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themselves as a “feminine writer” yet this might also be applied to more established women writers who 
have more freedom to experiment. 
34 Despite numerous publications that cite very early examples of metafiction, such as Tristram Shandy, 
metafiction does not escape being theorised and explained as postmodern. 
35 This can be seen in a variety of texts from advertisements for pizza to Hollywood blockbusters and highly 
successful situation comedies like Seinfeld. 
36 See H. Aram Veeser in Confessions of the Critics: He states that “confessional criticism means drafting 
new rules for judging scholarship, ranking journals, and preserving decorum, etiquette, and style” (1996: xi). 
37 The ramifications of ficto-criticism’s impact on pedagogy are not addressed in any detail in this thesis, 
since this is outside the scope of the project. However, it this would make a very interesting and worthwhile 
line of investigation particularly if interest in ficto-criticism contintues. 
38 Interestingly, Freedman in An Alchemy of Genres, talks of feminist poet-critical writing (another term that 
stands in for ficto-criticism) as “ecological” in the sense that it reuses, transforms and incorporates many 
voices (1992: 108-110). 
39 According to Stanley Trachtenberg in his review of Federman’s book Critifiction: Postmodern Essays, 
critifiction is when art becomes a “participatory exercise often merging criticism with fiction in a single 
form” (1994: 858). This confirms Federman’s intention that critifiction is a hybrid generic form. 
40 In an interview with Richard Kearney, Derrida critiques the way deconstruction has been taken up in 
English speaking universities (as has poststructuralism generally) to mean that there is no truth. Derrida 
states: “I totally refuse the label of nihilism” (1984: 124). See Dialogues with Contemporary Continental 
Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage published by Manchester UP, 1984. 
41 This novel is not addressed by Bouchard, however, she does look at Bradbury’s other academic novels and 
this one, published in 1987, fits well into the time frame she establishes for critifictional academic texts. 
Bouchard identifies a number of academic novels “written from the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s by 
British authors David Lodge and Malcom Bradbury” as examples of the academic critifictional novel (1995: 
497). 
42 See Winterson’s recent book The. Powerbook (2000).  In this text she makes a clear connection between 
technological developments and their impact on narrative conventions. Like many of her books, The. 
Powerbook is highly self-reflexive, unravelling the narrative conventions of story telling. Her book can be 
read as an act of theoretical criticism through the constant self-commentary, critically engaging with her 
narrative and narrative traditions. Changing the story and challenging the ending Winterson breaks narrative 
convention by telling it differently. Here, however, she draws a parallel between technological developments 
such as the internet and email, and the obvious narrative challenges that a rhizomatic and data-filled world 
presents to all those familiar stories of our culture, worn through with use.   140
chapter Four 
Becoming-woman:  
Australian ficto-criticism 
 
To extract the concepts which correspond to a multiplicity is to trace the lines of 
which it is made up, to determine the nature of these lines, to see how they become 
entangled, connect, bifurcate, avoid or fail to avoid the foci. These lines are true 
becomings, which are distinct not only from unities, but from the history in which 
they are developed. Multiplicities are made up of becomings without history, of 
individuation without subject (the way in which a river, a climate, an event, a day, 
an hour of the day, is individualized). (Deleuze and Parnet viii) 
 
Introduction 
Although in Canada the term ficto-criticism is limited to a handful of writers, in particular 
Aritha van Herk, in Australia the term has currency as the label to identify creative-critical 
writing more broadly.
1 This makes the Australian published discourse on ficto-criticism 
unique since it is the only English speaking country where one term has gained substantial 
recognition in literary and academic circles.
2 Whilst this recognition tends to be limited to 
the fields of literature, cultural studies and the arts, it remains meaningful that the term 
“ficto-criticism” emerged in this country with some currency. The fact that its validity has 
more recently become the topic of some heated debate does not detract from the 
significance of the Australian ficto-critical phenomenon.
3 The precarious position of the 
term illustrates ficto-criticism’s between-ness, at once recognised as viable and under 
contestation. The story of how this one term rose to dominance is significant, as I believe it 
demonstrates something fundamental about ficto-criticism. To reiterate the Deleuzian 
terms discussed in Chapter Two, ficto-criticism should be seen as a potential line of flight 
or molecular revolution, that desires to challenge the molar hole of normative critical 
writing. In this equation molar corresponds to structure, whilst molecular corresponds to 
flows. What forces caused the establishment of such a genre in Australia, and what does   141
this process reveal about the revolutionary capacity of a minor literary form such as ficto-
criticism? These are questions that are explored in this chapter. 
 
Continuing from Chapter Two, which outlined the Deleuzian framework chosen to 
elucidate the issues surrounding ficto-criticism, the present chapter further explores the 
applicability of Deleuzian theory to ficto-critical practice. This time, however, it is 
undertaken primarily in relation to a specific concept: the theory of becoming. This theory 
is engaged with in this chapter to advance that in order to maintain its revolutionary 
potential ficto-criticism must imitate the movement that constitutes becoming—at both the 
levels of practice and its conceptualisation. As a minoritarian practice—or minor 
literature—ficto-critical writing must refuse the magisterial position and colonising 
practices of normative academic writing; it must remain in contact with/as the other. In 
other words, when it solidifies into a practice with leading figures, codes and conventions, 
ficto-criticism cannot help but loose its radical political edge and, indeed, its relevance.  
 
This chapter thus encompasses a diverse range of material and purposes. It explores the 
history of ficto-critical practices in Australia, and critically introduces the concept-tool of 
becoming. In particular, the notion of becoming-woman, which is, according to Deleuze 
and Guattari, the becoming that all becomings must first past through. In this chapter the 
introduction of becoming-woman is timed strategically, deliberately intertwined with the 
history of the term “ficto-criticism” in Australia. Rather than separating and distilling the 
theory as the analytic framework at the beginning, this approach is consistent with my 
understanding of the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari and how they envisioned its use: 
more like a tool than a systematic and inflexible methodology. My application of their 
theory thus functions to reiterate my reading of the concept-tool of becoming by 
highlighting some true lines of ficto-critical flight, that is, those not incorporated into the 
official history. However, this application is also pragmatic. Not surprisingly, as I will 
demonstrate, the texts one discovers on the margins of Australian ficto-critical discourse 
are those that embrace the movement of becoming. This contextualised use of a Deleuzian   142
concept, therefore, simultaneously reveals the similarities between Deleuze and Guattari’s 
approach, especially their notion of theory as a tool-kit, and ficto-critical practice. As 
Michel Foucault has written, when one applies theoretical concepts as if they were a tool-
kit—rather than a system—they become powerful instruments able to reveal localised 
power struggles. When theory is applied as a tool-kit the analysis also becomes historically 
grounded and detailed, since it can only be carried out step-by-step (Foucault 145). Ficto-
criticism, after all, seeks to collapse the distinction between disciplines and genres such as 
theory or criticism, on the one hand, and creative writing or fiction, on the other: at its best 
it is a means to explore the power relations between the self and other in a specific context.  
 
Given these considerations, I begin this chapter by mapping the history of the term’s use in 
Australia, spiralling out to explore a range of ficto-critical texts that may, or, may not, 
identify as ficto-critical. Ficto-criticism, the word, thus functions at two levels here. 
Firstly, it works at the level of nomenclature, and so I examine the term’s deployment in 
Australia, and, secondly, it represents writing that is identifiable as ficto-criticism. As 
foregrounded by Deleuze, true becomings are distinct not just from unities, but from the 
history in which they are developed. The Australian genealogy of the word will therefore 
work as the initial part of the chapter’s narrative. Later, alternative histories and framings 
of ficto-criticism in Australia—as a practice (unlabelled and unnamed)—are imagined.  
 
Stephen Muecke, Noel King and postmodernism  
Like the international discourse of creative-critical or post-critical acts, ficto-criticism in 
Australia is strongly associated with postmodernism. What is significant in Australia, 
however, is how two writers in particular influenced the rise of ficto-criticism as a known 
practice—with postmodernism as its theoretical framework. This phenomenon can be 
explained by examining the earliest known reference to the term in Australia: Stephen 
Muecke and Noel King’s “seminal” 1991 paper titled “On Ficto-Criticism,” published in 
The Australian Book Review. The alleged centrality of this paper—that is, its construction 
as the first on ficto-criticism—shows the process through which these authors become the   143
“Kings” of Australian ficto-criticism. It also shows how ficto-criticism became known in 
Australia as an effect of postmodernism. Later in this chapter I question Muecke and 
King’s reign over Australian ficto-criticism and, as a result, more broadly the dominance 
of postmodernism over creative-critical writing. However, as I first need to establish their 
position I therefore begin by discussing Muecke and King’s paper “On Ficto-Criticism,” as 
a means to map their use of the term “ficto-criticism.”  
 
The first and most significant reference to ficto-criticism in the Muecke and King paper is 
to a statement by Fredric Jameson. From a published interview, they cite Jameson talking 
about a kind of fictionalised criticism. He is quoted as saying: 
It is very clear that there has been a flowing together of theory and criticism. It 
seems that theory can’t exist without telling little narrative stories and then at this 
point of criticism, criticism seems very close to simply telling stories. It is an 
advanced and energetic form of conceptual criticism. (9) 
These words from Jameson are used to explicate ficto-criticism, the term that Muecke and 
King establish here to identify this creatively critical practice. They also make reference to 
Rosalind Krauss’ term paraliterature, which is used to describe a seemingly parallel form 
of writing that deliberately blurs the distinction between literature and literary-criticism 
(Kerr, “Ficto-criticism, the “Doubtful Category” 93).
4 Notably, paraliterature, which at 
many points appears to be almost interchangeable with ficto-criticism, continues Muecke 
and King’s emphasis on the critical aspect of creative-critical texts. In this sense, they do 
not focus on the fictional characteristics of ficto-criticism; it is the contamination of the 
critical text with fiction that fascinates them. Although Muecke and King do not quote 
directly from Krauss on paraliterature, they not only invoke her term but also collage some 
of her words into their text when they discuss Barthes’ more recent work (as well as 
Derrida’s). In her article Krauss states: 
[Barthes’ more recent work] cannot be called criticism, but it cannot, for that 
matter be called not-criticism either. Rather, criticism finds itself caught in a   144
dramatic web of many voices, citations, asides, divigations. And what is created, as 
in the case of much of Derrida, is a kind of paraliterature. (292) 
This is, then, how Muecke and King construct ficto-criticism and these references to 
Krauss and Jameson are significant, as they have informed the visible (that is, published) 
discourse of Australian ficto-criticism. In particular, Muecke and King’s paper has 
strongly influenced the production of an Australian ficto-critical practice that can only be 
couched in terms of postmodernism. As their references to Derrida, Barthes and Krauss 
demonstrate, ficto-criticism is conceptualised here within in a postmodern and 
poststructuralist context. Krauss’ article is, after all, titled “Poststructuralism and the 
Paraliterary,” and not unlike the broader field of international ficto-criticism, the label of 
poststructualism in this context comes to signify postmodernism. Whilst postmodernism 
and poststructuralism are not one and the same these two words and movements are often 
conflated, with poststructuralism being broadly associated with the postmodern moment 
(Wolfreys et al).
5 Significantly, Krauss’ text demonstrates the way in which the reduction 
of complex theories and positioning(s) occurs. Derrida certainly would not appreciate 
being identified as simply a poststructuralist, yet here Krauss has grouped him with 
another contemporary French theorist, Barthes,
6 under the umbrella of poststructuralism. 
Whilst she is not wrong to do so, many of the subtleties of Derrida’s work are lost.
7 She 
further demonstrates the collapse of postmodernism with poststructuralism in her paper 
when she states that postmodern literature is the critical text wrought into a paraliterary 
form. Krauss states: “what is clear is that Barthes and Derrida are the writers, not the 
critics, that students now read” (Krauss 295).  
 
In the same way, and in keeping with this postmodern theme, Muecke and King’s paper 
opens with a quote from Don DeLillo’s White Noise, a text renowned for its postmodern 
characteristics. Similarly, in the interview with Jameson, from which the quote on ficto-
criticism arises, the discussion begins with a question about postmodernism. These 
references intersect both with Jameson’s words, which are used to explain ficto-criticism, 
and with Krauss’ theorisation of paraliterature. These intersections work to naturalise of   145
the notion that postmodernism has heavily influenced the invention of ficto-criticism. By 
quoting Jameson, an academic with an international reputation as a postmodern theorist 
and commentator, Muecke and King affirm that postmodernism is the context in which to 
discuss ficto-criticism. Ficto-criticism and paraliterature are thus both constructed as an 
effect of postmodernism.  
 
It is not, however, just postmodernism that is brought into play but also the notion of 
postmodernism as a radical crisis or rupture in knowledge. The same systems and 
structures at work in the international world of ficto-critical writing are thus reproduced in 
Australia. Muecke in “On Ficto-criticism,” for example, quotes King who says:  
Jameson’s description of the crisis in which ‘the hermeneutic gesture’ now finds 
itself is an exact description of the problem confronting the relation of literary-
culture studies to an increasing array of postmodern fictions and/or various lines of 
ficto-critical flight. (13). 
Similarly, they add: “With both postmodernism and ficto-criticism you have a return to 
storytelling and a shift away from the dense, intense, intransitive language of the high 
modernists such as Joyce and Faulkner” (14).
8 Whilst some of the references in the paper 
are more ambiguous about postmodernism as a delineated category, this last sentence sets 
up a binary between modernism and postmodernism, and is suggestive of more simplistic 
visions of postmodernism as the radical other of modernism. In “On Ficto-criticism” there 
is also a tangible excitement around this new genre of writing.
9 This excitement and the 
less than conservative style and tone of the paper further confirm the radical flavour of 
both ficto-criticism and postmodernism as well as the fact that they constitute a challenge 
to established paradigms of writing and knowledge.  
 
Other early texts confirm the influence of not only Muecke and King and but also 
postmodernism, thus validating and naturalising these author’s version of ficto-criticism. 
For example, in 1992 Bob Hodge and Alec McHoul published a paper in Textual Practice 
called “The Politics of Text and Commentary.” In it they put forward Reading the Country   146
(1984) by Muecke, Krim Benterrack and Paddy Roe as a model for a new type of positive 
self-reflexive commentary. Hodge and McHoul call this kind of writing “ficto-criticism or 
critical fiction” (209). This reference to Muecke’s co-authored book as a potential new 
form of critical commentary called ficto-criticism, and the publication of his ficto-critical 
text No Road in 1997, has helped ensure his influence as one of the ficto-critical writers 
and theorists in Australia.
10 This is something Muecke claims for himself. As part of his e-
mail signature, for example, he states: “‘No Road’ has developed a new genre of writing, 
ficto-criticism, which responds to the demands for an imaginative treatment of problems in 
contemporary cultural settings.”
11 Similarly, the University of Technology Sydney (UTS), 
where Muecke works, promotes No Road on its web site as “the first ficto-critical 
monograph published in Australia.”
12 King also has credence beyond the co-authored 
paper with Muecke, as there are two other papers by him that address ficto-criticism. They 
are “Occasional Doubts: Ian Hunter’s Genealogy of Interpretative Depth” (1993) and “My 
Life Without Steve: Postmodernism, Ficto-criticism and the Paraliterary” (1994). These 
publications add to King’s credentials as one of the key writers who engaged very early 
with this emerging form. Given that it is so hard to find sources dealing with ficto-
criticism on available scholarly electronic databases (they could until recently be counted 
on one hand),
13 Muecke and King appear well and truly to have ownership over the 
territory of Australian ficto-criticism.  
 
Significantly, even more texts affirm Muecke and King’s influence and central position. In 
1995, for example, a panel discussion on ficto-criticism was held as part of the Association 
for the Study of Australian Literature conference held in Adelaide. Two of the three 
published papers resulting from the conference, by Heather Kerr and Simon Robb, discuss 
ficto-criticism in relation to postmodernism. Notably, these papers reference the 
definitions given by Jameson and Krauss that Muecke and King quote, or reference one of 
the other texts by King that addresses ficto-criticism, suggesting the influence of Muecke 
and King.
14 Similarly, Alison Bartlett in her 1993 paper titled “Other Stories” published by 
Southerly cites Muecke and King and quotes the same 1987 interview with Jameson (165).   147
In the introduction to The Space Between: Australian Women Writing Fictocriticism 
published in 1998, Amanda Nettelbeck both cites the Jameson interview and refers to 
Krauss’ paraliterature, saying that  “[t]he connection between the fictocritical and the 
paraliterary made here is indebted to King’s essay” (15). Nettelbeck also uses 
postmodernism as the main theoretical reference in her introduction, limiting other 
possible framings.
15 Many of the pieces of ficto-criticism in this anthology were—
interestingly—passed on to co-editors Amanda Nettelbeck and Heather Kerr by Muecke 
and King when their own ficto-critical collection, to be called “The Morning After the 
Eighties,” failed to reach publication.
16 
 
King and Muecke’s use of Jameson’s interview and Krauss’ notion of the paraliterature 
has thus shaped the official or visible discourse of Australian ficto-criticism. The 
intersections with, and references to, postmodernism in that 1991 article has meant that at 
its official point of inception Australian ficto-criticism became associated with 
postmodernism, and seen as a new practice. One cannot discount the fact that ficto-critical 
writing also looks very postmodern: thus, their use of postmodernism as a frame is a very 
logical move. However, both the reduction of ficto-criticism to being merely an effect of 
postmodernism and indeed the identification of a ficto-critical moment are a symptoms of 
the conventions of academic writing and publishing, which are antithetical to a writing 
style that is heterogenous and multiple. What else has influenced ficto-criticism’s 
development in Australia? Is it as new as Muecke and King would have us believe? 
Significantly, academic writing and publishing relies on the discovery of new knowledges 
and movements: ideas to be identified, circulated, and on which academic reputations and 
publishing successes are built.
17 Muecke and King are, in fact, responsible for the wide 
spread employment of ficto-criticism to describe Australian creative-critical texts, and the 
resulting export of the term to England and America.
18 Despite the similarities between 
ficto-criticism and paraliterature and despite the fact that King seems to use the two terms 
interchangeably, they seize on ficto-criticism as the preferred label. One wonders why they 
tended toward the word ficto-criticism instead of paraliterature. Is it because Jameson uses   148
it? Muecke and King also discuss both Derrida and Barthes, the writers whose work 
Krauss describes as paraliterature. Still, they adopt ficto-criticism over paraliterature as the 
label for hybrid works. What is interesting is that ficto-criticism (the term) was already in 
use in Canada pre-1991. In fact, it is not Jameson who first used it in the interview 
published in 1987 that Muecke and King reference. Instead, it is his interviewer, Canadian 
Andrea Ward, who first uses the term in her question to him (in the original published and 
complete version of the interview, “ficto-criticism” appears in quotation marks). I explore 
the earliest sources of the word in the next chapter on Canadian ficto-critical practices. For 
the moment, I will survey the small number of other Australian texts that directly address 
ficto-criticism (the term). I will also begin to illustrate what Australian ficto-criticism 
might be beyond Muecke and King’s conceputalisation, despite their 1991 paper being 
known as the “germinal moment” (Brook 3).  
 
Other uses of “ficto-criticism” in Australia  
The focus of this chapter now becomes broader as I begin to question the implicit claim 
that Muecke and King discovered a thing called ficto-criticism, and the subsequent 
pervasive function of postmodernism in this story. The examples I will introduce shortly 
illustrate other instances in which the term has been employed, and begin to display the 
multiplicity of Australian ficto-critical practice. However, as I show, the deployment of the 
term continues to reflect an emphasis on the way in which ficto-criticism questions the 
authority and hegemonic role of the traditional critic or expert. If this is indeed the project 
of ficto-criticism—and I argue it is—then it must constantly and self-consciously 
undermine the will to power of the traditional critical act. Muecke and King’s dominance 
over ficto-criticism is thus in direct conflict with this practice, which wishes to undermine 
mastery and authority.  I now begin to lay the groundwork that will allow me to introduce 
the Deleuzian concept-tool of becoming-woman. This concept-tool will simultaneously 
show why ficto-criticism must remain deterritorialising and explain the power relations 
that have resulted in earlier ficto-critical work being overlooked.  
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After the initial small flurry of publications in the early to mid-eighties in printed form,
 the 
introduction of the internet saw a number of electronic texts published that addressed ficto-
criticism. These references to ficto-criticism begin to multiply the applications of the term 
in Australia. Ironically, whilst the overwhelming framing of ficto-criticism as a symptom 
of postmodernism has obscured other possible influences and framings, the effects of 
postmodernity’s technological developments have certainly aided the researcher who seeks 
to discover how the term is being employed. For example, electronic journals like 
antimony
19 have called for examples of ficto-criticism to publish, as has the South 
Australian based multimedia centre Ngapartji.
20 Recently, more journals have ficto-
criticism listed as a generic form accepted for publication.
21 antiTHESIS
22 from the 
University of Melbourne, for example, and dotlit,
23 from the Creative Writing section of 
the School of Media and Journalism at the University of Queensland, both list ficto-
criticism as an acceptable form for publication, as does Senses of Cinema, an online film 
studies journal.
24  University online handbooks have also surfaced when searching for 
ficto-criticism, both Monash and the University of Tasmania offering courses on ficto-
criticism. “HEA435 Fictocriticism,” for example, at the University of Tasmania, describes 
ficto-criticism as hybrid (part critical, part creative) postmodern writing that is aiding the 
reformation of literary and cultural studies by exploring “the crucial questions of 
subjectivity, objectivity, value and cultural politics.”
25 In this unit students are allowed to 
write ficto-critical work for assessment. Macquarie University’s Women’s Studies 
department similarly offered a course that dealt with ficto-criticism. In their 1999 Topic in 
Women’s Studies, the seminar titled “Writing Indigeneity: Voice, Genre, Style” 
considered “the issues of marginality, race, gender, identity politics, questions of 
indigeneity, community and culture, and ways of speaking.” Readings for the seminar 
were from “Canadian and Australian contexts, and contributions from poststructural 
theory, feminist theories of embodiment, critical culture theory and fictocriticism.”
26 In 
2001 the School of Creative Arts at the University of Melbourne offered as part of their 
Postgraduate Diploma in Arts Criticism, a course on "New Critical Practices.” Focusing 
specifically on ficto-criticism, described as an emerging practice, this course examined:   150
“The act of critical writing as a creative endeavour . . . This subject considers the use of 
autobiography in criticism and imaginative responses to the critical object.”
27 There are 
several other references to Australian university courses to be found on the internet,
28 but 
this sample gives an idea of the varying ways in which the term is employed in Australian 
academic circles: primarily a critical act that incorporates creative effects. In relation to 
universities, ficto-criticism can also be found as a research interest of a number of 
Australian academics, listed on their web profiles. Apart from Muecke,
29 the high profile 
ficto-critical advocate in Australia, Anne Brewster,
30 Heather Kerr,
31 Amanda 
Nettelbeck,
32 Anna Gibbs
33 and Marion Campbell
34 have listed ficto-criticism as a research 
area at various times over the last five years.
35 
 
With the introduction of the internet and other electronic databases ficto-criticism has, 
therefore, become more easy to track as high-powered search engines scan complete 
electronic texts. No longer does ficto-criticism need to appear in the title to enable a 
researcher to find texts. For example, when searching for ficto-criticism, several references 
appeared to writing by Brenda Ludeman who applies the term to describe her writing on 
the visual arts,
36 and to other writers who have adopted the term. As the references to the 
use of the word cited above indicate, ficto-criticism appears to have just as much to do 
with art criticism, postcolonial discourse, feminism, identity politics and marginality, as it 
might have to do with postmodernism or Muecke and King. Australian ficto-criticism thus 
begins to develop as a diverse field with influences and connections beyond those provided 
by the sanctioned discourse. Put another way, there are many other examples of ficto-
criticism going on at the margins. The more risks texts take in defying conventions not 
only means that they more closely resemble the deterritorialising process of becoming-
woman, but also that they are much more likely to go undiscovered or recognised by the 
mainstream. 
 
When I apply the concept-tool of becoming-woman to Australian ficto-criticism later in 
the chapter it will become clear that—ultimately— Muecke and King’s placement as the   151
ficto-critical forbearers limits the productive connections desired by writing-between. As 
the negative reviews of Muecke’s ficto-critical text No Road may suggest,
 37 his ficto-
criticism does indeed represent a release of desire—a challenge to normative modes of 
writing. However, his majoritarian placement as a father of Australian ficto-criticism 
renders any potential flows into a structure that blocks desire. The alignment of Australian 
ficto-critical practice as an effect of postmodernism, and as a new genre identified (and 
created?) by the subjects Muecke and King, overcodes ficto-criticism, diverting and 
suffocating its revolutionary potential as it is coopted into familial or arboreal relations. It 
also tends to reduce Australian ficto-criticism to its aesthetic or formal characteristics, 
glossing over or detracting from the political imperative of such rhizomatic writings. This 
process of limitation is in direct conflict with ficto-criticism as a line of flight or becoming. 
Ficto-criticism is a writing practice that works to refuse the magisterial position and 
colonising practices of normative academic writing; it is not a state of domination. Yet, 
here it has been coded and colonised.  
 
This capture is, however, inevitable. According to Deleuze and Guattari, capitalism 
functions by releasing flows of machinic desire which are then blocked by the molar 
aggregates of, for example, the family, school, church, political party and nation. Ficto-
criticism(s), as multiple assemblages or becomings between fiction and non-fiction are 
alliance-based rather than familial, as Muecke and King’s dominance would suggest. 
Muecke and King’s position as the fathers or inventors of ficto-criticism crushes 
multiplicity, as the labels attached to ficto-criticism function as an Oedipal structure in the 
context of Deleuzian thought. This is not a question of whether these labels are false, but 
how they operate in this system of knowledge production.
 38 In this sense not only 
postmodernism but the fathers of Australian ficto-criticism are the molar aggregates that 
threaten to extinguish the molecular flows of ficto-criticism. Under their rule ficto-
criticism cannot become, nor is it a becoming. By reading Australian ficto-criticism with 
becoming-woman as a tool, as I do in the next section, another space beyond Muecke,   152
King and postmodernism comes into view, a space where other possible influences on the 
development of ficto-criticism in Australia can be seen to flow. 
 
On becoming-woman, becoming-imperceptible 
In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari perform (rather than define) becoming with 
an assemblage of different becomings: becoming-intense, becoming-animal, becoming-
woman, becoming-minoritarian, and becoming-imperceptible. The notion of an 
assemblage also comes from Deleuze and Guattari and is suggestive of a heterogeneous 
group that is not ordered and is without hierarchy. Becoming, in Deleuzian thought, is thus 
a radical destabilisation of meaning or identity. They speak of becoming as always 
involving a pack, a multiplicity, since it has no subject distinct from itself; there is no order 
or logic, never a question of organisation, only of composition. In their assemblage 
becoming-woman is an absolute deterritorialisation, which cannot be achieved through a 
majoritarian relationship. This explains their use of woman in the equation of becoming-
woman, since women are always other to man as the norm or standard. It also explains 
why becoming-woman is, in their words, “the key to all the other becomings” (A Thousand 
Plateaus 277). Rather than enter into the same system of power relations—the will to 
power—Deleuze and Guattari call for the radical destabilisation of that structure through 
releasing the flows of desire, taking risks and refusing established patterns of knowing and 
being known (individuation). In this sense, there is no becoming-majoritarian, only the 
molecular movement of becoming-minoritarian. According to Deleuze and Guattari: 
Becomings are minoritarian; all becoming is a becoming-minoritarian. When we 
say majority, we are referring not to a greater relative quantity but to the 
determination of a state or standard in relation to which larger quantities, as well as 
the smallest, can be said to be minoritarian: white man, adult-male, etc. Majority 
implies a state of domination, not the reverse. It is not a question of knowing 
whether there are more mosquitoes or flies than men, but of knowing how “man” 
constituted a standard in the universe in relation to which men necessarily 
(analytically) form a majority . . . In this sense women, children, but also animals,   153
plants, and molecules, are minoritarian. It is perhaps the special situation of women 
in relation to the man-standard that accounts for the fact that becomings, being 
minoritarian, always pass through a becoming-woman. (A Thousand Plateaus 291) 
It is important to remember that Deleuze and Guattari are not referring to a subject woman 
in their concept of becoming-woman, but woman as representative of a subordinate or 
minoritarian positioning in relation to patriarchy and the man-standard. Becoming-woman 
is not meant to suggest any inherent qualities of a woman or women, but works as a 
shifting metaphor. Significantly, and, not surprisingly, their use of “woman” in their theory 
has attracted some criticism from feminist theorists. Shortly, using a text by Elizabeth 
Grosz, I will deal with the concerns Deleuzian theory presents for feminism and, in fact, 
the problems their work raises for all minority politics. However, as I will argue, their 
theory remains relevant and useful in understanding ficto-critical practice as a critique of 
the will to power of normative academic writing. In their theoretical oeuvre Deleuze and 
Guattari demonstrate a consistent desire for an (albeit risky) shift away from dominant 
structures and ways of knowing in order to open up a space for alternative knowledges. In 
relation to ficto-critical work, becoming-woman not only opens a space for a different 
approach to critical and academic writing it also opens a space for the other to emerge.  
 
Grosz on Deleuze 
As alluded earlier, the concept becoming-woman presents its own particular set of 
problematics for traditional minority politics, and these need to be addressed. Elizabeth 
Grosz in her book Volatile Bodies examines the relevance of Deleuzian thought and, in 
particular, becoming-woman for feminism (160-83). Grosz’s chapter on Deleuze and 
Guattari is useful as it summarises the objections to, and problems with, becoming-woman 
for feminism (and by extension other minority theories). It is also pertinent since it 
demonstrates how the common assumptions made in critiques of Deleuze and Guattari 
mirror the system of lack, which they are trying to imagine a line of escape from. In other 
words, many negative readings of Deleuzian thought (as disempowering for the other) 
continue to judge the conditions of their oppression from within the same system that   154
excluded them (the other) to begin with. As ficto-criticism—the deterritorialised other of 
normative academic writing—might be judged as inadequate and a failure from the 
perspective of dominant codes and conventions, Deleuzian thought can be “misread” and 
dismissed if one does not release one’s reliance on established ways of knowing and being. 
The dismissal of both Deleuzian thought and ficto-criticism thus seems predicated on the 
same problem—a reading out of context. Yet as Grosz signals, while there are risks 
involved in thinking differently the benefits may be substantial. For example, in the 
context of Australian ficto-criticism, the use of Deleuzian thought helps one discover a 
different body of ficto-critical work. These texts, through their failure to adhere to 
dominant standards of the academy, have become “feminine” and imperceptible.  Within 
this same context of power relations, becoming-woman also allows one to critically 
interrogate the dangers of ficto-criticism developing into a kind of writing with its own set 
of codes and conventions. 
 
In her chapter “Intensities and Flows” Grosz gives her “very serious objections or 
reservations” on the relevance of Deleuzian thought to feminism. First, she warns that the 
metaphor of becoming-woman is a male appropriation of women’s political struggles and 
theories. These appropriations function, she argues, to depoliticise women’s radicality. 
Grosz is also concerned with the romanticising of women’s very real and visceral conflict 
with patriarchy. Secondly, this same metaphor neutralises women’s sexual specificity, and, 
thirdly, Deleuze and Guattari’s work involves a “romantic elevation of psychoses, 
schizophrenia and becoming, which on one hand ignores the very real torment of suffering 
individuals and, on the other hand, positions it as an unlivable ideal for others” (163). 
Fourthly, the technocratic metaphors employed—such as machinic—utilise tropes that can 
only function on the denigration and exclusion of women. Whilst Grosz’s critiques are 
specific to feminism and women, the objections she raises resonate for other minority 
theories and minority groups that might wish to utilise Deleuzian thought. For example, 
becoming-woman may immediately invoke the reality of women as they employ the word 
woman, yet as already established, woman here stands in for the position of women as   155
subordinate to man as the standard. As Grosz herself points out, here, “woman” is not a 
literal woman. Woman’s relevance in this equation of becoming-woman is based on the 
position of woman as the privileged other in Western culture. Becoming-woman thus 
represents a becoming-minoritarian; woman could be exchanged for another minoritarian 
group in a different context.
39 As Deleuze and Guattari state, immediately after warning 
that even women must become-woman: “Even blacks, as the Black Panthers said, must 
become-black” (A Thousand Plateaus 291). Thus, the problems Grosz signals, such as the 
erasure of the specificity of woman’s experience in the concept of becoming-woman, 
could be extended to another minoritarian group within the movement that is becoming in 
Deleuzian thought. Their concept of becoming-woman, it could be argued, thus reduces 
and depoliticises the specificity of particular minority struggles, romanticising their 
domination.  
 
Grosz’s critiques are without doubt very relevant concerns and objections. However, these 
critiques—whilst very valid—are contradictory within the oeuvre of Deleuzian thought. 
This might perhaps explain Grosz’s own ambivalence toward the concept of becoming-
woman. She seems to struggle with her reservations, at once wary of what she describes as 
Deleuzian phallocentricism yet at the same time seeing some very positive potential 
benefits in their concepts for feminist theory. For whilst she makes very clear the need to 
approach Deleuze’s theories critically—to be attendant to their limitations—Grosz is also 
positive about their potential to help clear the ground so “that women may be able to 
devise their own knowledges, accounts of themselves and the world” (164). For example, 
Grosz states:   
Deleuze’s writings may provide unexpectedly powerful weapons of analysis, 
critique, transgression, and transformation. They may demonstrate . . . other kinds 
of theoretical approaches, other intellectual paradigms, new ways of 
conceptualizing knowledge, power, bodies, representations . . .. (165)  
Significantly, to embrace the movement that characterises Deleuze and Guattari’s writings, 
one is required to take risks, as one is required to release one’s reliance on established   156
paradigms and ways of knowing. It does not mean, however, that everything is 
automatically up for grabs. Like ficto-criticism, for example, one must think differently 
and challenge the conventions of writing and knowing. Yet, at the same time, the 
taxonomy of genre will always define ficto-criticism—in its refusal of such categories. To 
remain focused on these known territories, defending their worth and relevance, however, 
will keep us fixed in systems of domination. Grosz herself acknowledges the emphasis on 
experimentation in Deleuzian theory:  
There is no hierarchy of being, no preordained order to the collection and 
conjunction of these various fragments, no central organization or plan to which 
they must conform. Their ‘law’ is rather the imperative of endless experimentation, 
metamorphosis, or transmutation, alignment and realignment. (167)  
In keeping with this reading of Deleuze and Guattari, in the introductory section of the 
paper, Grosz discusses the best way to approach their writing. She says of their critical 
style, that one must suspend the critical attitudes one usually approaches texts with, at least 
until some broad patterns emerge (166). Grosz thus acknowledges the considerable shift 
from traditional ways of knowing and critical reading that Deleuzian theory requires. 
Despite this, her critiques of Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming-woman (yet not the paper 
overall) remain firmly connected to established or fixed territories of knowledge, 
contradicting Deleuzian thought. Her concerns about becoming-woman erasing the 
specificity of women’s sexuality, experience and struggles, for example, keeps woman 
fixed in a space of domination by reproducing the metaphysical oppositions that deny and 
devalue women’s experience. In other words, her critique can itself be critiqued for doing 
the same thing as she critiques Deleuze and Guattari for doing with their concept 
becoming-woman. Grosz’s critique of Deleuze and Guattari—consistent with academic 
intellectual tradition—takes an oppositional stance, it is adversarial, combatant, and relies 
on established territories and systems to work. Yet as Deleuze and Guattari point out, what 
concerns them is not the truth-value of a belief like Oedipus, but how Oedipus crushes the 
desiring machines. They ask quite different questions of a problem or situation, their 
emphasis being on creative desiring production rather than desire as a product of lack.   157
Whilst attendant to the need to suspend traditional critical approaches when reading 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work, it is precisely when Grosz focuses on how their work lacks 
from within existing conceptual frameworks that she brings the full weight of the critical 
tradition to bear on their writing. As a result, she crushes the flows of desire. However, her 
overall attitude toward their work in the paper reintroduces ambivalence, demonstrating, in 
an academic setting, the tensions between de- and re-territorialisation. It seems that Grosz 
is attracted to their potential to imagine new territories of knowledge, but is somewhat 
hesitant about the repercussions that may also be apparent in such an approach. The 
machinic flows of desire are released as Grosz identifies with their theories—at times she 
seems inspired—but her cautious approach recodes productive desire into a relationship of 
lack.  
 
It is Deleuze and Guattari’s intention with the concept-tool of becoming-woman to move 
beyond desire conceived as reflecting a deficit, and beyond the accepted solid territories of 
knowledge, beyond the categories of man and woman. Importantly, despite this and their 
use of “woman” in the concept becoming-woman, it does not mean that they are 
dismissive of molar feminist struggles. In fact, they argue:  
It is, of course, indispensable for women to conduct a molar politics, with a view to 
winning back their own organism, their own history, their own subjectivity: ‘we as 
women . . .’ makes its appearance as a subject of enunciation. But it is dangerous to 
confine oneself to such a subject, which does not function without drying up a 
spring or stopping flow. (A Thousand Plateaus 276) 
In Deleuzian thought, then, to keep the flow from the spring from drying up, one is 
required to take risks.
 In other words, oppositional politics must shift their focus away 
from their critique of oppression; they must also look at the systems and conventions that 
prevent one from thinking differently.
 40 As Grosz forcefully states:  
This, then, is a risky undertaking, one in which there is a danger that one may lose 
one’s way, be pulled astray from the path one has chosen; but the risks and rewards 
may be worth taking insofar as new paths of exploration, new goals, new   158
theoretical paradigms and frameworks, may be made possible which could bypass 
the dilemas posed for feminists by binary or dichotomous thought. (166) 
In the context of conceptualising ficto-criticism as a between formulation there is a need to 
also take risks. To destabilise molar entities and energise becomings, ficto-criticism 
requires that you release established patterns of bifurcation and reject the majoritarian 
position and its state of domination. In other words, ficto-criticism’s enactment of a 
becoming-woman requires that the ficto-critic take a minoritarian position. As Grosz 
suggests, this is a politically dangerous ground to walk on. However, she adds: “if we do 
not walk in dangerous places and different types of terrain, nothing new will be found, no 
explorations are possible, and things remain the same. The risks seem to me worth  
taking. . .” (173). Yet one of the risks in becoming-woman and becoming-minoritarian is 
that you risk being quite literally imperceptible, and this does not sit well with the tradition 
of the academy. 
 
Australian feminist ficto-critical moves 
If one continues to trace ficto-criticism in Australia, both the practice and the use of the 
term, a very different history begins to emerge from the one presented thus far.
41 It is a 
history in which Muecke and King’s dominance is displaced. This history is much less 
visible, takes place on the margins, and ironically (almost poetically) reproduces the 
subordinate position of women that Deleuze and Guattari reflect upon. In fact, not only 
was the term in use in Australia prior to Muecke and King’s 1991 paper but also the 
practice of ficto-criticism was clearly in evidence some sixteen years earlier, primarily 
employed by feminists. Indeed, while unlabelled and unnamed, ficto-criticism was very 
much in use by women writers.  Inasmuch as this may appear as unsurprising to anyone 
familiar with feminist work it still seems necessary to make the assertion given the 
overwhelming gender neutrality inherent in the framing of Australian ficto-criticism. The 
postmodernist turn has seen experimental writing forms such as ficto-criticism discovered 
as new, excluding and obliterating the effects of feminist work on such practices. As other 
feminist writers working in disciplines that have undergone a postmodernist turn—such as   159
anthropology—have observed: “The lie of excluding feminism has characterized most 
postmodernist writing by males” (Mascia-Lees et al. 232). According to Mascia-Lees et 
al., books such as Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in the 
Human Sciences (Marcus and Fischer 1986) and Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics 
of Ethnography (Clifford and Marcus eds., 1986) ignore experimental feminist writing in 
these fields and a substantial body of feminist theory: 
what appears to be new and exciting insights to these postmodernist 
anthropologists—that culture is composed of seriously contested codes of meaning, 
that language and politics are inseparable, and that constructing the Other entails 
relations of domination (Clifford 1986a: 2)—are insights that have received 
repeated and rich exploration in feminist theory for the past forty years. (227) 
In the field of Australian ficto-criticism, the publication of The Space Between: Australian 
Women Writing Ficto-criticism in 1998 (the first ficto-critical anthology) attests to its 
relevance as a writing practice for women under the influence of feminism. This is 
something that has been left unconsidered in the published material on ficto-criticism by 
Muecke and King. Frustrated with traditional forms that fail to accurately represent their 
experiences and point of view, women have been producing hybrid writings that reflect a 
ficto-critical approach for some time. Women in the academy have felt compelled to ask: 
“Is it the patriarchy that teaches that discussion of literature has to take that kind of 
impersonal form, that nondialogic form, that emotional-after-the-fact form?” (Koppelman 
77). There is a substantial number of feminist texts—both recent and past—that address 
the adversarial, impersonal, masculinised style of academic writing.
42 It has been argued 
these texts centre on individual achievement and break any sense of “connectedness to 
others” (Frey 60-1). For example, in the Introduction to Private Voices, Public Lives 
Nancy Owen Nelson states that the book was “the direct result of our desire, after years of 
academic training, to break out of the masculinist mode of communication . . .” (xvii). 
Excluded and alienated by the authoritative, colonising practices of traditional academic 
criticism, women have helped bring about a re-evaluation of the ways in which academics 
write. As Frey has said: “To put it bluntly, if it were not for women, we might not be   160
questioning the way that we write literary criticism” (61). Dissatisfied with established 
generic forms, many women have been working to create ways of writing that do not 
disavow their experience. One such woman in Australia, Alexandra Pitsis, strongly 
reinforces the connection between feminism, ficto-criticism and minority politics.  
 
In 1988, three years before the publication of Muecke and King’s article, Pitsis submitted 
her Masters thesis at UTS, describing it in her abstract as ficto-critical. Drawing on what 
she describes as the “ficto-critical work of writers such as Irigaray, Kristeva and Cixous,” 
Pitsis writes her own ficto-criticism. Writing after the 1987 interview with Jameson, which 
Muecke and King draw upon, Pitsis might have come across the term through any number 
of associations. What is interesting though is her use of the term to describe the work of 
the “French feminists” in a thesis concerned with opening “up general textual arguments 
about women’s writing, and women’s relation to language in general.” Pitsis’ own 
personal experience makes up much of her thesis material, which is concerned with: 
the ways an individual functions within an educational institution and other 
institutions, considering certain ‘differences’ that set up conflicts, problematics and 
contradictions. 
 
The ‘differences’ inherent in being a woman, coming from a non-Anglo 
background and having lived a relatively ‘disadvantaged’ life, are also explored in 
the manner in which these are carried through into the various realms of ‘life’ and 
its institutions. (Pitsis i)
43 
By including her own personal stories in creative form, Pitsis destabilises academic writing 
and by extension the institution of the academy: 
This writing, locked in private discourse, banished from the academic realm, is like 
an act of political resistance in that it reveals its grief at the multiple positions of 
not only the feminine but of all other terms like madness, ethnicity and poverty. It 
is a striking-out . . .. (Pitis 22)    161
Her political striking-out seems informed by her sense of exclusion from the academy and 
how the conventions of the academy (having gained access) deny her experience as a 
Greek-Australian woman: “She has to be mad to make any sort of space for herself, and at 
the same time step back into the space designated for her, and to, grapple with that 
‘reason’ that exists to exclude her” (Pitsis 24). She states: “In a way, my project is to bring 
a sort of writing to where it previously couldn’t exist or function” (36). While Pitsis’ thesis 
demonstrates the aesthetic markers of postmodernism, such as pastiche, her text is not 
consistent with the popular conception of postmodernism. Instead it is a highly political 
piece of writing from someone who is minoritarian and situated: 
For me that marginal space is not apolitical, or ahistorical but is tied in with the 
silent, unsaid methods of exclusion that work as ‘a silent code of ethics’ in 
academia, and other social institutions. The writing I do chronicles that process, in 
part. That is, the narrator’s experience is not just a disembodied voice that flows 
out of metaphoricity but is in a way fixed. (Pitsis 23-4) 
Pitsis’ work is, then, imbued with an immediate subjective experience that is historically 
placed. Like Fred Wah’s Diamond Grill, examined in Chapter Two, Pitis’ thesis is not 
ahistorical, apolitical, objective or disembodied. Her textual style is, in fact, her subject in 
the sense that its hybrid personal creative mode reflects her political intent: the form is the 
argument. Here, the connections with feminist theory and writing are obvious.
44 As Susan 
Rubin Suleiman reconfirms, the shift toward personal criticism in the last two decades has 
been influenced by not just the demise of structuralism but also “the growth of a politically 
self-conscious feminist criticism, intent on confirming that ‘the personal is the political’” 
(Risking Who One Is 1). As Probyn has written in “True Voices and Real People: The 
‘problem’ of the autobiographical in cultural studies:” 
This discovery of autobiography should be more aptly described as a re-emergence. 
While my own hesitancy about autobiography stems in part from its overnight 
popularity amongst some male theorists, I also feel a sense of deja-vu. I mean have 
we not gone through this before, raised our consciousness as to the importance of 
everyday histories and lived the personal as the political? The memory of being   162
excluded on the grounds that the realm of the personal is not social scientific 
knowledge lingers. (105-6) 
The exclusion of women and their stories has long been predicated on the assumptions that 
inform academic writing and research. The cultural markers of femininity are antithetical 
to normative academic writing. Therefore, ficto-critical writing that includes the excesses 
ghosting the edges of the academic essay (such as fiction, poetry, personal detail, memory, 
and bodily experience) challenges authority as much as the generic hierarchies and 
divisions on which the canons of knowledge are established. For example, Valerie Ross, in 
“Too Close to Home: Repressing Biography, Instituting Authority,” argues that the 
exclusion of biography in the formation of the literature department expresses a 
“condensation of institutional anxieties about women, class, popular culture, affect, social 
and domestic existence, and other ‘outside’ challenges to institutional authority” (137). 
The inclusion of the personal and extratextual is not just a way in which ficto-criticism 
marks out hybridity, it also “ruptures the fantasy of autonomy and control” implicit in the 
traditional academic essay by introducing the other (Ross 155).
45  Ross argues that the 
resistance to biography in traditional literary studies results from the fact that it constitutes 
a private/inside space that is gendered feminine. Although Ross focuses her discussion on 
biography, her argument can easily be extended to include autobiography, which also 
functions as feminine in this context. The inclusion of biography and autobiography, 
therefore, has the potential to contaminate the work of literary studies by locating it in the 
domestic and social; provoking “shame, embarrassment, [and] the taint of niavety” (Ross 
39 and 155). These are the critiques waged against ficto-criticism from the dominant or 
majoritarian perspective. They demonstrate the threat such hybrid writings represent to the 
academy as an institution; hence the powers brought to bear on such machinic flows.  
 
Pitsis’ text is thus—from a traditional perspective—self indulgent, discontinuous, and 
schizophrenic. As Pitsis writes, clearly suggestive of Deleuzian theory, “So she exists as a 
schizophrenic in academia (not in the romantic or the clinical sense)” (24). Representing 
the characteristics aligned with the feminine—defined through their opposition to the   163
masculine values of objectivity, rigour, disciplinarity, and rationality—her text reveals the 
ideological imperatives inherent in the traditional academic essay as neutral frame. Pitsis’ 
ficto-critical act thus not only demonstrates an earlier use of the term in Australia, but also 
draws together feminism and ficto-criticism. Most importantly, however, her thesis 
demonstrates her minoritarian position within the academy as a major influence on her 
desire to break free from existing modes of academic writing that exclude her experience. 
It also demonstrates the political nature of her ficto-critical act as an example of becoming-
minoritarian, becoming-woman. By refusing the conventions of the academy—the 
majoritarian voice—Pitsis has, quite literally, become imperceptible. She has been 
excluded from official history of ficto-criticism in Australia. 
 
If one continues to map ficto-critical writing in Australia, evidence of a long-standing 
relationship between the form, the term, and feminism continues to emerge. This history is 
much less visible, however, since these references to the term take place on the margins 
and not in mainstream journals with broad distribution. For example, in a postgraduate 
student journal titled Postscript from the University of Queensland you can find an article 
that challenges Muecke and King’s place as the fathers of Australian ficto-criticism. 
Significantly, this paper is not cited on any electronic database or search engine (such as 
Google, MLA or AustLit). Christopher Hill’s paper “On Ficto-Criticism: A Reading for a 
Writer’s Festival”  playfully echoes Muecke and King’s article on ficto-criticism. In it he 
gives his first encounter with the term, an encounter that provides an appropriately 
anecdotal and unofficial location from which to continue to explore an alternate history of 
ficto-critical practice in Australia: 
it was in the mens [sic] toilets at UTS scrawled high up on the facing door below a 
rather inaccurate undergraduate representation of female genitalia and a more than 
life-size penis.  A genius had responded to the ‘Ficto-Criticism Rules, OK!’ with 
‘SAYS WHO?’  Because of the proximity of the slogan to the line drawings many 
responses could be read as referring to either the assertion about Ficto-Criticism, or 
to the line-drawn penis.  Some overtly tolerant cleaner had allowed a dialogue to   164
evolve.  The first response was an anonymous ‘ME’ followed by ‘PROVE IT.’  
This was followed by a perfectly notated reference to an article in ABR [Australian 
Book Review] and a local night spot with time and date.  This was followed by 
‘BARTH,’ to which was added an ‘ES’ above a ‘NOT LIKELY.’  Then came 
‘DERRIDA’ neatly transformed into ‘DERRIDA’S DICK’ with directional arrows. 
And finally ‘KING MUECKE’ with a ‘THEY WOULD KNOW!?!!’ added for 
good measure. (Hill 15)  
The dialogue reported on in this quotation refers directly to the article by Muecke and 
King published in the Australian Book Review. This excerpt from Hill’s paper is 
significant for several reasons. Firstly, it reaffirms the marginal nature of the dialogue on 
ficto-criticism, implying that it is just as likely to appear in a student publication or on 
toilet walls than in a refereed journal.
 46 Secondly, it again signals King and Muecke’s 
dominance in the discourse on ficto-criticism in Australia. Yet apart from this irreverent 
framing of Muecke and King’s ficto-criticism, Hill’s paper is also interesting because it 
strongly asserts the influence of women writers on ficto-critical writing in Australia. 
 
In their paper Muecke and King make reference to the anthology No Substitute, which was 
the result of a writing group located in Perth. Published by the Fremantle Arts Centre Press 
in 1987 this anthology was co-edited by Terri-ann White, Anna Gibbs, Wendy Jenkins and 
Noel King. Muecke and King imply that No Substitute is the primary Australian ficto-
critical text. King’s involvement in the group, and his role as co-editor, reinforces the myth 
reflected on UTS’s toilet walls that King and Muecke were central to the discovery of 
ficto-criticism.
47 Notably, Hill is critical of the “boys own’ self-congratulatory” tone in the 
1991 paper, and the way in which they suggest they have “discovered a thing called ‘Ficto-
Criticism’” (Hill 15). Here, Hill’s reference to the more than life-size line drawing of a 
penis on a toilet wall becomes glaringly telling. This is about the phallus; this is no 
becoming-woman. It is all about power—the majoritarian position—and the space to 
name. However, according to Hill there is an alternative history of ficto-criticism in 
Australia: one that challenges the privileged position of King and Muecke. Hill claims to   165
have at that time been closely associated with a member of the writing group that No 
Substitute sprang from: “I do think it worth making the point that all these ‘Ficto-Critical’ 
pioneers were women” (17). Although No Substitute includes pieces by men, the ficto-
critical texts—those texts that work the boundaries—are by women. In fact, in their “On 
Ficto-Criticism” paper Muecke and King themselves make special mention of several 
women writers included in No Substitute: Anna Gibbs, Susan Melrose, Leslie Stern, 
Marion Campbell and Zoë Sofia. Furthermore, Hill says of the writing group connected to 
No Substitute:  
Things were centred on the Academe—Murdoch University—but the players—the 
women, were also in a real sense strangers to it. They were interested in working at 
the boundaries: challenging the reliability of orthodox landmarks and the accepted 
tools of order-making. Everything seemed to be up for grabs . . .. (Hill 17) 
Everything did indeed appear to be up for grabs, including, it seems, the right to name and 
own a thing called “ficto-criticism.”
 48 
 
Interestingly, the politics of whether or not to name one’s (feminist) ficto-critical practice 
has been discussed elsewhere. For example, an American group of academic women—
working in the area of autobiographical or personal ficto-critical writing—have addressed 
the very problem of naming their method of critical writing. In an interview with Jeffrey 
Williams titled “Writing in Concert,” Cathy Davidson, Alice Kaplan, Jane Tompkins and 
Marianna Torgovnick speak of the supportive and inspirational nature of their long 
standing writing group, a group that helped enable their experimentation with writing 
forms, particularly critical and academic writing. Torgovnick talks to Williams about their 
experimental critical writing: “You’re making me feel as if we need a name for what we’re 
doing, because otherwise somebody else is going to give us a name. I think we’ve been 
resistant to giving it a name . . . “ (Williams 67). Williams shortly after this statement asks 
the group whether “Twenty years from now, couldn’t people say that you were in a 
salon?” Torgovnick responds:    166
I don’t have any problem with being in a circle. I think we probably do represent a 
movement and we are passing up a power-move in not naming it. It’s a temptation 
that women have always succumbed to, not naming the movement, and then some 
man comes in and names the movement. (Willams 67) 
In a 1997 article published in TEXT, Anna Gibbs observes the possible effects of failing to 
name the practice of ficto-criticism in Australia as performed by women.  She states in 
“Bodies of Words: Feminism and Fictocriticism—explanation and demonstration:”  
There’s a strange forgetfulness around the term fictocriticism as it’s used in 
Australia now—for fictocriticism made its appearance here in the writing (mostly 
non-academic) of women very well aware of those strange, exciting and 
provocative texts emanating first of all from France and then later from Canada 
from the late seventies onward. (1) 
In the same article Gibbs argues that the collection Frictions: An Anthology of Fiction by 
Women, published in 1982, is one of the first Australian texts to include ficto-criticism. 
She gives her own work and work by Anna Couani, Kathleen Mary Fallon,
49 Wendy 
Morgan, Kerryn Goldsworthy and Sneja Gunew as examples of ficto-criticism. She says 
that ficto-criticism is:  
Not so much a genre as an accident, even a hit and run guerilla action, tactical 
rather than strategic. A precise intervention into a specific situation, surprise being 
of the essence, and no two impasses in writing or debate are ever exactly the same. 
(Gibbs, “Bodies of Words” 1)  
As a result, Gibbs suggests that “ficto-criticism was never a genre that was One;” its 
performative and processual character being essential in its effectiveness in challenging 
both conventions and the knowledges which rely on such conventions. By the same token, 
to limit ficto-criticism to certain writers and movements in intellectual thought effectively 
reduces its revolutionary potential and, in Deleuzian terms, demonstrates how such 
movements are captured and contained. Gibbs opens Australian ficto-criticism up and 
away from purely the influence of Muecke, King and postmodernism into the realm of 
feminism as she identifies a number of influential texts by women.
50 Marion Campbell’s   167
first novel, Lines of Flight (1985), for example, is cited as having “incalculable” influence. 
Gibbs also links the development of ficto-critical writing in Australia to the influence of 
French feminist writers such as Irigaray and Cixous. In this context, it is intriguing that 
Muecke and King would limit their references to French hybrid writing by only Derrida 
and Barthes.
51 As Gibbs’ paper suggests, would not the theories of French women writers 
such as Cixous, Irigary and Kristeva be just as relevant, even perhaps more so? Think of 
Cixous’ concept of écriture feminine, for example.
52 Pitsis makes this connection when she 
strongly links the work of Irigaray, Kristeva and Cixous to ficto-criticism.  
 
Still earlier examples of ficto-criticism by women exist—but continue unlabelled and 
silently performed. The earliest example of ficto-criticism that I have located is Finola 
Moorhead’s review of Mother I’m Rooted originally published in 1975 by Meanjin. 
Moorhead’s piece displays the characteristics and concerns of ficto-critical writing. In it 
she says: “Allow me to continue in an illogical, wandering, emotional, ‘feminine’ way, in 
other words, don’t ask me to prove what I know one way or another: this is not a 
masculine country” (Quilt 67). Sybylla Press in 1985 republished this review in 
Moorhead’s book Quilt. In the same collection Moorhead has several other pieces, which 
are experimental and which make reference to her frustration with the established rules of 
writing.
53 For example:  
Of experimental writing, now. Form cracks open and contents spill out, as sticky, 
fascinating and loose as the yolk of an egg. Mess. Messy. People who judge too 
soon reach for a mop. Whatever is there goes into the rubbish bin. They try to flush 
it down the sink. 
 
Dismiss it. How many reviews do this! They dismiss without examination or twist 
the new writing into some preconceived notion of their own.  
  (Moorhead, Quilt 127. Italics in original.)   
Notably, not just Quilt but other publications by Sybylla have included ficto-criticism. Yet, 
like Moorhead’s writing, there is no label—such as ficto-criticism—applied.
54 I think it is   168
no coincidence that Sybylla Press is a feminist collective committed to publishing work by 
women that might not ordinarily see publication. As stated in the introduction to another of 
their publications, second degree tampering, Sybylla is committed “to publishing and 
writing which radically challenges hegemonic ideas about women and writing.” Second 
degree tampering, published in 1992, includes work by Anna Gibbs and Jyanni Steffensen 
(that I have read as ficto-critical), but also work by Marion Campbell, Linda Marie Walker 
and Noelle Janaczewska, and all of the writing is highly subversive and experimental. 
Motherlode (1996)—also published by Sybylla—has ficto-critical works by Marion 
Campbell (“Spectacular Motherhood”) and Norie Neumark’s “Girlz in the ‘hood.’” 
Motherlode also included the republished “Spacing Out in the Mothershop” by Zoë Sofia, 
which was first published in No Substitute (and which Muecke and King isolate for special 
mention in “On Ficto-Criticism”). Although she does not use the term ficto-criticism, 
Terri-ann White in her review of Motherlode states: 
For me there were many pleasures: a recognition of how much good work is being 
made currently in Australia through hybrid elements. A mixing of forms, breaking 
down the niceties and codes between different expression. In Motherlode there is 
work made for the project but there is also extant work made in the essay form, the 
theoretical essay form, as work for performance, fiction and poetry, as 
politics/propaganda. (Rev. of Motherlode 126) 
Here, White reaffirms the political nature of ficto-critical practice by women. 
 
Despite Muecke and King’s place in the history of Australian ficto-criticism as the alleged 
authors of its “germinal moment,” these writings by women demonstrate that ficto-
criticism had been around for some time in Australia pre-1991—performed by women—
but unnamed. The invisibility of this version of Australian ficto-critical history in the 
mainstream published articles ironically reproduces the kind of power dynamic that ficto-
criticism works to reveal: the colonising aspects of academic research and writing. It also 
reveals the underlying assumption of ficto-criticism—as a self-reflexive practice—that 
truth is contingent and informed by your position.   169
 
My purpose here in reiterating the influence of feminist writers on ficto-critical practice in 
Australia is not necessarily to establish an alternative to the reign of Muecke and King or 
postmodernism as the definitive frames for ficto-criticism, but to recognise another equally 
valid determining factor. Feminism applied here through the conventions of academic 
argument has the potential to become the new molar aggregate, smothering other 
influences on Australian ficto-critical discourse. To do so is not my intention as it would 
be contrary to the notion of becoming. As Deleuze and Guattari point out, making an 
important distinction between a minority and minoritarian: 
It is important not to confuse “minoritarian,” as a becoming process, with a 
“minority,” as an aggregate or a state. Jews, Gypsies, etc., may constitute 
minorities under certain conditions, but that in itself does not make them 
becomings. One reterritorializes, or allows oneself to be reterritorialized, on a 
minority as a state; but in a becoming, one is deterritorialized . . . Becoming-
woman necessarily affects men as much as women. In a way, the subject in a 
becoming is always “man,” but only when he enters a becoming-minoritarian that 
rends him from his major identity. (A Thousand Plateaus 291) 
In other words, the practice of ficto-criticism embodies a potential becoming
55—in terms 
of its relation to molar structures and its self-reflexive politics—but it does not guarantee 
this movement. As Muecke and King’s dominance of Australian ficto-critical discourse 
reveals, even a practice such as ficto-criticism requires an attentiveness to one’s 
micropolitics. Being of a minority—or writing in a minority form—does not automatically 
result in becoming-minoritarian. In this context then, feminist writing with its focus on 
autobiographical detail, has the potential to limit ficto-criticism to creatively critical 
personal explorations, leaving out other forms of ficto-critical experimentation. Who else 
might be writing ficto-critically in Australia, and what other generically between forms do 
they take? What other lines of flight apart from feminist ficto-criticism exist?  
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In this sense, ficto-criticism can be conceptualised as a strategy of the other. 
Indeed, in a book of ficto-criticism by Australian academic Alison Bartlett
56 (who 
incidentally employs Cixous’ theory of écriture féminine) there is a pointed reference to 
minoritarian positioning and the challenging of established forms. While ficto-criticism 
may be a practice that women writers have taken up in Australia, it might also have just as 
much appeal for other minority writers who find existing generic styles limiting. In the 
same way, experimenting with genre may be one way that those banished to the margin 
can resist reproducing the established forms and structures that have traditionally worked 
to exclude them. Susan Hawthorne, in Bartlett’s ficto-critical “Polylogue: Writers 
Theorising, a Performance,” states: 
I think that women at the moment are experimenting more with form and with 
content, and style and with genre—the whole thing. I think it’s also happening 
amongst other groups, like, black writers, indigenous writers etcetera, people 
coming from cultures which are not currently in dominance. I think that part of the 
reason that’s happening is because we haven’t had a voice, and the old forms don’t 
necessarily suit us. When you have something different to say then you are forced 
to say it in different ways and so you have to seek out a form that’s going to suit 
your needs . . . (qutd. in Bartlett, Jamming the Machinery 21) 
Ficto-criticism presents itself as a means to interrogate the violence of representation, to 
legitimately explore what is inevitably left out and/or misrepresented through that process. 
The following readings of two contemporary Australian ficto-critical texts reveals the 
desire released in their defiance of established conventions. They creatively and 
experimentally re-imagine those stories and truths which have been excluded from 
dominant narratives. The two texts are Terri-ann White’s Finding Theodore and Brina and 
Kim Scott’s Benang: From the Heart.   
 
Finding Theodore and Brina 
In 2001 one of the people involved in No Substitute published a book that, although 
officially labelled “fiction” by the publisher, constitutes an ambiguous hybrid mix of   171
fiction and non-fiction and, consequently, and can be read as an example of ficto-criticism. 
The book is Terri-ann White’s Finding Theodore and Brina, published by the Fremantle 
Arts Centre Press (FACP). FACP has published several other examples of ficto-criticism, 
including the anthology No Substitute, Marion Campbell’s experimental feminist novel 
Lines of Flight, and Muecke’s No Road. Notably, despite its association with Muecke’s 
writing and research, and its currency in 1997, the term ficto-criticism was—as with 
Finding Theodore and Brina—not used in publicity material when No Road was 
released.
57 White’s Finding Theodore and Brina appears to be a fictionalised biography of 
her family history. Set largely in Western Australia—where White comes from—the text is 
(ambiguously) factual. However, its self-reflexive play, emphasis on fictional techniques, 
and constant references to invention, means that categorising this book non-fiction would 
have been—commercially—a risky business. It might have an extensive bibliography and 
several appendices incorporating archival material, but labelling it fiction must have 
seemed a much safer option in terms of sales. Is this why it is categorised fiction? The 
label fiction also guarantees the author much more leeway for creative experimentation in 
the eyes of reviewers who might be less than enthusiastic about texts that jumble fiction 
and non-fiction. Calling a text fiction means that an author can be less attentive to notions 
of truth and truth telling. In Finding Theodore and Brina White’s narrator seems conscious 
of her role as divulger of family secrets. If the book is presented as fiction to a general 
public, perhaps members of her family might be less likely to object? Strangely, though, 
calling this generically hybridised family memoir fiction induces the reader to become 
very conscious of truth-value and the ways in which histories are constructed. 
 
The generic pedigree of Finding Theodore and Brina is, without doubt, obscure. It is a 
bastard form, and reviewers have noted this. For example, Donna Lee Brien describes the 
book as creative nonfiction,
58 suggesting that because of the “self-consciousness of the 
narrator [it becomes], in part, a meta-discourse about the writer’s process and progress, the 
difficulties and pleasures of the research, the improbable coincidences, the secrets 
uncovered, the amazing stories found” (2). As Brien notes, there is a metafictive element   172
to White’s text by means of the narrator’s self-reflexive attention to the processes of 
writing and research. Similarly, Finding Theodore and Brina demonstrates the other two 
characteristics of ficto-critical texts. Firstly, it is written in first person and includes many 
personal details, encouraging the reader to identify the narrator as White and the text as 
autobiography. Secondly, the prose passages and quotations are arranged in collage-like 
sequences. Brien is positive about White’s book of “creative nonfiction,” yet she ends her 
review on an almost apologetic note, adding this qualifier to the end of the last sentence: 
“whatever genre we might label the product” (3).  
 
White’s text is an interesting example of Australian ficto-criticism as it draws together a 
range of issues that circulate and intersect with ficto-criticism in Australia, and more 
widely. White is a creative writer, not an academic, and whilst the discussion here has so 
far focused on ficto-criticism largely in relation to the academy, Finding Theodore and 
Brina signals the much broader implications of hybrid forms like ficto-criticism. The 
implications of generically transformative texts are not something specific to academics 
writing ficto-critically. The same issues and concerns emerge around White’s book, 
particularly given that it is labelled fiction, as they do around short pieces of ficto-criticism 
written by academics for academic journals. As Brien’s review illustrates, even if you are 
in favour of hybrid or creative nonfictional writing, not being able to label texts one thing 
or another, as in the case of White’s, presents problems. Dominant concerns prevail: is this 
fact or fiction; is it a real story? Questions of judgement, validity, representation, and 
quality rebound, and this I would argue is a deliberate performative strategy on the part of 
ficto-critics. Although this modus operandi may be more immediately obvious in texts that 
appear in an academic context, since academic writing has traditionally been associated 
with science and truth, the same strategy of creating uncertainty around these concepts is 
apparent in ficto-critical texts like White’s. The ambiguity created by the ficto-critical text 
around value judgement and notions of truth supports their narrative arguments, which are 
often centred on stories and histories excluded from, or devalued by, official literatures. 
This is the case with White’s book, as it is with the texts examined in the previous chapter.   173
The identification of Finding Theodore and Brina as a book of fiction foregrounds its 
political imperative (as long as this narrative strategy doesn’t become merely another 
instance of aesthetic and textual play under postmodernism). In other words, the hierarchy 
of genre is brought into sharp relief through reading this book: although it is labelled 
fiction it seems more closely related to non-fiction, since it relies heavily on non-fictional 
sources. For example, not only does Finding Theodore and Brina have appendices of 
historical documents and a bibliography, but it includes footnotes: it is referenced like a 
piece of non-fiction. The reader cannot help but start to question the rules that constitute 
fiction and non-fiction, and by extension history and fact. Clearly transgressing the generic 
markers of non-fiction, White’s book is something between fiction and non-fiction: ficto-
criticism. Her text constitutes a minor literature that appears wrought out of the experience 
of only being able to find faint and elusive traces of her great grandparent’s lives and 
characters. White’s narrator is forced to invent, work on hearsay and scraps of 
unsubstantiated tales. She states: “In attempting to return to these stories, I come to a 
conclusion that I may have to invent most of it” (211). 
 
Faced with so many unofficial, contradictory, broken and missing stories of her ancestors 
and her family’s history, the narrator sets about searching for a form that can deal with 
such unconvincing research material. At one stage the narrator discusses adapting the 
yizker bikher, or Jewish memorial book, as a means to remember. The narrator’s ancestors, 
Theodore and Brina, were Jewish, and the memorial book seems a likely model; the desire 
to remember lost stories from the margins—not to forget—intersecting strongly with 
Jewish history and the European Holocaust.  
 
From the perspective of official discourses, her family’s history is too obscure: it has been 
lost, overlooked, and cannot be rediscovered through the traditional methods of historical 
research. But the narrator does not want to forget: 
I don’t want to forget Theodore Krakouer and Brina Israel even if everybody else 
in the world has. There is so little passed down that I have become a collector of   174
shards: of memory, what might have been told to me at the end of this long line of 
tales. I want to catch these half-lit, often, paste jewels. I don’t know how authentic 
they are, but does it even matter? For me it doesn’t matter because I want to see 
what can be made anew, built from the remains. To honour the fleeting, the 
fragment, fractured histories and stories. None of this passed down; it has to be 
dredged up. (198)  
In this passage White signals her creative and productive approach to the material she does 
find through her process of research. She makes no promises of authenticity, in fact, quite 
the opposite: she can only speculate (160). Finding Theodore and Brina is thus a 
becoming-minoritarian, as White refuses authority and fixed territories. She does not act as 
interpreter of her material; rather, she engages creatively—experimentally—making anew 
from what little information she does have. She fills the silences of her family members 
who are situated on the margins of history. For example, unable to find records of her great 
grandmother’s journey by sea to Fremantle from England in 1852, she invents letters. 
Based on manuscripts documenting the shipboard diaries of working-class people, who 
undertook the same journey in the middle of the nineteenth-century, the narrator creates 
her version of Brina’s letters home detailing her lengthy and difficult journey. Seizing on 
this historical material as a basis to start from, she says: “Here is a genre to work within, a 
model” (144). This statement implies that she, the narrator, had difficulty locating a 
suitable form for her imaginings. Earlier, she discussed the Jewish memorial book as a 
possible model. However, in the end, White chooses the ficto-critical form, employing a 
variety of genres.  
 
Less concerned with truth-telling and historical facts, the narrator takes the “paste jewels” 
offered to her: “I am circling around fantasy and what I know, both from the present and 
the past. Open to persuasion, to changing my mind, to imaginings, to seeing the world in 
entirely new ways” (159-60). In the context of normative historical research and writing 
her text is, therefore, a becoming that destabilises and deterritorialises the molar lines of 
dominant historical narratives. It is a line of flight. As Deleuze and Guattari argue “. . .   175
writing should produce a becoming-woman as atoms of womanhood capable of crossing 
and impregnating an entire social field, and of contaminating men, of sweeping them up in 
that becoming” (A Thousand Plateaus 276). Significantly, in the process of dredging up 
the fractured stories of her ancestors, other stories that have been silenced surface from the 
margins of official history. In Finding Theodore and Brina you will find the cultural 
transgressions of madness, illegitimacy, miscegenation, and murder. These transgressions 
are processes of deterritorialisation, crushed and denounced by the molar lines of 
institutional systems. In the chapter titled “searching for meaning: Julie,” for example, the 
narrator speaks of her cousin who died as a result of concealing her pregnancy. There are 
few traces of her in official stories; “The pure silence around that girl and her baby. 
Folding into itself. A grief without a voice” (62). In this chapter, the narrator writes: 
“Nobody will be injured by any of this candour, not now. This impulse is about 
challenging the convenient myths that we have inherited and, in good faith, perpetuated. It 
is charged with thinking about the way forward” (36). By discovering and revealing such 
lines of flight, White’s ficto-critical text, therefore disrupts central narratives and their 
supporting ideologies such as the family, religion, law, morality, notions of sexuality, the 
individuated subject, and even Australian national identity. 
 
For example, in one of the narrator’s self-reflexive moments she tells the tale of her 
naivety around miscegenation in Australia, a naivety revealed—as verging on comical—
through the hindsight of her research. The narrator had believed the popular myth of how 
Aboriginal people came to have European surnames: 
For so many years when Aboriginal people were identified with the mark of British 
names, for generations, it was always explained as the practice of the blacks taking 
the name of their bosses or masters. That white masters named their property was 
obvious: mark it as yours. The mark of the oppressor. And people believed it. So 
when I started thinking of my family line, the Krakouer family, in the 1980s, and 
the famous football players Jimmy and Philip Krakouer became heroes, I was 
assured that it was because their grandfather or his grandfather had worked for   176
David or Rudolph or Raphael in the South-West some time around the crossing of 
the centuries. (123-4).  
It is on such mythologies that white Australia maintains its national identity and ability to 
ignore such important issues as reconciliation. By admitting her naivety White’s narrator 
allows marginalised stories to speak.
59 Revealing her failings, the secret of her 
inadequacies, the narrator is becoming-minoritarian. She reveals her failure to see through 
such racism: where slave like relations of domination and ownership are preferred as the 
explanation (a symptom of the times) over the horror of acknowledging miscegenation. 
When she discovers a reference to her great-grandfather as the defacto partner of an 
Aboriginal woman, Sophie Smith, her first instinct is to close the book: “Back then, I had 
quietly closed the book and kept it to myself. It felt like a time bomb; I didn’t want to 
detonate it” (125). The secret of her failings as she perceives them—her naivety and initial 
inability to disrupt the family’s stories and societal rules—becomes the secret of 
miscegenation. As Deleuze and Guattari write: “The secret is not at all an immobilized or 
static notion. Only becomings are secrets; the secret has a becoming” (A Thousand 
Plateaus 287). In other words, it is the becoming that brings the secret. In revealing her 
secrets, and the family’s, the text’s self-reflexive confessional politics come to the fore. In 
Finding Theodore and Brina there are many societal secrets that signal becomings. There 
are also the stories behind knowledge and textual production.  Significantly, in many ficto-
critical texts there is a confessional element as the narrator reveals their text’s weaknesses, 
exploring the processes of writing, and even visiting the reality of their own shortcomings. 
Ficto-critical texts are not magisterial and authoritative. The secret confessional moments 
of ficto-critical texts are not held gravely they are marked by transparencies and speed. 
Notably, Deleuze and Guattari discuss the secret as divulged by women in terms of 
confession and an active micropolitics. Men, however, have their secrets, which are held 
with grave (molar) importance: 
they end up telling everything—and it turns out to be nothing. There are women, 
on the other hand, who tell everything, sometimes in appalling technical detail, but 
one knows no more at the end than at the beginning; they have hidden everything   177
by celerity, by limpidity. They have no secret because they have become a secret 
themselves. (A Thousand Plateaus 289) 
To put it differently, with such a flood of information—of deterritorialised flows—it 
becomes impossible to measure and interpret against any pure form. Her confession 
becomes indiscernible to logic. They state: “it is curious how a woman can be secretive 
while at the same time hiding nothing, by virtue of transparency, innocence and speed” (A 
Thousand Plateaus 289). Not surprisingly, confession has become a discursive practice 
associated with the feminine. In Confessional Politics Irene Gammel connects confession, 
the female voice, and a lack of authority: 
. . . confessional readings frequently entail a process of devaluation of the female 
voice. The female voice relating personal experience, like the sinner’s and the 
patient’s, belongs not to the realm of abstract and official langue but to parole, to 
familiar and intimate speech, and is thus characterized by a low degree of formality 
and authority, as it is perceived as ephemeral or trivial. (4) 
The confessional moments in ficto-critical texts thus help challenge both genre and 
confessional politics, with their play on texuality, fiction and truth. For example, 
confession is traditionally aligned with truth telling. Yet, in Finding Theodore and Brina 
the text’s confessional moments are not unmediated cries from the heart, they are 
performative and self-reflexive. This is achieved by the ambivalence around whether the 
text is fiction or non-fiction, and whether White is actually the narrator. Is the text really 
autobiographical? At this moment there is a loss of the Oedipal subject and the emergence 
of subjectivity as autopoeisis. In Finding Theodore and Brina for example, the narrator is 
mediated through the fragmented multiple nature of the text, fictional performativity and 
the play on patriarchal hermeneutics. The subject is not fixed; she can be changed through 
her research; she is historically contingent. At one point, she asks: “Can a researcher 
become contaminated by her material?” (134). Similarly, her ideas are not fixed; she is 
open to “seeing the world in entirely new ways” (160). There is also no arboreal tracing of 
the family tree, as might be expected in a family memoir, no guide at the beginning of the 
text so the readers can track a linear family narrative. Instead, the text is made up of a   178
rhizomatic collection of scraps of information, imaginings and memory informed by a 
process of pick-up. Thus, White’s Finding Theodore and Brina populates the margins of 
history without ever really specifying either genre or individual.  
 
The ficto-critical form of this book is reflective of the need to reclaim stories banished to 
the margins. In the process, the text’s focus increases beyond merely the narrator’s family 
as it becomes a piece of cultural commentary on contemporary Australia. Past and present 
collapse, a warning for today against continuing such exclusions and the bigotry that 
informs them:  
History is a discipline of selection and we weren’t chosen . . .The story of this 
family is enmeshed within the story of Australia but to prove all of it is beyond 
anyone’s charter. It contains shameful records, neglected or unacknowledged. 
Figures rush out of the landscape and they are not always Krakouers. (217) 
The figures referred to in this paragraph are Aboriginal, and the landscape is postcolonial.  
The violence enacted against minority groups, excluded from history and official 
discourses, is thus (often) both physical and semantic. Atrocities are not carried out on a 
purely physical level, but also at the level of language and culture, as an active politics of 
forgetting is enacted. Such stories, however, cannot be erased and prevented from 
resurfacing. The fact that both Theodore and Brina were Jewish resonates profoundly in 
this ficto-critical text; the attempted genocide of Jewish people runs parallel with the 
politics of genocide inherent in early Western Australian legislation. Based on eugenics, 
the Western Australian government attempted to “breed out” Aborigines, and absorb them 
into white society. White’s narrative outlines one family’s story, a remembering of people 
forgotten. However, ghosting her story is a much greater story of silence and forgetting, 
only now really coming to the fore in Australia. As the narrator of Finding Theodore and 
Brina states: “Where once the stories of the British majority were the dominant stories of 
our culture, now it is the stories held along the edges that begin to be heard” (122). The 
figures rushing from the landscape approach dominant Australian culture (Anglo, male and 
middle-class) both physically and semantically, hence the need for a self-reflexive ficto-  179
critical form that is consciously attentive to not reproducing the structures of domination 
and exclusion.  
 
Benang: From the Heart 
The second Australian ficto-critical text I wish to look at is Kim Scott’s Benang: From the 
Heart (1999). This book by Scott has something in common with White’s Finding 
Theodore and Brina. Benang, quite literally, represents the (Aboriginal) figures rushing 
forth from the landscape—the stories from the margin—that White’s narrator describes. It 
is also a fictionalised account of Scott’s personal history. According to an interview 
conducted by Susan Midalia, “Benang . . .was written as a fictionalised version of family 
history, in order to investigate non-Aboriginal attitudes to Aboriginality, issues of power, 
and the psychosis which Kim [Scott] believes lies at the heart of mainstream non-
Aboriginal culture” (1). Not unlike his first novel True Country,
 60 Scott’s Benang is an 
investigation into the violence of colonisation. I am choosing to read this text (also 
published by FACP) as ficto-criticism because it is in-between in many ways: not only a 
sophisticated critique and analysis of colonising processes through its mix of fiction and 
non-fiction, but also an attack on the binary systems that maintain divisions between white 
and black, reason and emotion and intellect and body.  
 
The story told by Scott is from the perspective of the “first white man,” Harley, who is the 
product of his grandfather’s amateur eugenics project. His grandfather Ernest Scat is 
inspired in the 1920s by A. O. Neville to undertake a controlled breeding program with 
Nyoongar
61  women. Significantly, Neville was the Chief Protector of Aboriginals from 
1915 to 1940 in Western Australia, during which time he implemented a systematic 
program to eliminate Aborignality (assigned to skin colouration), by controlling the lives 
of Aboriginal people, in particular, those who were of “mixed race.”
62 Nyoongar people of 
mixed race were labelled and described by such words as quadroon and octoroon. Those 
with light skin were removed from their families and communities, educated and socialised 
into white society, and only allowed to marry those with light skin. Harley’s grandfather   180
Scat reproduces Neville’s disturbing experiment, naturalised by the discourse of eugenics, 
which was popular during that period. Scat is, in the novel, Neville’s fictionalised cousin, 
and like Neville he employs the Western concepts of rationality and science to the same 
disturbing ends: 
Whatever the confusions of my genealogy, there seems little doubt that my 
grandfather intended to be my creator. It was he who, if not indeed forming the 
idea, applied it as Mr Neville was unable to do. 
 
For Ernest, it was a rationalisation of his desire. It was a challenge. It was as if 
he—a little too late to be a pioneer, and not really cut out to tame the land—could 
still play a role in taming a people into submission. (32) 
The proximity and personal nature of Scat’s experiment powerfully works to bring home 
the pathology and self-interest of those involved in the policies of genocide written into 
Western Australian law during that period. Harley discovers the records of his 
grandfather’s grotesque experiment whilst recovering from a car accident, and begins to 
trace his Nyoongar family.  
 
On the back of the book there is a reviewer’s comment from Amanda Lohrey. Lohrey is 
quoted as saying: “Kim Scott . . . uses a cool, almost matter-of-fact style to brilliantly 
render a form of white madness that ravaged the Australian continent in the disguise of 
Reason.” Lohrey’s commentary is telling, as it focuses on a central tenet of Scott’s book 
Benang, which is not, it seems, coincidentally subtitled From the Heart. This text is not 
disembodied and lacking emotion, yet, nor is it lacking logic or sense. With his clever and 
humorous unravelling of dichotomous binaries, Scott critiques the authoritarian, 
disembodied, and fascist position of the (in this case amateur) scientist who constructs 
himself as rational purveyor of truth. Scat, Harley’s grandfather, through his project of 
eugenics, is attempting to control and categorise the other through the discourse of science 
and reason. He is also attempting to stabilise meaning. Nyoongar identity is thus 
objectified and limited in a violently reductive fashion. Yet, as Scott demonstrates, there is   181
nothing objective, civilised, or rational about his method or science. For example, as one 
reviewer of Benang has noted, Scat’s fleshy existence intrudes on his research (Slater 223). 
At one point, Scat finds himself with an erection:  
Absorbtion, he said, it’s possible. Assimilation.  
For some reason the words aroused Ernest; perhaps because he was still struggling 
to free himself of certain erotic memories and guilt. Indeed, his erection threatened 
to intrude into his mental note-making, as if wanting to prove that there was plenty 
of lead in this pencil. (Scott 46) 
Clearly, Scott’s novel can be easily read as a critique of colonisation and the systems of 
knowledge that underpin such arrogant and paternalistic brutalities. But Scott’s critique 
does not reproduce those same systems of domination by operating generically within the 
conventions of serious, rational criticism. His text is ficto-critical as he destabilises genre, 
the subject, rationality, science, and even dominant notions of Aboriginality and whiteness. 
Harley, contemplating his grandfather’s writing, compares his reason with his Nyoongar 
family’s reason/s: 
It was never random, it was never just wandering, it was never wilderness. I think it 
was more like my own wondering, even as I made my way through my 
grandfather’s papers, looking for traces, for essences, for some feeling of what 
happened, for what had shaped it this way. Fanny [Pinyan Benang Wonyin—a 
Nyoongar relative of Harley’s] led her family though a terrain in which she 
recognised the trace of her ancestors, and looked for her people. She brought them 
back. I would like to think that I do a similar thing. But I found myself among 
paper, and words not formed by an intention corresponding to my own, and I read a 
world weak in creative spirit. (471-2) 
As Lisa Slater has written about Benang: “In reading white writing (that is, white making 
and remaking of the world), as weak in creative spirit, the gaze is being turned upon the 
construction of whiteness” (220). In other words, instead of merely setting himself in 
opposition to racism and colonisation, Scott creatively imagines another space in which the 
categories of both whiteness and Aboriginality may be transformed. For example, the   182
concept of assimilation—the absorbtion of Aboriginal people into white society—is 
playfully and creatively reappropriated in Benang. Scott incorporates quotations from 
historical sources, such as this one from Neville: “As I see it, what we have to do is uplift 
and elevate these people to our own plane . . .” (qutd. in Scott 11). Harley has a literal 
“propensity for elevation” (12). He floats. As the first white man, Harley physically hovers 
above the landscape. Here, Scott is playing with language as a discursive practice, and his 
text has been consciously constructed to function (at a formal level) to support his 
theoretical argument: 
Benang is thus designed to make the reader think and feel. Highly self-conscious 
about its aesthetic and political principles, it requires the reader to think about 
history, representation and ethics, and to question our own actions, beliefs and 
attitudes. (Midalia 4)  
Scott’s attack on binary systems at many levels in his text is therefore a political act: it is 
not just aesthetic textual play that concerns Scott it is power. According to Deleuze and 
Parnet: 
It is wrong to say that the binary machine exists only for reasons of convenience. It 
is said that “the base 2” is the easiest. But in fact the binary machine is an 
important component of apparatuses of power. So many dichotomies will be 
established that there will be enough for everyone to be pinned to the wall, sunk in 
a hole. Even the divergences of deviancy will be measured according to the degree 
of binary choice; you are either white or black, Arab then? Or half-breed? 
(Dialogues 21) 
Notably, despite Scat’s efforts, Harley’s identity as the first white man is not stable, as he 
neither settles into whiteness, nor is completely at ease with himself as Aboriginal. 
According to Slater, “Scott’s textual politics position identity formation as complex and 
multi-voiced as the novel: intersubjective and culturally and historically contingent. In 
doing so, Scott destabilises the black/white binary” (222). As a result, Scott’s narrative 
muddies the system of bifurcation that works to stabilise meaning and contain the other. 
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Scott’s ficto-critical form is, therefore, both strategic and symbolic. At one point, for 
example, Harley suddenly discovers some new characters that populate his family story, 
his statement about their discovery self-reflexively playing on representation and genre. 
They may only be characters in this story, but they are family to him: “I worried, as any 
reader must also do, at this late and sudden introduction of characters. Except that for me it 
was not characters, but family.”  This statement, that has metafictive intonations, 
reverberates with Australia’s dominant national narratives. Like Finding Theodore and 
Brina, Benang: From the Heart calls on us to question the hierarchies that underpin not 
just generic taxonomy but also white/black, Australian/Aboriginal, intellect/body and 
reason/emotion. In conclusion, Benang is (generically) not just a work of fiction but a 
highly inventive text that incorporates theoretical insight, historical documentation, and 
which—importantly—is embodied in that it speaks “from the heart.” It is critical (that it 
not be dismissed as merely fiction). 
 
Another Australian author whose work blurs the line between fact and fiction as a means 
to acknowledge and explore the partiality of different truths is Drusilla Modjeska. In 
March of 2002, she is quoted in the Sydney Morning Herald as identifying “government 
fictions and lies and corporate fictions and lies” as one of the reasons why “literary non-
fiction” and memoir are so popular. She says: “We are an information-heavy culture, 
hungry for facts. We have to face the possibility that in a time of moral and political 
confusion, non-fiction has more to say” (Wyndam 76). Modjeska’s comments are 
interesting as they suggest a perspective on literary non-fiction or ficto-criticism that 
confirms the influence of the molecular/minoritarian in undermining the validity of 
molar/majoritarian discourses. From Modjeska’s perspective, for example, part of the 
interest in literary non-fiction and memoir is the result of the negative influence of 
postmodernism on fiction. In the same Sydney Morning Herald article she is reported as 
saying: “Part of the problem for fiction had been a stream of novels from students of 
creative writing and postmodernism, many of them ‘tricksy and unsubstantial’” (Wyndam 
76). Modjeska’s comments are suggestive that there is no clear or singular factor that is   184
influential on the development of writings that explore the space between. Muecke and 
Gibbs have both argued for the influence of creative writing programs in Australian 
universities on the development of ficto-criticism,
63 yet according to Modjeska the “tricksy 
and unsubstantial” fiction coming from creative writing graduates has helped initiate the 
interest in literary non-fiction (ficto-criticism). In other words, postmodernism is not the 
only culprit in producing ficto-critical texts. However, despite these contradictions around 
influences, the one thing that most ficto-critical forms of writing have in common is a 
desire to creatively explore what is at the margin: to tell a different story and to tell it 
differently. It is a search for new narratives, and signals the exhaustion of established 
stories and their generic forms. Writer Gail Jones, for example, explores what is left out of 
official discourses in both her ficto-critical academic work, discussed earlier, and her ficto-
critical fiction. Jones explains how her collection of short stories, Fetish Lives, came 
about: “A lot of the stories in Fetish Lives arose from a kind of interrogation of the 
orthodox version [of history and biography] and an attempt to reconstruct what seemed to 
me to have been pegged to the margin” (Interview with Mair 18). Jones’ collection 
explores odd details left unexplored from famous figures of history through historiographic 
metafiction. She states, “my style of writing is one that doesn’t pretend to be fact. It 
actually draws attention to artifice all the time and the fact that history is also an artifice of 
narrative . . .” (Interview with Mair 18). Like Jones’ Fetish Lives, Modjeska’s books 
Poppy (1990) and The Orchard (1994) also weave fact and fiction. Her books are fiction, 
but include footnotes. Interestingly, Modjeska’s writing has been described by Brenda 
Walker “as that which includes speculativeness, erudition and the techniques of the essay;” 
evoking the critical nature of her work (7). In an interview with Bronwyn Rivers in 
Meanjin Modjeska—also an academic—discusses her pull away from the Logos world of 
the father towards a “kind of inner, less logical, less rational voice” (320). According to 
her:  
One of the characterisitics of women’s writing is that you’re always having to deal 
with that non-universality, with writing out of the third term . . . Where are you 
speaking from? How do you look without being looked at? How do you look while   185
being looked at? . . .I think women are forced, by their very nature and by the 
culture, to address those sorts of issues in a way that men don’t have to. (322) 
Modjeska’s reference here to women’s nature as the impetus for them to be self-reflexive 
is problematic. However, her identification with woman’s position within patriarchal 
culture reinforces what has been demonstrated by this chapter: her acknowledgment of the 
cultural placement of women as minoritarian in relation to the man-standard helps explain 
why women have employed, and are employing, ficto-critical modes. In Poppy, for 
example, a biography of her mother, Modjeska is forced to make things up to fill the gaps 
where information didn’t exist. She describes the shift from the historian’s “rather stitched-
up, academic voice, always trying to prove something,” to a more conversational dialogic 
voice as liberating (320). Similarly, experimental writer Ania Walwicz speaks of the same 
frustration with the limited critical voice within the academy. This is a frustration with the 
molar lines of institutionalised guides and rules for writing and being: 
The formal essay. You must do a formal essay now. The mode. The presentation. 
The guide. The guide will guide you now. The formal essay, the quotation. The 
neoclassical emphasis on unity, continuity and linearity. The book that speaks to 
books now. I enter a formal essay now. I do my debut. The entry. I wear a pink 
dress now. The docile body of the institutionalized student. The docile body of the 
institutionalized subject. (“No, No, No—The Reluctant Debutante” 335). 
According to Walwicz, in the academy: “You can write a poem but you can’t write a 
personalized essay, not yet. No, no, no. Daddy tells me” (“No, No, No—The Reluctant 
Debutante” 336). Walwicz’s reference to the power of Daddy within the academy and the 
docile body of the institutionialised  student gendered feminine (in a pink dress) again 
reconfirms the ficto-critical flight as a line of becoming-woman. Not surprisingly, ficto-
critical tendencies are often evident in works by creative writers who are resistant to the 
powers of the critics, who often limit the possible interpretation of a creative work with 
their rational voice from on high.
64 Walwicz, for example, has written that she is 
uncomfortable with the way the critic objectifies both the writer and their texts, and wishes 
to avoid being limited to one category or position (Walwicz, Interview with Jenny Digby   186
835-6). Instead, she includes literary theory in her creative works and appropriates the 
critic’s role: “I become the critic in red roses, and actually comment on my work right 
there inside the book” (836). Reacting to the violence enacted on her texts by the literary 
critic, Walwicz challenges their right to speak with authority over her texts. 
 
conclusion 
In Australia and internationally there seems to be an increasing trend toward writing-
between fact and fiction as a way to explore the stories and histories left out of the official 
or molar narratives of historical fact, and to write back to those who determine the stories 
that get heard by undermining the chief generic form that helps them construct their point 
of view. Ficto-criticism strategically employs its generically transformative style to 
interrogate the binaries that inform systems of domination, such as patriarchy, colonisation 
and racism. In ficto-critical texts the form is not just the vehicle for the story; the form is 
part of the message. The ficto-critical shift can, therefore, be conceptualised in terms of a 
resistance to institutionalised knowledges and the genres that inform them. If ficto-
criticism can be thought of as a genre it can only be done in so much as what it resists.  
 
By inducing the reader to question meaning and meaning production through disrupting 
generic expectations, ficto-critical texts thus undermine the systems that inform fixed 
territories of knowledge that exclude difference, what is understood in this generic context 
as excess. As already established, the inclusion of the other in academic writing 
destabilises the authority of the academy. Yet, as the dominance of Muecke and King in 
Australian ficto-criticism suggests, ficto-criticism risks manifesting as a false refuge—a 
simulation of becoming—unless its movement at a micro political level actualises a line of 
flight. Escape can never be guaranteed, which is why a case-by-case approach must be 
undertaken. This theme will be engaged with in the final chapter where I argue that ficto-
critical writers must risk themselves—not just the other—if they are to fully embrace ficto-
criticism as a political tool, a way to self-reflexively explore the violence of representation. 
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1 The use of “ficto-criticism” in Canada will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
2 The upcoming 2003 Australian Association of Writing Programs conference titled “Negotiations: Writing, 
the Academy, and Publishing” suggests that the term ficto-criticism is still very much in circulation. Several 
of the abstracts listed on the University of New South Wales website address ficto-criticism. The conference 
is due to be held from 27
th November to 30
th 2003 at the University of New South Wales. Online. Google. 17 
Nov 2003.  Recent issues of Cultural Studies Review (formerly UTS Review) also include papers that address 
ficto-criticism.  
3 See the debate in TEXT , specifically Muecke’s letter to the Editor in 4.1, 2000. He asks: “Anyone know 
what happened to ‘fictocriticism’ as a name for this [Creative Non Fiction] kind of writing; would have 
thought it was a candidate, given it is an Australian label . . .” www.gu.edu.au/school/art/text/. For an outline 
of creative non from an Australian context see the interview by Donna Lee Brien with Lee Gutkind 
published in TEXT 4.1, 2000. The interview is titled “Creative Nonfiction: A virtual conversation with Lee 
Gutkind.” http://www.gu.edu.au/school/art/text/april00/gutkind.htm 
4 See Rosalind Krauss’The Optical Unconscious (1993) as an example of paracritical writing. Krauss mixes 
theory, personal detail and critical insight in this book, which addresses the tradition of modernist art 
criticism and its role in limiting what constituted modern art. 
5 In the recent Key Concepts in Literary Theory  by Wolfreys, Robbins and Womack, the section dealing 
with postmodernism states: “Subsequently in the late 1970s and 1980s postmodernism became confused with 
the equally vague term poststructuralism, particularly the alleged emphasis on the part of the latter 
phenomenon with textuality and play” (2001: 128). 
6 Barthes positioning as a poststructuralist is based on his later works since his earlier work is unashamedly 
structuralist. His later book Roland Barthes (1995), for example, is ficto-critical as it is autobiographical, 
personal, critical and theoretical. In fact, the texts that Krauss’ refers to in her paper include his later works 
such as, Roland Barthes, A Lover’s Discourse and The Pleasure of the Text (1986: 292). 
7 Derrida comes from a very different philosophical background from Barthes. Derrida’s work constitutes a 
more rigorous critique (deconstruction) of Western metaphysics. 
8 Some ficto-criticism can, however, be just as difficult—just as dense—as the work of Joyce and Faulkner. 
This is particularly so for those readers not familiar with academic language and references. Many reviews of 
ficto-critical texts critique them for being filled with jargon, “sometimes sacrificing clarity.” See Kristen 
Henry’s review of W/EDGE in TEXT, April 1997. www.gu.edu.au/school/art/text/ 
9 Scott Brook says “it’s no secret FC [ficto-criticism] was first employed in Australia in Stephen Muecke and 
Noel King’s 1991 ABR essay-review” (2003: 10). 
10 Muecke was not, however, using the term in relation to his work at the time of the publication of Reading 
the Country.  
11 “Signature” attached to an email received from Muecke, March 2002. 
12 Online. Google. 11 April 2002. 
13 Christopher Hill also had difficulty finding references to Australian ficto-criticism. For example, in his 
paper“On Ficto-Criticism: A Reading for a Writers Festival” [sic] he states he has difficulty finding 
published articles on ficto-criticism (1997). 
14 Robb cites King’s “My Life Without Steve: Postmodernism, Ficto-Criticism, and the Paraliterary” in 
“Academic Divination” (1996: 98). Heather Kerr in “Ficto-criticism, ‘The Doubtful Category’” cites two of 
King’s papers: “My Life Without Steve: Postmodernism, Ficto-criticism and the Paraliterary” and 
“Occasional Doubts: Ian Hunter’s Genealogy of Interpretative Depth” (1996). 
15 See my review of The Space Between, “Situation Occupied in The Space Between.” Here I argue that the 
emphasis in the introduction to this book on postmodernism and poststructuralism tends to dilute the 
influence of women and feminism on this form, despite it being a collection by women.  For example, 
Nettelbeck says in the introduction to The Space Between: “It is here, at the intersection of literature and 
postmodernism, that fictocriticism appears as an increasingly familiar form” (1998: 3). 
16 This was to be published by Wakefield Press in 1996. Online. Yahoo. 3 March 1997. 
17 By “publishing successes” I am not intending to suggest that academic publishing is successful in a 
commercial sense, but a sense of discovery, and newness (of having to be up to date with new developments) 
helps generate interest and sales in academic publishing. Similarly, notions of originality are central to 
academic research and writing. Ficto-criticism, whilst portrayed as “new,” is not necessarily commercially or 
academically viable (as many of the critiques demonstrate) as it breaks with generic convention and readers’ 
expectations. 
18 Australians Leslie Stern and Lucy Sussex, teaching and/or publishing in the United States, and writing 
ficto-critically, have contributed to the term’s arrival there.  I’m assuming that their use of the term stems 
from its wide spread application in Australia. In 1997 Lucy Sussex published a piece of ficto-criticism in SF   188
                                                                                                                           
Eye, an American science fiction journal. In the article Sussex uses “fictocriticism” and “ficto-biography” to 
describe her style of writing. Leslie Stern’s The Scorsese Connection (1995) has been described as ficto-
criticism. See Adrian Martin’s review “Call It Scorsese” in UTS Review.  Martin is less than complimentary 
of ficto-criticism (the term); he says: “an ugly but unavoidable term” (1997: 219). Stern’s more recent 
publication, The Smoking Book (1999) is also ficto-critical and was described as such in reviews. Stern was a 
visiting scholar at the Getty Research Institute in 1998. During this time she gave lectures that employed the 
term. Notably, Stern published in No Substitute. In other words, she was involved with the early writing 
group that Muecke and King identify in their paper “On Ficto-Criticism” as helping contribute to the 
development of ficto-critical writing. In 1998 Marilynn K. Loveless, then from Griffith University, delivered 
an interactive workshop on William Shakespeare’s work titled: “Deconstructing Willy: Ficto-criticism and 
Other Strategies of Dissent,” at Texas A&M University. Her presentation was part of an Interdisciplinary 
Conference on Language and Literature, hosted by the English Graduate Student Association (Online. 
Infoseek. 12 December 1998). 
19 Online. Yahoo. 3 Feb. 1997. This journal didn’t, however, seem to get off the ground.  
20 Online. Excite. 19 Sep. 1997. Ngapartji has ficto-criticism listed as a “genre.” Heather Kerr and Moya 
Costello have both published in Ngapartji’s Reading Room:“dream mother” by Kerr, and “Head Girls and 
Helen Garner’s Women” by Costello. 
21 Recently, the journal Imperium has begun to advertise online for ficto-critical submissions. Imperium is 
based at the University of Luton, England. This suggests that the term is now being used more widely, not 
just in Australia and Canada. 
22 Online. Google. 16 April 2002. See also volume 8.2 of antiTHESIS for an example of writing identified as 
ficto-criticism, Keith Ansell-Pearson’s “Poison: (Scrambled Extracts From a Viroid Life).” 
23 Online. Google. 14 April 2002. 
24 See Mairead Phillips’ ficto-critical meditation on Goddard’s film Vivre Sa Vie published in October 2001 
by Senses of Cinema. Online. Google. 16 April 2002. 
25 Online. Web Ferret. 15 May 1999. 
26 Online. Hotbot. 11 Dec. 2000. Wendy Waring and J Biddle are listed as the course coordinators. 
27 Online. Google. 16 April 2002.  
28 See Amanda Nettelbeck’s 2000 Honours seminar titled “Life Narratives: Autobiography, Oral History, 
Fictocriticism.” Online. Google. 14 April 2002. In the 2003 on-line handbook for UTS, “Ficto-critical 
Writing” is advertised as one of their units (Google. 15 Jan 2003). 
29 Muecke also comes up periodically when searching for “ficto-criticism” on the internet. For example, in 
the online version of Real Time, a free cultural review publication based in Adelaide, he was interviewed by 
Annemarie Lopez. In the interview he discusses his writing practice, pedagogy and ficto-criticism. Real Time 
has also published reviews that are ficto-critical. For example, see Linda Marie Walker’s review of Oraculos.  
Linda Marie Walker’s work has been identified by Adrian Martin as ficto-criticism (see his review of 
Sterne’s Scorsese Connection). Walker was involved with Paul Hewson with the online journals Parallel 
Gallery and Journal and G.A.P: Grievous. Angel. Press. These journals included a number of ficto-critical 
works (not identified as such but clearly ficto-critical) by Jyanni Steffensen, Brenda Ludeman, Simon Robb, 
Linda Marie Walker, Michael Tawa, David Broker and others. Last updated in November 1995 these 
journals appear to no longer be current. Online. Yahoo. 25 September 1997. 
30 Online. Excite. 18 April. 1997. 
31 Online. Excite. 19 Sept 1997. 
32 Online. Excite. 14 Jan 1998. 
33 Online. Excite. 14 Jan 1998. 
34 Online. Yahoo. 21 Sept 1998. 
35 Several continue to list ficto-criticism as an area of research interest, for example, Anne Brewster. 
36 See, for example, “Carolyn Eskdale: The Fabric of Fiction.” This is a creative review of Eskdale’s work. 
Also, her essay accompanying Carolyn Lewen’s exhibition “Countenance” at the Centre for Contemporary 
Photography in Melbourne also describes itself as ficto-critical. Online. Excite. 15 Nov 1997. 
37 See Owen Richardson’s review in The Weekend Australian and Jenny Pausacker’s brief commentary in 
The Age (1997). 
38 As Deleuze and Guattari state: “It is not a matter of saying that Oedipus is a false belief, but rather that 
belief is necessarily something false that diverts and suffocates effective production.” (1983: 107). 
39 Still, as Deleuze and Guattari also warn, you must not confuse minoritarian with becoming. 
40 Deleuze and Guattari, for example, state: “The Women’s Liberation movements are correct in saying: We 
are not castrated, so you get fucked” (1997: 61).   189
                                                                                                                           
41 Paul Dawson, in a recent article in Westerly, discusses the development of ficto-criticism in Australia 
(2002: 139-51). He acknowledges feminist influence on ficto-criticism, but spends much of the paper on 
Muecke and King and overall tends to fall back to postmodernism as an explanation or frame for the 
practice. He states, “[i]t is now possible to argue that fictocriticism is a textual space for the postmodern 
writer-critic. . . “ (2002: 148). 
42 See Changing Subjects: The Making of Feminist Literary Criticism (1993), Between Women: Biographers, 
Novelists, Critics, Teachers and Artists Write About Their Work on Women (1984), to name only two 
examples. One could, of course, look to much earlier feminist texts. Virginia Woolf’s essays, for example, 
have much in common with autobiographical criticism in its current form.  See Elsie F. Mayer’s “Literary 
Criticism with a Human Face: Virginia Woolf and The Common Reader” in Private Voices, Public Lives 
edited by Nancy Owen Nelson, where Mayer makes this connection.  
43 Layout as the original. 
44 See, for example, Melody Graulich’s highly personal essay “Somebody Must Say These Things: An Essay 
for My Mother,” in which she begins with: “ I have opened this essay with a conversation long established in 
feminist criticism, the personal voice, not simply to establish my relationship to my subject but because the 
engagement between critic and subject and how it shapes both reader and text is my subject” (1993: 176). 
45 Ross, however, misses one very important indicator of minoritarian status (as a challenge from “outside” 
to institutional authority): race. Significantly, it is often those excluded from major literatures, on the grounds 
that they will destabilise authority, who are choosing to write ficto-critically. 
46 Ficto-criticism is often a style of writing employed by students. Honours theses, Masters and PhDs are 
being written ficto-critically, or, at least, will contain a ficto-critical element. See Antonina Yvette Lewis’ 
ficto-critical Honours thesis from Griffith University and work by Rae Luckie, for example “Notes towards a 
fictocritical exegesis,” which was presented at the 1999 Association Australian Writing Programs 
Conference, Perth, Western Australia. Cassandra Lee Atherton completed her MA thesis at the University of 
Melbourne in 1998 titled “Crush: A Creative Exploration of the Lolita Complex.”  Sylvia Martin, who 
reviewed The Space Between for Australian Women’s Book Review, is working on her PhD in women’s 
studies at Griffith University. She is working in ‘the space between’ academic and creative writing. 
Anthologies publishing the work of creative writing students will also include ficto-criticism. See 
publications such as The Naked Eye from Curtin University, for example.  
47 In a 1997 examination for 9639 Honours English at the University of Adelaide the examination paper 
titled “Studies in the Essay: Poststructuralist Writing,” asks students of discuss what kind of essay writing 
characterises a number of terms including ficto-criticism. Significantly, after the term there are a number of 
writers listed in brackets. All men, they include Jameson, Muecke, and Hodge and McHoul (presumably due 
to their 1992 paper “The Politics of Text and Commentary” where they identify Muecke’s co-authored 
Reading the Country as ficto-critical).  Google. 17 Nov 2003. 
48 Notably, Murdoch University was during this time a place where such experimentation was being 
encouraged. Despite this, I believe the experience Hill describes of the women feeling somewhat alien to the 
reified environment of the University holds true. 
49 Mary Fallon along with Anna Gibbs, Beth Spencer and Linda Marie Walker are identified as ficto-critical 
writers by Adrian Martin in his review (titled “Call It Scorsese”) of Lesley Stern’s book The Scorsese 
Connection  (1997: 219).  
50 Gibbs, in her history of ficto-criticism, however, makes reference to a publication that does not exist. 
There was no special issue on ficto-criticism by Westerly. This reference to a non-existent publication further 
muddies the history of ficto-criticism and adds to its “less than rigorous” reputation. 
51 As another example of the tendency in Australian ficto-critical discourse to limit influences to Barthes and 
Derrida (and post-structuralism) see Paul Dawson’s “What is a Literary Intellectual? Creative Writing and 
the New Humanities.” Dawson states: “Yet post-structuralist theory deriving from work of Barthes and 
Derrida (regularly cited as influences on fictocriticism) has been castigated for its introspective self-
reflexivity and political quietude” (2003: 35).  
52 In the introduction to Confession of the Critics, Veeser signals the influence of écriture feminine on 
autobiographical criticism in the United States (1996: xiv). 
53 See also Moorhead’s “Miss Marple Goes to Ayers Rock: A Performed Reading.” This piece is also ficto-
critical, creatively critiquing the media’s role in the Lindy Chamberlin case. The piece, designed for 
performance, includes a lecture from Miss Marple, prose, poetry, lists and a diagram. Evoking the detective 
genre, this performative essay self-reflexively plays on the notion of truth suggesting that all truth may be 
fictional and contingent.    190
                                                                                                                           
54 For another early example of writing by Moorhead which is ficto-critical see “The Landscape of the Egg” 
published in Difference: Writings By Women (1985). This anthology contains work by poet-critic Audrey 
Lorde.  
55 Lyotard’s notion of “the jews” discussed in Heidegger and “the jews” holds some interconnections with 
the Deleuzian concept of becoming. Like Deleuze and Guattari, Lyotard makes the distinction between Jews 
as a people and “the jews.” “the jews” does not represent a nation, or a political, religious or philosophical 
figure, but rather what they come to represent in relation to (and in) dominant Western thought: radical 
alterity. Like becoming-woman, “the jews” is a concept determined through its relation to dominant 
standards. Plural, in lower case and quotation marks it represents those outside—those who must be removed 
or excised—and this is not limited to Jews alone. As radical alterity the concept of “the jews” suggests a 
becoming which is then blocked and repressed. In this quotation from Deleuze and Guattari, however, they 
are making a distinction between a minority group (like Jews) and a becoming. One does not guarantee the 
other. Merely being part of a minority does not mean one is deterritorialised. 
56 Gail Jones in her review of Jamming the Machinery describes the work as ficto-criticism, and 
congratulates the Association for the Study of Australian Literature for publishing Bartlett’s book, as “so 
brave an endorsement of the principle of creative disruption” (1998/99: 31). Jones also states on the risks 
involved in writing ficto-critically that: “This audacity of mode signals a welcome expansion of the 
possibilities of academic writing, and its theoretical confidence, evident above all in performative gestures, 
reminds us that critical renewals and appropriations require both gumption and assertiveness” (1998/99: 30). 
57 Instead Muecke’s book was promoted as travel writing. This was a decision deliberately taken, as it was 
feared that labelling No Road ficto-criticism might limit its sales. However, despite often being reviewed as 
ficto-criticism No Road was (for a small publisher like FACP) a reasonable success. In the “Gleebooks 
Gleaner” (newsletter for the famous Sydney bookshop Gleebooks) of May 1997, No Road was listed as their 
fifth best seller in the category of literature. For examples of reviews that use ficto-criticism, see Owen 
Richardson’s review in The Weekend Australian and McKenzie Wark’s in The Australian, both apply the 
term to Muecke’s No Road (1997). See the Works Cited for details. 
58 Incidentally, Brien is a proponent of the label creative nonfiction in Australia. See her paper “The Place 
Where the Real and the Imagined Coincides” in TEXT (2000). 
59 Interestingly, this paragraph is suggestive of some ambiguity on White’s narrator’s part about completely 
facing the implications of her unquestioning acceptance of this myth. For example, there is some slippage 
between the “blacks” having some agency and being wholly marked by the process of colonisation. In one 
part of the section quoted the “blacks” “take” the names of their white bosses. This is followed by an 
assertion that the “blacks” are marked as the property of their colonisers. This ambiguity makes the 
confession less meaningful, watering down the violence of colonisation. It is almost as if the narrator wants 
to hold onto the myth of paternal ownership instead of the reality of sexual abuse and rape. This is especially 
true since the following admission, that people believed the lesser explanation, is made in third person: “And 
people believed it.” The narrator, with this statement, distances herself from her culpability in maintaining 
the myth. At the same time it rings with an embarrassed guilty tone (I believed it too). 
60 In his first novel, True Country, Scott explores a landscape populated by similar issues. 
61 Nyoongar  (alternatively spelt Nyungah) represents the Aboriginal peoples of the South West of Western 
Australia. 
62 See Anna Haebich’s For Their Own Good: Aborigines and Government in the Southwest of Western 
Australia 1900-9140 (1988).  
63 See Gibbs’ “Bodies of Words” (1997) and Muecke’s  interview with Annemarie Lopez in “Changing 
Narratives, Transforming Worlds” (1997). 
64 According to Kevin Brophy, factional or ficto-critical writing has defused some of the tensions between 
creative writing and critical-theoretical texts (1998: 228).    191
chapter five 
Becoming-minoritarian:  
Canadian ficto-criticism 
 
Movement always happens behind the thinker’s back, or in the moment when he 
blinks. Getting out is already achieved, or else it never will be. Questions are generally 
aimed at a future (or a past). The future of women, the future of the revolution, the 
future of philosophy, etc. But during this time, while you turn in circles among these 
questions, there are becomings which are silently at work, which are almost 
imperceptible. We think too much in terms of history, whether personal or universal. 
(Deleuze and Parnet 2). 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter Four I argued that rather than replicate the mastery of normative academic work 
ficto-criticism must imitate the movement of becoming to maintain its revolutionary potential 
and relevance. This must occur at both the level of its conception and in its practice. I 
illustrated the contradictions inherent in limiting the form through the identification and 
discovery of an Australian ficto-critical movement with key proponents, codes and 
conventions all bound together with (the construction of) an original document (Muecke and 
King’s “On Ficto-Criticism”). Notably—and antithetical to the political intent of ficto-
criticism—this origin is imbued with a narrative of mastery consistent with dominant modes of 
academic research and writing. By illustrating the less documented stories of Australian ficto-
criticism by women I linked their social and cultural position with their desire to write ficto-
critically, as a practice of becoming-woman. By writing ficto-critically those at the margin can 
strategically undermine the power of academic writing—as the pinnacle of non-fiction 
(truth)—which excludes and/or misrepresents them and their experience. In this chapter I 
extend this argument by continuing to map the genealogy of the term. As I argue, “ficto-  192
criticism” originated in Canada rather than Australia and, significantly, was the direct result of 
a writer’s highly radical and experimental practice. Given her nomadic style, the author of this 
ficto-critical practice, Jeanne Randolph, is both largely unknown in Canada and unheard of in 
the official discourse of Australian ficto-criticism.  
 
Closely following the structure and theme of the last chapter, I thus begin Chapter Five 
discussing the ficto-criticism of Jeanne Randolph and the context from which the term 
emerged. Firstly, I demonstrate the process through which her ficto-critical practice has been 
overlooked in Australia, despite her work being the impetus for the development of the term 
and the explanation for its arrival in Australia. Secondly, I argue that whilst she is (indirectly) 
responsible for the emergence of ficto-criticism as an identifiable Australian practice, she 
remains absent from that discourse as her ficto-critical work is highly deterritorialised. 
Randolph’s lack of presence in the discourse of ficto-criticism in Australia illustrates the 
incompatibility of becoming-woman and the academy, and mirrors the experience of many 
women Australian practitioners. In Canada, on the contrary, while her work also remains 
marginalised, it is, however, starting to attract some critical attention and this is largely due to 
an increasing interest in ficto-critical practice internationally. As suggested above, the story of 
Canadian ficto-critical writing may be very different from its Australian counterpart, yet there 
appear to be some very startling intersections that strongly reinforce one of the main 
propositions of this thesis: that ficto-criticism, either in its Australian or Canadian expression, 
is a specific literary intervention; a political practice that interrogates the power of 
representation and interpretative value.  
 
Thirdly, after examining the writing by Randolph that inspired the term, and briefly exposing 
how it was exported to Australia, I discuss the work of Aritha van Herk, another key Canadian 
writer who uses the term to describe her writing. In this context, I argue that van Herk’s 
adoption of a ficto-critical practice was—like Muecke’s Australian ficto-criticism—influenced   193
by the work of Jeanne Randolph. Finally, I examine in relatively less detail a diverse selection 
of Canadian authors, writing both in English and French (in which case I study the texts in 
English translation) who employ the tropes of ficto-criticism. Most importantly, I examine the 
Québecoise writer Nicole Brossard whose practice, I argue, has heavily influenced Canadian 
creative-critical writing. However, the decision to sample a wide range of Canadian texts is a 
deliberate strategy intended to reflect the fact that ficto-criticism is both an open, labile generic 
space between and a practice increasingly prolific and visible in a growing range of contexts. 
Furthermore, this analysis of varied examples underwrites the assertion put forward in the 
previous chapter that ficto-criticism is a form wrought out of the conflict over difference and 
minoritarian politics. As a result, Canadian feminist writing is prominent in this chapter, as is 
the work of many writers of colour. These writers, I argue, employ ficto-criticism as a political 
tool, as they are concerned with the critique of critical writing.  This critical practice, in fact, 
exposes the violence of representation that is normalised through the language, genre and style 
of rational academic discourse. 
 
Who Killed Jeanne Randolph? 
(Canadian) ficto-criticism  
and how  it arrived in Australia 
As already established in Chapter Four, the references in the published ficto-critical discourse 
in Australia suggest that the term is Muecke and King’s. As discussed in “On Ficto-Criticism” 
Muecke and King cite an interview with Jameson made in 1987, where he states that there has 
been a flowing together of theory and criticism. However, what Muecke and King fail to make 
explicit to their readers is that the term is actually used in the published interview with 
Jameson. Significantly, the citation from Jameson that they reproduce leaves out the sentence 
“‘Ficto-criticism’ makes a lot of sense to me” (9). In fact, this sentence precedes the section 
they quote.
1 As a result, by neglecting to include the sentence where Jameson uses the term 
prior to describing what creative-criticism might be, Muecke and King’s paper implies that   194
“ficto-criticism” is their own term. What is significant about this editorial decision (or 
oversight) is that unless you read the original interview with Jameson, it really appears that 
Jameson is quoted to merely affirm Muecke and King’s conceptualisation of a “new” practice 
that they have already identified. Contrary to what Muecke and King would have us think (or 
believe) the writing that caused the emergence of this term comes neither from Muecke and 
King nor from Jameson but from an obscure cultural critic based in Toronto named Jeanne 
Randolph. Indeed, the Jameson interview that Muecke and King quote from was published in 
Impulse, a visual arts journal based in Toronto. A quick scan of the text of this interview 
shows that it is the interviewer Andrea Ward who introduces the term rather than Jameson. 
Ward’s familiarity with the ficto-criticism can be explained by the fact that she was a student 
at the Ontario Centre for Arts (OCA), where Randolph was a teacher, and that several years 
prior to Ward’s interview with Jameson Randolph’s writing on local visual arts had already 
been described as ficto-critical. In other words, the term was already in circulation in Canada 
and Jameson was merely responding to a question that made reference to it. In her interview 
Ward also leads the discussion toward conceptualising ficto-criticism as an attempt to address 
what she describes as the corrective power of criticism.
 2 The genealogy of the term is 
significant as argued in Chapter Four, as ficto-criticism must characterise becoming in order to 
achieve its political work. Therefore, Randolph’s invisibility in the Australian discourse on 
ficto-criticism reveals her practice as a becoming silently at work, that is, as a movement 
toward becoming-imperceptible.  
 
Randolph is a psychiatrist and cultural theorist who had been writing ficto-criticism on the 
visual arts in Canada since the late 1970s. Her ficto-critique has as its main target the binary 
structures that inform the mainstays of critical writing; her work constitutes an attack on 
authority, judgement, and legitimacy. As Randolph states: 
My entire writing production has been to argue against the rhetoric propelled by setting 
up dualities (binary thinking) in which topics being explored are analysed by   195
perpetuating categories explicitly or implicitly, such as “bad” vs “good,” “authentic” vs 
“phoney,” indeed “nature” vs “culture.” (qutd. in McGregor 55).  
Two collections of Randolph’s writings illustrate her commitment to unravelling binary 
systems: Psychoanalysis and Synchronized Swimming (1991) and Symbolization and its 
Discontents (1997), both published by the artists’ collective based in Toronto, YYZ Books.
3 
These texts contain many examples of ficto-criticism in the characteristic style of Randolph. 
With titles such as: “Truth Disguised as Lie,” “The Predicament of Meaning,” and “Sleepy 
Time Tales,” these ficto-critical works are playful, creative-critical texts that engage so 
subjectively with the artwork in question that they make a mockery of normative art criticism, 
and indeed any form of critical, interpretative writing. Randolph does not just combine 
elements of fiction and non-fiction, such as autobiographical criticism and experimental 
writing, but also breaks the rules of citation and sense. Randolph’s highly provocative work is 
located on the extreme edge of ficto-critical discourse for breaking down traditional critical 
writing into virtual nonsense.
 For example, one critic has described her writing as ambiguous, 
wilfully duplicitous and often difficult to decipher, arguing, “one is forced [when reading her 
work] to settle for guesses”
 (McGregor 56).
 4 
 
As a psychiatrist Randolph developed her ficto-critical theory of writing on the visual arts 
based on the psychoanalytic object relations theories of D.W. Winnicott, particularly his book 
Playing and Reality. Although Randolph writes on the visual arts, her concerns relating to the 
tradition of modernist art criticism echoe the concerns of literary and cultural critics, as well as 
fiction writers, who write performatively and self-reflexively between fiction and non-fiction. 
Her affirmation of a ficto-critical practice, outlined in her paper “The Amenable Object” and 
first published in the Toronto art journal Vanguard in 1983, interrogates Freud’s 
conceptualisation of “Art-as-Neurosis.”
  Instead of a Freudian understanding of art as a 
symptom in need of an interpretative cure, according to Randolph’s reading of Winnicott, art 
is a mix of both subjective and objective experiential responses (30). Randolph argues that   196
Winnicott’s conceptualisation of art “raises the possibility that in art it is the ambiguity 
between the objective and subjective that gives an artwork a unique psychological validity” 
(26). Instead of the art object as a symptom of neurosis, that is a sublimated communication 
from the artist’s unconscious, the creative impulse is an act of play: an “adaptive relationship 
with the mysterious world” (30). Obviously the product of this adaptive relationship does not 
remain static, but changes depending on, firstly, its context and, secondly, the subjective 
experience of both the producer and viewer of the artwork. It is in this ambiguous space 
between the objective and the subjective that the art critic might imagine a mode of writing 
about art as a way to link the intellect with the senses. As Randolph suggests: “Like the soles 
of the feet curved gently upon the contours of the brow, the intellect must be limbered until it 
can reach around to meet the heart, gut and spleen” (21). The viewer’s subjectivity, therefore, 
comes into play, as the artwork becomes the amenable object, informed and in a sense 
reproduced by the viewer’s experience. Randolph describes this process as “systematic 
subjectivity,” a notion of subjectivity that echoes Guattari’s autopoesis. Here both the viewer 
and artist interact subjectively and productively with the artwork. As the following quote from 
Randolph’s “Amenable Object” illustrates, the subjectivity she imagines is not fixed, nor is the 
meaning of the artwork. Subsequently it cannot be limited by one interpretative key: 
Reshaping Winnicott’s theory to the aims of art criticism allows a way to interact with 
the artwork as an intentional revelation of the artist’s version of experience, 
intentionality that need neither be explicit or disguised. Unlike art-as-neurosis, this is 
not a theoretical model of an artwork from the purportedly objective view of someone 
who wants to study how the artist creates it. This is a view of the art object once the 
artist has left it in public. (31) 
Randolph’s “The Amenable Object” works as her ficto-critical “manifesto.”  Randolph, 
however, does not use the term here and although from the late 1970s she had been writing art 
criticism in the style of ficto-criticism, it was not until the early 1980s that the term appears in 
print, applied to her work by Bruce Grenville. In 1986 Grenville, in a discussion of art   197
criticism in Canada, published an article that argues for an alternative critical practice: ficto-
criticism. This is the first published reference to the term that I have been able to locate. In it 
he identifies Randolph’s work as an example of writing that perverts traditional art criticism. 
According to Grenville: 
We can no longer support the notion of art criticism as an authoritative text which 
reveals the meaning and establishes the legitimacy of an artwork to a submissive 
audience. Nor can we look to criticism as a qualitative judgement handed down from 
above. Instead, it must be recognised as a form of speculative fiction. (15) 
Grenville goes on to discuss Randolph’s critical work as “speculative fiction,” arguing that her 
inclusion of a number of critical voices breaks down the dominant authoritative critical voice. 
He adds that her self-reflexive proposition that her writing is fiction undermines any claims to 
authority or legitimation. Grenville further argues: “she has developed a form of writing which 
might best be described as ‘ficto-criticism’” (“Art Criticism in Canada” 15).
 5 In a later article 
Grenville revisits Randolph’s ficto-criticism, stating that it “offers the clearest instance of an 
intervention into modernist critical practice” (56). Appropriately titled “Lines of Flight” this 
article reflects the synergies between Deleuzian thought and ficto-criticism and again argues 
for an alternative critical practice to “project us into a line of flight from the binary machine 
and its will-to-truth” (58).
6 
 
Difficult to describe, Randolph’s ficto-criticism often appears as collage, sometimes with 
personal reference, but most often it is confronting and confusing, leaving the reader grappling 
with meaning. One text, which gives an indication of the polyvalent nature of her work, is the 
piece “Mincemeat—A Recipe for Disaster.” Originally published as the introductory essay for 
an exhibition titled “Verge: Sheila Ayearst” in 1990, “Mincemeat” can be read as a critique of 
traditional (art) criticism. Instead of a key to the works on display—a framework or reference 
point for the viewer—Randolph inverts and parodies the expert art critic’s role by presenting 
us with a detailed recipe for mincemeat. On the one hand, she diminishes or reduces the act of   198
art criticism to the feminised world of cooking: who is, after all, traditionally expected to cook 
at Christmas? On the other hand, she reclaims its importance by appropriating the voice of an 
expert, in this case the voice of the food historian, by including historical, folkloric and 
popular information on the ingredients and the dish itself. This kind of double-sided-ness or 
ambiguity is common throughout “Mincemeat” and other ficto-critical works by Randolph. By 
using the (pompous) tone of the expert’s voice, yet peppering the text with untruths or fictions, 
the mincemeat recipe challenges traditional art criticism that dissects the work to reveal its 
secrets for the passive and uninformed viewing audience. There is no discussion here on the 
compositional meaning of Ayearst’s brush strokes, nor are there any historical references to 
earlier works of art as a frame. Instead, the reader of this exhibition catalogue gets a bizarre 
cooking lesson: 
Combine a quarter pound of each of dried, candied, chopped citron, orange and lemon 
peel. Combining ingredients and submitting them to culinary technique is a venture 
that emboldens the cook, for she savours the process of accidents and cunning from 
which results the concoction that, when presented to the dinner guest, confounds the 
distinction between material and immaterial, between physical sensation and figurative 
effect. There exists of course no recipe the realization of which does not permit 
additions or substitutions of ingredients to heighten or perturb either the nutritive or 
evocative power of the dish. Accordingly, you may wish herein to substitute candied 
kumquat for the citron. Kumquats once grew profusely along the sand dunes of Spain’s 
Mediterranean coast. (Psychoanalysis and Synchronized Swimming 109) 
This passage—in the context of an exhibition catalogue—highlights the metacritical aspect of 
Randolph’s work. There are enough elements and terms in “Mincemeat” that suggest it is 
about the artwork, such as, “material and immaterial” and “figurative.” At the same time it is a 
confusing treatise on the ingredients and recipe for mincemeat, full of contradictions and 
slippery half-truths. For example, the authoritative and expert tone of the narrator is 
undermined by statements such as the one referring to kumquats growing “along the sand   199
dunes of Spain’s Mediterranean coast.” The reference to the exotic Mediterranean and the tone 
and language are convincing despite the fact that, when reading the sentence, one begins to 
wonder what kind of citrus tree would survive in the coastal conditions suggested by sand 
dunes. In fact, kumquats originated from China, not Spain as the sentence implies. Yet the 
obscure nature of this piece of general knowledge and the convincing authoritative tone, 
places enough doubt in the reader’s mind to make them unsure, thereby striking up an 
uncomfortable feeling that something is not quite right. Similarly, there is no explicit 
statement that kumquats actually do originate from Spain, rather it is merely implied. This 
makes the ground even more unstable, making it difficult to rebuff. This is just one example of 
a number of contentious and contradictory assertions that confuse the reader throughout 
“Mincemeat.” Nevertheless, this example, as representative of the whole piece demonstrates 
the slippery ambiguity Randolph crafts in her ficto-criticism. As a result, there is no single 
reading for one to rest on. This swinging-to-and-fro against any solid position is characteristic 
of Randolph’s anti-dialectic stance. One is always constantly shifting one’s reading as the text 
seemingly changes and moves beneath you. Ironically, in the context of the exhibition 
catalogue the readers expecting traditional criticism find themselves swiftly unsettled by a 
very traditional recipe. 
 
Faced with this creative and slippery work in a catalogue that accompanies a visual arts 
exhibition, readers find themselves confronted by a text as equally creative and indeterminate 
as the collection of images that make up the exhibition. There is no traditional authoritative 
interpretative gesture to shed meaning and light. Nor is there any attempt to provide one. Here, 
ficto-criticism can be seen to break down the boundaries between science and art and between 
literature and criticism. Randolph has herself spoken of viewing her ficto-criticism as a 
practice parallel with the artwork she writes in response to. According to Grenville in the 
introduction to Psychoanalysis and Synchronized Swimming:   200
From theory to criticism, to fiction and ficto-criticism, Randolph questions the nature 
of critical practice within the Canadian art community. She challenges the conventions 
of critical writing by undermining its claims to authority, scientific objectivity, and the 
Real. In so doing, she disrupts the traditional representation of the art object and its 
claims to unity and authenticity. Through a conflation of psychoanalysis, art criticism, 
fictional literature, critical theory, the politics of representation and the ethics of 
interpretation, Randolph constructs a tenable counter-narrative for contemporary 
critical practice. (12) 
Randolph’s ficto-criticism is therefore a key example of creatively critical writing as it is 
representative of the hybridity ficto-criticism has the potential to imagine. Indeed, Randolph 
seems to follow Deleuze and Guattari’s call for “experimentation against any kind of 
interpretation.” In relation to the territorialising project of normative critical interpretative 
writing, her texts are thus becomings. Refusing authority over the object of attention and by 
making transparent the rules of knowledge production through her metacritical commentary, 
Randolph’s ficto-criticism operates to refuse the either/or dichotomy at both a formal and 
philosophical level. Thus, ficto-criticism becomes a revolutionary force, imagining and 
allowing the flows of desire in a creative drive of “and, and, and, and,” instead of either/or, 
that is, instead of good versus bad, culture versus nature, subject versus object and self versus 
other. Far from objective her art criticism is an example of a systematic subjective and creative 
response to a work of art made available to the viewer.  
 
Her performative lectures are similarly challenging, as she deliberately works to unsettle the 
audience’s expectations and undermine legitimation. For example, in a presentation made for a 
panel discussion in 1999 for the OCA in Toronto Randolph collaged a number of quotations 
together from Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Sartre on the question of objectivity. These 
quotations are all suggestive of a stance critical of objectivity. That is, out of context they 
appear to question whether objectivity is obtainable, or indeed, even useful. For example, from   201
Kierkegaard she quotes: “Let us not deal unjustly with the objective tendency (and you might 
call it pantheistic self-deification) but let us rather view the objective tendency as an essay in 
the comical” (Randolph, Notes to “The Ethics of Ficto-Criticism” 5). Like her published ficto-
criticism, Randolph’s performative lectures playfully undermine the objective stance and her 
own authority. Most significantly, in this presentation she promises a citation that will mirror 
Canadian identity, but later in the performance she misplaces it: 
“Now,” I claimed, as I scuffled and rummaged through the eight paperback books, the 
loose scraps of paper, and the sky blue file folder I had before me, “I shall hold a 
mirror to Canadian Identity.” And this is the performative moment in my presentation, 
where I spend time shifting through this mess looking for a citation . . . “Oh my where 
the hell is that quote? Where the FUCK did I put it. Bare with me, I was re-reading it 
just half an hour ago before this panel began. Oh it’s a good one. Where the hell? . . .” 
I paused rummaging fitfully. 
“You know what? I can’t find it! I can’t find the perfect mirror of Canadian identity. I 
tell you what. Let’s not spend any more time watching me shuffle papers and fret. I’ll 
give you my email address and if anyone wants me to send them the quote that serves 
as the perfect mirror of Canadian Identity, just email me . . ..” (Notes to “The Ethics of 
Ficto-Criticism” 7). 
The point is that Randolph would not and could not present the quotation that holds a mirror to 
Canadian identity. Instead, if you chose to ask for the quotation (and only one in the audience 
did) you would find yourself with several that speak of the importance of clear communication 
and “order and harmony,” and, again, more quotations that comment on the subjective. For 
example: 
We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; 
because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would 
do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages.   202
(Edmund Burke, qutd. in Randolph, email addendum to “The Ethics of Ficto-
Criticism”) 
These quotations may be relevant comments on Canadian identity, and how Randolph might 
see Canadians as searching for and relying on categories, rules and polite contact through clear 
well-bred speech. However, as Randolph suggested in an interview with me shortly before this 
panel, she deliberately plays on the reader or listener’s desire for what constitutes truth.
7 As 
McGregor has said of Randolph’s work: 
By setting up these pieces [of ficto-criticism] . . . in such a way that they can’t be read 
with confidence as either fictive or factual, she destroys the grounds on which we 
usually determine “truth value,” thus forcing the reader/viewer to arbitrate for himself 
or herself not merely the meaning of this text, but the relationships borne by all/any 
texts (including art) to each other and to the world-at-large. (152) 
By misplacing the promised citation, Randolph interferes with the audiences’ desire for 
knowledge and understanding. Present at several of Randolph’s performative presentations, 
Grenville states:  
I have seen her deliver them . . . and they can be quite frightening to observe, not only 
because the response from the audience can be most vociferous, but also because she is 
invariably delivering a complex subject through a process that is extemporaneous, 
contingent and provisional. (Grenville, “Doubt” 7). 
Her performance in the context of a conference panel discussion thus raises questions about 
the pedagogical imperatives of such structured scenes of knowledge production. Randolph 
goes beyond merely articulating her theoretical and critical position; she enacts it through her 
performance. Randolph’s ficto-critical work sits between genres in a very radical and mixed-
up fashion, breaking down the rules of interpretation, judgement, and the binaries that inform 
such gestures into virtual nonsense. Furthermore, her ficto-critique radically destabilises the 
core practices of knowledge production and pedagogy by shifting and twisting potential 
readings of her work. In this way, Randolph refuses both authority and legitimation to the   203
extent of denying her own involvement in or relevance to the development of ficto-criticism, 
despite clear evidence to the contrary. It is perhaps because her writing replicates the 
movement of becoming that she has remained literally imperceptible in ficto-critical 
discourses in Australia.  
 
Crypto-frictions and geografictione:  
Aritha van Herk’s ficto-criticism 
Continuing with this genealogy I turn to the work of another Canadian woman writer who uses 
the term ficto-criticism. Aritha van Herk’s work is of interest here, not only due to the fact that 
she uses “ficto-criticism,” but also because there is convincing evidence to suggest that 
Randolph influenced her. Her work, like that of many ficto-critical practitioners, is also 
significant as it shows a clear link between identifying with the margin and the desire for 
creative-criticism. Notably, despite van Herk’s international reputation and extensive 
identification with the term, she too is absent from the published discourse of Australian ficto-
criticism.
 8 Given her international profile, van Herk’s invisibility in Australian ficto-criticism 
seems even more unlikely than Randolph’s. Her profile, added to the fact that there are such a 
small number of writers employing the term, would suggest that one could reasonably expect 
those writing on ficto-criticism in Australia to have heard of her. A simple search on the 
internet reveals her association with the term, as she has written several books of ficto-
criticism. Her collection of writings A Frozen Tongue (1992), for example, is actively 
identified as ficto-criticism on the back cover. Furthermore, the book’s publisher, Dangaroo 
Press, has an office in Sydney, thus demonstrating that her work has been accessible in 
Australia.
9 As her earlier collection In Visible Ink, published in 1991, also contains the term 
ficto-criticism, it is reasonable to assume that van Herk has been responsible in both Canada 
and Australia for spreading the word on ficto-criticism among literary and cultural theorists.
10 
Yet in the same year that van Herk published her first book of collected ficto-critical writings, 
Muecke and King published their paper on ficto-criticism in Australia; a paper which, as   204
discussed earlier, was imbued with a sense of discovery. However, even as late as 1998 
Muecke had not yet heard of van Herk, or her ficto-criticism.
11 Whilst I can find no direct 
published reference to van Herk in relation to Australian ficto-critical writing, Anna Gibbs 
does signal the influence of Canadian women writers on ficto-criticism when she speaks of the 
forgetfulness around the term as it is currently used in Australia (“Bodies of Words” 1). Van 
Herk’s absence, like Randolph’s, reconfirms the gender divide around Australian ficto-
criticism, and the two very different stories of its inception in Australia.  
 
In Canadian literary circles, however, ficto-criticism is associated specifically with van Herk’s 
work. Yet, at the University of Calgary where van Herk teaches, students are beginning to 
employ the term to describe their creatively critical theses.
12 How did van Herk come to apply 
the term to her writing? Notably, she discovered the term in an art journal. In an interview in 
Canadian Literature, in response to Karin Beeler’s question on what first encouraged her to 
combine fiction and criticism, van Herk states: 
Well, it’s not actually my term at all. It’s an art criticism technique,  
because I think that art critics and those people who appreciated art grew very, very 
tired of reading art catalogues that used a particular language which we all know is 
used, over used, over inscribed . . . they began to write parallel narratives to the art that 
they were watching. It really began as a New York phenomenon in the 80s. (“Shifting 
Form” 82). 
Despite her assertion here that ficto-criticism is an American word, associated with art 
criticism and discovered by her in an art journal, when I met with her in Calgary in 1999 van 
Herk was unable to find the original reference where she first came across the term. Nor could 
she remember the title of the visual arts journal. However, at the time, she did recollect that 
the term appeared in reference to the work of a woman art critic. During my research trip to 
Calgary, I spent considerable time reading through the van Herk Papers, without finding any 
trace of the journal or other references to the origin of the term.
13 It is quite possible, in   205
consequence, that the art journal van Herk was referring to was Canadian and that the ficto-
critical writing that inspired her was Jeanne Randolph’s, as all existing references to ficto-
criticism are in relation to Randolph, Australian sources, or van Herk herself. This assertion is 
based on extensive research on the internet and on electronic databases such as Art Index, 
where one would expect to find some reference to “ficto-criticism” if it was employed in 
America in the 1980s.
14 If it actually was a term used in New York during this time, then the 
total lack of evidence indicates that it must have been a very marginal, short-lived 
phenomenon. By the same token, if it was in circulation in the New York world of art 
criticism, it may well have been influenced by Randolph’s work, given the proximity of 
Toronto to New York. The international journal Impulse, which published the Jameson 
interview mentioned earlier, also published many examples of Randolph’s ficto-criticism. 
Grenville has confirmed Randolph’s profile as an art critic, stating she has “written 
extensively for all of the major Canadian art periodicals” (“Art Criticism” 15). This evidence 
combined with the fact that the earliest references to the term are clearly made in relation to 
Randolph’s work, confirms that she was highly instrumental in the development of ficto-
criticism as an identifiable practice.
15 While there may well have been others writing in a 
similar style on the visual arts, what is of interest here is the way in which the term has been 
taken up and what this says about the practice and its intention to destabilise established 
knowledges. Indeed, it seems appropriate that the origin of the term remains vague, as its 
imperceptible beginning(s) are consistent with ficto-criticism as a multiple, contingent, 
experimental and process driven form of writing.  
 
From establishing the genealogy of ficto-criticism (the word), I turn now to examining some 
of van Herk’s ficto-criticism as a starting point to exploring other Canadian writing also 
located between fiction and criticism. As this chapter shows, there is a clear link between 
minority politics and the emergence of ficto-critical practice in Canada. Van Herk’s gender,   206
her experience as a Dutch immigrant child and her identification as a Western Canadian writer 
has shaped the development of her own ficto-critical style. 
 
In January 1987 van Herk published her first work of ficto-criticism, “Witness to Private 
Motives,” written to accompany an exhibition held at the Alberta College of Art in Calgary. 
Compared to her later ficto-critical writing this is a relatively unsophisticated example, where 
she explores the act of looking at the artwork from her own acknowledged subjective position. 
I describe the piece as unsophisticated because it is largely a descriptive response to the works 
of art. For example: 
Viewing these works is an act of surreptitious pleasure which takes the viewer 
unawares. It is also an act of nervous presentiment. We want to cry out, ‘Stop! Look 
out!’—to warn the figures of the motion contained by what we see. We tiptoe away, 
tiptoe back to watch again . . . We see inevitably ambiguous images, both ordinary and 
ominous, caught and held in postures that are incomplete . . .. (“Witness to Private 
Motives” 5). 
Clearly, this text is very different from the work of Randolph discussed earlier, as it is more 
coherent and obviously linked to the works on exhibit. However, as van Herk states in the 
interview with Beeler, her ficto-critical writing practice has evolved over time: 
So the ficto-criticism that I started with evolved into crypto-frictions, which I really see 
as secret codes and a desire to get the critic to start reading the story to uncover a kind 
of critical position. That’s been a lot of fun for me, because for me it’s play, and I think 
we need to recognise the gestures of play in our work, or we’re going to become 
deeply boring (laughs). (“Shifting Form” 82). 
In 1991 with the publication of In Visible Ink: Crypto-frictions, van Herk had therefore further 
developed her ficto-critical writing practice, and her conceptualisation of the term, with the 
invention of “crypto-frictions.” As Elspeth Cameron has written, “’crypto-frictions’ [are] 
hidden or secret messages ignited by rubbing together criticism and fiction” (226). In Visible   207
Ink is part of the Writer as Critic series edited by Smaro Kamboureli and published by 
NeWest.
16  Importantly, van Herk’s playful and amusing paper “Blurring Genres: Fictioneer as 
Ficto-Critic” is republished in this collection in this collection. Originally presented at a 
conference in Edmonton in 1988, this essay is an irreverent attack on the conventions of 
writing.
17 It also reveals a strong theme in van Herk’s ficto-criticism: a parallel between the 
rules of writing and the rules of patriarchy, both of which restrict and confine her spirit and 
creativity.  
 
The narrator of “Blurring Genres” who we are encouraged to believe is van Herk through 
references to plausible incidents, develops an alter ego: the buchaneer. The narrator or 
fictioneer develops this alter ego—her doppelganger—because “her fiction didn’t want her 
committing infidelities (genre crime) with other forms” (14). Not wanting to spoil her fictional 
reputation, the narrator and fiction writer develops the character of Hannike Buch the 
buchaneer, who then begins to take over, bullying the narrator into an acknowledgment of her 
genred position: 
“You are impossible,” says the fictioneer. “You want to rob me of what order and 
shape there is to my art, if not my life.” 
“Art! Life! You need to learn how to evade plot, my dear,” says Buch. “I am the alter 
ego, and I am standing here, vibrating like a cello behind a great bunch of funereally-
arranged flowers, trying to convince you that genre is something like a long line of 
nicely varnished but implacable coffins ready to slam their lids down on you, alive or 
dead, the moment you choose one.” (22) 
Here the ficto-critic can be seen to be playing with the conventions of genre, strongly 
developing a case for ficto-criticism: “It is, dear fictioneer, a ficto-criticism, a necessary 
departure from genre and its expectations” (23). The doppelganger or alter ego of the author 
signals an internal struggle, watched over in van Herk’s crypto-friction by the genre police. 
They are present to ensure that the fictioneer does not carry out any genre infidelity. Van   208
Herk’s essay is thus very playful and humorous. However, the seriousness of crossing borders 
(of thinking differently) is foregrounded by the concept of the genre police, constructed here 
as though part of the secret police, and charged with special powers. These special genre 
police might even have the power to make you disappear if you fail to follow the rules and end 
up committing genre infidelity. Susan Gingell articulates the literal imperceptibility of ficto-
criticism in her amusing open letter review of In Visible Ink. With reference to the buchaneer, 
Hannike Buch, Gingell in her own ficto-criticism says:  
But damn it, Aritha. Look what you and Hannike have done to my thin veneer of 
academic decorum. Wouldn’t it be a perfect irony if the UTQ [University of Toronto 
Quarterly] editor doesn’t publish this . . . this . . . whatever this generic hybrid is, and 
In Visible Ink goes unreviewed. (153-4) 
Gingell, it seems, has responded to the buchaneer’s (and van Herk’s) irreverent gibes and 
pushes, their case for writing ficto-critically, but she warns of the dangers of doing so. In 
Visible Ink may risk becoming imperceptible if the reviewer responds to the text ficto-
critically.
18 The internal struggle voiced by Gingell in the quotation above, replicates the 
struggle between the fictioneer and buchaneer, which in turn is suggestive of the tension 
between classification and what lies outside (or is classified differently). According to van 
Herk the chains of convention have to be examined and acknowledged before an escape can be 
imagined: “Houdini’s struggle is the artist’s struggle to escape that coffin of conventions, 
named and policed by genre” (“Blurring Genres” 37). These categories and their conventions 
must be transgressed, and this is exactly what van Herk does as ficto-critic. 
 
In “Viscera and Vital Questions,” for example, van Herk writes:  
I want to trouble the reader—to upset, annoy, confuse; to make the reader react to the 
unexpected, the unpredictable, the amoral, the political. 
I want to explode writing as prescription, as a code for the proper behaviour of good 
little girls. (131)   209
Therefore, instead of traditional generic forms of writing, she offers her crypto-fictions, 
produced by the friction between fiction and criticism: 
After reading a text, fiction or not, she would write a parallel text, a story or not a story 
that was ficto-commentary on the fiction she was supposed to ‘elucidate’ . . . There 
were no footnotes, which distressed everyone. Instead, there were long meanderings 
and stories and denials and harangues and poetry and repetitions and exaggerations and 
ignorings and sometimes even drunkenness caught in those ficto-criticisms. She was 
trying to avoid plot. She was trying to avoid position, she was trying to avoid form . . .. 
(“Blurring Genres” 41) 
Van Herk’s irreverent method of citation (her lack of footnotes) and her admission to 
weakness, such as drunkenness, undermine her authority and the authority of other writers 
who conform to the conventions of critical writing. As Anthony Grafton has written in his 
book The Footnote: A Curious History, “footnotes confer authority on a writer” (8).
19 
Throughout “Blurring Genres” van Herk makes reference to well-known authors and critics, 
yet she employs their words casually, never using the correct method of referencing. For 
example: “Genre is an act of nomenclature too, a designation, even though (and here’s a 
footnote), the root of the conception of genre seems to be the relation of the literary work to its 
audience (check Frye for this, and Aristotle too)” (36). The bracketed reference to Northrop 
Frye and Aristotle gives the essay an unfinished flavour of a work still in process. Similarly, in 
one section the narrator quotes a secondary text on Claude Levi-Strauss. She does not cite 
them properly, nor can she locate the original text by Levi-Strauss: “Buch is damned if she can 
find her own reference to him. Does she dare leave him, dangling there?” (39). This self-
reflexivity highlights the metacritical stance of van Herk’s ficto-criticism. In other words, her 
failure to cite correctly is not an oversight. It is a deliberate strategy. Like Randolph, therefore, 
van Herk undermines her own authority, in this case, by playing self-reflexively with and 
around the footnotes. Van Herk’s method of subverting her authority is less subtle (in this 
instance) than Randolph’s slippery untruths, which are convincingly portrayed as fact in   210
“Mincemeat.” Despite these differences, both van Herk and Randolph work to critique and 
undermine the mastery of established critical traditions, both literary and artistic, through their 
hybrid texts. They both also destabilise the binary system. As Ellen Quigley has written: “Van 
Herk continually destabilizes binary opposition and creates deferral” (66). This is achieved by 
her generic hybridity and the conflicting narrative lines and characters, which interrupt, 
oppose and contradict one another (Quigley 61). For example, the voices of the buchaneer, 
Hannike Buch, fiction writer, narrator, fictioneer, and ficto-critic generate a polyvocality, 
undermining the unified and fixed Oedipal subject of normative critical writing. Her slippery 
use of ficto-criticism, crypto-friction or crypto-fictions, in “Blurring Genres”—terms never 
really determined—adds to this continuing process of deferral.  
 
Taking both her concept of crypto-frictions and her play on the pair gender/genre even further, 
van Herk developed a “geografictione” in Places Far From Ellesmere (1990). In this book-
length ficto-criticism van Herk offers us a text that incorporates autobiography, fiction, 
contemporary theory, literary criticism and feminist theory and criticism. Places Far From 
Ellesmere is a fictional non-linear narrative that has been identified as enacting a form of 
literary criticism by reviewers.
20 In this text she un-reads and re-reads three locations, places 
where she spent her childhood, youth and early adulthood (Edberg, Edmonton and Calgary 
respectively). All are far from Ellesmere. Place, memory and self become intertwined in a 
“geografictione” that offers the possibility of re-reading those locations, her memories of 
them, and herself. In the last section, mapped onto Ellesmere Island, van Herk re-reads 
Tolstoy’s Anna Karenin from a feminist perspective and critiques his moralistic treatment of 
his character Anna. By extension and association, van Herk’s critique incorporates a re-
reading of all women who dare to read alternatively and imagine possibilities outside the 
constraints of the life that patriarchy offers them. From this last section the argument extends 
backwards to the first three sections of the geografictione where respectively the narrator, as a 
girl, young woman and mature woman, is constrained by the fictions of patriarchy. By   211
imagining an alternative fiction for Anna, Ellesmere Island, and herself as the author, the 
narrator of Places Far From Ellesmere also envisions an alternative reading of the landscape 
feminised and colonised by European explorers who mapped and charted only one inflexible 
fiction. Van Herk, therefore, also implicitly enacts a critique of how male writers have 
colonised the landscape with stories in which women are fixed as “mothers/saints/whores, 
muses all” (van Herk, “Women Writers in the Landscape” 8). 
 
Places Far From Ellesmere thus functions as cultural and literary criticism; a feminist text that 
works narratively to clear a space for alternative stories to emerge. According to Quigley, “ 
van Herk uses the nomadic landscape to erase the binary definitions of Self/not Self (Other), 
presence/absence, origin/construction, and matter/matrix that embody the phallogocentric 
construction of knowledge, desire, and subject positions” (52). Self-reflexivity is thus part of 
her parodic critique of normative modes of writing, which, policed and enforced by the critic, 
limit the self, the imagination, and creative play. Her project of undermining authority through 
disrespectful ficto-critical border-crossings simultaneously undermines the authority of both 
the critic and the canon, suggesting a “recuperative insurgency” (16). According to van Herk: 
“Because such [border-crossing] texts refuse to occupy the space cleared and approved by 
genre, they are uncanonical, spurious, will go nowhere. By estranging themselves from the 
safety zone of genre, they participate in their own marginalization” (van Herk, “Spectral 
Tattoo” 16). This quote from her paper “Spectral Tattoo: Reconstructive Fictions” is 
significant as it reconfirms the minoritarian politics of such desiring cross-genre texts. As 
Freedman has written: “Perhaps the works that best exemplify the crossover and even cross-
fire mode are those writers who have had literal, geographic borders to cross, those writers 
exiled from both home and dominant, white, heterosexist, bourgeois culture” (The Intimate 
Critique 14). Although not unconscious of her problematic relation to the centre, van Herk 
identifies herself as articulating a minority voice. She self-reflexively writes:   212
The privileged (and don’t I know how privileged I am now, since I haven’t been 
privileged for very long) need to remind themselves, each other, not to rely on the 
ascendancy of that privilege, but to think themselves into the different position of the 
different . . . The space and place to speak/write her own experience, without 
encroaching, appropriating, taking over. We need to back off. . . And I am not black or 
native, so as feminist or fictioneer I’m not sure I should appropriate difference to 
aggrandize either my own fiction or my own feminism. (133)  
Despite her vacillation around whether her appropriation of difference is valid or right given 
her relatively privileged position, van Herk ultimately (in this ficto-criticism) identifies as 
“one who is part of a colonised sex” (In Visible Ink 133). Her ficto-criticism, such as Places 
Far From Ellesmere, thus foregrounds her cross-boundary writing as a practice informed by 
feminism, and wrought out of her experience as a woman within a patriarchal society. 
Similarly, the impact of other normalising narratives on van Herk does not go 
unacknowledged in her ficto-critical writing. For example, her childhood experience as the 
daughter of poor Dutch immigrants appears to have contributed to her desire to write story 
differently. Dominant narratives that punish and exclude difference, in this case around 
ethnicity and class, have similarly impacted on her. She writes: “As an immigrant daughter, 
poor and different, a funny name, funny clothes, funny parents, DP [displaced person], the 
kids called me, even if I was born in Canada, branded with a story I had no choice but to 
regret” (In Visible Ink 137). The stories forced on her as a woman, poor immigrant daughter, 
and writer, appear to have not only positioned her to critique dominant Canadian narratives, 
but also to have aided her desire to write differently. In an article for the Montreal Gazette, for 
example, she identifies strongly as colonised other in a postcolonial landscape:  
I am a western Canadian woman writer. Every one of these elements is colonized . . . I 
am a writer colonized by words—a language that thinks itself omnipotent, a canon that 
creates a great tradition as arbitrary and egocentric as the male poets it valorizes, the 
tradition that constantly traps my pen into silence. And yet, because I am other I will   213
not be silenced: I can afford to speak, here on the fringes of the world. . . No one cares 
what I write: I can write what I want. (“We are robbing artists”) 
In other words, her experience of the margin (as she sees it) has influenced her ficto-critical 
practice, and her call for those who are privileged to “think themselves into the different 
position of the different” (In Visible Ink 133). In the same newspaper article van Herk says: 
“The impulse to dominate, control, exploit, is the most (wrongly) admired and rewarded of 
desires in our contemporary world.” In fact, the whole article argues for the recognition of the 
value of being at the margin, a space of creative potential. Is van Herk calling upon the 
privileged into becoming-woman? She argues: 
All the distinctions we succumb to are man-made . . . We cannot permit ourselves to 
scuttle back to ghettos and divisions, to the perverted sanctity of family, heterosexual 
orthodoxy, race, class, colour, where we are separated by walls of words, their 
different meanings differentiating us in too many directions. (In Visible Ink 133) 
Inevitably, van Herk’s self-fashioned identification as marginalised and colonised other is not 
without its own set of problematics, particularly given her current relation to the centre. Critics 
of her work have noted that in some instances her writings reproduce a similar process of 
colonising to the one that she sets herself up as a feminist to un-read. This time, in relation to 
those more othered than van Herk herself, namely, the First Nations people of Canada. For 
example, Asta Mott argues that van Herk’s conceptualisation of the North as a tabula rasa, a 
blank page, reflects the European imagination of Southern Canada (“Aritha van Herk’s Places 
Far From Ellesmere”). Mott suggests that whilst “Places Far From Ellesmere successfully 
subverts the masculine North, it paradoxically also replicates the traditional [European] 
portrayal of the North as a blank space ready to be used for one’s own purpose and narrative” 
(103). In constructing the North as a tabula rasa van Herk has been accused of romanticising 
and idealising a marginalised space that in the Canadian imagination has always functioned as 
the other, that is, a means to define the centre. Her article in the Montreal Gazette, concerning 
the benefits of being othered and positioned at the margin (both understood as productive   214
creative conditions) could similarly be read as romanticising a reality that for many is beyond 
any romantic conceptualisation, particularly those who live daily with the reality of racism, 
violence and prejudice. Other critics, however, have defended van Herk, arguing that her 
project revolves around countering the canonical European and colonial literary discourse. 
They argue that this project is in this context successful, given the role of the North in colonial 
masculine fictions (Neuman, “Writing the Reader” 225).  
 
However, her current position as a successful white writer and university professor 
complicates van Herk’s use of the margin. Yet, van Herk is not denying oppression or 
attempting to undermine the reality of those at the margin. Rather, I believe, she is attempting 
to render more complex the man-made divisions that allow othering to occur. That is, through 
her ficto-critical writing practice she is attempting to address the underlying fascism (in a 
Deleuzian sense) inherent in codes of writing, pedagogical tradition and knowledge 
production. For instance, in the section quoted earlier where she self-reflexively addresses the 
problems of difference, privilege, appropriation and speaking for others, van Herk articulates a 
desire for an anti-racist feminism that is open to multiple differences (Quigley 58). As Quigley 
has argued, whilst racial binaries are present in van Herk’s work, “they are often placed within 
a parodic context that recognizes and criticizes the problematic theory that emerges when 
working between the forms that establish the many binaries of dominant culture” (58). This is 
not to say that van Herk’s writing itself is completely without moments of potential micro-
fascism (where appropriation and colonisation may be subtly traced). As Mott has asked of 
Places Far From Ellesmere—hinting at the problematics involved in assuming that a radical 
form always equals a revolution—“is everything in this text revolutionary and subversive?” 
(107). These tensions suggest both the difficulty in accomplishing a line of escape and the 
very real risks involved in imagining an alternative space. Ultimately, it might be due to van 
Herk’s higher profile, compared to Randolph’s, that her texts must adhere to certain 
conventions. These questions and tensions are fully explicated in the final chapter where I   215
problematise ficto-critical writing by unravelling some individual texts that display ficto-
critical characteristics. The exploration of these tensions reconfirm the difficulties implicit in 
absolute statements concerning the space between, something that van Herk has 
acknowledged: “. . . what is given in one ficto-critical circumstance may be utterly subject to 
question under another ficto-critical circumstance” (van Herk, “Anhang” 91).
21 In order to 
illustrate the variable range of Canadian ficto-critical texts, I now move to explore fiction-
théorique, arguing that the writing of Québecoise women writers—particularly Nicole 
Brossard—has had considerable impact on the development of creative-critical writing in 
English Canada. Brossard’s identity (French speaking, Québecoise and a woman) on the 
margin of dominant Canadian culture, I argue, has influenced the development of her own 
very specific creative-critical style. 
 
fiction-théorique 
Quebec Women’s Writing:  
As I have argued, van Herk’s ficto-criticism—her desire to write story differently—appears to 
have developed largely out of a minoritarian consciousness influenced by her experience as a 
woman writer, immigrant daughter and postcolonial subject. As many critics have noted, and 
as van Herk declares herself, her writings are underwritten by a strong feminist perspective. 
Significantly, as Shirley Neuman has suggested, the “e” of van Herk’s geografictione not only 
firmly signals the feminine and feminist bent of Places Far From Ellesmere, it gestures 
toward the tradition of Québecoise women authors writing in the feminine (222). Although 
van Herk writes in English, she has indicated the influence of Quebec women writers on her 
work, in particular, the well-known lesbian and feminist Québecoise writer responsible for the 
now famous statement: “To write: I am a woman is heavy with consequences” (These Our 
Mothers 45).
22 Indeed, Nicole Brossard’s statement is suggestive of what has motivated her 
transgressive practice of fiction-theory (fiction-théorique). In “Laying the Body on the Line” 
van Herk celebrates the writing of Brossard, signalling her influence: “Let me confess: I want   216
to write/read the horizontal texts that Nicole Brossard calligraphies. I want to write the same 
body’s same passion . . . I savour Brossard’s page and pleasure . . .” (87-8). Whilst van Herk’s 
writing is very different in style from Brossard’s, there are parallels between their projects 
insofar as they both identify with a minoritarian position and articulate a desire to write 
through convention as a political act. Their work is also materialist and both write with a focus 
on language informed by feminist theory. Similarly, as the name fiction-theory suggests, this 
is a hybrid form like van Herk’s ficto-criticism. Brossard, who has had tremendous influence 
on women’s writing in both English and French Canada,
23 destabilises genre through writing-
between.
24  As she has written, “Always: overcome what obstructs with synthesis” (These Our 
Mothers 69). While Brossard’s writing-between may be very different in style from van 
Herk’s and Randolph’s, ficto-criticism, geografictione and fiction-theory appear motivated by 
similar concerns; all three are imbued with a desire to blast open binary pairs and the 
conventions that keep the latter in place. 
 
Since Brossard has a tremendous body of work behind her, having published her first 
collection of poetry in 1965, I cannot examine in detail her oeuvre or do it justice due to my 
reliance on translations.
25 Instead, I explore the concept of fiction-theory to establish the 
character of this writing as minoritarian, that is, as informed by Brossard’s experience as 
woman, lesbian and Québecoise. In this chapter, I do not embark on detailed analyses of her 
texts, since I am concerned less with their meaning and more with the implications of their 
hybridity. As a between practice Brossard’s work is sometimes described as deconstructive. 
Whilst critical, its focus is on creating alternative spaces beyond the stereotypes and ideologies 
that limit and contain woman. Brossard’s famous line as quoted earlier (“To write: I am a 
woman is heavy with consequences”) comes from her text These Our Mothers (L’Amèr), the 
book in which it is said she first developed the concept of fiction-theory (1983 and 1977 
respectively).
26 According to Louise Cotnoir, the “to-and-fro between fiction and theory 
nourishes their [Québécoises’] works, now known as writings in the feminine” (15). Speaking   217
about why she moved toward a practice of fiction-theory, she says “when I was writing 
L’Amèr, I felt I had to move reality into fiction because patriarchal reality made no sense and 
was useless to me” (qutd. in Godard, “Theorizing Fiction Theory” 53). Brossard’s highly 
political identification in her writing as a woman explains her experimental style, which 
breaks with syntax, code and category. It is fragmentary, poetic prose, which also plays with 
the layout of text on the page.
27 In These Our Mothers, she critiques the patriarchal figure of 
mother: 
The shattering of difference like an entrance into fiction. An active bliss of rupture. At 
the same time my body opens. But a fissure and not the fragment. Opening into the 
density of matter. One day and the consciousness of a sharp explosion in the slit. Inside 
the opening all differences are excited since colour is sensation, from mauve to red, 
difference. Or while the body is being tattooed on the outside. But within my own 
difference I see clearly. (40) 
This section of a paragraph illustrates Brossard’s style—its non-linear track—that, as a result, 
requires a different reading approach. In its experimentation and immediate identification with 
the experience of women within a patriarchal culture, Brossard’s fiction-theory clearly 
resonates with Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming-woman. In her own words: 
In fact, we know that patriarchal language discredits, marginalizes, constitutes the 
feminine as inferior, when it takes us into account; but most of the time, language 
makes women nonexistent, obliging us to perform rituals of presence which exhaust 
the most vulnerable, while electrifying the most audacious among us. Thus to write I 
am a woman is full of consequences. The work on re/presentation and appearances 
draws us into a trajectory which goes from fear to desire, from aphasia to memory, 
from fragmentation to integrity, from humiliation to dignity, from alienation to 
consciousness, from auto-censure to transgression. (“Corps d’energie: Rituels 
d’écriture” 9)   218
Brossard’s writing is full of desire for another way of being in the world, which is envisaged 
through the practice of fiction-theory.
28 As she has written in These Our Mothers, “could it be 
said when imagination catches fire, it ends up a fuse and political” (70). Originally published 
in French in 1977, These Our Mothers has as its subtitle for the English translation “Or: The 
Disintegrating Chapter.” This subtitle is indicative of her intention to disrupt literary norms. 
Barbara Godard demonstrates the way Brossard’s fiction-theory explodes literary convention: 
Fiction theory: a narrative, usually self-mirroring, which exposes, defamiliarizes and/or 
subverts the fiction and gender codes determining the re-representation of women in 
literature and in this way contributes to feminist theory. This narrative works upon the 
codes of language (syntax, grammar, gender-coded diction, etc.), of the self 
(construction of the subject, self/other, drives, etc.), of fiction (characterization, 
subject, matter, plots, closure, etc.), of social discourse (male/female relations, 
historical formations, hierarchies, hegemonies) in such a way as to provide a critique 
and/or subvert the dominant tradition that within a patriarchal society has resulted in a 
de-formed representation of women. All the while it focuses on what language is 
saying and interweaves a story. It defies categories and explodes genres. (“Theorizing 
Fiction Theory 59-60) 
In another article, Godard extends the cross-border thesis of fiction-theory to identify how it 
works to challenge the objective neutral work of theorising, a process that alienates and 
excludes difference. According to Godard, “Realigning the boundaries, shifting the frames, 
fiction/theory brings into the shape of narrative the dislocating work of theorizing, to expose 
the ‘matter’ of fiction as gendered (heterosexist) and racist conditions of production and 
reproduction” (“Women of Letters” 298). This confirms the political nature of Brossard’s 
work—as a self-reflexive means to resist the colonising role of representation. This is 
achieved through the hybridity of fiction-theory and its defiance of convention. Godard is not, 
of course, alone in realising the political implications of Brossard’s fiction-theory. Forsyth, for 
example, has mapped Brossard’s career in political activism, arguing that her writing has   219
always been informed by a radical political view.
 29 In the article, “The Political in the Work 
of Nicole Brossard,” Forsyth outlines the context from which Brossard’s writing developed, a 
period of intense, postcolonial agitation.
30 In what follows I briefly outline the context from 
which Brossard’s fiction-theory evolved, to establish more acutely how her position at the 
margin has influenced the development of her own specific ficto-critical practice. As I shall 
show ficto-criticism is a highly political form of literary intervention, which has been 
informed by the experiences of those who advocate its practice. 
 
Graduating from the Université de Montréal in 1965, Brossard became involved with the 
publication of a new journal, La Barre du Jour (the first light of dawn).
31 This journal, 
according to Forsyth, was partially influenced by the socialist nationalist movement Parti Pris 
and their journal by the same name, which had begun in 1963, during the period of the Quiet 
Revolution: 
The combination of poetic creativity and revolutionary fervour was most effective 
during the Quiet Revolution in formulating political goals, while releasing creative 
energy and allowing a dynamic collective imagination to form a vision of a new 
society. The writers of the Parti Pris group proved by example that a dynamic text, 
incorporating a poetic and theoretical dimension, is an effective weapon in the struggle 
for social change. (“The Political Work” 159) 
In the 1970s, however, Brossard’s focus shifted from the local political struggle of Quebec to 
feminism, and La Barre du Jour began publishing special issues  
dedicated to feminism and women’s writing.
 32 What is significant about her position as a 
Francophone citizen of Canada, influenced by and involved in nationalist political movements, 
and her position as lesbian, is that both manifest as otherness within the landscape of the 
Canadian nation state. In effect, as a Québecoise lesbian, Brossard is triply displaced through 
her gender, sexuality and colonised cultural position. Much has been written, for example, on 
the particular and role of women in Quebec, where it was not until 1940 that they attained   220
suffrage, some twenty-two years after it was awarded federally in 1918 (by 1922 all Canadian 
provinces except Quebec had given women the vote) (Wachtel). Cast as symbolic mothers, 
women were seen as the reproducers and defenders of a threatened culture, as a result, any 
divergence from this role was judged as an act that would potentially undermine the whole 
fabric of French-Canadian society (Smart 9). Whilst language played an important role in 
nationalist movements, women’s position in Quebec was therefore consistent with the 
linguistic role of the feminine in French, as mute “e.” In “E muet mutant” Forsyth argues that 
Brossard aggressively assumes the linguistic symbol of her powerlessness and marginal 
position: “She declares the silent, humble letter to be in mutation. According to Brossard, 
women must take possession of language and turn it to their own ends” (“The Political Work” 
162). Here, the influence of French women writers such as Luce Irigaray is apparent,
33 and, 
like Irigaray’s work, Québécoise writing in the feminine risks the charge of essentialism.
34 
However, as Louise Dupré has stated, writing in the feminine, rather than constituting an 
essential notion of woman, is about the relation of woman to man as the standard: “It’s not a 
question . . . of sending woman back to her ‘feminine nature,’ a consequence of the ‘eternal 
feminine.’ Let’s say rather woman perceived as other has been excluded from language” (26). 
Dupré’s observation reconfirms the minoritarian positioning of women as the motivation for 
writing ficto-critically, rather than any inherent characteristic of femininity. This is why ficto-
criticism is a practice often employed by communities located at the margin. 
 
Brossard’s minority location, first as a colonised Francophone citizen of Canada and secondly 
as a lesbian, thus appears to have informed her political practice of fiction-theory. However, as 
Parker warns, Brossard’s marginal location is slippery, as it is determined by her position in 
relation to the dominant centre: 
Lesbian is neither who or where the poet is, but rather a quality of emotion and desire 
that defines itself in terms of differences with regard to the prescriptive norms that   221
regulate social relations. Like her textual practices, her personal angle of vision is 
transgressive. (3) 
Her subjectivity as lesbian writer is not, therefore, fixed as it can be revisioned through her 
radical texts. However, there is a consciousness around her minoritarian placement in relation 
to masculine heterosexual reality. As a result, her location at the margin becomes a productive 
and transgressive space in which to view the fictions of dominant realities. As Brossard has 
written in her more recent fiction-theory titled She Would Be the First Sentence of My Next 
Novel (1998): 
she had become aware of the marginality to which the feminine was confined, would 
remain confined unless and until a second marginality, the consequence of becoming 
aware of the first one, set her free. In other words, a woman, she would keep feeling 
inferiorized in her marginality unless and until she found the words that would make 
her even more marginal, but this time fully conscious and in control of her double 
marginality. Without this double marginality, there was nothing to tell that would make 
the difference. (37) 
In revelling in her marginality and making it a tool for her agency, Brossard’s fiction-theory 
not only strategically disrupts the system that defines her place on the edge by refusing to 
aspire to authority, she also reimagines difference as productive and creative. Both by moving 
beyond genre and defying narratives of closure, Brossard’s fiction-theory breaks the 
conventional split between mind/body, thus disrupting the authority of a unitary subject. 
Refusing authority, Brossard’s texts neither claim objectivity or to represent fixed truths. 
Instead, they are highly subjective writings, influenced by her embodied experience (Forsyth, 
“Errant and Air-Born” 15). The intertextuality, polyvocality, heterogeneity, fragmentation and 
multiplicity of Brossard’s fiction-theory shatters “the tight little boundary of the ego” (Lamy 
qutd. in Godard, Gynocritics xi).
35 As Brossard has stated: “[a]bolish conquest” and “[f]or 
once I want to speak neither of nor for other people” (The Ariel Letter 49 and 37 respectively). 
There is substantial evidence, therefore, not only in her own words but also in the words of the   222
writers who engage with her writing, to support the assertion that her minoritarian experience 
informs her desire to write differently and to be wary of the power of representation (in her 
attempt to maintain a multiplicity). In the same way, the subjectivity that she engages in this 
process is unlike the ego-driven self of normative critical writing, as she is neither removed 
from her environment nor is she unchanged by it. 
 
The factors contributing to Brossard’s influential practice of fiction-theory, therefore, appear 
strongly informed by radical politics and wrought from her experiences of being at the margin. 
These experiences, particularly those of being woman and lesbian, are the ones most often 
given as influential in the development of fiction-theory in Canada. However, several other 
influences appear at the margins of the official feminist story of fiction-theory. For example, 
not only contemporary French women theorists, such as Irigaray, have been influential, but 
also contemporary French male theorists.
36 These writings were available much earlier to 
Francophone Canadians, compared to English Canadians, as they did not have to wait for 
translations to be published.
37 As Parker has suggested, Brossard’s location at the intersection 
of European and North American thought gave her “direct access to philosophical and literary 
movements of the last century. These include the avant-garde practices of modernism, 
modernity and postmodernisms, as well as Marxism, psychoanalysis and poststructuralist 
thought . . .” (1). Here, Parker’s comment reintroduces some complexity to the ficto-critical or 
fiction-theory equation through highlighting a range of influences on Brossard’s practice. She 
also indicates the effect of postmodernism as an intellectual fashion on Brossard’s readership. 
According to her, Brossard’s “poetry and ‘fiction-theory’ have attracted . . . writers, 
academics, critics and students of postmodernist texts” (3). Whilst this quotation signals how 
well fiction-theory translates into “the postmodern” aiding its visibility, it is at the same time a 
highly politically motivated practice informed by feminism. Its simultaneous positioning as 
postmodern, feminist and political reiterates the difficulty in limiting writing-between to 
singular readings. Can practices such as ficto-criticism be at the same time the product of   223
postmodernism and a reaction against it? Can feminist writing such as fiction-theory be 
influenced by, yet also a departure from, phallocentric tradition?
38 As Parker asserts, a range 
of factors has influenced Brossard’s development of fiction-theory. This is also true of ficto-
criticism more generally, as I have already demonstrated. If ficto-critical writing does have 
something in common—and this is certainly true of the works I have examined so far—it is a 
desire to throw into question the underlying structures of knowledge that inform the process of 
othering. It is their minoritarian movement, that is, their becoming-woman that defines them. 
In other words, ficto-critical texts are often concerned with ethical dilemmas. What the ficto-
critical writings of Randolph and van Herk share with Brossard’s fiction-theory is that they 
appear to emanate from an identification with what it means to be at the margin. That is, they 
work politically to unravel majoritarian discourses. 
  
As Forsyth has argued in “Nicole Brossard and the Emergence of Feminist Literary Theory in 
Quebec since 1970,” Brossard has become since the 1970s a major writer in Quebec and has 
had a major effect on Francophone Canadian women writers. According to her, Brossard’s 
influence has also extended to critics, forcing them to recognise a distinctive body of feminist 
thought (211). Unlike Australian ficto-critical writing, in Canada there is a much stronger and 
more visible link between such hybrid forms and feminism. Brossard is the high-profile 
feminist, author of fiction-theory, yet she is not the only Quebec woman writing 
experimentally in a creative-critical form. The same period of intense creative activity in 
Quebec that began in the seventies (and which witnessed Brossard’s arrival) saw the 
emergence of other Québecoise women writers. Many of their texts are both contemporaneous 
and similar in their intention with Brossard’s fiction-theory and writing in the feminine. These 
texts include writing by Madeleine Gagnon, Louky Bersianik, Louise Dupré, Jovette 
Marchessault, France Théoret, Carole Massé, Yolande Villemaire, and the Anglophone writer 
Gail Scott among others. According to Forsyth, in the same paper on feminist literary theory in 
Quebec, it was Francophone feminist writers that initiated the self-reflexive, creatively critical   224
text in Canada. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that Brossard’s influence, as well as the 
influence of other Quebec women writers of fiction-theory, has greatly impacted on many 
English Canadian women writers. For example, in the same paper, Forsyth finds herself 
influenced by Brossard as she consciously considers her own critical practice. She speaks of 
becoming “increasingly uncomfortable with the language of presumed objective detachment” 
(the language which her literary training had taught her to use) (215). Forsyth suggests that to 
do as Brossard asks—to write as a woman—is highly charged politically: 
whenever the feminist critic reads or writes a text, she will necessarily begin with the 
lucid awareness that she is participating in the literary fact as a woman. As Nicole has 
suggested, the consequences of such awareness are enormous, since it will lead to a re-
situation of self, a departure from the beaten critical path and a constant search for a 
new kind of literature. (“Nicole Brossard and the Emergence of Feminist Literary 
Theory” 215-6)  
The relation of women to majoritarian discourses has, not surprisingly, meant that Canadian 
and Québecoise women writers share a desire for a new kind of literature. Whilst English 
Canadian and French Canadian women writers have different approaches to both writing in 
particular and language in general, as well as very different histories and literary traditions, 
they share a preoccupation with and suspicion of language. In that sense, Godard argues that 
as “Explorers in language, women’s writing and feminist criticism cross [the] linguistic 
frontiers [of English and French]; the common element of gender and marginality provide the 
point of border blurring” (Gynocritics ii). Significantly, this quote comes from the publication 
Gynocritics: Feminist Approaches to Canadian and Quebec Women’s Writing, which resulted 
from the Dialogue conference held at York University in 1981. Godard, who edited this 
bilingual collection, signals that it is not just linguistic borders that are crossed through these 
women coming together. She also states that it is the aim of the contributors to this publication 
“to break down the barriers between critical discourse and creative activity, between subject 
and object of reflection, and between subjective and objective approaches . . .” (x). Feminist   225
writers in English Canada may have a different approach from Québecoise women writers, yet 
both appear to have as their target the hierarchies of division that enable oppression. Their 
critique, as has been shown, mobilises a refusal to play the game of binary opposition. 
 
Canadian women writing-between in English 
Writing-between in English Canada is diverse, and does not have a specific and well-known 
term to identify it, as it does in Australia. However, some women writers in English who are 
also bilingual have been influenced by fiction-theory and have aided its propagation in 
English-Canadian feminist literature.
39 Their bilingual abilities meant that they were 
introduced early to Québecoise and French feminist writing and theory. These writers are 
Daphne Marlatt and Gail Scott.
 40 Both have substantial profiles as feminist Canadian writers, 
particularly Marlatt. According to Peggy Kelly, “[by] the early eighties . . . Daphne Marlatt 
and Gail Scott were . . . writing fiction-theory” (69). She identifies their experimental novels, 
Marlatt’s Ana Historic and Scott’s Heroine, as examples of fiction-theory as a feminist 
practice. Kelly outlines the accepted conceptualisation of fiction-theory (as deconstructive of 
genres, language-centred, situated in its materiality, and feminine), arguing that Ana Historic 
and Heroine demonstrate these characteristics. According to Kelly, as these texts are 
underwritten by a “feminist analysis of andocentric cultural constructs,” central to fiction-
theory, they also work to deterritorialise other concepts and structures of dominant culture 
(70). She extends the fiction-theory praxis to include the deconstruction of history and a pre-
occupation with non-unified subjectivity, suggesting that both novels clearly feature these 
aspects. Both Marlatt and Scott are feminist writers intent on unravelling the majoritarian 
discourses of patriarchal society, and in this quest they have developed a practice of writing-
between. Marlatt, for example, has written: “Feminist writing, when it destroys the reader’s 
expectations of normative language use, form and genre, can be seen as a subversion of 
conventional/patriarchal reality embedded in those expectations” (Readings From the 
Labyrinth 167). Significantly, one of the main characters in Ana Historic is married to an   226
academic. At one stage this character, Annie, speculates on her husband’s reaction to her 
writing (her scribbles): “but this is nothing, i imagine him saying. meaning unreadable. 
because this is nothing is a place he doesn’t recognize, cut loose from history and its relentless 
progress towards some end. this is undefined territory, unaccountable. and so on edge” (81). 
Annie scribbles when she is supposed to be working on her husband’s research, his “Big 
Book.” She imagines her clichéd place in the acknowledgments: “‘and to my wife without 
whose patient assistance this book would never have been written.’” (79). She admits, what 
she really wants is to tell her own story (79). Similarly, Scott has written in her ficto-critical 
collection Spaces Like Stairs (1989) that women—forced to operate in language from a 
negative semantic space—have no choice but to seize language and find new ways to use it 
(26).
41 
 
As I have argued, many women writers who identify and theorise their position in patriarchal 
society as colonised other are drawn towards the deterritorialising practice of ficto-criticism. 
This identification with the minoritarian is not, however, necessarily limited to gender, as, for 
example, in the case of Brossard who strongly identifies as a lesbian and as Québecoise. 
Similarly, Marlatt also identifies as a lesbian writer,
 42 and Scott—as an Anglophone in 
Quebec—has spoken of her position as a minority in “a largely French milieu” (“Virginia and 
Colette” 30). Sexuality, race, ethnicity and class surface as markers of difference in Canadian 
culture. Furthermore, it is often out of an identification with, and recognition of, the exclusion 
of such difference that Canadian ficto-critical writers in English appear motivated to write 
between, questioning representation.
 As a result, a diverse range of stylistic approaches 
function ficto-critically. In order to illustrate this, I now briefly survey key anthologies and 
journals that have published ficto-criticism by women, including an examination of select 
Canadian ficto-critical texts in English. While not being an exhaustive study, due to the large 
number of between texts, this survey includes close readings of specific feminist mobilisations 
of ficto-critical practice.    227
 
Unlike Australia, in Canada there have been several important feminist conferences—such as 
the Dialogue conference in 1981 that produced Gynocritics—which have acted as productive 
spaces for not only celebrating feminist writing practices and theories, but also for the 
dissemination of ideas. These conferences have aided the development of experimental 
women’s writing in Canada—particularly English Canada—through introducing the work of 
Quebec women writers. The most significant of these events was the 1983 Women and 
Words/Les femmes et les mots Conference, held in Vancouver.
 43 Marlatt has described the 
event as bringing: 
together scores of Francophone, Anglophone, white, First Nations, Asian and Black 
women writers, editors, publishers, translators, critics and readers for a spirited series 
of discussions and performances. It was the first and largest gathering of women across 
the country . . .. (Readings From the Labyrinth 9) 
According to Gail Scott, “The Women and Words conference . . . seems to have been a turning 
point, with feminists showing new appreciation for the relationship between their struggle for 
profound change and so-called ‘experimental’ writing by women” (“Virginia and Colette” 33). 
Scott goes on to suggest that Quebec women writers played a vital role in this sea change, with 
their focus on language-centred writing. However, as noted by those involved, whilst these 
conferences generated exciting dialogues during the course of the event, everyone then 
“returned to their isolation” (Godard, “Women of Letters” 263-4). As a result, feminist 
collectives emerged to maintain connections through publishing.
44  
 
One prominent feminist journal, Tessera, was largely the result of these events and effects 
(263-4). Involving Marlatt and Scott, Tessera held its first editorial meeting during the Women 
and Words Conference in 1983 (Marlatt, Readings From the Labyrinth 9). Tessera has 
published much fiction-theory, and as Barbara Godard has written one of the imperatives of 
the original editorial board was to invent a new critical voice that illuminated women’s texts   228
rather than oppressing them. She argues: “What is at stake here is not just antagonism to a 
masculine academy, but recognition, love even, for women writers” (259). According to 
Godard, who was part of the original editorial team of Tessera (with Kathy Mezei, Daphne 
Marlatt and Gail Scott): 
Writing through has been Tessera’s concern, through the marked binaries of feminist 
debate displacing the opposition itself: mind/body, theory/criticism, theory/feminism, 
psychoanalysis/materialism. Another boundary Tessera erases in its work on the in-
between is that separating the academy from the literary institution at large. (“Women 
of Letters” 270). 
Tessera, with its emphasis on criticism as life writing, actively blurs the distinctions between 
theoretical and creative texts;
 fiction-theory being the stated editorial focus of Tessera 
(Binhammer 9). In an effort to destabilise the traditional divide between writers and critics, the 
first editorial collective was deliberately made from active writers and literary critics. In other 
words, there was an intention—as with the writing published—to cross the boundaries 
dividing public/private, fact/fiction, object/subject and self/other. As a result, Tessera is a 
journal that has published many examples of ficto-criticism, in particular, the special issue in 
1986 that focused specifically on fiction-theory. In 1994 Collaboration in the Feminine: 
Writings on Women and Culture From Tessera, was published. This anthology, edited by 
Godard, includes work published in Tessera over the ten-year period from 1983, and is an 
excellent source of Canadian ficto-criticism in English, with some notable examples, including 
jam ismail’s “Diction Air,” Janice Williamson’s “Tell Tale Signs,” and Marlene Nourbese 
Philip’s “Whose Idea Was it Anyway?” These pieces are of particular interest as the theory is 
absorbed into the texts in creative play, rather than being constantly foregrounded.
 45 
Consistently, these ficto-critical texts enact through their hybridity a desire “to disrupt the 
normal(izing) individualist and impersonal practices of writing and reading, to critique 
representation” (Godard, “Women of Letters” 264).  
   229
In a special issue of Tessera
46 dedicated to textual corporeality, two pieces emerge that 
articulate ficto-criticism’s critique of the institutional rules of writing and speaking that 
guarantee authority: Erin Soros’
47 “sentence” and Janice Hladki’s “hook, line, and sync her: 
fishing in/out questions of competency, regulation, and authority.” In “sentence” Soros takes 
up Foucault’s analysis of pedagogical structures and applies it to the modern educational 
written form par excellence, the essay. Soros asks why Foucault never takes his analysis of 
disciplinary institutions such as the clinic, madhouse and prison—which are all described as 
schools—further, to include a focused study on the school or university itself. In her work, 
Soros plays with the written assignment demonstrating its role in inscribing the student body. 
The layout of “sentence” on the page reproduces the form of experimental poetry and includes 
images and pieces of text from different sources, such as the imagined voice of the educator. 
For example, “You can usually blame a bad essay on a bad beginning,” “the thesis must be a 
coherent document,” and “coherence means that the parts of the paragraph should be logically 
connected.” Soros’ text is not, of course, logically connected or coherent in the traditional 
sense, thereby enacting a critique of the use of conventional rules of the essay as a means to 
demonstrate the student’s mastery over their material. The text also self-consciously 
foregrounds the exclusion of the personal and subjective from academic writing forms: 
Your writing should not be subjective (based on the imagination) but should be 
objective (based on textual evidence and supported by examples). Perpetuate the 
concept that the ‘true self,’ the imagination, the psyche, the subjective, the body is 
somehow outside the writing, the textual evidence, the citations, the present tinting of 
explaynation, the analysis, the ch/using of ex ample, some how? not constructed 
with/in the e.s. say structure itself and we cling to this sp/lit. (21) 
At the end of “sentence” Soros includes a chart titled “Composition Evaluation,” a grade sheet 
for the reader, which outlines the rules of composition within traditional pedagogy. Clearly, 
her work would fail such an examination. 
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Hladki’s piece is similarly focused on academic forms, this time the academic presentation. As 
a doctoral student, Hladki takes the form of the academic presentation and turns it into a 
performance (as did Jeanne Randolph). She asks, what are her “investments as a doctoral 
student in learning what might constitute a ‘legitimate’ academic presentation” (108). “hook, 
line, and synch her” thus functions self-reflexively, much like Soros’ piece: “Our speaker is:/ a 
large presence on the intellectual horizon/ an academic persona/ part of a star-studded 
intellectual stable” (113). Her text consequently undermines the authority of the academic and 
their modes of knowledge transference. 
 
The other key journals that have published women’s experimental writing-between include 
Fireweed,
48 (f.)Lip, Room of One’s Own, and Raddle Moon (this is by no means a definitive 
list). Not surprisingly, special issues, such as the 1991 issue of Room of One’s Own that 
focused on the problems women confront with criticism (as both readers and writers), includes 
ficto-criticism more readily since they explicitly deal with literary conventions.
49 An 
examination of the substantive role of critics as maintainers of convention presents playful 
scenes for women—traditionally excluded from the canon—to explore interpretation, 
judgement and explication. Experimental women’s writing can also be found in journals not 
specifically dedicated to women’s writing, such as Brick, Open Letter, Prairie Fire
50 and West 
Coast Line. Canadian Fiction Magazine has also published ficto-criticism.
51 Increasingly, 
journals are publishing ficto-critical forms as criticism. However, Canadian ficto-criticism in 
English has tended to be concentrated in publications that both focus on and encourage 
feminist explorations of writing. As Godard has written in “Ex-centriques, Eccentric, Avant-
Garde,” “The more forcefully they [women] have asserted their feminism, the more disruptive 
their literary productions have been.” (58). The anthology A Mazing Space: Women Canadian 
Women Writing (1986) is a publication that illustrates the diverse range of women’s 
experimental writing including a number of notable examples of ficto-criticism, many of 
which demonstrate a determination to write through the conventions of language and   231
literature. The anthologies By, For and About: Feminist Cultural Politics
52 (1994) and 
Language in Her Eye
53 (1990) similarly contain work by women that break the conventional 
rules of literature, taking the space between fiction and criticism. Significantly, Wendy 
Waring, uses the term ficto-criticism in the introduction to By, For and About to describe the 
work of Janice Williamson included in the anthology.
54 Similarly, she calls Lee Maracle’s 
piece “Oratory” “theory as story.” Margaret Christakos’ text “Post-Cards” is another ficto-
critical example, where she reflects on the academic world. Christakos talks of her inability to 
carry out the required radical separation between mind and body. In Language in Her Eye 
there are also several works that deliberately and very consciously make the connection 
between the style of the writing and the content. These writers are questioning whether 
traditional critical modes of writing reproduce the systems of domination that many authors 
purport to critique. For example, according to Himani Bannerji
55 in “The Sound Barrier: 
Translating Ourselves in Language and Experience”: 
A whole new story has to be told, with fragments, with disruptions, and with self-
conscious and critical reflections. And one has to do it right. Creating seamless 
narratives, engaging in exercises in dramatic plot creating, simply make cultural 
brokers, propagators of Orientalism and self-reificationists out of us. My attempt here 
has been to develop a form which is both fragmentary and coherent in that it is both 
creative and critical—its self-reflexivity breaking through self-reification, moving 
towards a fragmented whole. (40) 
Throughout these ficto-critical writings there is a constant consciousness around writing—at 
the level of syntax and form—and a call for writers to think through the notion of style as an 
extension of content.  
 
Ficto-criticism: Writing through race 
In the previous section I suggested that Canadian feminist writing-between has been 
influenced by a desire to write differently and challenge the authority of critical academic   232
writing, as the discourse that has traditionally excluded women’s experiences and voices. In 
this section I expand the proposition that the defiance of generic convention in feminist 
creative-criticism is motivated by the writers’ political convictions and location at the edge of 
dominant masculine society. In view of this, I would like to examine closely Marlene Norbese 
Philip’s “Whose Idea Was It Anyway?” This text, one of the notable pieces of ficto-criticism 
published in Collaboration in the Feminine (the anthology devoted to ten years of publishing 
by Tessera), is interesting for several reasons. Philip’s text warrants particular attention not 
only because it is an inspiring work of ficto-criticism but also because it is informed by a 
critique of racism, colonialism and capitalism. Published in a feminist journal, this text 
functions pivotally to open out ficto-criticism—now clearly established as a form relevant to 
Canadian feminism—to other minority groups in Canada. Born in Tobago and having 
immigrated to Canada in 1968, Philip identifies as an “Afrosporic” writer (Philip, “Who’s 
Listening” 144). Philip’s text “Whose Idea Was It Anyway?” demonstrates that writing-
between is not only centred on issues relating to gender in Canada, although this has been the 
tendency most actively spoken about thus far. The space between theory and fiction, that is, 
between criticism and literature, is a strategy of writing that has also been employed by writers 
of colour, who, like women, have specific interest in debunking the fiction of objectivity. 
Philip’s work is significant as it powerfully renders the potentially destructive and 
dehumanising function of ideas, when they become depoliticised abstractions or concepts 
voided of materiality. Since her work deals with issues parallel to Kim Scott’s Benang certain 
similarities between their strategies emerge.  
 
In “Whose Idea Was It Anyway?”  Philip speculates on whom exactly it was who came up 
with the concept of slavery. This essay-length ficto-critical work enacts a critique of racism 
through its exploration of the question it raises through the title. Yet, it also does much more 
through its choice of form. By choosing a ficto-critical mode, Philip’s essay removes an idea 
from the abstract and places it into the realm of the personal and actual. This strengthens her   233
argument, which is not articulated in the depersonalised tone of an academic who deals with 
abstract ideas and values, but within the intimate space of oral storytelling.
56 This is a world of 
real people, real bodies, and personal stories. At the same time the text is not merely fiction. In 
other words, Philip re-personalises slavery by playing on the generic divide between fiction 
and non-fictional modes. In her text slavery is now up close and personal, no longer an 
abstract question belonging to history. “Whose Idea Was It Anyway?” thus becomes a 
personal question for the reader, particularly the white reader who is blind to their privileged 
position and ignorant of the contribution that slaves made to the burgeoning wealth of first 
worlds.
57 Borrowing from what appears to be a slave ship’s log, she lists the names of the 
inevitable commercial losses on the journey: 
  Cuffee African man of some 30 years—jumped overboard 
Quesaba  Negro woman of undetermined years—died this day of wasting illness 
Quarshie  Negro man of some 30 years—passed away from dropsy 
Abena  Very young woman—under 20 years—taken suddenly by fever . . .. [and 
the list goes on] (197) 
As demonstrated in the reading of Scott’s Benang, there are parallels between the logic that 
enables racism and that which enables objective, academic discourses. The same system or 
economy that allowed the dehumanisation of African people, an economy that relies on the 
split between mind/body, self/other and master/slave, informs the codes and conventions of 
academic (historical) writing. By asking whose idea was it anyway and seeking the owner of 
such a brilliant, commercial idea—asking them to take their place in history—Philip makes 
the connection between the economy of knowledge and the economy of slavery. It is the same 
arrogance and will to power that allowed Africans—black ivory—to be packed in the 
hundreds into the bowels of ships and sent abroad as chattel, which controls and determines 
authorised knowledge and reality. Her parodic use of a question common to historical research 
works to undermine these economies, as there appears to be no one willing to own up to the 
conception of slavery. Philip, however, answers the question for the reader: “It is hard to tell in   234
the dim light, but his eyes are blue, like the painted ocean, his hair is blonde, his skin is fair 
and he laughs again and again.” “Whose Idea Was It Anyway?” begins with a description of a 
room, a scene consistent with a novel from the period of the slave trade and then collages 
together different dialogues, word definitions (such as transubstantiation and idea), with 
stories of mastery and commercial success. Her work is creative, researched (it lists works 
cited) and embodied. In other words, Philip’s ficto-critical text does not reproduce the same 
binary economy as the one she critiques.  
 
Language is a consistent theme in Philip’s work, as is a desire to undermine the concepts of 
universality and objectivity. In fact, the ficto-critical form is a common choice for her, whether 
she is writing prose or poetry. For example, her poem “Discourse on the Logic of Language” 
incorporates a critique of colonialism, sexism and racism; while theoretically informed it is 
also poetic and creative. In this work she looks at the role of language through an extended 
play on tongues, speech and silence, and the way in which language was used as a tool to 
control slaves. Through an analysis of scientific discourses, she makes a connection between 
the inherent racism in these objective sciences and other universal discourses constructed by 
the West. Philip has said of “Discourse” that her intention was to shift the “canon of 
objectivity and universality,” to permanently disturb it (“Notes From a Working Journal” 17). 
The other work by Philip that extends similar themes—particularly around silence—is her 
novel-length text Looking For Livingstone: An Odyssey of Silence (1991). This is also written 
ficto-critically, and, simply put, overtly critiques the construction of the dark continent as a 
place of silence and uninhabited in any meaningful way. The text, however, is complex, 
language focused and contains a range of generic forms (poetry, letter, prose, and biographical 
reference). Her collection Frontiers: Essays and Writings on Racism and Culture (1992), 
similarly crosses generic divides. While the texts in Frontiers are consistent with the genre of 
the essay, within the context of institutionalised knowledge Philip’s text would be judged 
emotive, personal and far too subjective. The quality of its intellectual rigour may also be   235
challenged as a result of its very subjective tone. In this sense, the essays published in this 
collection challenge traditional critical writing, and most definitely the neutral or universal 
quality of dominant discourses. Philip’s work is written out of a particular historical and social 
context. As Carol Morrell has written in Grammar of Dissent: Poetry and Prose by Claire 
Harris, M. Nourbese Philip and Dionne Brand, “[t]his writing against is essential because 
language encodes the cultural and political facts of dominance and exclusion” (15). In this 
quotation Morrell is talking about the work of Philip, Claire Harris and Dionne Brand, all 
writers of colour. As Morrell’s words suggest, Harris and Brand’s work—whilst different from 
Philip’s—maintains a similar challenge to literary tradition as a means to undermine the 
inherent racism in dominant discursive forms.
 58 As she herself points out, her work manifests 
a refusal to comply with either the boundaries of genre or the physical margins of the page 
(Morrell 32). Harris’ poetry, for example, focuses on language and its power to shape reality:  
  Daughter    there is no language 
  i can offer you    no corner that is 
  yours    unsullied 
  you inherit the intransitive  
  case      Anglo-Saxon noun  
(Morrell 78) 
Clearly, as this quotation illustrates, Harris is intent on foregrounding the lack of self forced 
onto the woman of colour. Significantly, Brand’s collection of prose poetry, No Language is 
Neutral (1990), similarly functions through a metafictive use of language to undermine 
majoritarian fictions. Here Brand focuses on the fictions of heterosexuality, history and race. 
Of particular ficto-critical interest, however, is her collection Bread Out of Stone: 
Recollections, Sex, Recognitions, Race, Dreaming, Politics (1994). In the essay from which 
the title is taken, according to Brand: “there is only writing that is significant, honest, 
necessary.” Here she signals the ethical nature of her discourse, as politically situated. All of 
the essays in this collection are highly personal and maintain as central Brand’s racial and   236
lesbian identity. As she states, obviously frustrated by the conventional line drawn between 
writing (or art) and politics: 
It is probably not even necessary to say ‘poetry and politics’ as if those words are 
distinct, but I’ve become so used to explaining and explaining their dependency on 
each other to Canadian reviewers and audiences that I’ve forgotten that it is 
unnecessary here. (Bread Out of Stone 25) 
Significantly, like Philip’s work in Frontiers, the essays in Bread Out of Stone most obviously 
resemble what has been described as the autobiographical turn in academic writing. However, 
this interpretation and classification is predicated on the assumption that Brand and Philip 
aspire to be judged against academic language and speech. Is the distinction between writing 
forms even relevant?  As the text quoted above suggests, Brand sees no separation between 
her politics, self and writing. The choice to remove her skin is not open to her as her colour 
always marks her difference (as does her gender and sexuality). Because she emphasises her 
writing as a political act, she cannot adopt the neutral voice, which, due to her identity, is not 
readily available to her anyway. On her writing she says: 
There is never room, though there is always risk. There is never the room that white 
writers have in never speaking for their whole race, yet in speaking the most secret and 
cowardly language of normalcy and affirmation, speaking for the whole race. (Bread 
Out of Stone 23) 
The possibility of not writing autobiographically—in a situated manner—is not so readily 
available (if at all?) to writers of colour who are constantly expected to articulate their racial 
and cultural differences.
59 Yet for them the risks involved in doing so are much greater since 
they risk being essentialised (and dismissed) as exotic other through a perceived naïve 
autobiographical stance, and/or seen to speak for their whole race. This dynamic—forced on 
them by their position as other—ironically reproduces the kind of universalising that keeps 
them at the margin. The rise of ficto-critical writing in the academy—with an increasing 
interest from white males—illustrates that (for many) the choice to write ficto-critically   237
reflects privilege. As Hiromi Goto—another author of ficto-critical texts—has written: “choice 
is a position of privilege/That needs to be addressed” (220.) In her work titled “Body Politic” 
she discusses with her usual wry humour the space she is forced into, and then marginalised 
for: 
  I can never unzip my skin 
  and step into another. 
  I am happy with my colour until someone points 
out how it clashes with my costume. 
I hold my culture in my hands and form it on my own, 
so that no one else can shape the way 
it lies upon my body. (“Body Politic” 220) 
Goto, primarily known for her creative writing, has also addressed issues of race through ficto-
criticism (and her fiction). For example, “Alien Texts, Alien Seductions: The Context of 
Colour Full Writing,” ficto-critically combines two generic styles. The first is a highly 
personalised subjective voice—suggestive of feminist writing—which we are encouraged to 
understand as the author, due to the use of “I” and the descriptions of events pertaining to her 
writing and its acceptance/non-acceptance. This is the voice of a woman writer who is 
Japanese Canadian, who writes “well aware of race,” and who addresses the writer directly 
asking hard questions about their attitude to “aliens” (266). The second generic form used is 
fiction. Interspersed throughout the essay are scenes of an alien abduction. Goto begins by 
stating that aliens have never abducted her, yet she still has a fascination for them. The 
opening paragraph self-reflexively engages with the kinds of discourses espoused by white 
people on the racialised other or alien. Her parodic use of the perception of the other by 
dominant white culture works in several ways. Firstly, it brings her own relationship to the 
other (the alien) into play: how does she alienate them? How does she colonise their voice? 
Secondly, it functions to bring into view for the white reader a consciousness around how they   238
may construct the narrator—a “Canasian”
 60—as exotic other. The personal tone of the essay-
like segments intensifies this process, since the alien is not out there, but here speaking to you. 
 
The fictional accounts of alien abduction work in a similar way in the sense that they 
undermine the neutrality of whiteness, and the reality of different perceptions. The first scene 
(“Scene 1 or Chapter 1”) of alien abduction is told from the perspective of a male human. Jim 
is obviously white, although he is not racialised, due to his central role in the story (alien 
abduction only happens to whites, doesn’t it?). In other words, we can only determine his race 
by applying the universal perspective of the dominant; this functions to make us aware as 
readers of the process of meaning making going. Jim wakes up to find himself on a cool 
smooth surface in the presence of an alien: “The figure was slight, short, could not have been 
over five feet in height. The head was large, hairless, with flattened facial features. It was the 
eyes, the alien eyes, black and horribly slanted” (263). As the text describing the abduction 
continues, marked by italic font, there is a slight slippage as the alien becomes more 
humanised. However, the story continues to be told from Jim’s perspective: “the alien’s visage 
was so—inscrutable.” In the next fictionalised scene of alien abduction we are shown events 
from the perspective of the alien.  We discover in the following scene (subtitled “Seen 1 Too 
Many”) that the alien is, in fact, a woman college student called Sharon. Jim is the intruder in 
her residential accommodation: her bed. This shifting point of view raises questions of 
audience, meaning making, perspective and the process of alienation. The ambiguity around 
Sharon’s race illustrates the desire to know and identify the other, and raises the question of 
appropriation and authenticity. Can she be alien, Asian, other and called Sharon? Jim 
describes her as slanty-eyed and inscrutable, but who determines identity and reality when 
perspective is so subjectively informed? Significantly, Goto extends her play on alien to 
include other alienated groups, reflecting on her own particular focus on race. She does not 
want to reproduce the same systems of exclusion, yet she makes no apologies for writing in   239
“Full Colour” (as the subtitle to this piece suggests). According to Goto, these alien abductions 
must end.  
 
The texts discussed only lightly touch on a substantial body of ficto-critical writing by 
Canadian writers of colour, which strategically play on the divide between fiction and non-
fiction to model the arbitrary divisions that allow the process of othering. These works refigure 
a range of majoritarian discourses, including history, subjectivity, heterosexuality, identity and 
family. As Goto’s text illustrates, ficto-criticism can be a powerful tool, which renders 
complex ideas and theories into critical fiction. The use of narrative devices do not detract 
from the validity of the opinion or argument put forth, as it would in an academic context. 
Instead, they actually constitute a substantive part of the argument. Yet, ficto-criticism 
requires one to step forth into new critical territories. For example, in a special issue of West 
Coast Line titled “Colour: An Issue” editors Roy Miki and Fred Wah describe their process of 
selection as being determined by a desire for writing that “unsettle[s] the unquestioned 
authority of certain controlling critical terminology” (preface). This issue of West Coast Line, 
therefore, contains many examples of ficto-critical writing. One of them is Aruna Srivastava 
and Ashok Mathur’s short piece titled: “Preston Terre Blanche, Snow White, and the Seven 
Deadly Disclaimers, or The Dos of Racism (a not so far off fairy tale).
61 “Their fairy tale is 
actually a list of comments from several academic and artistic gatherings in Alberta, and 
reveals the racism encountered in these situations by the writers who identify as anti-racist 
activists. Their work is interesting as it highlights the relationship between a materialist ficto-
critical practice and their work as activists. Both Srivastava and Mathur are academically 
trained and display their anger with the institutional structures of the university in perpetuating 
prejudice, despite claims to the contrary. In fact, Srivastava has written elsewhere about her 
frustration with what she sees as the hypocritical rhetoric of anti-racist and anti-sexist 
academic discourses.
62 Calling for praxis, something beyond academic analysis, she states:   240
As so many theorists of race and anti-racism have suggested, the only way to do 
cultural work is to recognize that it is, in fact, cultural work, not ‘purely’ or limitedly 
academic. The disciplines and isolation of institutional life make those of us who have 
complicated investments in academe, those of use who are subjected to the domination 
of institutional norms, histories, and denials, forget that it is working across these 
boundaries and borders, in coalitions (as fractious as these may be), that allows us to 
mount the most effective resistance. (125) 
This fragment comes from a paper by her on anti-racist teaching, which is written ficto-
critically. In this case, while the ficto-critical form is primarily autobiographical, it also 
contains an element of collage. In other words, Srivastava crosses generic borders as well as 
those between the institution and actual communities. Her text is highly personalised and 
connects her ficto-critical style with her anti-racist pedagogical approach. Srivastava 
articulates her failure, as she worries that her colleagues will judge her oral, fragmented and 
collaborative presentation as not constituting the work of a proper scholar (“Anti-Racism 
Inside and Outside the Classroom” 113). The self-policing that she experiences, which 
undercuts her confidence, is the internalised voice of academic discourse. Put another way, 
Srivastava articulates the difficulty she is experiencing in escaping the genre police, the 
institutional forces that render the body of the woman of colour silent. For Srivastava her anti-
racist and anti-sexist work requires her to write as an embodied subject. Yet, in another ficto-
critical work Srivastava lets the body speak even more inappropriately in an academic context.  
 
In a collaborative text with Louise Saldanha she allows the reader to witness her experience of 
being a South Asian woman who is chronically ill within the academy. Both Saldanha and 
Srivastava suffer serious illnesses including epilepsy, diabetes and lupus. Here, they speak 
plainly of the incompatibility of illness and the academy, both of which are intensified by their 
gender and race:   241
In academia, we valorize the mind over body split. Admitting to illness is a threat to 
rationality and order because it threatens our sense of control . . . Illness, like gender 
and race, becomes a character flaw: a sign of weakness, unreliability, vulnerability. 
(Saldanha and Srivastava 5) 
Therefore, like their racialised and gendered bodies, their illness brings the body very visibly 
into play within the context of the university, a milieu that relies on a polite, docile, absent and 
neutral body to actualise its knowledge production. As Salhanha and Srivastava state: “To be 
ill is to admit that your body is in the way; it is to be impolitely embodied” (5). By bringing 
their bodies back into play, by disclosing their illnesses, they make apparent the regulatory 
function of the tertiary institution: “To be ill, especially chronically ill, in the academy, then, is 
to realize how ubiquitous and complex the systematic regulation of our selves is” (6). As the 
examples listed above clearly show, ficto-critical writing at the hands of those situated at the 
margin has as its target the neutral, objective language and discursive practices of dominant 
culture. Within the academic environment this ficto-critical dynamic reaches its peak through 
bringing into sharp relief the function of normative academic writing in controlling, excluding 
and repressing the other. 
 
Another writer whose work powerfully articulates the effects of neutral objective truth or fact 
on those clearly at the margin is Lee Maracle. Her book I Am Woman: A Native Perspective on 
Sociology (1996), for example, analyses the effects of colonisation on First Nations peoples, 
and calls for readers to react to her stories with humanity. She does not present her analysis as 
objective or neutral. Written self-reflexively, Maracle makes no apologies for writing in first 
person with an acknowledged subjectivity. She states: “Few writers are willing to state their 
personal feelings about things before subjecting things to the cold light of analysis. I do not 
believe any opinion is free of bias and the preceding words reflect my particular biases” (103). 
Similarly, she challenges the division between fiction and non-fiction by showing that the 
story is always changing and arguing that this does not invalidate it (Maracle 5). Her work is   242
undoubtedly indebted to oral traditions, as is the work of European Canadian writers. Maracle, 
in her preface, makes the same connection as the other ficto-critical texts I have examined. 
This reinforces the early connection between minority positioning and ficto-criticism; hence 
the large number of texts by feminists and writers of colour that possess an in-between 
character. That is, these writers have identified the parallels between objective rational 
thinking, writing and processes of colonisation and domination:
63  
Women are not deserving of power because we are emotional beings, beings who are 
incapable of ‘objective, rational’ thinking. This is especially true of Native women, 
whose cultures require that we put our hearts and minds together in the thinking 
process. I have come to realize that all decision-making is subjective and emotional, 
that the rational thinkers among the Europeans struggled to rationalize their own 
emotional attitudes and re-name their beliefs in vain. It is ultimately better to face the 
feelings we have and struggle to grow from them to a better place than to deny the 
heart and make heartless decisions. (Maracle xi). 
While Maracle’s writing is not the sophisticated language-focused writing of fiction-theory it 
nevertheless embodies in its materiality and ficto-critical form a similar critique of 
majoritarian discourses of the nation state. Interestingly, Lynette Hunter has written in 
Outsider Notes (1996) about the critical embarrassment of academics when confronted with 
autobiographical texts by Native women writers, expressing an unease with their perceived 
lack of sophistication and describing these writings as indecorous. Hunter is not speaking 
specifically of Maracle’s work, yet her comments could be applied to Maracle given her 
personal and at times emotional tone. Maracle talks of the importance of heart; would this 
work in defence of a text’s value? The unease and embarrassment Hunter describes is a telling 
commentary on literary criticism in the academy and its role in the nation state, something that 
Hunter is also conscious of. She argues that these texts require that literary critics recognise 
that genre is used differently by different communities. Indeed, another Native writer, this 
time Jeannette Armstrong, has said that the development of new genres in Canada “is based on   243
an exploration of how Native traditions of expression can be applied to English literary 
tradition.” (Anderson 53). Questions of quality exclude texts perceived as theoretically 
unsophisticated, and yet the dissemination of these very important texts can be visibly 
increased if taught at university.
64 Because they fail to meet certain European standards of 
genre and sophistication, should they be excluded? According to Hunter there is a need to 
change the perception of these texts, which “are often dismissed by the institutions that teach 
literary criticism . . . as ‘low-status’” (146). This is another instance of the invalidation of 
knowledge not deemed important by those at the centre who construct disciplines. Maracle, 
however, argues for a valuing of community, love, spirituality and understanding.  Canada 
may have recognised the importance of shifting the perception of their own national 
literatures—to replace the English canon with Canadian writing—yet at this molecular level 
(if Hunter is right) there seems to be an inability to apply the same analysis to a different set of 
texts. Hunter calls for “engaged reading” as a means to overcome the problems of repression 
and appropriation often occurring to texts that stand outside the molar. Engaged reading is for 
Hunter a social action, which seeks to look at the difficulties and differences that texts from 
marginalised social groups present to mainstream readers and to work out ways to articulate 
those issues without repressing and appropriating. Could ficto-criticism work as a kind of self-
reflexive engaged reading? At its best it presents a powerful tool to redress the violence of 
representation and to dismantle the bifurcating structures of rational Western thought. For 
those at the margin it is a form of literary intervention that provides the author a means to 
question and critique the genres and forms that are historically linked to their oppression. Kim 
Scott’s Benang: From the Heart is an excellent example of the agency the ficto-critical form 
may provide to writers who speak from the edge, and who recognise that to be heard they must 
dismantle the discourses that deem compassion, heart, and feeling irrelevant to fact. Yet, are 
the implications of ficto-critical practice the same for those from the margin and centre? And 
will ficto-critical texts always reflect the politics suggestive in Hunter’s notion of an engaged 
reading practice?   244
Conclusion 
The diverse range of writing-between discussed in this chapter presents many differences and 
styles of ficto-critical writing. In the context of this thesis it is not expedient to examine in 
detail every, and all, ficto-critical writing in Canada. Rather than present the definitive ficto-
critical texts, here I have brought many together to highlight the commonality of their 
concerns in their multiplicity. The danger in this approach is the risk of eliding differences and 
this is in evidence here. At the same time, it is essential that I keep ficto-criticism open and 
multiple. Not doing so would suggest my failure to comprehend the centrality of ficto-critical 
experimentation as a means to imagine new ways of being in the world as a critical subject. 
What I have hoped to have shown is that what these diverse texts have in common is a focus 
on breaking down the universality and neutrality of supposed objective academic or critical 
writing. The works I have discussed demonstrate that, by bringing into play the other of 
academic discourse yet combining it with a critical (and often implicitly theoretical) analysis 
or position, ficto-criticism problematises the concepts of judgement, interpretation and 
representation. In addition, it mixes fact and fiction, self-reflexively entertaining its own 
fictionality as a means to situate itself socially and historically. In other words, ficto-criticism 
is a form of writing wrought out of the conflict over difference and minoritarian politics.
65 It is 
a highly political discourse that demonstrates the characteristics of a minor literature.
66 Ficto-
criticism as a process that enables an autopoetic conceptualisation of the self destabilises the 
traditional subject of academic critical writing and dissolves the mastery of official discourses. 
It also reveals the fiction of genre. Ficto-critical forms make a connection between the style of 
writing and the content, asking both writers and readers to examine at the level of form what 
structures of domination are in place in our own writing and reading practices. Many ficto-
critical works thus function as models for a mode of critical writing that does not colonise the 
object of its analysis, but attempts a reading of and with the text/subject; an empathetic 
engagement that understands subjectivity as informed by and changing with context and event.  
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In the next chapter I critically examine ficto-critical forms in order to assess whether they 
indeed do what they seem to suggest they do, answering the question whether ficto-criticism is 
necessarily an effective measure against the spectres of repression and appropriation.  
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1 The complete section on ficto-criticism from the original published interview by Ward (AW) with Jameson (FJ) 
reads as follows: 
AW: Do you think that the nature of ‘ficto-criticism’ is successful in undermining the ‘corrective’ power 
of criticism? 
FJ: ‘Ficto-criticism’ makes a lot of sense to me. It is very clear that there has been a flowing together of 
theory and criticism. It seems that theory can’t exist without telling little narrative stories and then at this 
point of criticism, criticism seems very close to simply telling stories. It is an advanced and energetic 
form of conceptual criticism. (1987: 9) 
In the Muecke and King paper, they begin their citation from “It is very clear . . ..” 
2 Other Canadian writers on the visual arts that write ficto-critically include Lorne Falk, Anne Brydon and Sigrid 
Dahle. See, for example, Falk’s “L is for Letting Go,” in semiotext(e) canadas (1994: 295).  
3 Randolph has recently published a new collection of essays titled Why Stoics Box: Essays on Art and Society 
(2003) also published by YYZ books.  
4 See also Gary Ditchburn’s 1993 MA thesis “The Search for Criteria in Theory-Based Criticism,” presented at 
York University, Ontario. Ditchburn dedicates much of his thesis to attacking and undermining Randolph’s ficto-
critical practice, which he aligns with poststructuralism. He describes her writing as slack, uncritical (184), 
dogmatic and failing to measure up to his criteria for good art criticism (1993: v).  
5 The second reference to ficto-criticism is in Gaile McGregor’s review of several new Canadian publications 
titled “The Mainstreaming of Postmodernism: A Status Report on the ‘New’ Scholarship in Canada.” Published 
in 1989 in the Journal of Canadian Studies this lengthy article reviewed two new visual arts journals Vanguard 
and Parachute. Under the subheading “Artwriting” McGregor discusses Randolph’s work. She says: “Randolph’s 
most interesting contribution . . . is her experimentation with a genre she calls ficto-criticism” (1989:152). 
6 Published in Culture Lab (1993: 49-58). 
7 Jeanne Randolph, personal interview, 19
th Oct. 1999. 
8 Van Herk’s first novel won the Seal First Novel Award and was subsequently published in the United States, 
England and Europe. Several of her books have been translated (Judith, The Tent Peg and No Fixed Address) into 
other languages, including: German, Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish, French and Italian. In Contemporary 
Canadian and US Women of Letters by Thomas Gerry, ficto-criticism is used to describe van Herk’s text In-
Visible Ink.  
9 Notably van Herk has also visited Australia several times and presented her work at conferences. 
10 My own introduction to the term was, indeed, through van Herk’s writing, taught in an undergraduate creative 
writing class by Anne Brewster at Curtin University, Perth, Western Australia. Brewster also included work by 
Nicole Brossard and Hélène Cixous in the readings for this creative writing class. 
11 Personal interview.  12
th July 1998. 
12 For instance, Yasmin Ladha, a student of van Herk’s at the University of Calgary, describes her Masters in 
Creative Writing titled “Circum the Gesture” (1993) as ficto-criticism; Ladha’s thesis was published as Women 
Dancing on Rooftops (1997). Kim Suvan’s Masters “Humbling Heroines: A Ficto-Critical Investigation of Fairy 
Tale Motifs” (1997) was also supervised by van Herk, as was “Remailed: Post-ing ‘The Drover’s Wife’” by 
Elizabeth Dozois (1991). All of these theses have had ficto-criticism applied by the authors to describe aspects of 
the writing. 
13 van Herk Papers, University of Calgary, Alberta. 
14 Art Index is an electronic database that indexes articles in international arts publications, yearbooks, museum 
bulletins, exhibition lists and film reviews from 1984 onwards. 
15 In an email to me Grenville confirmed his understanding that ficto-criticism was Randolph’s term (25 March 
2000).  
16 In the first book in this series by George Bowering, Imaginary Hand: Essays, Kamboureli speaks of the Writer 
as Critic series as inviting readers to read criticism as literature. Linking his notion with the work of writers such 
as Lyotard, Blanchot and Derrida, she suggests that this approach to criticism is common in Canada (1988: vii). 
17 This paper was given in November 1988 at Toward a History of the Literary Institution V in Edmonton, 
Alberta, and in April 1989 at the Blurring Genres Conference in Calgary, Alberta. 
18 Coincidentally, van Herk discusses another reviewer’s reaction to her writing-between. She has stated: “There 
was a recent review of The Oxford Anthology of Short Fiction by Women, which said that In Visible Ink wasn’t a 
story and didn’t ‘belong’ in the anthology. This kind of orthodox admonition makes me crazy; women write in all 
kinds of ways . . .” (qutd. in Tihanyi 2000: 54).   247
                                                                                                                                
19 This is an entertaining book on the history of the footnote. Published in 1997 it indicates the increasing self-
consciousness around the conventions of writing, particularly scholarly writing. 
20 For example, see Leona Gom’s review where she states: “I would prefer to find more such literary analyses in 
such unacademic places” (1991: 126). 
21 Appendix to Katja-Elisabeth Pfrommer’s Diss. “Metafiktion und Genre-Blurring in Aritha van Herks [sic] 
Places Far From Ellesmere und In Visible Ink” (1997: 90-6). 
22 This has been variously translated, and is also known in English as: “Writing I am woman is full of 
consequences” (Forsyth, 1978: 31). 
23 On the influence of Brossard on writers and critics from Quebec, see Forsyth, “Nicole Brossard and the 
Emergence of Feminist Literary Theory in Quebec Since 1970” (1987: 211). Alice Parker also describes Brossard 
as a writer of now “imposing status” (1998: 3). 
24 Brossard quoted in and translated by Parker, states, “we have to credit writing in the feminine with a 
decompartmentalization of genres.” (1998: 8). 
25 Much of the work performed by Brossard is, for example, reliant on her play on French grammar, in particular 
gender agreements. In English there is no equivalent, it is therefore reasonable to suggest that even with an 
excellent translation some of the subtleties will have been lost. 
26 Barbara Godard et al., “Theorizing Fiction Theory.” See also Alice Parker, Liminal Visions of Nicole Brossard  
(1998:7). Earlier texts by Brossard also demonstrate much in common with her fiction-theory in These Our 
Mothers. For example, see Turn of a Pang (1976), originally published in French as Sold-Out (1973). 
27 See Brossard’s Daydream Mechanics (1980), for example. The format of the book is long and slim, and the 
text is only present along the very top of the page: Brossard frequently experiments with the white space of the 
page in relation to the text.  
28 Another key text of fiction-theory by Brossard is The Ariel Letter (1988) (originally in French La lettre arienne 
(1985)). 
29 See also Patricia Smart’s paper titled “Voices of Commitment and Discovery: Women Writers in Quebec” 
(1978: 17-18). 
30 See also Alice Parker’s Liminal Visions of Nicole Brossard (1998: 1). 
31 La Barre du Jour ran under this title from 1965-76, becoming La Nouvelle Barre du Jour in 1977. 
32 See Patricia Smart’s paper “Voice of Commitment and Discovery,” where she says of the 1977 special issue of 
La Barre du Jour on feminism: “[it] can be frustrating on a first reading, for they consciously avoid the logic, 
linearity and rationalism of what is considered a bankrupt male intellectual tradition and seek instead a blend of 
poetry and theory which allows for depth, verification of theory by experience and the gradual emergence of the 
idea. The barriers between the traditional genres of the ‘essay’ and ‘creative writing’ are ignored” (1978: 15-16). 
33 According to Cotnoir, Brossard’s Masculin grammaticale (1974) reworks Irigaray’s Speculum of the Other 
Woman and This Sex Which Is Not One. 
34 Within the realm of renowned French women theorists Hélène Cixous’ work on écriture féminine would 
appear to intersect strongly with “writing in the feminine” by Quebec women writers. However, as Karen Gould 
points out, there is a significant difference between Cixous’ approach and that of Quebec women writers: in 
Quebec “writing in the feminine” is gender-specific, it is not a practice available to men. Cixous, however, 
believes that all men have access to the feminine and thus can also write in the feminine (1990: 38). 
35 Whilst Lamy is speaking more generally about the multiplicity of Quebec women writers’ texts, the same can 
be applied to Brossard’s work. 
36 Forsyth lists Bataille, Barthes, Lacan and Derrida as influential on the Barre du Jour group in “The Political in 
the Work of Nicole Brossard” (1985: 160).  
37 In “Virginia and Colette” Gail Scott speaks of her early introduction to ideas not as easily accessible to 
Anglophones (1986: 34). 
38 See Lola Lemire Tostevin’s ‘sophie for an example of fiction-theory, which is, in part, a feminist critique of 
Derrida. The apostrophe signalling absence: (philo) ‘sophie. Tostevin is highly critical of Derrida’s failure in a 
seminar to be consistent with his theories:  
In spite of claims that his deconstructive method of analysis allies itself with the voiceless, the marginal 
and the repressed, Jacques Derrida doesn’t much care for questions by women. During the seminars of 
his two week course, The Political Theology of Language, he spent at least fifteen minutes 
disseminating most questions from men, while he only spends two or three minutes disseminating 
questions from women and even then he manages to trivialize them to the point of eliciting laughs from   248
                                                                                                                                
the class. If in his texts, Derrida likes to question the masters, in his classes master and students stay in 
their respective places. In Derrida’s seminars women remain seminally divided. Keep to the margins to 
bear witness to what he tells. (1988: 45) 
39 Fiction-theory is probably the term most often applied to writing-between in Canada. For example, Christl 
Verduyn reads Margaret Atwood’s Murder in the Dark as fiction-theory. See her paper titled “Murder in the 
Dark: fiction/theory by Margaret Atwood” (1986: 124-31). Marlatt has used the term fictionanalysis, and others 
have used biotext, and biofiction. Academic Lorri Neilson, based at Mt St Vincent University in Halifax, uses the 
expression “arts-based inquiry” to describe a practice that results in a text that could be described as ficto-
criticism. In this approach the focus is on the research methodology., which (as the expression suggests) is an 
approach to academic research that is creative. For an overview of what constitutes “arts-based inquiry see AJER 
(Alberta Journal of Educational Research), issue 48.3 (2002). Neilson has also edited with Ardra L. Cole and J. 
Gary Knowles The Art of Writing Inquiry (2001), published by Backalong Books and The Centre for Arts-
informed Research, Halifax, Nova Scotia.  
40 See Scott’s “Virginia and Colette on the Outside Looking In” where she discusses the influence of French 
writing generally, and Quebec feminist writing, on her own work. Marlatt also acknowledges the “theoretical 
energy” of Quebec feminist writers as stimulating in her collection Readings from the Labyrinth  (1998: 9). 
41 In the preface to this notable collection of ficto-criticism Scott suggests t it is that her feminist practice that has 
led her toward a sense of the essay as both fictional and self-reflexive: “In other words, a text where the 
everyday, the political, the cultural meet, risking syntax in the process of position and dissolving ‘meaning’ 
(notably the traces of male dominance), and the (traditional female) subject” (1989: 10). Lorna Jackson explores 
Scott’s Spaces Like Stairs as an example of the dissolution of the boundary between the literary and the critical, 
in the process undermining the authority of the conventional academic essay. See Lorna Jackson’s MA thesis 
“Writer/Critic/Hysteric: Who’s (Reading) Who in Spaces Like Stairs, Errata, and Talking” (1993). 
42 Marlatt also talks of her experience as an English immigrant, and the way in which her accent and use of words 
marked her as different.  Earth, for example, was dirt in Canada, and the woods were bush. Of this linguistic 
difference Marlatt says: “you experience the first split between name and thing, signifier and signified.” Her 
experience in Penang as a child also added to her sense of displacement on arrival in Canada. Their Englishness 
even more marked through an already articulated nostalgia for England, as her mother (”Mummy”) worked hard 
to maintain her children’s “Englishness.” Marlatt says that “It leads to an interest in and curiosity about language, 
a sense of how language shapes the reality you live in . . .” Readings from the Labyrinth (1998: 23). 
43 In the Feminine:Women and Words/Les Femmes et les Mots (1985) are the published conference proceedings 
for the Women and Words conference.  This text demonstrates the kind of energy circulating around feminism 
and women’s writing at this time in Canada (Ed. by Ann Dybikowski, Victoria Freeman, Daphne Marlatt, 
Barbara Pulling and Betsy Warland).  
44 See also the publication Telling It: Women Across Cultures (1990), which resulted from the conference by the 
same name, held in Vancouver in 1988. 
45 In “Representation and Exchange: Feminist Periodicals and the Production of Cultural Value” Godard 
discusses the problems that feminist journals face when competing for funding. She argues: “The institutional 
desire for purity, for upholding the law of genre with its norm of disinterestedness, positioned the hybrid 
publishing ventures of feminism with its explicitly engaged art-making on the margins” (1997:1 11). Tessera met 
with some of the criteria for funding (quality and Canadianness), however, according to Godard it failed to attract 
a wide readership (ultimately the price paid for its innovation) and thus overall failed the funding criteria. This 
placed the journal in a contradictory position, as in order to widen its readership it would have to become less 
experimental.  
46 Tessera 19 (1995). 
47 For another example of ficto-criticism by Soros, see “’Anorexia:’ Flesh Speaking Word.” Tessera 23 (1997: 
60-7). 
48 Some examples of ficto-criticism published in Fireweed are Rozena Maart’s “Language and Consciousness,” 
Kyo Maclear’s “Not in So Many Words: Translating Silence Across ‘Difference,’” and  “Oxalá” by Ana Dos 
Santos.  See Works Cited for details. 
49 Room of One’s Own 14.4. In this issue, for example, Charlene Diehl-Jones and Aritha van Herk, in their work 
titled “diallage,” playfully celebrate the need for creative play which is closed down by rules and convention, 
such as narrative closure. According to Susan MacFarlane in the introduction to this issue, Diehl-Jones and van   249
                                                                                                                                
Herk’s “diallage” illustrates the “interdependence of fiction and theory,” their style adding a further dimension to 
their content (1991: 5). 
50 See Nicole Shurkin-Simpson’s “ESSAIII!!!” in Prairie Fire 16.3 (1995): 139-48. From a materialist feminist 
perspective Shurkin-Simpson explores the essay form. This piece again links the personal, feminism and ficto-
criticism.  
51 Canadian Fiction Magazine hosted the third issue of Tessera. See number 57 (1986). 
52 Edited by Wendy Waring. Toronto: Women’s P, 1994. Reprinted in 1998. 
53 Edited by Libby Scheier, Sarah Sheard and Eleanor Wachtel. Toronto: Coach House, 1990. 
54 Williamson’s Crybaby! is an excellent example of ficto-criticism. 
55 Bannerji is a writer who has written extensively on the established critical method. See her contribution to 
Literary Pluralities (1998) edited by Christyl Verduyn. See also Bannerji’s collection Thinking Through: Essays 
on Feminism, Marxism, and Anti-Racism (1995). 
56 See Walter Benjamin’s “The Storyteller: Reflections on the Works of Nikolai Leskov” for a full discussion on 
storytelling as a social act entrenched in the experiential. Unlike the novel that relies on a solitary individual 
reader, storytelling is based on a tradition linked directly to experience. Benjamin laments the demise of 
storytelling, which he argues was overcome by the novel with the invention of printing. According to Benjamin 
the audience of storytelling is left to interpret “things the way he [sic] understands them, and thus the narrative 
achieves an amplitude that information lacks” (1969: 89). In the context of Philip’s piece—with its oral 
storytelling tone—ficto-criticism is set in opposition to normative critical writing as the model for imparting the 
facts. 
57 In “Whos’ Listening” Philip addresses the question of audience, articulating the difficulties that those who are 
colonised have in reaching their audience. Who is their audience? The question of audience is foremost for those 
at the margin.  If they choose to write out of their tradition, they risk alienating their own communities (since they 
are often better versed in the traditions of the coloniser). At the same time, they risk being stereotyped as exotic 
other through identifying with their own culture. This dilemma reflects the double bind articulated by the 
centre/margin paradigm (1995; 129-49).  
58 Whilst racism is a focus of these writers, they do not only critique racism and colonisation. Sexuality, gender, 
and class also figure in their writings. 
59 As Harris writes, the “I” spoken is not a naïve autobiographical usage. It is instead an “I” constructed in 
narrative that is located in a specific body (of a female African); it is neither disembodied nor universal. 
60 See “Translating the Self: Moving Between Cultures” (1996: 112). Goto adopts the label of “Canasian” in a 
sarcastic tone, conscious of the racism inherent in such a label. 
61 In other works, Mathur uses the term biotext to describe a critical practice that is situated in his experience. See 
“The Margin is the Message: On Mistry, Mukherjee and In Between.” His novel Once Upon an Elephant (1998) 
is fiction, although it incorporates postcolonial theory such as Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak,” and is clearly 
a critique of racism in Canada. He has also published another short ficto-critical work as part of the exhibition 
Taking it to the Streets; titled “Trouble Makers in Training: Notes Towards Anti-Racist (art) Activism,” Mathur 
critiques the failure of academics to incorporate praxis in their academic lives. He states: “These academics often 
contain themselves solely within academic circles, expressing belief that their work, which may critique racism in 
numerous venues, is best performed only at (but rarely against) academic institutions” (1998: 28). 
62 See, for example, her co-authored essay with Louise Saldanha titled “Why Do We Do This Anti-Racist Work 
in the Classroom?” The article is structured as a dialogue between Saldanha and Srivastava and articulates 
dissatisfaction between the institutional conventions and the kinds of practices that help enable anti-racist 
teaching in the university. Both write in a highly personal manner, discussing both successes and failures (1998: 
4-11).  
63 See Nicole Ward Jouve’s book White Woman Speaks With Forked Tongue: Criticism as Autobiography as an 
example of another argument for writing ficto-critically. She argues: “Thinking is not the management of 
thought, as alas it is too often taken to mean these days. Thinking means putting everything on the line, taking 
risks, finding out what the actual odds are, not sheltering behind a pretend and in any case fallacious and 
transparent objectivity” (1991: 5). 
64 My assumption that these texts are important is based on an understanding that they present opportunities for 
readers to address racial stereotyping and provide an alternative perspective from the literature of European 
Canadian writers.   250
                                                                                                                                
65 In Captivity Tales (1993) Elizabeth Hay brings together a number of different genres.The text is written from 
the perspective of a Canadian woman living in New York and explores different stories about Canadians in New 
York (mainly historical). The narrative includes the character’s story of the research process, mixed in with 
personal reflection and detail. Significantly, one of the main themes of the book is the position of Canada in 
relation to America, exploring Canadian identity and the relationship between the two countries. Although the 
book appears as fiction I believe it also functions as a critical text—indeed—a ficto-critical text. What is 
interesting is that, again, the minoritarian position of the narrator seems to have informed the generic choices. 
66 Significantly, Canadian postcolonial theorist Diana Brydon has identified “postcolonial fictocritique” as a 
focus of her research in progress (“The Ends of Postcolonialism: Challenges and Limits”). This is important since 
clearly Brydon is identifying the practice as one that has relevance to postcolonial discourse in its function as a 
minor literature. Some of the writers she intends to discuss include those examined in this thesis: Gail Jones, Lee 
Maracle, Marlene Nourbese Philip, Aritha van Herk and Ashok Mathur. Online. Google. 17 Nov 2003. 
http://publish.uwo.ca/~dbrydon/dynamic/research.html   251
chapter six 
Risking the self, risking the other1 
 
Introduction 
The final chapter draws together the main thesis arguments by illustrating the complexity of 
the issues arising in relation to ficto-criticism. Does ficto-criticism really signal the exhaustion 
of traditional critical conventions to the point where they will no longer have any relevance? 
Does the emergence of something identifiable as ficto-criticism mean that we are reaching a 
state of post-criticism as Gregory Ulmer’s term would suggest? These are the questions I 
explore in this final chapter. 
 
Through carrying out close readings of several ficto-critical texts—whilst remaining attendant 
to their micro-politics—this chapter examines the success of ficto-criticism in countering the 
colonising forces of normative academic discourse, as a means to measure its revolutionary 
potential. In the process I continue to establish the heterogeneity of writing-between. By 
examining both the author function and the use of autobiographical detail employed in ficto-
critical texts, I show that not all ficto-criticism is as radical as it may seem on first 
examination. For instance, ficto-critical texts that appear primarily as creative texts may never 
manage to undermine established ways of knowing and the conventions they rely on since 
they are too easily reappropriated as mere literature and discharged of their critical intent. 
Thus, through these close readings I reaffirm the ficto-critical author’s need for constant self-
reflexive attention to the text’s micro-politics. If ficto-criticism is to really disrupt the mastery 
and colonising violence of critical writing it must be freed from prescriptive rules of 
interpretation or analysis. Similarly, when ficto-criticism is removed from the system of 
binaries that normative academic discursive tradition relies on, the questions it raises become 
much more complex. In this context, it may be tempting to launch into broad generalities to 
contain ficto-criticism’s excessive and contradictory elements. However, detailed and specific   252
case studies reinforce what ficto-criticism attempts to grapple with: that truths imposed from 
above repress the difference and a multiplicity implicit in all knowledge. As I demonstrate in 
this chapter, ficto-criticism must self-reflexively focus on risking the self, rather than merely 
continue to jeopardise the other in the masterful tradition of dominant critical writing. In other 
words, it is not enough to superficially or temporarily undermine one’s mastery of the subject 
of critical attention. Instead, one must take consistent and considerable risks with one’s own 
identity and critical style to undo the will to power.   
 
The texts that I examine in this chapter are Smaro Kamboureli’s critical work Scandalous 
Bodies: Diasporic Literature in English Canada (2000), one of Robert Kroestch’s 
“postmodern” essays titled “The Moment of the Discovery of America Continues,” and Dany 
Laferriére’s “non-fiction fiction” Why Must a Black Writer Write About Sex? (1994).
2 
Readings of these texts will, firstly, reaffirm the complexity of the issues arising in relation to 
ficto-criticism and, secondly, begin to address the question of whether ficto-criticism actually 
marks the end of critical writing as we know it. Since I am reading ficto-criticism as 
symptomatic of specific historical conditions and writing-between, it is necessary to think 
through the intensities of ficto-criticism at a micro-political level through specific texts. The 
different speaking positions of these authors, and their varying identities and backgrounds, 
illustrate the reason why case-by-case studies are required, and how the reading of ficto-
criticism varies tremendously depending on the material conditions of the text’s production. 
As I show in view of Kamboureli’s and Kroetsch’s texts, some expressions of ficto-criticism 
are more easily absorbed into institutional practices since they neither risk the author’s 
authority or identity, nor do they actually challenge the colonising function of critical writing. 
Laferriére’s text, in turn, makes clear that the disruption of literary convention has different 
meanings, depending on the author’s speaking position and, in particular, their own position of 
power. 
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Scandalous Bodies 
Smaro Kamboureli, in the first chapter to her last critical book, begins by discussing her recent 
experience of “‘political paralysis,’ an ‘inability to make difficult critical choices,’ and, along 
with that, a reluctance to commit to the fixity of words on the page” (1). In the period leading 
up to writing Scandalous Bodies: Diasporic Literature in English Canada (2000), Kamboureli 
seems to have reached a “critical impasse” in her academic career, a difficulty “in negotiating, 
let alone incorporating into [her] study, what both personal experience and theoretical insight 
compelled [her] to confront” (3). What Kamboureli appears to be articulating in this 
introductory chapter (“Critical Correspondences”) is a frustration with the slippage/s between 
her theoretical and intellectual position and the lived reality of her experience as a woman, 
academic, Canadian, and diasporic Greek. In relation to the whole book, Kamboureli’s first 
chapter is significant as it moves towards enunciating many of the issues that both inform and 
influence ficto-critical discourse; a discourse that implies the exhaustion of traditional modes 
of critical and theoretical writing. In the context of ficto-critical discourse, therefore, 
Kamboureli’s critical or secondary text thus becomes the primary text for analysis. 
Significantly, in her first (and highly personal) chapter, she relates her concerns about the 
relevance of her work and argues for a more contingent, self-reflexive approach to critical 
analysis. Yet, while her first chapter’s features are clearly ficto-critical, the rest of the chapters 
are consistent with normative academic writing (perhaps only with some minor variations). 
The complex tension between the first and following chapters, and the possible readings of her 
text as a whole, makes Scandalous Bodies a very relevant starting point to begin the ensuing 
discussion on whether ficto-criticism achieves what popular conceptual framings suggest. In 
fact, the discussion of Kamboureli’s Scandalous Bodies makes evident the conditions that 
appear to have contributed to what she describes as her critical impasse, and foregrounds the 
similarities between these influencing and those that inform ficto-criticism.  
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As the texts examined in the thesis thus far illustrate, ficto-criticism is a discourse that 
implicitly critiques the universality of traditional critical objectivity on which majoritarian 
discourses rely. Kamboureli’s critical crisis similarly appears informed by an increasing or 
renewed unease with the complicity between the academy and the nation state. She recalls the 
period in which her critical crisis found its beginnings: “This was the time of the presumed 
certainties of political correctness, the ‘politics of blame’ (Said 1986, 45) and vociferous 
advocacies, but also a period of global upheavals” (1). Significantly, the period that 
Kamboureli identifies as marking the beginnings of her critical paralysis—the age of political 
correctness—began in the 1980s. This is the same period when ficto-critical texts were 
becoming increasingly visible. This is no coincidence as both Kamboureli’s anxiety and ficto-
criticism are responses to a number of effects, including the destabilisation of truth and 
authority as foundations of academic discourse. In fact, the molecular multiplicity of 
marginalised voices questioning the molar lines of the academy and society appear to have 
informed Kamboureli’s anxiety over her role as an academic and critic. In view of this, she 
states: 
As academics, we have learned to tread gingerly on these paths of [colonial] history. 
Indeed, those ‘labelled,’ and others like them, are no longer the objects of our studies; 
they are the subjects of their own discourse—at least that is what many of us 
academics argue. But who are we? Whose interests do we represent beyond our own 
academic interests? Who do we write for, and why? . . . And, for that matter, what is 
the range of states of being and mind that colonialism covers? Does self-location, that 
most frequently recurring and debated issue today, suffice to immunize academic 
discourse against the perils of representation (speaking for or about others), against the 
politics of the institutions that we are complicit with—however strong our avowed 
desire to change them? What cultural and political dynamics does the theatre of the 
classroom dramatize? How do we as individuals negotiate our political stance vis-à-vis   255
the history of both ideas and of the institutions in whose contexts we teach? 
(Scandalous Bodies 2)  
The dynamics she describes—underwritten by contemporary theories of domination—seem to 
have informed Kamboureli’s reappraisal of her critical approach. In her chapter she appears to 
be asking herself why colonising systems remain so pervasive despite rigorous academic 
analyses and critiques (including her own). Symptomatic of the current crisis in critical writing 
suggested by ficto-criticism, the quotation above demonstrates Kamboureli’s anxiety around 
her complicity with an economy of institutionalised domination that represents and represses 
those at the margin. It must be noted that Kamboureli’s desire to question her own complicity 
with the institution and nation state appears informed by pressure from within the academy, 
that is, her peers, to interrogate the neutral, disembodied position of traditional academia. As 
argued earlier, in the academic world to be embodied is a political act since this world’s 
functionality relies on disembodiment and author evacuated prose. Kamboureli asks how she 
fits within these debates, and what her responsibilities are as a diasporic critic. 
 
Kamboureli’s anxiety over her role in maintaining systems of domination illustrates the 
increasing pressure on academics to think through their role and relation to the centre. The 
same dynamic also explains the association between some ficto-critical writers and the notion 
of the popular academic who writes for the people, signalling a desire to break down the ivory 
tower of academia and influence social change more directly. What do academics contribute to 
society and how can they best make that contribution? Whilst clearly informed by concerns 
around the repression and representation of the other (as the quotation from Kamboureli 
demonstrates), economic changes have also influenced the growing need to respond to such 
questions. For example, as funding to universities is squeezed, academics must increasingly 
justify their role. The need for justification in this economic climate is often more intense for 
scholars in the humanities, as they must answer questions from both inside and outside the 
academy about the relevance of their work to the university and society more broadly. While   256
the sciences appear as more immediately practical and generative of funding, employment and 
industry, what is the contribution of the humanities? Kamboureli acknowledges these 
pressures, suggesting that they have factored in her need to think through these issues.
3 
Ironically, as the humanities become more interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary as well as 
less concerned with fixed notions of truth, authority and knowledge, economic pressures on 
universities to become corporations could potentially see a return to departmental and 
disciplinary structuring. It might also see a return to an emphasis on objective scientific 
language in the humanities, as a way to justify their value. However, as Kamboureli’s critical 
impasse demonstrates—as does the critique engendered in ficto-criticism—objective neutral 
language remains overall the dominant practice in universities despite changes to theoretical 
and disciplinary modalities. Yet, given all these complicated and somewhat contradictory 
details, it still appears reasonable to suggest that Kamboureli’s crisis is in part driven by a 
consciousness of the failure of cultural and literary criticism to fulfil its traditional role of 
providing answers to current cultural and social malaise (even though theoretically it may no 
longer be deemed appropriate).
4 To put it differently, what is the use of the humanities since 
they appear to have failed to achieve their disciplinary goal? The humanities, therefore, find 
themselves in a double bind. To truly develop strategies for creating a better world free of 
discrimination—to make them more valuable to society—they need to interrogate their own 
complicity with such systems. And this includes the alienating and colonising role of 
conventional modes of academic writing. At the same time, there is immense pressure on 
academics to conform to more traditional pedagogical practices and disciplinary boundaries as 
students become clients; vessels to be filled with applied knowledge so that they may find 
employment.
5 Put another way, desire for social change is constantly caught by the molar lines 
of the nation state. This double bind illustrates the difficulties in making absolute statements in 
relation to ficto-criticism, and marks a specific and potentially critical moment in pedagogy, 
particularly within the humanities. Theoretically the humanities are not responsible for finding 
the answer to society’s malaise, yet socially, politically and economically they need to justify   257
their worth. Ironically, despite her theoretical position and her critique of the history of ideas, 
Kamboureli’s struggle would appear underwritten by a desire to fulfil the traditional role of 
the humanities. Her crisis is marked by an underlying concern about potentially failing her 
critical and political project. 
 
The politics of self-location 
As Kamboureli signals, the response of many academics in the humanities to questions about 
their contribution to social change has been to situate themselves in their critical writing, 
identifying their position in terms of their relation to the centre or the margins. This is a 
reaction to difficult questions about the academic’s role colonising processes (such as, the 
violence of representation) and about their value to society. Concerned about their relation to 
the centre, academics have begun to declare themselves in their texts in terms of their racial, 
sexual, class and gendered identity. It must be noted that this generally superficial practice of 
self-location often stems from privilege; a guilty realisation of one’s advantage in the face of 
the sort of vociferous advocacies Kamboureli speaks of. To have the choice of self-
disclosure—that is, either to refute the neutral universal voice of academic writing or continue 
speaking in that way—one must be in a central position in the first place. For Kamboureli the 
answer does not, however, lie in a politics of self-location. Interestingly, self-location through 
autobiographical detail is often enacted in ficto-critical texts. The act of self-location in 
academic writing thus functions like a very mild form of ficto-criticism, in that it attempts to 
acknowledge the power relations at work behind the conditions of its production.  While it 
nominally introduces the notion of an embodied academic, it is not a very effective response to 
the violence of representation, working as a weak, untheorised panacea that fails to adequately 
address the specificity of texts and their production. Kamboureli is right in being suspicious of 
such unsophisticated almost knee-jerk responses, but even she seems drawn into declaring her 
position. Her opening chapter functions with some degree of self-location through its 
autobiographical detail, as she speaks quite intimately about her critical impasse. Ironically,   258
given the personal nature of this chapter, Kamboureli is highly critical of self-location and the 
pressure she feels on her as an academic to place herself in terms of an assumed authenticity.
6 
She argues that her subjectivity is not fixed and her hybrid position as diasporic critic, 
(privileged) academic, and Greek woman makes it more difficult for her to place herself in 
terms of some authentically marginal or central position: 
The pressure I felt to position myself, instead of resolving my tensions, kept pointing 
to various layers of my subjectivity, revealing my identity to be unsettled, continuously 
disrupted, determined by different alliances on different occasions. (5) 
Kamboureli thus rejects the act of self-location as an adequate answer to the problems implicit 
in the representation of the other in academic writing. How can she define herself in such 
reified absolutes when her subjectivity is already hybridised? The alternative to self-location, 
that is, traditional academic objective neutrality, is obviously even less appealing to her, as she 
is more than conversant with the theoretical hypocrisy such a role would engender. How does 
Kamboureli resolve these issues? What do the increasing economic, theoretical, and ethical 
pressures on academics really mean for academic research and writing?  
 
The contemporary theories that underwrite Kamboureli’s reluctance to situate herself have 
been established in Australian and Canadian universities for some years. These theories, which 
inform cultural and literary studies, critique our commonsense ways of being in the world that 
often collude with the oppression of difference. Yet, as Kamboureli concedes, little has 
changed for those at the margin who continue to live with the reality of prejudice. Her 
professional crisis signals how easily theories that challenge institutional knowledge such as 
poststructuralism, deconstruction, feminism, and postcolonialism can be taught in universities 
in abstract terms. They are often enlisted as theoretical tools to read the forces of power at 
work in texts “over there,” without any requirement that they could be applied at the 
individual, micro-political or local and institutional levels. Whilst contemporary theory has 
been influential in sparking the anxieties underlying Kamboureli’s crisis and ficto-criticism, it   259
alone has not been enough to cause significant shifts. This, I believe, reflects the continuing 
division between mind and body, public and private and non-fiction and fiction. Yet, at least 
for some ficto-critical writers, such as Kamboureli, these arbitrary binaries are no longer taken 
as given. Her palpable anxiety illustrates this well. The critical impasse expressed within 
Kamboureli’s opening chapter is thus significant and interesting as it demonstrates the 
difficulties facing academics, pedagogical practice and universities as their left-liberal 
emancipatory politics are being thoroughly interrogated, particularly by voices from the 
margin. Even literature is speaking back, metafictively incorporating its own critical 
commentary. As Kamboureli has suggested, the objects of academic study are now the 
subjects of their own discourse. Their arrival has helped cause an examination of individual 
politics at the micro-political level, including one’s writing and teaching style. Her struggle 
over these issues is fundamental to understanding the forces productively informing ficto-
critical discourse and the historical conditions that have aided its recognition and circulation.  
 
Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse, for example, articulate the effect of the 
increasing pressure on academics during the 1980s to address the politics of their own 
practices. In The Violence of Representation: Literature and the History of Violence (1989) 
they say:  
As American academics at this moment in history, we feel it is somehow dishonest to 
speak of power and violence as something that belongs to the police or the military, 
something that belongs to and is practiced by someone and somewhere else. (4) 
How easy is it to escape the violence of representation? How does one remain in the university 
and effect change? How long can most academics continue to work without actively applying 
a critical analysis to their own practices and privileged position, particularly when the analysis 
of power, representation and ideology is their focus?  
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Kamboureli, however, manages to resolve her anxieties by articulating a working solution to 
her concerns about her role in the violence implied in representing others. Scandalous Bodies 
is testament to her success in finding an answer to her personal and intellectual dilemma 
brought on by these factors. Moved beyond her political paralysis, and refusing to enter into a 
politics of self-location, she develops a manifesto calling for a self-reflexive and responsible 
practice, which she names “negative pedagogy.”
7 According to Kamboureli, negative 
pedagogy stands in opposition to positive pedagogy. For example, instead of teaching 
understood as a teleological narrative, negative pedagogy “redefines the object of knowledge 
as nothing other than the process leading towards ignorance” (25). Within this concept, 
Kamboureli is thus encoding a critique of enlightenment narratives. As a result, in negative 
pedagogy both teacher and student are learners; a process in which there is no pretence of non-
complicity or innocence in relation to power systems and their reinforcement through 
knowledge production. According to Kamboureli, “[w]hat this [negative pedagogy] means for 
learners is that they don’t simply learn knowledge as a specifically designated object: they also 
learn how knowledge is produced, perceiving the power relations usually concealed behind the 
force of knowledge” (26). This answer is her way of resolving concerns about the politics of 
representation in academic writing and the relevance of theoretical work to actual social and 
political struggles.  
 
Developing the relationship between Kamboureli’s text and ficto-criticism becomes 
increasingly complicated at this point: whilst she does not actively write ficto-critically, her 
first chapter is informed by similar concerns to those of ficto-critics. In other words, through 
the use of autobiography her chapter functions nominally as ficto-criticism. Containing a ficto-
critical sensibility, as she challenges the authority and voice of the normative academic 
discourse, her text breaks down the distinction between self and other, taking risks and 
challenging traditional pedagogical models that rely on discursive mastery. For example, at 
times her chapter acquires a confessional tone as she describes her anxieties about her   261
professional practice, thus revealing her own process of learning and offering a personalised 
account of a period of intellectual uncertainty. Kamboureli’s disclosures are risky in the 
context of the academy since, in this environment, demonstrated mastery is always desirable. 
Although, in the end, Kamboureli seems to recover a sense of mastery by articulating a 
solution to her concerns (negative pedagogy), there are moments where she reveals her 
personal ambiguities, fears and difficulties. For example, speaking of her research at the time 
of her crisis, she states: 
I felt that my study was in search of a different author. It kept changing direction, 
resisting the narrative threads I was intent on following, moving in and out of Canada 
and its literature, conflating various temporalities—and thus revealing my historical 
imagination to be other than what I thought it was. I soon began to show signs of 
personal and academic weariness, the effect of the seemingly tangible gap that 
separates academic discourse from social reality, government and institutional policies 
from practice, the intricacies of academic argument from the heat and pressure of 
personal emotions and engagement. (2) 
Interrogating the role of academic work in institutional power—albeit focused primarily on the 
classroom—Kamboureli’s manifesto, through its self-declared wish to disturb binaries, 
functions as a form of ficto-criticism.
8 In fact, there are manifest parallels between the notion 
of negative pedagogy and ficto-criticism. As I have shown earlier, some academics who 
engage with ficto-critical techniques also demonstrate an interest in alternative pedagogical 
approaches (Anne Brewster and Aruna Srivastava, for example).
9 Both Kamboureli’s negative 
pedagogy and ficto-criticism are concerned with self-reflexivity and both focus on revealing 
the power relations at work behind knowledge.  
 
However, despite these similarities—and Kamboureli’s nominal foray into autobiographical 
ficto-criticism as the opening for her book—overall Scandalous Bodies is not written ficto-
critically. It is the relationship between her introductory chapter and the rest of her book to   262
which I now turn. The tension between the content of Kamboureli’s first chapter (including its 
personal style) and the remaining chapters illuminates some of the potential problems of ficto-
criticism as a discursive form.  In an effort to come back to the questions raised at the 
beginning of this chapter, I use this close reading of Scandalous Bodies as a springboard into 
discussing what kinds of ficto-critical expressions at the micro-political level constitute a line 
of escape or becoming. Throughout the ensuing discussion, it becomes increasingly apparent 
that hard boundaries of inclusion and exclusion are inappropriate to such a labile concept as 
ficto-criticism.  
 
What is most interesting about Scandalous Bodies’ first chapter is not Kamboureli’s use of 
autobiography but, given the political imperative of this manifesto, the contradiction between 
the style of this chapter and the generic choices for the rest of the book. For example, despite 
declaring in her manifesto that she wishes to “radically question knowledge and its modes of 
production,” the rest of the chapters in Scandalous Bodies are written in a style consistent with 
normative academic writing (25). They do not demonstrate the process of her learning in 
relation to their individual analyses, nor do they take many risks by contravening generic 
convention. Therefore, despite her stated anxiety around her complicity with the violence of 
representation, Kamboureli limits her self-reflexive negative pedagogical approach to the first 
chapter of her book and the absence of a resolute ending.
10 I would question the efficacy of 
this generic and textual choice for the rest of the book, given her self-proclaimed desire to 
develop a responsible practice that reveals the power structures at work behind knowledge 
production. It appears that overall at the level of form Kamboureli’s book largely follows the 
conventions of academic writing. Whilst her preface and introductory chapter are not 
authoritative in the traditional sense, the chapters that follow are quite traditional in their style 
and analysis. She continues to use first person throughout the book, yet the syntax, tone and 
language are consistent with critical writing. Her self-reflexive ficto-critical leanings, 
therefore, seem contained in the opening statements, a gesture which is consistent with   263
normative academic writing in terms of the conventional role of the preface or introduction. 
She may acknowledge the value of multiplicity, a need to begin in medias res, to avoid 
traditional pedagogical processes of justifying method, and referring to established arguments, 
yet overall Scandalous Bodies seems firmly planted within the system of institutionalised 
authority. There are, for example, many citations of renowned critics and theorists as she 
draws on established authority to give weight to her argument. She also justifies her approach 
in a way consistent with normative academic writing and research, despite refuting the 
imperative to do so. The content may be lacking a cohesive syntax or single unified argument, 
as she defensively states in the preface, however, she still seems very much connected through 
her overall choice of textual style to a tradition that is informed by the enlightenment 
narratives she so forcefully attacks. Kamboureli’s voice may not be wholly authoritarian or 
author-evacuated, yet I would argue that there is little difference between her book and the 
traditional academic criticism that informs and supports the positive pedagogy she wishes to 
do away with.  
 
My intention here is not to critique Kamboureli for her failure to be wildly ficto-critical (in 
fact, my thesis, also a product of institutionalised learning, is itself conventional).
11 Clearly 
Kamboureli’s focus is not on ficto-criticism and the conventions of academic writing. 
However, what is of interest here is that, despite her sophisticated theoretical insight into 
language, knowledge and power—and her acknowledgment of a need for negative pedagogy 
(her critical impasse)—she only extends her self-reflexivity relatively superficially at the level 
of content. What does this say about the compelling power of academic convention, and the 
investment academics must have in such conventions to survive in the academic environment? 
Her defensiveness of her approach in the preface confirms the risks involved in writing as 
becoming for an academic. Even though Kamboureli takes relatively few risks, she is 
defensive in her explanations and justifications of her failure to meet academic conventions 
such as, for example, a resolute ending. In “Reflections on Academic Discourse” Peter Elbow   264
notes how quickly academic discourse is changing in disciplinary terms, yet still clings to 
traditional modes of writing: 
it seems to me that many academics seem more nervous about changes in discourse—
and especially incursions of the vernacular—than about changes in ideas or doctrine. 
Many happily proclaim that there is no truth, no right answer, no right interpretation; 
many say they want more voices in the academy, dialogue, heteroglossia! But they 
won’t let themselves or their students write in language tainted with the ordinary or 
with the presence and feelings of the writer. (152) 
As already argued throughout this thesis, autobiography causes embarrassment in the context 
of traditional academic discourse. Lynette Hunter’s self-reflexive observation (referred to in 
Chapter Five) that impassioned autobiographical texts by Canadian Native women writers 
cause academic or critical embarrassment reveals the theoretical and professional unease such 
naivety generates among academics. Since Kamboureli is a theoretician, I would suggest that 
whilst her reluctance to situate herself is theoretically motivated, the theory also allows her a 
certain protective distance. What would happen if she were to extend the voice and register of 
her preface and first chapter into the rest of the text? What if she were (as Elbow has put it) to 
leave her rubber gloves off and continue to touch her meanings with her naked fingers? 
According to Ursula Le Guin, “People crave objectivity because to be subjective is to be 
embodied, to be a body, vulnerable, violable” (151). 
 
So whilst Kamboureli makes a temporary foray into ficto-critical terrain in her introduction, 
the following chapters of her book function to reappropriate much of the revolutionary power 
she sets up in the first. As Elbow has suggested about many academics, there appears to be a 
theoretical willingness and desire for multiplicity, but a failure to make substantial changes at 
a discursive level. To give a brief example of the kind of textual choices made in the 
remaining chapters, here is a sample from “Sedative Politics” (Chapter Two):   265
Between the 1920s, when Grove wrote his first novel in English, and the second half of 
the 1990s, when I am writing this, a lot has changed about the perception and status of 
ethnicity in Canada. Notably, the literature written by the descendants of the ‘New 
Canadians’ of Grove’s time and by later immigrants has gained a measure of both 
popular and academic legitimacy and of cultural and political weight. (81) 
Apart from the use of “I,” personal reference has been voided from the text. This is a 
phenomenon which has been observed by other writers interested in criticism and 
autobiography and who have written about the return in academic writing to speaking the “I.” 
12 For example, in “Criticism and the Autobiographical Voice,” Susan Rubin Suleiman makes 
a significant distinction between different applications or usages of autobiography in critical 
writing. Published in 1996, her article begins by discussing the shift toward autobiographical 
writing by academics in the last decade. She says that: 
an increasing number of academic critics have sought to reach a larger audience, 
beyond the confines of specialised disciplines and vocabularies. Without sacrificing 
complexity of thought, they have tried to write in a language accessible to more 
people. Part of that process has been abandoning what use to be the first rule of 
academic writing—Never say “I”—in favor of a more personal way of discussing 
literature and culture. (“Criticism and the Autobiographical Voice” 256) 
Notably, the time frame Suleiman outlines for the shift to autobiography in critical writing 
intersects with the emergence of ficto-criticism as a defined practice, and the beginnings of 
Kamboureli’s difficulties in writing critically. Suleiman identifies two different kinds of 
autobiographical acts in critical writing. The first is what she calls necessary, and the second 
contingent. As the terms she employs suggest, a necessary use of autobiographical detail is 
crucial to the essay and its argument. However, where the critic makes personal or anecdotal 
reference as an aside or introduction, this constitutes a contingent use of autobiography in 
critical writing. Suleiman says: “To remove the first type from an essay would radically alter 
its meaning and structure; to remove the second would merely deprive the reader of a   266
pleasurable diversion” (257). Within the confines of Kamboureli’s first chapter to remove the 
personal detail would do exactly what Suleiman describes, it would radically alter its meaning. 
Its use here is necessary or crucial to her point. However, if one looks at Scandalous Bodies in 
totality, the analytical chapters would remain relatively unaffected if one were to remove this 
first chapter, which, while framing the book, in no way fundamentally changes the arguments 
that follow. Even though Suleiman’s description of the use of autobiography as a pleasurable 
diversion cannot be said of Kamboureli’s introduction, since it is about an intellectual and 
professional crisis the analytical chapters clearly do not incorporate this crisis. According to 
Suleiman it is not enough to merely use the “I” there must also be a willingness “to expose 
personal weaknesses or embarrassments” (260). Alone, the “I” does not constitute an 
autobiographical voice. If Kamboureli’s argument for negative pedagogy—explored through 
an autobiographical voice— is understood to be an acknowledgment of the contingency of her 
knowledge and authority, then her use of just the “I” in the remaining chapters seems like a 
shift back toward the neutral academic voice. Interestingly, Suleiman goes on to state that the 
use of the autobiographical voice in criticism is probably just a trend, it cannot be permanent 
since the inclusion of the creative keeps criticism “open to the unforseen” (260).
13 
Kamboureli’s Scandalous Bodies replicates the dynamic described by Suleiman by containing 
the personal confessional moments to the introductory chapter and, whilst speaking the “I,” 
fails to expose any further weaknesses or potential embarrassments. Kamboureli’s 
transgression is, therefore, only temporary. Significantly, this dynamic of inoculation in 
Scandalous Bodies demonstrates—through the distinctions Suleiman makes—the ease with 
which some instances of ficto-criticism can function to relieve the tensions raised by the 
recogntition of the other, without any real shifts in power. Although Kamboureli attends to the 
power dynamics at work in the university through her concept of negative pedagogy, as the 
application of this theory in the classroom undermines the authority of the teacher and 
institution, what of the similar hierarchy (particularly in a critical text) between the author and 
reader? What of the notion of the expert and their authoritative relation to the reader? Indeed,   267
it would appear reasonable to question the effectiveness of Kamboureli’s discursive choices 
for most of her text given her stated project. While she is right to question whether the politics 
of self-location immunise academic work against the perils of representation, in many ways 
her first chapter functions very much like an act of self-location. After stating her concerns 
about her institutional complicity—and to some degree locating herself (albeit in unfixed 
terms)—she then goes onto carry out a mode of analytic writing that virtually replicates the 
disembodied critic.  
 
Ficto-critical texts—as demonstrated in the thesis thus far—work to destabilise the molar 
unities of the nation state by disrupting generic expectation and thus encouraging the reader to 
interrogate their own processes of meaning making. This is probably the reason why the most 
common form of ficto-critical transgression into critical academic writing is autobiography. 
Yet, as Kamboureli’s book shows there are degrees of intensity and risk involved in different 
autobiographical acts. Reinstating the first person pronoun into academic writing is the most 
obvious place to begin questioning the universal neutrality of academic discourse. As the 
analysis of Scandalous Bodies suggests, this alone is not enough to disrupt the discursive 
power of academic texts based on objectivity. However, as the Chapter Three demonstrated, 
autobiographical criticism is certainly the most established or accepted ficto-critical 
expression. Based on the history of ficto-criticism in the academy, therefore, autobiographical 
critical acts appear most likely to be easily reappropriated by the institution. In fact, the 
personal turn in critical writing was one of the first manifestations of ficto-criticism, largely 
influenced by feminist discourse. Feminist critiques of objective neutrality and the mind/body 
split saw many women writers begin to reinvest critical writing with an embodied voice 
informed by an experiential feminist materialism. They would no longer follow tradition and 
write out of a neutral (masculine) space free of historical, social and political reality. The use 
of autobiography and the personal voice is now quite commonplace in academic criticism, 
although it surfaces much like it does in Scandalous Bodies, as a partial and temporary   268
moment of transgression. Autobiographical moves tend to be the most conservative ficto-
critical response to an escalating anxiety over the violence of representation. The partial 
acceptance of autobiographical or personal criticism by the establishment illustrates its relative 
ease with institutional lines. What I wish to do now is to look closely at different signifiers of 
autobiography in critical writing to explore whether it works effectively to interrogate and 
undermine the neutral, authoritative and objective voice of normative academic writing. 
 
Problematising the self 
Since women were the first in the university to experiment with autobiographical fiction in 
non-fictional writing, it is not surprising to find that women writers have already interrogated 
the use of “I” and autobiographical detail in critical writing. For example, Susan David 
Bernstein’s 1992 paper “Confessing Feminist Theory: What’s ‘I’ Got to Do With It?” 
problematises the kind of self employed in feminist autobiographical criticism. According to 
her the use of experience is an act of representation and thus requires critical analysis. Indeed, 
this is something lacking in most critical texts that address ficto-critical writing. Like 
Suleiman, Bernstein makes a distinction between different autobiographical acts in criticism. 
She identifies two modes of confessional criticism: a reflective mode and a reflexive mode. 
Significantly, Bernstein prefers to use confession rather than autobiography, since she argues 
that confession implies a much greater act of transgression (121). To confess is to admit to or 
acknowledge something, usually associated with a wrong. Thus, in confessing one places the 
self at much more risk. Her choice of words acknowledges the disruption to authority that the 
intrusive “I,” as a rhetorical event, can effect (Bernstein 121). Thus, autobiography becomes in 
this context a much less dangerous exercise for the author, as it does not necessarily mean 
revealing one’s weaknesses or failures.  
 
In her paper Bernstein offers four modes of reflective confessional acts, making a distinction 
between these forms and reflexive critical writing. These are highly useful distinctions as   269
through this taxonomy she illustrates that the incorporation of confessional experience into 
critical acts does not automatically constitute political action. Echoing Suleiman’s distinction 
between necessary and contingent modes of autobiography in critical writing, Bernstein 
affirms that the confessional mode has the potential to become a matter of style, “a renovation 
rather than a reformation” (131). Her taxonomy shows us the different forms of confessional 
politics at work in critical writing. I would like to offer a brief outline of the four modes of 
reflective confession identified by Bernstein, since these aptly illustrate the complicity of 
many modes of autobiography with dominant structures (as my reading of Kamboureli’s text 
also suggests). Notably, many autobiographical ficto-critical texts fail to adequately address 
the power at work behind their text’s production, taking relatively few risks with their power 
and authority. After this outline I then discuss Bernstein’s reflexive mode of confessing, which 
she sets up in opposition to reflective, and argue that reflexive confessing is more consistent 
with the notion of ficto-criticism as becoming-woman. Indeed, since in the reflexive mode the 
author engages with the struggle between the “I” and the “it,” this mode presents much more 
risk to the author, and their implied objectivity and authority. 
 
The four modes that Bernstein places under the heading of reflective confessing are: 
contestatory, expressionist, exhibitionist, and hypertheorized.
14 In the first mode, “contestatory 
confession,” the first person is used as a rhetorical device to redress the limitations of critical 
discourse. As I have indicated, and as Bernstein argues, all autobiographical manoeuvres begin 
here. She warns that if this becomes obligatory—as the dominance of autobiographical forms 
of ficto-criticism suggests—then it will lose its revolutionary potential. Significantly, this is 
the form that Kamboureli employs throughout most of her text. Like self-location in critical 
texts, the use of “I” does little to challenge the critic’s authority and power if it is merely used 
as a rhetorical strategy. The second kind Berstein identifies is “expressionist confession,” 
where emotion is relied on to undo objective authority in critical writing. This form, however, 
does not problematise the “I,” and “Daddy knows best” finds itself replaced by “I, woman,   270
knows best” (125). This alone does not guarantee any disruption of the speaking position of 
the critic or their identity. The third kind is “exhibitionist confession.” Here personal 
disclosure becomes rhetorical nudism, reinforcing “a hegemonic subject position through the 
force of its sensational revelations” (125). Fourthly, and finally, there is “hypertheorized 
confession.” This mode exploits theory to sanitise a troubling personal disclosure. As 
Bernstein effectively demonstrates, the use of autobiographical or confessional detail does not 
necessarily go far enough to question the authority of normative critical modes. As a result, it 
does not automatically constitute a radical political act at all and may function more like a 
mild panacea. According to Bernstein, “[i]f the ‘impersonal’ voice effaces the means of 
production, the ‘personal’ voice does not necessarily make those conditions more accessible” 
(128). She goes on to state that “[s]o many of these confessional ‘I’s’ signify the unexamined 
use of example that stands in for truth itself” (Bernstein 131). The same, therefore, can be said 
of many ficto-critical acts that rely on autobiographical detail to enact hybridity, and which 
fail to adequately interrogate and address their own complicity with the nation state at a micro-
political level. At the macro level—of genre—ficto-criticism challenges tradition and 
conventional rules, yet at the micro-political level the terrain is much more convoluted.   
 
In contrast to these reflective modes of confessional criticism, Bernstein suggests a reflexive 
mode. Significantly, this concept of reflexive confessional criticism comes much closer to 
ficto-criticism conceptualised as becoming-minoritarian. In her words, reflexive confessing “is 
primarily a questioning mode, one that imposes self-vigilance on the process of subject 
positioning both in language and discourse and at a specific historical moment or a particular 
cultural space” (Bernstein 140). In other words, this mode of critical writing explores the 
struggle between the “I” and the “it” in a specific context and is suggestive of an autopoetic 
engagement with the other. To demonstrate reflexive confessing Bernstein identifies Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak’s “French Feminism in an International Frame” as an example. According 
to Bernstein the shift from third-person to first-person in Spivak’s piece illustrates the politics   271
of subject construction. As a reflexive confessional mode, Spivak’s text demonstrates that this 
kind of writing can function effectively as a strategy for imagining new territories of 
knowledge. This is enabled by the simultaneous attention it gives to the construction of 
subjectivity through discourse, history and ideology.  It is the reflexive model of confessional 
criticism in which the construction of the critical subject is dramatised. 
 
The ethics of ficto-criticism 
Moments for Reflection: Robert Kroetsch’s 
critical essays 
If ficto-critical texts are about attending to the representational violence of writing, and more 
specifically critical writing, then, as Suleiman and Bernstein suggest, these texts will need 
very pro-actively and self-reflexively to attend to their own powers of self-representation. This 
self-consciousness will have to move beyond the kind of reflective gestures that, for instance, 
Garner carries out in The First Stone, or the implied self-reflective rhetoric of merely 
employing the “I” in critical writing used by Kamboureli throughout most of Scandalous 
Bodies. Other autobiographical or confessional acts must similarly be critically interrogated. 
Also very crucial to this process, and lacking particularly from Suleiman’s analysis, is a 
theoretical or critical sensitivity to the different speaking positions of various academics and 
critics. As some commentators have noted, ficto-critical risks undertaken by tenured 
academics have quite a different tone about them to those made by more junior academics 
with less job security. Tenured professors can afford to take far more risks with the critical 
genre (if they choose to do so). In the same way, ficto-critical acts by academics from 
differing sexual orientation, class, racial, ethnic and gender identities cannot be considered by 
the same set of criteria. For example, confession has very different meanings across different 
cultures, and for many non-Western cultures it is an unsuitable or inappropriate strategy.
15 In 
the same way, the act of speaking is a substantial act in itself for some women writers of 
colour, an act that challenges dominant ideologies and their power structures. What one needs   272
to be attentive to when reading ficto-critical texts, therefore, are the specific conditions of their 
production.  
 
Robert Kroetsch’s critical essays, for example, are a case in point. They are interesting 
examples to read in view of Bernstein’s notions of reflexivity and reflection, since they surface 
at the intersection of several of the themes related to ficto-criticism: identification with the 
margin or periphery, a challenge to authorised knowledge, and postmodernism. His critical 
essays reveal the complicated relationship between ficto-criticism as a category with 
identifiable characteristics, and the reality that ficto-critical texts often run contrary to the 
labels assigned to it. A close reading of his hybrid critical essay “The Moment of the 
Discovery of America Continues” reveals that not all his creative critical texts challenge all 
conventions, and that the form of autobiography employed here, in fact, reclaims a relatively 
coherent, conservative and unmediated self. The identity produced through the text is not the 
fractured postmodern self one would imagine, but an individuated self, consistent with much 
more traditional concepts of knowledge and history. In other words, whilst Linda Hutcheon 
has described his critical essays as postmodern for blurring fiction and non-fiction, they do not 
always achieve a level of self-reflexivity one would call transgressive (161). Applying 
Bernstein’s terms, this particular critical essay by Kroetsch would be reflective rather than 
reflexive. Thus, Kroetsch’s “The Moment of the Discovery of America Continues,” as with 
many of his creative critical essays, fails to adequately dramatise the critical subject, and the 
self-reflective gestures he incorporates often function to increase his authority rather than 
decrease it. As such, one begins to question Hutcheon’s description of him as “Mr 
Postmodern.” This seems a particularly relevant comment since the kind of postmodernism 
evoked by Hutcheon is very much postmodernism as a radical break from that which preceded 
it. For example, according to Hutcheon, in his critical essays “Kroetsch deliberately subverts 
academic convention: they are wilfully fragmentary, discontinuous, asystematic, incomplete—
and provocative because of this. . . . As postmodern, Kroetsch’s work combines the theoretical   273
and the creative. . .” (160-1). However, as Diana Brydon and Janice Kulyk Keefer have 
suggested, there is a contradiction in her methodology and analysis in relation to 
postmodernism. They state, “although she writes of the postmodern attempt to ‘rethink binary 
oppositions completely in terms of the multiple, the plural and the heterogeneous’ (52), her 
own text consistently undercuts this pluralist focus to reinforce binaries and even, at times, to 
privilege one of them” (42). Brydon and Keefer go on to question the willingness of Canadian 
critics to enshrine Hutcheon as “Ms Postmodern.” Ironically (although unintentionally) 
mirroring the contradiction inherent in Hutcheon’s representational fixing of Kroetch as “Mr 
Postmodern,” they argue that her identification as “Ms Postmodern” raises “troubling 
questions about the nature and uses of authority, especially for theorists anxious to unseat and 
interrogate the wielders of that authority” (47). As she becomes “Ms Postmodern,” and 
presumably the expert, Hutcheon’s authority increases. I now wish to explore the question 
concerning these contradictory moments, by examining Kroetsch’s failure to question his own 
privilege—to problematise the construction of the writerly self—in his postmodern creative-
critical writing.  
 
Kroetsch has written that Canada is a postmodern country, a country of margins, feminised 
and invisible (“Disunity as Unity”). He has also famously stated (and is often quoted as saying 
that) “Canadian literature evolved directly from Victorian into Postmodern” (Boundary 2 1). 
According to Kroetsch criticism is merely another version of the story of our search for story 
(Neuman and Wilson 30). These kinds of statements have, undoubtably, aided Hutcheon in her 
identification of Kroetsch as “Mr Postmodern,” par excellence. Notably, Kroetsch identifies 
with the margin. In “The Moment of the Discovery of America Continues,” through the 
description of his experiences of growing up on a farm “way hell and gone out in Alberta,” he 
constructs an image of himself as feminised and bookish. He is doubly or triply ex-centric. At 
the margins of a place that is itself far from the centre, in a country on the periphery of Europe 
and America:   274
My upstairs bedroom, quite by accident, looked out on the yard; I became a kind of 
juvenile Flaubert, staring out at a world that I would capture in words. The hired men, 
in turn, made no bones about telling me I was a disaster, sixteen years old and still 
reading books, often to be seen in the garden doing women’s work when I should be 
out pitching bundles or working the summerfallow. I couldn’t be trusted with a team of 
horses, partly because of a tendency to day-dream, against men. (4) 
Whilst this essay contravenes the traditional form of critical writing by including 
autobiographical passages, and by combining fragments of experience with quotations and 
critical analysis, there are also (as suggested by the passage above) moments in which a 
traditionally romantic, individuated author is invoked. He actively plays with notions of 
narrative and fiction—the search for story—and his essay is fragmentary and incomplete. Yet, 
many of these aesthetic markers of postmodernism are negated by the speaking voice, which 
encourages us to identify with Kroetsch as an authority, that is, as a man of letters. He may 
believe himself to be ex-centric and he certainly reflects on his position through his play on 
story, but he still appears very much the master of his fictionalised world. As Candice Lang 
has written in “Autocritique:” “The trendy ‘I’ that beams out at the reader from the ‘personal’ 
critical essay can be every bit as oppressive and subtly seductive as the detached, authoritative 
voice of the ‘impersonal’ ‘third-person’ text” (50). The overriding coherence of the speaking 
voice, which relies on the oral tradition of storytelling, works to bring the discontinuous 
fragments back into some order and coherence.  
 
Of the four modes of reflective confession outlined in Bernstein’s taxonomy, Kroetsch’s essay 
employs three: contestatory, expressionist and exhibitionist. For example, disrupting the 
convention of critical writing that uses the detached voice of the critic, he redresses the 
authority of normative modes of critical language (contestatory). In the same way, he uses 
emotion to undo that same objective authority (expressionist). However, his failure to question 
his own critical self constructed via these rhetorical structures means that the voices from the   275
centre (Europe, America, Eastern Canada) are merely replaced by the voice of self-confessed 
ex-centric (postmodern) Kroetsch. Finally, his revelatory moments of personal disclosure 
reinforce a hegemonic subject position (exhibitionist). For example, he confesses to his 
readers his sexual encounter at age twenty-one with a Métis woman. He says, encouraging an 
atmosphere of sensational detail, “I’ve never written about that experience until this moment” 
(10). This implies that his experience is some kind of a dark secret, which perhaps should not 
have been spoken. This is his secret of having been “taken to bed” by a Métis woman “who 
knew much more about sex than [he] did” (10). Does this speak a fear of miscegenation, or 
merely the eroticisation of the other? Alternatively, one wonders if perhaps he has kept his 
secret until now out of gentlemanly respect. In the tradition of Hemingway, the young aspiring 
writer seeks experiences to inform his writing. He may have been sexually inexperienced, but 
there is nothing risky in this revelation, after all he was only twenty-one at the time. His 
confession does nothing to disrupt the critical or masculine (heterosexual) authoritative self, or 
any of the dominant narratives that support such an identity. Rather than undermining 
traditional notions of the individual, Kroetsch’s self-confessing reinforces a very romantic and 
heterosexual masculine notion of the writer. Therefore, does his essay necessarily break with 
or question dominant structures of knowledge? Does it represent a becoming? Rather than 
disrupting his authority, the disclosures he makes reinforce his masculine, white, writerly 
character, at the same time as he claims a marginalised position. His encounter with the Métis 
woman, for instance, seems more like a confirmation of his attractiveness and adventurous 
spirit. A feminist reading of this passage discloses no acute risk of the self and wonders about 
the voice of this woman. 
 
Kroetsch argues that he responds to discoveries of absence, invisibility and silence in the 
Canadian landscape and imagination by making up a story, “our story” (2). However, one is 
compelled to ask, who exactly is the “we” invoked by his “our”? One of the consistent 
questions in “The Moment of the Discovery of America Continues” is “How do you write in a   276
new country?” (5). This gives us the answer to the question of who this “we” is. Kroetsch is 
obviously speaking from the perspective of the dominant white settler. Thus, this search for 
story is predicated on an understanding that the Canadian prairie was uninhabited prior to 
settlement by Europeans: 
Our inherited literature, the literature of our European past and of eastern North 
America, is emphatically the literature of a people who have not lived on prairies. We 
had, and still have, difficulty finding names for the elements and characteristics of this 
landscape. The human response to this landscape is so new and ill-defined and 
complex that our writers come back, uneasily but compulsively, to landscape writing. 
Like the homesteaders before us, we are compelled to adjust and invent, to remember 
and forget. (5) 
In no way does Kroetsch acknowledge the existence of First Nations people and their 
relationship to the land in this essay. What is particularly disturbing about this paragraph is 
Kroetsch’s sentence, which begins with “[t]he human response to this landscape is so new.” 
Through the use of human, Kroetch’s text can be seen to be denying not only First Nation 
people their prior ownership to the prairies, but also their existence as human. Similarly, his 
ease at appropriating First Nations’ cultural icons such as the trickster figure demonstrates his 
failure to adequately problematise his own immersion in powerful structures of privilege. He 
writes: 
I wrote a series of poems called ‘Old Man Stories.’ I had discovered the literature of 
the Blackfoot—the stories they might well have told along the Battle River though the 
many generations when that river was a kind of boundary between the Blackfoot and 
the Cree. The Blackfoot trickster figure was (and still is) called Old Man. And those 
old stories are appropriate to the new Province of Alberta . . . . (2) 
Kroetch then goes on to quote from his series of poems a story of the Old Man and the Fox. In 
her review of his collection The Lovely Treachery of Words (in which this essay appears), 
Aritha van Herk is right to say that “These essays dare to be unsure about themselves, they   277
dare to ask questions, they declare themselves susceptible” (“The Critic as Inhabitant of the 
Margins” C6). Kroetsch’s essays are indeed much more open than the traditional critical 
mode, and the discontinuity produces ambiguity and uncertainty around interpreting and 
judging his text. Yet, the overwhelming voice in this example reclaims a relatively unmediated 
self, whose value resides in the rhetoric of exposure. Yes, a self constructed as a persona and 
which engages with questions of representation, but one which fails to address self-
representation. His construction of a reader like “him,” for example, functions to elide 
difference. The fragmentary textual character of his essay is reclaimed as coherence, since his 
discourse is based on the assumption of universal values and shared perspectives. In the end, 
while it may be slightly transgressive, overall it maintains a conservative position and is in no 
way transformative.  
 
The increase in autobiographical moves in academic or critical writing can, therefore, be seen 
as a complex political issue, much more politically complex than its simple codification as 
postmodern suggests. Postcolonial critics, for example, have noted the function of (self-) 
reflection in the writings of white (Western) academics. For example, according to Asha 
Varadharajan:
16   
The reflection on subject positions has become unavoidable for the sympathetic 
Western critic who chooses to engage with the other without presumption or patronage. 
The danger of this timely recognition of a perhaps inescapable ethnocentrism is that it 
could be turned easily enough into an excuse for inaction. This conscientious refusal to 
speak for those whom the discourse of the Empire designates as other would become a 
way of absolving oneself of the responsibility implicated in the history of colonization, 
any intervention on behalf of the other, it could be argued, will be contaminated by that 
history and therefore futile. The process of self-scrutiny would then translate itself into 
consolation for the wrongs of the past and into paralysis in the present. (xiv)    278
Varadharajan is speaking specifically of the recent trend in academic work to reflect on the 
positioning of the subject (and object) in the critical text, rather than ficto-criticism. However, 
as Kamboureli’s text has shown us both are informed by underlying concerns about 
representation and colonisation. In this context, ficto-criticism is a strategy of critical writing 
that has developed in response to the complicity of normative objective writing with the 
brutality of history. Varadharajan’s warning that such consciousness around subject 
positionings may function as a means to enable inaction, could therefore, be useful to think 
through in relation to ficto-criticism. Whilst she is concerned with this self-consciousness by 
Western critics bringing about a critical paralysis (as demonstrated by Kamboureli’s critical 
impasse), Varadharajan’s analysis raises questions in relation to ficto-criticism. Some forms of 
ficto-criticism, particularly autobiographical forms, could be read as a means to open the text 
to the other, however, this is often a surface effect without any real interrogation of one’s 
privilege or risk of the self. This is why the meaning of ficto-critical texts alters so much 
depending on the identity of the writer/speaker. If ethnography was historically the first 
discipline to register a shift toward ficto-critical writing, and if it originally relied on the native 
informant to relay cultural information to the field researcher, could ficto-criticism be seen as 
a shift toward speaking from the position of the native informant? That is, could the ficto-
critical move to focusing on the self, and writing from one’s own experiences, been seen as an 
appropriation of the position of the native informant? Is it merely another colonising gesture 
when carried out by a Western critic and employed to relieve their anxiety about the violence 
of representing the other? If one positions oneself nominally as other (on the margin, 
feminised), there may be less need to actively interrogate one’s own privilege, which in this 
dynamic has the potential to go largely unacknowledged. As Charmaine Perkins has written: 
[The] appropriation of the discourses born out of oppression and struggle, by those 
who, in fact, possess power, is the strategy of choice for the traditionally privileged to 
assuage their own feelings of guilt and or complicity—achieved through active and 
passive participation in racist structures—by identifying with the oppressed. In fact, as   279
is usually quickly pointed out, they are equally oppressed in many ways. So although 
many such individuals feel genuine concern, very few, it seems, are prepared to do 
anything about it, least of all to give up any of the perks that come within traditional 
power structures. (251) 
Some ficto-critical texts by Western academics and writers, therefore, could be seen as less 
about risking the self and more about risking the other.
17  Yet, as I show in the subsequent 
section, racial, sexual, and gender identity have the power to shift the possible readings of 
ficto-criticism, that is, to make the ficto-critical text mean something radical under different 
conditions of production. 
 
Dany Laferriére’s non-fiction fiction 
To demonstrate the different readings evoked by ficto-critical texts by writers from different 
racial and cultural backgrounds, I would like to look at a text by a Canadian-Haitian writer, 
Dany Laferriére. Originally a journalist in Haiti, Laferriére went into exile in Canada in 1978, 
and became an almost instant celebrity after the publication of his first book, provocatively 
titled How to Make Love to a Negro (Without Getting Tired) (1987 in English). The text I am 
addressing here, however, is Why Must a Black Writer Write About Sex? (1994). Although a 
very different book from How to Make Love to a Negro, there is a continuum of themes since 
both focus on the intersection between sex and racial identity. Whilst very dissimilar to 
Kroetsch’s postmodern essay, Laferriére’s Why Must a Black Writer Write About Sex? sits in 
the ficto-critical space-between for being both creatively and critically engaged. It is a hybrid 
mix of prose, autobiography, as well as cultural and literary criticism. 
 
Broken into short punchy chapters this book by Laferriére, like Kroetsch’s essay, it is written 
in first person. However, Why Must a Black Writer Write About Sex? is unlike Kroetsch’s 
essay as it is in the style of reportage, and not in the tradition of the essay.  It is also a much 
longer work. Laferriére, in fact, describes the book as being composed of field notes and   280
begins (in what appears s a strongly postmodern gesture) by stating that it is not a novel, 
making reference to René Magritte’s famous painting of the (not) pipe. Described on the cover 
as being about North American culture and success, this book has also been (generically) 
identified as “non-fiction fiction.” Like Kroetsch, Laferriére plays on the division between fact 
and fiction, storytelling and the role of representation in creating reality. For example, in the 
chapter titled “I Am a Black Writer” he recounts a conversation between himself, the writer, 
and a girl who approaches him on the street. The girl asks him whether the story he tells is his 
story and if it is true? The narrator responds by saying: 
‘I don’t know what to tell you . . . No one can tell a story exactly the way it happened. 
You fix it up. You try to find the key emotion. You fall into the trap of nostalgia. And 
there’s nothing further from the truth than nostalgia.’ (29) 
The narrator goes on to ask the girl “Why is it so important to know if the story really 
happened to the author?” As one of many references to the author function throughout this 
book, this scene reinforces Laferriére’s focus on dramatising the production of his identity. 
Notably, references such as this work much more reflexively than Kroetsch’s reflective 
nostalgic autobiographical moments, since they overtly critically engage with autobiography 
as a rhetorical strategy. Laferriére thus interrogates not just the problem of representation, but 
self-representation. In fact, his whole text deals with the politics of his identity, in a very 
engaged and critical manner. Even the title speaks of his intention to problematise and 
dramatise the identity of the author. This is a major difference between Kroetsch’s text and 
Laferriére’s Why Must a Black Writer Write About Sex? Despite employing similar 
autobiographical strategies, Laferriére’s book is much more politically engaged than 
Kroetsch’s.  
 
Notably, Laferriére’s writing is open to charges of sexism (something he addresses himself in 
this book). However, I believe that narrowly defining his writing in these terms is to 
misunderstand his project, and overlook his main point and a central strategy of his ficto-  281
critical work. That is, he deliberately mimics—to the point of mockery—the hyper-sexed 
identity of the Black man constructed by Western culture.
18 Early on in Why Must a Black 
Writer Write About Sex? Laferriére discusses a conversation with a (white) magazine editor: 
I got on the phone and informed the magazine’s editorial board that racial issues are 
very important to me.  
‘In what way?’ the guy on the other end of the line asked.  
‘From the sexual point of view.’  
I don’t know a single white who doesn’t start salivating when the issue of interracial 
copulation is raised. As long as there’s at least one taker, I’ll have work in America. 
‘Why choose that point of view?’  
The hypocrite! (12) 
Throughout this book he very deliberately pushes the racial stereotype of Black man wanting 
to have sex with the white woman, who is, preferably, blond. The erotics of miscegenation in 
Laferriére’s book thus takes on a very different meaning from Kroetsch’s, which, in contrast, 
is constructed as if a dirty little secret. His sexual encounter with the Métis woman is only just 
spoken, whilst Laferriére constantly revels in the desire for the other as a means to parody the 
white construction of the hyper-sexed Black man (and indeed their own desire for the other). 
In other words, Laferriére emphasises desire as a productive force in his text, as a way to 
critically challenge the assumptions of his readers (Black and white). To focus on the 
misogyny of his parody keeps his text firmly planted within the same framework from which 
he is attempting to escape, and effectively stifles his act of mimicry. It is also worth noting that 
there are no descriptions of actual sexual encounters in his autobiographical text. For a Black 
man who is supposed to constantly have sex on his mind—according to the logic of dominant 
white culture—this seems odd, and reinforces my proposition that Laferriére’s strategy is a 
deliberate re-appropriation of a discourse constructed by the centre. This is what gives the text 
its political power; the resemblance of his position to the coloniser’s is what makes his book 
menacing.    282
 
Laferriére is thus constantly dramatising and questioning the process of subject positioning 
within a specific historical and cultural moment throughout his book. Whilst he relies on a 
relatively coherent speaking subject, such as Kroetsch, his use of mimicry changes the 
political dynamic, as does his racialised identity. Even if one is to overlook his reflexive 
strategies and reads his text as employing autobiographical or confessional rhetoric to 
construct a coherent self, the politics of doing so for him—as a Black man—takes on a very 
different meaning.
19 Laferriére doesn’t need to identify his marginalised speaking position like 
Kroetsch; it has been violently forced on him. His marginalised position within dominant 
culture manifests itself in more than mere geographical terms, or in the image of the alienated 
sensitive writerly character. For example, the same magazine editor that prefers Laferriére not 
to write about race and sex in North America assumes that instead he will—of course—prefer 
to write about the Caribbean:  
‘Since you come from the Caribbean, we thought that—’  
‘The same old garbage! People are supposed to write about where they came from! I 
write about what’s going on around me, here and now, where I live.’ (13) 
The specificities of production and the different speaking positions of Laferriére’s and 
Kroetsch’s texts, therefore, demonstrate that the politics of ficto-critical texts are not clear-cut. 
While ficto-criticism may be a strategy employed by writers from the margin, such as 
Laferriére, in many ways it reflects the identification of a problem for the centre rather than 
the margin. That is, those from the margin begin with a problematic relation to the speaking 
self, particularly within the context of academic and critical writing, which relies (when 
spoken) on a universal “I.” Ficto-criticism, as I have suggested, also has the potential—
however well meaning Western writers may be—to alleviate anxiety around speaking for the 
other, by, on the surface, becoming other. By the same token, ficto-criticism, as a symptom of 
an increasing consciousness around subject positions in critical writing, may function as an 
excuse for political inaction as Varadharajan has stated. As Perkins reaffirms, racism is not so   283
much an act of ignorance but an effect of certain ways of knowing and ordering the world: 
“institutions such as education are [thus] deeply rooted in ideological practices of structural 
inequity” (252). This is something that few academics feel compelled to explore on a micro-
political level. Do autobiographical forms of ficto-criticism—which are enacted as mild self-
reflection—have the potential to ease the academic conscience, thereby allowing one to 
overlook the need to develop a critical praxis to address inequality? As Marlene Nourbese 
Philip has noted, the debate over censorship and the appropriation of others’ voices functions 
to distract from institutionalised racism, sexism, and classism (“The Disappearing Debate”). I 
am not suggesting, however, that ficto-criticism as a strategy must immediately be cast off, but 
rather it must—like any textual production—be critically interrogated. For example, many 
ficto-critical texts, like Kroetsch’s, are enacted from within the relative safety of the 
theoretical framework of postmodernism. Early autobiographical ficto-critical transgressions 
by feminist writers did not have the security of a sanctioned conceptual platform from which 
to speak. As a result, such early creative critical transgressions were acts that involved much 
more risk for the self. 
 
Ficto-critical text’s that appear primarily as fiction (historiographic metafiction, for example) 
contain risks as well. They also have the potential to maintain the status quo, despite assertions 
by most critics to the contrary. According to Bob Hodge and Alec McHoul, however, in their 
paper on ficto-criticism “[t]he self-reflexive work of fiction is perhaps too readily 
accommodated within the texts colonized by Literature as an institution, so that it loses some 
of its capacity to disrupt the dominant disciplinary practices” (207). This perhaps explains why 
many critics who write about metafiction feel little need to question their own critical writing 
style. Despite arguing that an effect of metafiction, as a self-reflexive practice, is to breakdown 
of the divide between subject (critic) and object (fictional text), they continue to maintain this 
divide in their own critical writing and write in the mode of normative academic criticism. The 
context of the ficto-critical text, therefore, plays an important role in its identification. When it   284
is shorter in length and obviously generated from within a university setting its ficto-critical 
insurgency becomes more apparent. The politics are very different for each example as the 
first more obviously challenges generic convention. Longer texts that appear on the surface 
more like fiction, are very easily reappropriated (as Hodge and McHoul have noted) into the 
disciplinary generic structures of literature. 
 
Conclusion 
I began this chapter by asking several questions about ficto-criticism. Whether, for example, it 
really signalled the exhaustion of traditional critical conventions to the point where they no 
longer had any relevance, and whether the emergence of ficto-criticism as an identifiable form 
meant that we are reaching a state of post-criticism. The answers to these questions are, of 
course, a resounding no. Consistent with writing-between—read through the theories of 
Deleuze and Guattari—ficto-criticism can be seen as a deterritorialising practice. This practice 
is then brought back to some degree of territoriality through the forces of institutionalised 
power, which block the desiring process of ficto-criticism. One cannot, therefore, make 
sweeping statements in relation to this practice. Similarly, it will never be something that is 
necessarily highly politically charged as there are shifting intensities of transgression. This 
explains the need for case-by-case studies. The detailed examination of specific examples 
shows—as I have done—the complexity of writing-between and the inaccuracy of claiming 
any determinate radicality for ficto-criticism. The ficto-critical autobiographical expression of 
texts such as Scandalous Bodies, for example, reveal the problematic potential of some ficto-
criticism, particularly when the transgressive moments are largely limited to the preface or 
introduction. The examination of the critic’s identity in relation to the critical argument and 
their privilege, does little to undermine the authority of the masterful critic when carried out 
rhetorically (merely as an aside). This may be true even with a sophisticated theoretical 
acknowledgment of one’s constructed subjectivity, as Kamboureli does. In the same way, 
critical writing that displays some degree of self-reflection, but lacks what Bernstein has   285
identified as self-reflexivity, can very easily be reappropriated. Texts, however, that more 
completely surrender their authority—embracing a loss of self and meaning through the 
autopoetic engagement with the other—are much less easily contained and brought back into 
the fold. Jeanne Randolph’s ficto-critical work, which prompted the development of the term 
as argued in Chapter Five, clearly illustrates this, since her work has been largely 
unrecognised and certainly in Australia completely overlooked in the “official” story of ficto-
criticism. What we must be attentive to is how ficto-criticism functions—in certain contexts—
with very different meanings. As Laférriere’s work shows, his racialised identity alters the 
possible reading of his text. While it may be easy to charge him with misogyny, this would 
overlook his strategic use of mimicry and play on racial stereotypes. Academics must also be 
mindful of the potential of ficto-criticism to work as a way to assuage the dominant critic’s 
guilt for their priviledged lifestyle. A mere identification with the margin is not nearly enough. 
This is especially so when one considers that an academic’s comfortable and affluent existence 
is often the result of a career built on an oppositional perspective, and identification with the 
oppressed. Having mildly problematised their privilege, academics may then feel no need for a 
closer examination of the institutionalised practices which they are a part of and which 
function to dominate the other and control difference. If ficto-criticism is to function 
effectively as an antidote to the corrective powers of criticism, then it must take risks with the 
self. 
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1 This title was inspired by Susan Rubin Suleiman’s Risking Who One Is: Encounters With Contemporary Art and 
Literature (1994). 
2 Originally published in French in 1993 by VLB Editeur, under the title Cette grenade dans la main du jeune 
Négre est-elle une arme ou un fruit? 
3 Kamboureli acknowledges her need to affirm her role within the humanities—to be accountable—in light of the 
backlash against the humanities and the “threats to Canadian post-secondary education in general” (2000: 3). 
4 This contradiction is one of many presented by the questions ficto-criticism raises, as it highlights the fault lines 
of academic discourse. If theoretically it is no longer deemed necessary to find answers to society’s problems, 
what is really motivating Kamboureli’s anxious reappraisal of her critical practice? 
5 What Paulo Friere has called in The Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1990) the “banking model of education.” 
6 Kamboureli says: “The more I failed to see the salience of giving credibility to my critical discourse by locating 
myself in precise (and presumably authentic) terms, the more frustrated I felt because of the social and academic 
pressures to do so” (2000: 5). 
7 This is, in fact, what she argues for in her personalised first chapter. 
8 See Scandalous Bodies (2000: 25) where Kamboureli says: “Negative pedagogy thematizes not only the object 
of knowledge, but also the method of learning and unlearning truths. It is thus self-reflexive with regard to its 
methods as well as the positions of teacher and student. In fact, the purpost of its self-reflexiveness is to disturb 
the binary relation, and the accompanying hierarchical model.” 
9 The work of bell hooks is an obvious example of where an alternative writing practice for cultural criticism is 
adopted (usually highly personal and subjective) and combined with an interest in alternative pedagogies.  See, 
for example, her introduction to Outlaw Culture: Resisting Representations (1994: 1-7). 
10 The last section of the last chapter in Scandalous Bodies is titled “Ending without Resolution.” 
11 As I discussed in the Introduction, my thesis is open to similar charges to those I am applying to Kamboureli, 
and there in lies the irony of contradiction. How do you escape the violence of representation within the context 
of the academy and its history? Ultimately, there is no one clear answer. At the same time, it remains valid to 
query and critique such contradictions—which is exactly what this thesis is concerned with. That is, exploring the 
tensions between ficto-criticism and normative critical writing, and whether or not ficto-criticism can imagine a 
line of escape.  
12 My reference to a “shift back” to speaking the “I” is in relation to earlier versions of the essay form, which 
were much more discontinuous, meandering and personal than the form taken up in contemporary academic 
work. For a brief history of the essay form see Réda Bensmaïa’s Appendix to her book The Barthes Effect: The 
Essay as Reflective Text (1987: 95-100). Bensmaïa’s description of the essay by writers like Montaigne makes 
them seem, significantly, much more like ficto-critical writing. She describes it as a contradictory genre that 
refuses to let itself be pinned down. 
13 In “Mock Heroics and Personal Markings,” Sylvia Molloy discusses the effect of including personal detail in 
an academic paper on different audiences. A queer theorist, Molloy argues that it constitutes a “dangerous 
gesture” according to some. To others it is seen as an exceptional and even heroic gesture (1996: 1074). 
14 Although Bernstein sets up this taxonomy, much like the different characteristics of ficto-criticism, these forms 
of confessional expression are neither mutually exclusive nor monolithic. 
15 See, for example, Guillermo Gómez-Peña’s “La Migrant Life.” Here he discusses in an autobiographical ficto-
critical piece the inappropriateness of confession for him. He says, “I have always found the ‘confessional’ tone a 
bit foreign. The spectacle of my own pain and (anti)heroism is strictly reserved for my loved ones. Why? I  am 
not Protestant, nor do I come from an exhibitionist culture of public confession, like Anglo-America. I am an ex-
Catholic pagan, and I only write or make art about myself when I am completely sure that the biographical 
paradigm intersects with larger social and cultural issues” (2000: 7). 
16 Smaro Kamboureli quotes this same passage from Varadharajan in her introductory chapter to Scandalous 
Bodies. However, her use of and emphasis on Varadharajan is different from mine.  Kamboureli uses this quote to 
explain her critical paralysis. She goes on to discuss how her position as diasporic critic is even more fraught 
(than the Western critic’s), due to the hybridity of her position (2000: 5). My focus is on how self-location 
through autobiographical ficto-critical expressions may function to alleviate the dominant critic’s guilt, and 
assuage them from taking direct political work or actively pushing the limits of their text.  
17 See also Rey Chow’s introduction to Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural 
Studies (1993). Chow looks specifically at how academics may identify with the margin, erasing the specificities 
of their own cultural, racial, sexual and gendered positioning.   287
                                                                                                                                
18 I am referring here to Bhabha’s concept of mimicry outlined in The Location of Culture (1994). 
19 As Claire Harris has written, reinforcing the complex nature of the ‘I’ spoken by her as an African woman, 
which is neither unmediated nor essentialist: “Postmodernism asks: whose body, whose gaze, whose history, 
whose personality, etc. etc. The response embedded in my work is not the disembodied ‘I,’ nor is it everyone’s 
‘I,’ both of which are rooted in faulty and debilitating versions of history, in notions of power and control over 
both persons and nature central to modern European culture, to its cult of individualism, and to the Americas. Nor 
is it the naïve ‘I’ of autobiography. Instead it is the ‘I’ of specific body, the African body, the female African 
body, as well as the ‘I’ of imagined, and selectively structured, narrative context” (Morrell, 1994: 31).   288
General conclusion 
A growing international trend has seen authors increasingly writing between fact and fiction as 
a way to explore the stories and histories left out of the official narratives. Ficto-criticism, the 
term I have chosen to name these emerging writing practices in this thesis, strategically 
employs its generically transformative style to interrogate the binaries that inform systems of 
domination, such as patriarchy, colonisation and racism. In ficto-critical texts the form is not 
just the vehicle for the story; the form is part of the message. This ficto-critical shift can, 
therefore, be conceptualised in terms of a resistance to institutionalised knowledges and the 
genres that inform them. 
 
The dominant literature on ficto-criticism, however, suggests that writing generically between 
fiction and non-fiction is a mere symptom of a postmodern discourse preoccupied with the 
transgression of boundaries, the destabilisation of truth and the death of master narratives. 
Certainly, while the debate around postmodernism may have lost some of its intellectual 
currency, its discursive power, nevertheless, continues to frame the official understanding of 
ficto-criticism. Indeed, postmodern theory may have facilitated the critics’ identification of 
ficto-criticism as a practice, making them sensitive to the transgressiveness of writing-
between. Yet, this means neither that creative-critical writing emerged as a practice in the 
1980s (at the height of the postmodern debate) nor that postmodernism was the only discourse 
informing ficto-criticism’s development.  
 
Therefore, whilst ficto-criticism may in fact intersect with postmodernism, in its engagement 
with the collapse of critical distance as well as its overt dissatisfaction with nomenclature, in   289
Chapter Three I argued against what appears to be a particularly contradictory reductionism. 
In fact, postmodernism has ironically come to function as what Deleuze and Guattari would 
call an order-word, constraining the creative complexity at play in practices of hybrid writing. 
By the same token, the conceptualisation of ficto-criticism as “postmodern” not only 
overlooks the multiplicity inherent in the former’s development as a practice and discourse but 
also distracts from the subversive potential and subtle stylistic variability of individual ficto-
critical texts. As a result of this reductionism a binary structure is invoked, which resembles 
debates circulated in recent years in relation to the opposition between modernism and 
postmodernism. In terms of this bifurcating vision, ficto-critical writing is either celebrated as 
the radical other of normative academic writing—that is, as new, exciting and revolutionary—
or denigrated as a lightweight, narcissistic, and incoherent form that lacks intellectual rigor. 
Through this binary conceptualisation the practice of writing-between remains caught in the 
same system of thought it challenges by means of its hybridity and, as a result, ficto-
criticism’s desire to imagine a new paradigm for thinking and writing criticism is crushed.  
 
Nevertheless, it is perhaps the persistence of the debates and themes arising from ficto-
criticism’s subversion and contamination of academic writing—the primary genre of 
legitimised knowledge—which signals that something very important is at stake. Thus, in 
order to uphold its transgressive potential ficto-criticism must constitute itself as becoming not 
only at the level of its practice but also its conceptualisation. As a result, through Deleuze and 
Guattari’s notion of minor literature, in Chapter Two I articulated a methodology with which 
to approach writing-between while remaining consistent with its multiple, open character. As a 
minor literature ficto-critical writing rejects the masterful and colonising practices of   290
normative academic writing. Rather than being measured against the rigid categories of 
traditional literary criticism that rely on interpretation, such as genre, style and type, ficto-
criticism seeks to liberate itself. On the contrary, its identification as a practice with both 
leading figures and specific codes and conventions cannot but diffuse its radical political 
approach and, ultimately, its relevance. Releasing ficto-criticism from the traditional critical 
framework enables one to refocus on the political implications of this writing, which are often 
masked by binaries. By applying Deleuze and Guattari’s concept-tools I was able to identify a 
three-fold assemblage of ficto-critical expression: collage/montage, autobiography, and 
metafiction. Importantly, I pointed out that these differing expressions are not mutually 
exclusive and that, rather, all three often appear in a single ficto-critical text. In discussing a 
broad selection of Australian and Canadian ficto-critical texts, I demonstrated the way in 
which the writers endorse a notion of subjectivity as flow, as opposed to the Oedipalised 
subject of normative critical writing that controls the other through acts of interpretation.  
 
For Deleuze and Guattari the individuated subject is a product of the imposition of the Oedipal 
complex as the hegemonic model of interpretation. In this repressive system desire is 
understood as lack and any expression outside the rules is defined as dysfunctional. In 
consequence, desire is reclaimed by Deleuze and Guattari as a productive, connective, and 
creative process that enables the subject to be imagined as a vital process of becoming, which 
constantly changes through its engagement with the other. By the same token, ficto-
criticism—and the subject it generates—can also be seen positively as an equally productive, 
connective, and creative process. In this sense, ficto-criticism need not regret its transgressions 
nor vindicate its lack of observance of the conventions of academic writing. This is because as   291
a different critical paradigm, ficto-criticism vigorously looks for alternative links between self 
and other; and instead of inhibiting difference through the codes of normalised interpretation, 
it engages in a process that is both experimental and ethical. In fact, rejecting any sense of 
mastery over the other, the subject of ficto-critical writing reflexively recognises the former’s 
impact on the self, acknowledging in this way the contingent nature of all critical writing as 
well as the partiality of all knowledge.  
 
Thus, the Deleuzian perspective inscribed in this dissertation’s methodology echoes the 
productive character of a practice that is always in defiance of binary structures. On the 
contrary, from a traditional academic stance there is a resistance to fully accept ficto-
criticism’s multiple manifestations, perhaps due to a fear that it may become too broad and, 
eventually, nonsensical. However, in order for writing-between to reach its transgressive 
potential, it is fundamental that ficto-criticism is kept fully open to the otherness that mobilises 
both itself as a practice and the world from which it originates. As argued, ficto-criticism 
facilitates the envisioning of a new autopoetic subjectivity that challenges the normative 
relationship between self and other in academic writing. This, however, relies on an awareness 
of the hazards involved in the application of both binary systems and order-words to writing-
between. This can be explained by the fact that the application of fixed structures of 
interpretation permanently mark the ficto-critical text with lack, killing off not only any 
productive connections but also the power garnered through being neither one nor the other. 
Both binaries and order-words are, in fact, antithetical to the project of ficto-criticism, which 
instead relies on its between character to carry out its critique of normative academic writing. 
In fact, binary structures that produce normalising terms, such as postmodernism, are the main   292
object of the critique of writing-between. Its aim is the disclosure of both the binary model’s 
failure to account for meaning’s heterogeneity and the inability of normative academic writing 
to do justice to the diversity of what is between. For this reason, I have argued for the need to 
examine ficto-critical texts on a case-by-case basis, especially in order to examine the extent to 
which particular works are as politically charged as these conceptualisations may suggest.  
 
In consequence, what distinguished this thesis’ approach to ficto-criticism was its openness to 
what might constitute this writing practice as a form broadly located between fiction and non-
fiction. In this sense, my discussion of Helen Garner’s The First Stone in Chapter One, was 
aimed at widening the category of ficto-criticism in order to question the intricacies of a form 
that gains its power through generic transgression. My analysis of Garner’s creatively-critical 
text suggested that writing-between constitutes a heterogenous domain where broad 
generalisations based on binary structures are not only contradictory but also potentially 
dangerous, as they tend to fix the deterritorialising workings of the ficto-critical text.  
 
Even though the Canadian use of the term ficto-criticism refers to the work of a limited 
number of writers, particularly Aritha van Herk, in Australia the term has been used broadly to 
identify most creative-critical writing. Whilst this recognition tends to be limited to literature, 
cultural studies and the arts, it remains meaningful that the term ficto-criticism emerged in this 
country with some prevalence. The story of how this term rose to dominance in Australia, as 
discussed in Chapter Four, is significant, as it reveals something fundamental about ficto-
criticism. In this context, my application of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept-tool of becoming 
helped in identifying some true lines of ficto-critical flight: those not incorporated into the   293
official history of Australian ficto-criticism. Not surprisingly, the texts one discovers on the 
margins of Australian ficto-critical discourse are those that embrace the movement of 
becoming. Thus, through my mapping of the history of the term’s use in Australia, I have 
explored a range of hybrid texts whose authors may, or may not, identify as ficto-critical. By 
inducing the reader to question meaning and meaning production through disrupting generic 
expectations, theses texts undermine fixed territories of knowledge that exclude difference: it 
is, in fact, the very inclusion of the other in academic writing that most prominently 
destabilises the authority of the academy. Yet, as the dominance of Stephen Muecke and Noel 
King in Australian ficto-criticism suggests, ficto-criticism risks manifesting as a false refuge—
or escape—unless its movement at a micro political level actualises a line of flight. In fact, as I 
have argued in this thesis, rather than replicate the mastery of normative academic work, ficto-
criticism must replicate the movement of becoming to maintain its revolutionary potential and 
relevance. For this, I illustrated the contradictions inherent in limiting the form through the 
identification and discovery of an Australian ficto-critical movement with key proponents, 
codes and conventions all bound together with (the construction of) an original document, 
namely, Muecke and King’s “On Ficto-Criticism”. Notably, I showed that this origin is 
antithetical to the political intent of ficto-criticism as is imbued with a narrative of mastery 
consistent with dominant modes of academic research and writing. By illustrating the less 
documented stories of Australian ficto-criticism by women, I linked their social and cultural 
position (as privileged other in Western culture) with their desire to write ficto-critically as a 
practice of becoming-woman. Consequently, I argued that by writing ficto-critically those at 
the margin can strategically undermine the power of academic writing—as the pinnacle of 
non-fiction (or “truth”)—which excludes and/or misrepresents them and their experience.    294
 
In Chapter Five I demonstrated, however, that the term ficto-criticism originated in Canada 
rather than Australia and that this was the direct result of a writer’s highly experimental work. 
Given her nomadic style the author of this ficto-critical practice, Canadian Jeanne Randolph, is 
both largely unknown in Canada and unheard of in the official discourse of Australian ficto-
criticism. I have also shown the process through which her ficto-critical practice has been 
overlooked in Australia, despite her work being the impetus for the development of the term 
and the explanation for its arrival in Australia. Similarly, I have argued that whilst Randolph is 
(indirectly) responsible for the emergence of ficto-criticism as an identifiable Australian 
practice, she remains absent from this discourse paradoxically due to the highly 
deterritorialised character of her ficto-critical work. Randolph’s lack of presence in the 
discourse of ficto-criticism in Australia illustrates the incompatibility of becoming-woman and 
the academy, and mirrors the experience of many women Australian practitioners. In Canada, 
on the contrary, while her work also remains marginalised, it is beginning to attract some 
critical attention and this is largely due to an increasing interest in ficto-critical practice 
internationally.  
 
After my examination of Randolph’s writing, I discussed the work of Canadian Aritha van 
Herk, arguing that her adoption of a ficto-critical practice was influenced by the work of the 
former. Finally, I examined a diverse selection of Canadian authors, writing both in English 
and French, who employ the tropes of ficto-criticism. Most importantly, I discussed the work 
of the Québecoise writer Nicole Brossard whose practice, I argued, has heavily influenced 
Canadian creative-critical writing. The decision to sample a wide range of Canadian texts was   295
a deliberate strategy intended to reflect the fact that ficto-criticism is both an open, labile 
generic space between and a practice increasingly prolific in a growing range of contexts. 
Furthermore, this analysis of varied examples underwrite the assertion that ficto-criticism is a 
form wrought out of the conflict over difference and minoritarian politics. Both feminist 
writers and writers of colour in Canada, I argued, employ ficto-criticism as a political tool, as 
they are concerned with the critique of academic writing.  This critical practice, in fact, 
exposes the violence of representation that is normalised through the language, genre and style 
of rational academic discourse. 
 
A key notion guiding my analysis concerned the necessity to keep ficto-criticism open and 
multiple. Not doing so would suggest a failure to comprehend the centrality of ficto-critical 
experimentation as a means to imagine new ways of being in the world as a critical subject. 
What I have shown is that what these diverse texts have in common is a focus on breaking 
down the universality and neutrality of the supposedly objective genre of academic writing. 
The works I have discussed demonstrate that, by bringing into play the other of academic 
discourse while combining it with a critical/theoretical position, ficto-criticism problematises 
the concepts of judgement, interpretation and representation. In addition, it mixes fact and 
fiction, self-reflexively entertaining its own fictionality as a means to situate itself socially and 
historically. In other words, ficto-criticism is a highly political discourse that demonstrates the 
characteristics of a minor literature. Ficto-criticism as a process that enables an autopoetic 
conceptualisation of the self destabilises the traditional subject of academic critical writing and 
dissolves the mastery of official discourses. It also reveals the fiction of genre. Ficto-critical 
forms make a connection between the style of writing and the content, asking both writers and   296
readers to examine at the level of form what structures of domination are in place in our own 
writing and reading practices. Many ficto-critical works thus function as models for a mode of 
critical writing that does not colonise the object of its analysis, but attempts a reading of and 
with the text/subject; an empathetic engagement that understands subjectivity as informed by 
and changing with context and event. 
 
Therefore, the project of ficto-criticism—as I have chosen to read it in this thesis—is to 
unlearn one’s authority and privilege as the beginning of a process towards developing an 
ethical relationship with the other. This conceptualisation of ficto-criticism clearly has serious 
implications for those whose authority is already in question, that is, those already at the 
margin. However, the notion of ficto-criticism as a practice of becoming-woman and 
becoming-imperceptible implies a critical awareness of its potential to reproduce dominant 
structures, whilst claiming both a loss of authority and a distance from the centre. That is, 
ficto-criticism is a potentially problematic strategy when its political and ethical imperative is 
reduced to merely aesthetic play, which is masked by a claim to being minoritarian while 
failing to constitute a becoming. However, as my analysis of Randolph’s writings showed, 
truly disruptive works are those most likely to be overlooked. In the words of Caesar: “What is 
vital, raw, or disaffected never gets out because it’s not allowed to count for knowledge” (xii). 
Indeed, Randolph’s absolute lack of presence in Australia and her rather nominal profile in 
Canada, as argued, illustrates the incompatibility of writing practices engaged in becoming-
woman and the academy’s reliance on authority, competency and intellectual rigour. As 
becoming-woman, Randolph’s ficto-criticism cuts across the molar unities of the nation state: 
significantly, Bruce Grenville describes the “palpable” effect of Randolph’s performative   297
presentations, which rather than intending “to put an audience at ease…cast a long shadow of 
doubt” by undermining the audience’s will to power and control (“Doubt” 7).   
 
Thus, conceiving ficto-criticism as becoming requires more than mere insertions of 
autobiographical introductions or creative fragments to normative texts. Concurrently, 
however, there are no ficto-critical rules, as the context and utterance determines the intensity 
of the particular transgression. If one is serious about challenging the power and authority of 
the hegemonic critical paradigm it is then necessary to move beyond just arguing for 
multiplicity, transgression, and situatedness or simply reflecting on one’s relation to the other. 
As Deleuze and Parnet put it: “proclaiming ‘Long live the multiple’ is not yet doing it, one 
must do the multiple. And neither is it enough to say, ‘Down with genres;’ one must 
effectively write in such a way that there are no more ‘genres,’ etc.” (16-7). If ficto-criticism is 
more than the product of a writer’s discomfort with their potential complicity with structures 
of domination, then reflectively engage with one’s own position and voice may not be enough 
to produce any transformation of the status quo. Instead, the ficto-critic must actively and 
creatively engage with the other without clinging to origins, fixed meanings, or territories. In 
order to break both with consensus and the reliance on the control of difference and excess, it 
is imperative, therefore, that the ficto-critic risks the individuated and masterful self. 
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